(Part VII of this article appeared on 18 April, 2025)

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa: Glamorous Entry and Ignominious Exit

After Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory in the November 2019 presidential election and the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna’s (SLPP) landslide win in the August 2020 parliamentary elections, Sri Lanka’s political landscape underwent another drastic shift. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s popularity peaked during the parliamentary elections, helping the SLPP secure nearly a two-thirds majority. However, in a dramatic volte-face of events within just two years, ‘Gota-mania’ had turned into a ‘Gota-phobia’. The five-year period from the 2019 presidential election to the landmark 2024 presidential election, which brought the National People’s Power (NPP) to power, was marked by a series of dramatic political events, including the Aragalaya—intense popular agitations that signified an unprecedented shift in the country’s political culture.

From the outset, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa had to face the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to the postponement of parliamentary elections. Without parliamentary oversight, he implemented health measures to manage the health crisis, resulting in excessive executive aggrandizement. In October 2020, Parliament passed the 20th Amendment, reversing the democratic reforms of the 19th Amendment. As the country grappled with the economic fallout of the global pandemic, certain decisions taken by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa further deepened the crisis, pushing the economy to the brink of collapse.

After 2019, Sri Lanka’s domestic and international political environment began to change significantly. The previously cordial atmosphere of dialogue and accommodation with the UNHRC was reversed. In February 2020, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa announced Sri Lanka’s decision to withdraw its co-sponsorship of the UNHRC resolutions previously agreed upon by the former administration. This move drew strong international criticism, particularly from Western nations. Despite this, Sri Lanka assured the UNHRC that it remained committed to achieving sustainable peace through an inclusive, domestically led reconciliation and accountability process. The shifting political climate was reflected in UNHRC Resolution 46/1, adopted in March 2021, which, for the first time, acknowledged the need to preserve, analyse, and consolidate evidence of human rights violations and abuses in Sri Lanka for potential future prosecutions. On February 14, 2020, the U.S. State Department announced a travel ban on Sri Lankan Army Commander Lieutenant General Shavendra Silva, his immediate family, and several other military officers. The ban was imposed on the grounds of command responsibility for “gross violations of human rights,” specifically extrajudicial killings at the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war.

Foreign policy under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was largely shaped by the pressing domestic challenges his administration faced, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic and the worsening economic crisis. As the country grappled with severe financial instability, mounting debt, and declining foreign reserves, Rajapaksa’s government sought closer ties with nations that could provide economic relief, including China and India. Growing public dissatisfaction and protests over economic mismanagement influenced foreign policy decisions. Finally, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was driven more by necessity than strategic vision, reflecting the urgent need to address domestic crises.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s decisions, driven by domestic political pressure from his Sinhala nationalist clientele, undermined Sri Lanka’s credibility with key international partners. His rejection of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant and the Japan-funded Light Railway Transit (LRT) project exemplify this trend. By rejecting the MCC grant, the President prioritised political narratives over economic benefits. His government framed the MCC as a threat to sovereignty, aligning with nationalist sentiments, even though it was a no-strings-attached grant. The unilateral cancellation of the JICA-funded LRT project without prior consultation with Japan further strained relations. Japan is one of Sri Lanka’s biggest development partners, and scrapping such a significant project without negotiation damaged diplomatic and economic ties. This decision not only led to the loss of a beneficial urban transport system but also risked future funding from Japan. It signaled to international donors that Sri Lanka was an unreliable partner. These actions reflected short-term political maneuvering rather than a strategic approach to economic development and foreign policy.

Since January 2022, all major economic indicators declined sharply, triggering a new wave of public protests. People from all walks of life took to the streets in tendon to protest the rising cost of living, prolonged power cuts, fuel shortages that led to days-long queues, exploding gas cylinders, and the scarcity of essential goods such as milk powder, food, and medicine. Alongside these grievances, the protests also brought unprecedented attention to longstanding issues of economic mismanagement. It took a new turn with the setting up of Gota-Go-Gamga in front of the Presidential Secretariat on April 9^th. With no viable alternatives, the Sri Lankan government declared its first-ever sovereign default on April 12, 2022—marking the country’s first default since gaining independence in 1948. It was too late to prevent the deepening economic and political crisis from reaching total collapse. Nevertheless, the Aragalaya cannot be understood merely as a spontaneous uprising driven by economic hardship. From a broader perspective, it marked the beginning of a new phase in the crisis of the post-war Sri Lankan state

The Aragalaya and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Interlude as interim President

The Aragalaya that forced President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country in disgrace and send his resignation from overseas on 14 July 2022 was arguably the most consequential political phenomenon in post-war Sri Lanka. It effectively ended the Rajapaksa family’s dominance in national politics and set in motion political dynamics that will shape the country’s trajectory for years to come. As a complex and multifaceted movement, its true impact cannot be measured by immediate outcomes alone; a long-term perspective is essential to fully understand its significance. One of its most striking effects was the unprecedented rise of the JVP/NPP, which, having previously secured only 3% of the popular vote, achieved a historic victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections.

In the aftermath of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Resignation, Ranil Wickremesinghe was elected as interim President by a Parliament still dominated by the SLPP led by Mahinda Rajapaksa. By the time President Ranil Wickremesinghe mobilised heavy military forces to decisively crack down on Gota-Go-Gama on July 22, 2022 and prevent a section of protesting youths moving towards parliament, the protesters were debating on how to end their protest. By orchestrating a dramatic show of power, Wickremesinghe positioned himself as the saviour of the nation, claiming credit for restoring stability and preventing Sri Lanka from descending into anarchy and economic collapse. However, this narrative allowed him to consolidate power while the Rajapaksa political establishment remained intact in the background. After four months long dramatic events, the country seemed to have returned to the status quo ante.

The international community was stunned by the magnitude and intensity of the protest. All the key international actors were concerned about the direction of Aragalaya. As there were many actors and dispersed leadership to Aragalaya, it was not possible for any external power to influence the outcome single handedly. The protest movement itself decided its course on its own. However, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s modus operandi raises the question of whether he leveraged the Aragalaya to secure his own political future. History is full of sudden twists and turns, but in the long run, one twist often negates another.

The Aragalaya brought the ‘people’ factor to the forefront of international relations, emphasizing that global governance is no longer solely about diplomacy among political elites but increasingly about responding to popular demands. It challenged traditional diplomatic narratives that prioritize state stability over public welfare. As a result, foreign governments, international financial institutions, and regional organisations were compelled to engage with the concerns of the people. India extended emergency credit lines to Sri Lanka, international media amplified the voices of protesters, and global financial institutions like the IMF considered public sentiment in bailout negotiations. This demonstrates how grassroots movements can influence international discourse and shape policy decisions.

The impact of Aragalaya was further amplified by digital platforms, transforming it into a global phenomenon. Social media enabled real-time updates, mobilisation, and international awareness, drawing attention from human rights organisations, foreign governments, and diaspora communities. This digital interconnectedness highlights the growing role of ordinary people—not just governments—in shaping international relations. The Aragalaya serves as a powerful reminder that citizens are not passive subjects of global affairs but active agents capable of influencing political and economic decisions worldwide.

The Aragalaya brought global attention to corruption and economic mismanagement, emphasising their direct impact on governance, human rights, and international relations. Corruption, once seen as a domestic issue managed within national legal frameworks, is now increasingly recognised as a fundamental governance failure with far-reaching consequences. This shift was evident in the comprehensive report submitted by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, to the 51st session of the Human Rights Council in September 2022. In her report, she addressed the link between economic crimes and Sri Lanka’s economic crisis, expressing hope that the new administration would respond to public demands for accountability, particularly for corruption and abuses of power, with a renewed commitment to ending impunity.

After Sri Lanka withdrew from co-sponsoring the UNHRC resolution in 2020, its relations with Western powers deteriorated—a trend continued under President Ranil Wickremesinghe too. In October 2022, the UNHRC adopted Resolution 51/1, which, for the first time, established the Sri Lanka Accountability Project (SLAP) under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to collect evidence of alleged violations. In November 2022, a group of British parliamentarians called for measures beyond UNHRC resolutions, urging sanctions—including asset freezes and travel bans—against alleged Sri Lankan war criminals and their referral to the International Criminal Court. Even before UNHRC Resolution 51/1, on February 14, 2020, under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the U.S. blacklisted General Shavendra Silva and imposed a travel ban on him. In January 2023, Canada imposed sanctions on former presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa for their involvement in “gross and systematic violations of human rights” during the armed conflict. In September 2023, twelve bipartisan members of the U.S. Congress urged the State Department to hold Sri Lanka legally accountable under the ‘UN Convention against Torture’. On March 25, 2025, Britain also imposed a travel ban on three Sri Lankan ex-generals, including General Shavendra Silva, and a former LTTE commander from the east, who later switched loyalties and supported the Sri Lankan Army.

The primary focus of foreign policy under President Ranil Wickremesinghe was guiding Sri Lanka out of its default status. As Acting President on July 18, 2022, Wickremesinghe turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and initiated negotiations for a bailout package. Under his leadership, Sri Lanka reached a staff-level agreement with the IMF for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. This effort culminated in March 2023, when the country successfully secured a board-level agreement, marking a significant step toward economic recovery. After intense negotiations with the Official Creditor Committee (OCC)—which includes major bilateral lenders such as Japan, India, and France—along with the China Exim Bank, Sri Lanka finalized debt restructuring agreements on June 26, 2024. These agreements, totaling USD 10 billion, were reached with key bilateral creditors, including the OCC and China Exim Bank.

One of the other key priorities of President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s foreign policy has been attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost Sri Lanka’s economic recovery. India was the first country to come forward to help Sri Lanka in early 2022 and provided extensive assistance totaling approximately USD 4 billion, encompassing various forms of support such as multiple credit lines and currency assistance, notably an agreement to supply petroleum worth USD 700 million through a Line of Credit. Additionally, export credit facilities totaling USD 1.5 billion were extended for the import of essential commodities, facilitated by India’s EXIM Bank and the State Bank of India.

Since then, India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s economy has surged, solidifying its position as the main trading partner. In August 2022, the Indian Rupee (INR) was designated as an international currency in Sri Lanka. The deepening engagement of India was particularly evident in the power and renewable energy sectors.

In February 2023, Adani Green Energy received approval to invest $442 million in developing 484 megawatts of wind power capacity in Mannar town and Pooneryn village in northern Sri Lanka. This investment, along with a 20-year power purchase agreement with India’s Adani Green, further cements India’s influence over Sri Lanka’s energy sector. In March 2024, Sri Lanka signed an agreement with U Solar Clean Energy Solutions of India to construct hybrid renewable energy systems on three northern coastal islands—Delft, Analativu, and Nainativu. This project is backed by an $11 million grant from India, reinforcing its commitment to Sri Lanka’s renewable energy development.

At a time when Sri Lanka desperately needed foreign investment, the India-China rivalry became evident in the country’s plans to develop container terminals at the Colombo harbor. China had already built the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) with a $500 million investment and held an 85% stake in its operations. Meanwhile, India and the United States were increasingly concerned about China’s growing presence in both the Hambantota port and Colombo harbor. In response, the Wickremesinghe government offered the West Container Terminal to India instead of the East Container Terminal. This move was seen as an attempt to balance strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean. However, rather than a well-calibrated foreign policy, it appears more like strategic promiscuity —leveraging Sri Lanka’s strategic assets solely to attract foreign investment.

When the National People’s Power (NPP) Government assumed power following Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s victory in the presidential elections on 21 September 2024 and secured a two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections on 14 November 2024, the country’s foreign policy was in total disarray, lacking clear direction. Given the strategic importance of foreign relations in statecraft—particularly in the context of regional dynamics, Indian Ocean geopolitics, and evolving global power shifts—it became imperative for the new administration to redefine Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. It is a formidable challenge that requires accurately identifying foreign policy priorities, selecting viable strategies as a small island state, and advancing them prudently while carefully assessing critical strategic developments in regional and global political spheres.

by Gamini Keerawella

(To be concluded)