Connect with us

Opinion

Sri Lankan democracy enters new phase of forced retreat

Published

on

Text of the speech delivered by
Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda
at the launch of the book,

Democracy and Democratization in Sri Lanka: Paths, Trends and imaginations, September 09, 2023, at Kamatha Cultural Center Auditorium, BMICH. Prof. Uyangoda is the Editor of this two-volume publication.

I have no doubt at all that the Chairperson of the BCIS, the Board of Academic Affairs, the BCIS management, the chapter contributors, and the BCIS staff are delighted to see the two volumes of Democracy and Democratization in Sri Lanka: Paths, Trends and imaginations in print. This, as far as I know, is the first major academic publication undertaken by the BCIS. It is Madam Chandrika Kumaratunga’s vision, initiative, guidance and unwavering support that has made this notable achievement possible.

It is she who proposed this research project’s thematic focus. She trusted the Academic Board and the research team and gave them a free hand to develop and work on it. At the same time, I apologize to her on behalf of the team for giving her a few anxious moments.

There were some delays caused partly by the general crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic. Besides, the missed deadlines set during normal times were unavoidable in a project of research and publication of this magnitude, carried out in a time of exceptional crises in our society, politics and the everyday life. For me as the lead researcher and the Editor, seeing these two volumes in print is a worthy reward for two and half years of hard labour.

Context

We at the BCIS began to conceptualize and plan this publication on the experience of democracy in our country, at a time when the Sri Lankan people were on the verge of losing their democratic heritage. When the year 2019 began, the threat of a hard authoritarian system replacing a weak and battered democratic order had indeed become alarmingly real.

We at the BCIS Board of Academic Affairs and its Chairperson felt that an analysis of why a promising democracy at the time of independence had failed so abysmally is a theme warranting critical scholarly inquiry and explanation.

Thus, we launched this research and publication project on democracy and democratization in Sri Lanka in mid -2020. As I have already mentioned, the Covid-19 Pandemic of 2021 came while we had just begun our work. It interfered with our project in a variety of ways, including halting most of the research.

More significantly, the Pandemic had led to a new political process in Sri Lanka. It can be termed as accelerated backsliding of democracy spearheaded by one faction of the ruling elites. It appeared almost like the last stage of Sri Lanka’s democracy.

But, Sri Lanka’s democracy, even in retreat, has shown that it has had some magical capacity for surprises. And that is exactly what we witnessed during the Spring and Summer of 2022. Sri Lankan citizens suddenly woke up demanding more democracy than what the political elites were willing to concede.

During the Aragalaya of 2022, the ordinary people, citizens without wealth or power, rose up demanding substantive democratic reforms. The ordinary citizens in their capacity as demos began to make claims to their ownership of democracy. They also highlighted that Sri Lanka’s democracy in general and representative democracy in particular, were in a deep crisis.

It was indeed an attempt by the people, demos, to re-generate as well as re-invent democracy in Sri Lanka. That is why the citizens’ protest in 2022 diserves to be acknowledged as a significant turning point in the somewhat twisted process of democratization in Sri Lanka.

In brief, the events of 2022 provided new perspectives and critical insights immensely useful to our own work on democracy and democratization in Sri Lanka. It showed us that the ordinary people play a powerful role as an agency for democratization. Their faith in democracy is far greater than that of the elites who exploit democracy for predatory ends. That is the spirit with which these two volumes evolved.

Organisation of the Book

The book has 22 chapters divided into two volumes. They are written by Sri Lankan scholars. The chapters are lined up under six themes which are as follows:

· Democracy in South Asia and Sri Lanka: Historical and Conceptual Contexts.

· Constitutional and Institutional Crises of Democracy in Sri Lanka.

· Democracy in the Social and Ethnic margins

· Alternative Forms of Democratic Thinking and Practice

· Democracy, Discontent and Resistance

· Protests as a Vector of Democratisation.

I want to share with you very briefly what I as the Editor see as unique about this book.

· This is the first book-length scholarly work exclusively devoted to the theme of democracy in Sri Lanka.

· All chapter contributors are Sri Lankan scholars who have been witnesses to the rise, decline and attempts at regeneration of democracy.

· The analysis developed in the chapters do not belong to a specific disciplinary area of the social sciences, such as political science or constitutional law. There is a plurality of approaches from the fields of social sciences and humanities.

· The book does not advocate or campaign for any particular version or variant of democracy. It argues for the plurality of democracy as a political concept and practice. Yet all chapter contributors stand for bringing the normative ethics of equality, freedom, justice and social emancipation back to the theory and practice of democracy.

Key Messages

What are the messages that these two volumes with chapters on diverse themes convey? Let me share with you a few of them that have a direct bearing on how we should view democracy and democratization anew.

· Democracy, as an organizing principle of political and social life, has strongly local social and popular roots in Sri Lanka as it has been the case elsewhere globally: It is a historical fact that modern democracy in Sri Lanka is an aspect of the European colonial legacy: However, people of Sri Lanka from various social classes have appropriated it and made use of it for their own social interests. In this process, there has been a double transformation. While the local society and its politics has been altered by liberal democracy, the local society has also changed the idea of democracy with a substantive, though subtle, critique of liberal democracy.

This has two theoretical implications. Firstly, the Sri Lankan people have not been passive recipients of a Western, European, or colonial, political idea. Secondly, they have played an active, agential role in appropriating and transforming that European idea. This book describes it as a creative process of ‘localizing democracy.’

· Ideas and practices of democracy have preceded the invention of the language of democracy

: Genealogies of the idea and practices of democracy predates its colonial origins in Sri Lanka and South Asia. The impulses and desires for democracy have always been there everywhere and whenever there were organized political power in the form of the state in pre-modern societies too. Historical and literary evidence in ancient and pre-colonial India and Sri Lanka show that the human desire for freedom from domination, independence, autonomy and justice have been integral to the social and political struggles within organized social formations.

It has been so in the processes of state formation in ancient Sri Lanka and South Asia, as elsewhere. This is the primary historical essence of ‘universalism’ of the idea of democracy. In other words, the idea and practices of democracy have been there in many forms in pre-colonial societies long before the language of modern democracy has been invented and the impulses for democracy rigidly formalized and frozen in meaning.

· The ordinary citizens are more faithful custodians of democracy than the elites:

Democratization is not a process confined to the activities of political elites as well as governments, as wrongly assumed in the mainstream democracy studies and assessments. The Sri Lankan case studies in the book show that democratization from below, at the level of the governed and the disempowered citizens, is most important in mapping paths of democratization in Sri Lanka. This thesis is valid to democracy’s liberal variant too.

The book shows that the dispossessed and the ordinary citizens, rather than the elites, have had a greater stake at defending and consolidating democracy. They have done it through the struggles of resistance against the elite-led de-democratization. The elites have domesticated, tamed, abandoned, and even became hostile to the liberal normative content of democracy.

People have also collaborated with backed the political elites in the latter’s projects of de-democratisation. However, in crucial moments of crisis the people, demos, have defended and deepened the idea and the normative content of even liberal democracy in Sri Lanka.

· Elite capture of liberal democracy has made democracy thin

: A lesson I have learned in the course of research for this book is that liberal democracy has the unintended consequence of dividing the population of Sri Lanka into two new classes in its own way: political elites and political non-elites. This has been a general pattern in other societies too.

Sri Lanka’s process of elite-led democratic backsliding has been paralleled with the introduction of representative government early last century. Elites who benefitted from the electoral, representative democracy have appropriated the liberal democracy and used it as an instrument for consolidating their social, economic, political and familial power.

Thus, the conception of democracy associated with Sri Lanka’s ruling elites has been a thin and truncated version of liberal democracy. Its role in democratization has now come to an effective end. Sri Lankan people await a strong democracy in terms of its social roots and normative commitments.

· Popular resistance to deprivations and unjust exercise of power has deepened the normative foundations of democracy in Sri Lanka

: The instrumentalist use of representative and parliamentary democracy by the elites is only one side of the story of democratization in Sri Lanka. In contrast, there is a subaltern story of democratization too.

The Left parties, working class, peasants, the working people, women’s groups, ethnic minorities, and student movements have contributed substantively to deepening the idea, the meaning, normative goals and the social relevance of Sri Lanka’s democracy. Through social practices of demands and direct political action for substantive equality and justice, they have shown how the limits of narrowly conceived and much abused representative democracy could be reformed. Thus, Sri Lanka’s democracy is not the monopolistic possession of the political elites. It is the inheritance of a plurality of non-elite social groups as well.

· Continuing conflict between democratic backsliding and popular demand for more democracy awaits a deep-democratic resolution:

Since independence, Sri Lanka’s democracy has evolved along two contradictory trajectories. The first is the path of democratic backsliding and de-democratization chosen by the elites. The second is the path of demanding and fighting for more democracy by the subordinate and non-elite social classes, trade unions and social movements, the civil society groups, and reformist elites.

The conflict between these two opposing paths is a major facet of the crisis of democratization in Sri Lanka. Its resolution presupposes a project of re-democratisation through radically substantive political and constitutional reforms.

What is Happening to Democracy

Let us briefly reflect on what is happening to democracy in Sri Lanka at present. Sri Lankan democracy seems to have entered a new phase of forced retreat engineered by the new ruling coalition. People of Sri Lanka who have yearend for the revival of democracy find themselves caught up in a new version of what our book calls the ‘de-democratization trap.

’ Its key feature has been the incorporation of ordinary citizens as disempowered voters to a deceitful social contract crafted by the political elites. As the citizen’s protests last year and this year have shown us, that deceitful social contract is now shattered. Citizens want to replace it with a deeply democratic and authentic social contract.

Meanwhile, there seems to be two processes of polarization of the Sri Lankan society into two hostile camps. The first is between the haves and have nots in the economic and social sense. The second is the growing enmity between the majority of the citizens who crave for more democracy and a minority of the elites who thrive on no democracy. The ways in which these polarities and contradictions will play themselves out are sure to shape the nature of politics of Sri Lanka in the months and years to come.

Returning to open democracy, more executive, legislative and judicial accountability, re-democratization of the constitution, the state, the government, and parliament, guaranteeing of economic and social justice to the poor, the working people and the middle classes are essential pre-conditions for resolving these contradictions peacefully with no recourse to violence by any side. That is also a message implicit in our book.

So, students of democracy in Sri Lanka will have a politically exciting time ahead. I and my collaborators sincerely hope that these two volumes will inspire a new interest in democracy studies among the young scholars in Sri Lanka. I am also hopeful that the readers will not fail to notice that the chapters have been written by a team of Sri Lankan scholars who have a deep passion for democracy.

Finally, let me thank a few people whose contribution to the success of this initiative warrants special acknowledgement. I have already referred to the inspiring and non-interventionist leadership provided by Madam Kumaratunga. Of course, it is our team of chapter contributors who have made these two volumes actually possible. They had the patience to tolerate the constant nagging by an impatient Editor and his support staff.

I must also mention the contribution made by our two copy-editors, Madara Rammunthugala and Nicola Perera, for refining the entire text. All reveiwers of the draft chapters also deserve my grateful acknowledgement for their contribution to ensuring the scholarly quality and standards of the publication. Suresh Amuhena designed the cover for us amidst many other commitments. Dr. Minna Taheer and Ms. Isuri Wickramaratna of the BCIS extended to me their assiatance throughout this project.

The BCIS staff Board of Academic Affairs and BMICH Board of Management ensured generous institutional support for the success of this entire intiative. Finally, Mr. Vijitha Yapa and his staff undertook the task of designing, printing and selling the book. All of them are partners of this worthy achievement. There are so many others who deserve my sincere thanks, and they are mentioned by name in the ‘Acknowledgements’ section book.

Finally, I am really happy that we have Professor Pratap Bhanu Mehta, an eminent scholar from India, as our keynote speaker. I will not take any more of your time to allow you to listen to his erudite presentation.



Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Opinion

‘Why we should forgive debt for poorer countries – and medical students’

Published

on

The above caption is the title of an article written by Dr. Kamran Abbasi, Editor-in-Chief of the BMJ. In it, he laments the extremely high cost of medical training, with young UK medical students burdened by an unbearable debt of around £100,000 by the time they qualify—often before they’ve earned a single penny.”

Dr. B. J. C. Perera responded to the article on 12 April 2025 by e-mail, and his response was published promptly. (doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.r744/rapid-responses).

His response is as follows:

Re: Why we should forgive debt for poorer countries—and medical students: Another perspective from Sri Lanka

Dear Editor,

The BMJ article “Why we should forgive debt for poorer countries—and medical students” certainly gives food for thought.

The real problem is that the students have to pay for everything in Western countries. Nothing really is free. There is also the cultural norm that instigates young people to leave the homes of their parents and be independent. There is a very real cost to getting educated, and this continues with post-graduation as well.

As for our country, Sri Lanka, hardly any young doctor who qualifies is saddled with an unbearable financial burden in the form of a repayable loan. Almost the vast majority of them operate as medical students from the homes of their parents, and the latter attend to the expenses. The university education is totally free, and there are no tuition fees or any other payments to be attended to. Only a very small minority of medical students take Bank Loans, and even in those, the amounts are not even remotely close to Stg pounds 100,000 which figure was quoted in the paper.

We may have our faults, but we do look after the primary, Secondary and Tertiary education of our young people. I am also a product of our free education system. If my parents had to pay for my education or I needed to get a massive bank loan, I would not be what I am today. In return, I have stayed back in Sri Lanka and repaid in full the debt I owe to our people by providing my services in our free National Health Service.

Dr B. J. C. Perera

MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paed), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed,
FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL)
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of
Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Joint Editor, Sri Lanka Journal of Child Health
Section Editor, Ceylon Medical Journal
Past President, Colombo Medical School Alumni Association (CoMSAA) – 2015
Past President, Sri Lanka Medical Association (2013).

Founder President, Sri Lanka College of Paediatricians (1996-97)

Continue Reading

Opinion

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations:

Published

on

Mahinda

1990-2024 – Part VI

(Continued from 11 April, 2025)

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy after the War

The domestic political context of Sri Lankan foreign policy underwent a significant shift following the end of the war in 2009. The Mahinda Rajapaksa regime that steered the war to a victorious end fanned war triumphalism in the country and used it craftily for regime stability. In contrast, a deeply melancholic atmosphere of frustration, helplessness, and defeat permeated the North. In response to the new challenges stemming from the way the war ended, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy was forced to redefine its priorities. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the regime gave currency to anti-western rhetoric in the country in response to these challenges.

Since the end of the war, Sri Lanka’s strategic position has evolved significantly. One of the key foreign policy challenges that emerged in the wake of the conclusion of war was how to address the growing international criticism over alleged violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during the final stages of the conflict, which gained traction in global diplomatic forums. Western powers, particularly the United States, Canada, Britain, and the European Union, pressured Sri Lanka to investigate alleged war crimes committed by both parties during the final phase of war. This led to a noticeable deterioration in Sri Lanka’s relations with these countries. How to respond to the US-backed resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) regarding alleged IHL violations, and also to potential future resolutions against Sri Lanka at the UN Security Council, became the central concern of Sri Lanka’s post-war foreign policy. Driven by this obsession, Sri Lanka is increasingly aligning itself with powers that can provide protection against such actions and shield itself from diplomatic and economic pressures from the West.

In President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s vision of economic development, known as the ‘Five Hubs’ concept, the Indian Ocean played a central role. Each of the five hubs—Maritime, Aviation, Commercial, Energy, and Knowledge—had a direct foreign policy dimension. However, there was no concrete plan or program of action to materialize these policy goals. Instead, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under Rajapaksa in the post-war period was largely preoccupied with residual issues stemming from the end of the war.

In the immediate post-war period, international pressure on Sri Lanka centered on three key issues: investigating the events of the war’s final stages amid widespread allegations of war crimes by both sides; ensuring transitional justice by identifying those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and civilian deaths; and determining the whereabouts of missing persons, many of whom were believed to have perished in the conflict.

The international community, particularly India, urged the Sri Lankan government to implement a viable political reconstruction programme for war-affected communities in the North and East, ensuring their integration into regional and central decision-making. This call emphasiz\sed the effective devolution of power under the 13th Amendment

International stakeholders expressed their willingness to support economic rebuilding in the North and East. They emphasised the urgent need for a coordinated economic recovery programme and advocated for a comprehensive reconstruction plan to restore critical services. Additionally, they stressed the importance of community involvement, ensuring that those most affected by the conflict actively participated in shaping and implementing the recovery efforts.

The issue of transitional justice and accountability emerged soon after UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the country at the invitation of President Mahinda Rajapaksa on May 23, 2009, five days after the Sri Lankan government officially declared the war over. In the joint statement issued following the visit Sri Lanka reiterated its strong commitment to promoting and protecting human rights in accordance with international standards and emphasised the importance of an accountability process to address violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The Secretary-General expressed hope that the Sri Lankan government would take measures to address these grievances.

After Ban Ki-moon’s visit, international pressure mounted for the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the government was of the view that Sri Lanka is a sovereign and independent country and no one has a right to interfere in its domestic affairs of the country.  Initially, the UNHRC was tolerant toward Sri Lanka and willing to allow time and space for the country to develop its own mechanism to address transitional justice issues. This is evident in the resolution adopted at the eleventh Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on May 27, 2009 (A/HRC/S11/L.1/Rev), which commended the Sri Lankan government’s efforts to address the urgent needs of internally displaced persons and welcomed its continued commitment to promoting and protecting human rights (Amal Jayawardane, 2025, p. 144).  In response to the growing international concerns over the issue of accountability and transitional justice, President Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learned and Reconciliation, as a domestic initiative, on May 15th, 2010.

To the dismay of the Sri Lankan government, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a three-member Panel of Experts on June 23, 2010. The panel, chaired by MarzukiDarusman and consisting of YasminSooka and Steven Rattner, was tasked with advising the Secretary-General on issues of accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. The Sri Lankan government strongly rejected this move, calling it both unnecessary and unwarranted.

Initially, the LLRC seemed like a hasty response to Western pressures and received a lukewarm reception. However, the LLRC took its mandate seriously and presented its final report on November 15, 2011. The report offered significant observations and recommendations concerning the origins of the conflict, restitution, and other efforts toward national reconciliation. It emphasized that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of successive governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people” and stressed that “a political solution is imperative to address the causes of the conflict” (The LLRC Report, 2021).

Regarding the issue of accountability, the LLRC noted that “eyewitness accounts and other available materials indicate that significant civilian casualties occurred during the final phase of the conflict.” It recommended that “action be taken to investigate the specific instances mentioned in the observation. If investigations reveal any offenses, appropriate legal action should be taken to prosecute or punish those responsible.”

In March 2012, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted Resolution A/HRC/19/L.20, titled Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka, urging the Sri Lankan government to adopt the LLRC’s constructive recommendations and take “all necessary additional steps to fulfill its legal obligations.” However, dismissive stance of the Sri Lankan government toward international IR bodies was clearly illustrated by the manner in which UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay’ visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013 was handled.  Later that year, during its 22nd session, the UNHRC adopted another resolution calling on the Office of the High Commissioner to enhance its monitoring and reporting on Sri Lanka’s human rights situation, as well as the progress on reconciliation and accountability. This resolution required the Office to provide an oral update at the Council’s 48th session, a written update at its 49th session, and a comprehensive report at its 51st session, including further options for advancing accountability.

In response to growing international pressure, the Sri Lankan government appointed the Maxwell Paranagama Commission (Presidential Commission to Investigate Complaints of Missing Persons – PCICMP) in August 2013. The commission was tasked with investigating the disappearances of civilians in northern and eastern Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009. However, the establishment of both the Paranagama and Udulagama commissions did little to quell international concerns. The failure of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government to address the issue of accountability became apparent in the March 2014 UNHRC resolution, which called on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to investigate the allegations in order to prevent impunity and ensure accountability.

India appeared less focused on advocating for transitional justice and accountability in international forums and, instead, prioritized the political empowerment of minorities, particularly in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Alongside this, India emphasized efforts toward economic reconstruction and national reconciliation, aiming to foster stability and long-term peace.

Full implementation of the 13th Amendment became an international concern in the post-war context. In the last stage of the war, the Sri Lankan government has repeatedly assured the international community that “Sri Lanka will take measures for the effective implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution” (Human Rights Council, 2008).  Sri Lanka continued to assure the international community of its intention to offer a devolution package built on the 13th amendment to the constitution after 2009. India raised this issue in several bi-lateral diplomatic encounters. Most important is assurances given to India in this regard by Sri Lanka.

While the post-war Mahinda Rajapaksa regime faced tensions with Western powers and India, it leaned toward China, reshaping Sri Lanka’s geostrategic position in the early post-war years. Sri Lanka has maintained cordial relations with China since the early 1950s while balancing its ties with other major powers, namely India and the United States. However, after 2009, its foreign policy took a different turn, leaning more toward China at the expense of the traditional balance it had carefully maintained. This shift has had significant implications, particularly in the context of evolving regional and global geopolitical dynamics.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella

Continue Reading

Opinion

End of an Era: Passing away of Raja Uncle (Mr. Rajapaksha)

Published

on

Rajapaksha

1935 – 2025

With heavy hearts, we share the passing of our dear neighbor, mentor, and cherished friend, Raja Uncle — known formally as Mr. Rajapaksha — who passed away peacefully on April 1, 2025, at the age of 89.

For over 50 he was a constant and beloved presence in our community — someone whose actions spoke louder than words, and whose kindness left a mark on every life he touched. Gentle in spirit, firm in values, and endlessly thoughtful, he helped shape the heart of Bogahawatta with his humility, quiet strength, and unwavering dedication.

He carried himself with grace and dignity — slim, well-groomed, and strikingly handsome, with a calm confidence that made people feel at ease. He never tried to be a person who gave orders — instead, he led through respect, active listening, and thoughtful action. His leadership was never loud — it was steady, consistent, and deeply human.

A founding member of the Bogahawatta Welfare Society, Raja Uncle gave more than 40 years of devoted service to the betterment of the Bogahawatta community. In the 1980s, as the area grew and safety became a concern, he established the neighborhood watch, restoring trust and unity in a time of change.

He organized road cleaning and repair efforts, worked alongside neighbors, and played a vital role in the construction of the Bogahawatta Welfare Society headquarters, which stands today as a symbol of unity and progress.

He also cared deeply for everyday needs. For nearly 20 years, before running water was available, the community well was a lifeline. When it fell into disrepair, Raja Uncle would quietly take the responsibility to clean and maintain it, asking for no recognition. I had the honor of helping him at times, and I saw the pride and purpose behind every quiet act.

When I served as president of the local youth society, he became my mentor. With his help, we organized a talent show, community art exhibition, built a mini library, and gave young people opportunities to lead. His daughter Tharanga, the society’s secretary, worked beside him — a reflection of the values he passed on.

He also shaped my personal journey. He introduced me to a temple, and gently guided me toward a spiritual life I still hold close today.

He was our protector. If a stranger walked down our lane, he would calmly and respectfully inquire about their purpose, ensuring the safety of every home and child. During a heated argument in my youth, he stood nearby for over an hour, silently watching until it ended, and then walked me home. He didn’t lecture. He didn’t judge. He simply cared.

Every April, without fail, he was the Master of Ceremonies at the Sinhala and Tamil New Year festival. His voice, his presence, and his joyful warmth brought the entire community together in celebration year after year.

In times of sorrow, he led with compassion. He would gather neighbors to visit grieving families, sometimes traveling great distances, and delivered eloquent eulogies that offered comfort and honored lives with dignity.

What truly set Raja Uncle apart was his love — especially the remarkable bond he shared with his wife. Their marriage was the most loving I have ever witnessed. They were the love of each other’s lives — gentle, respectful, and unwavering. He never raised his voice. They never let conflict come between them. Their partnership was built on trust, affection, and shared values.

In July 1980, as public servants, the two of them stood together in protest against unjust government layoffs. They both lost their jobs, but they stood by their beliefs. They started a business together, overcame hardship side by side, and were eventually reinstated. In time, Mrs. Rajapaksha rose to a top-level position in Sri Lanka’s Department of Immigration and Emigration — a testament to her brilliance and their shared resilience.

They raised their children in a home of dignity and purpose. In a country where less than five percent were admitted to university at the time, all three — Tharanga, Lahiru, and Lasitha — were accepted. A rare and proud achievement rooted in hard work and love.

His family grew across the world — Lasitha became a British citizen, and Lahiru a citizen of Australia. Raja Uncle visited them often, maintaining the same closeness and warmth across any distance.

And perhaps the most remarkable of all: he helped lead a place that was once a quiet, forested area in the 1970s into a thriving, respected neighborhood — one so valued that even a Defense Secretary of Sri Lanka chose to make it his home. This was not the work of ambition, but of vision and service — built slowly, over decades, through trust and integrity.

To me, as his next-door neighbor, he was one of the most steady and trusted influences in my life. He showed me that a meaningful life isn’t defined by what we achieve — but by how we treat others, what we give, and how we listen. I shaped my life after him.

Although I haven’t been as closely associated with him since leaving Sri Lanka in 2000 and becoming a citizen of the United States, his memory has remained with me every step of the way. These are just a few of the memories I carry — as much as I can recall. I still wish, from the bottom of my heart, that he could be my neighbor forever — to guide me, to listen, to share his quiet vision.

He touched so many lives, across generations. There are countless stories, small and great, that live on in the hearts of those who knew him. His presence will be remembered not only through words, but in the community he shaped, the values he carried, and the lives he quietly uplifted over these 50+ years.

May his soul rest in peace, and may we carry forward the spirit he lived by — humility, strength, compassion, and quiet dedication — just as Raja Uncle did, every single day of his extraordinary life.

Continue Reading

Trending