Connect with us

Features

Sri Lanka struck hard as COVID-19 starts global second wave

Published

on

by Rajan Philips

After months of Covid-quiet, the coronavirus has hit the country hard. Sri Lanka’s 33rd Covid-cluster could not have erupted in Minuwangoda any more suddenly and in larger numbers. It caught the government literally holding its constitutional pants to the neglect of everything else. After stagnating for months at 3,200+ cases, the Sri Lankan Covid-19 total rose by more than a third in a matter of three days. Since its discovery last Sunday, the 33rd cluster accounted for 1,053 cases by Wednesday. 729 cases were reported on a single day, a record. The total number of infections in the country has since passed 4,500.

The case count is still miniscule compared to the large South Asian countries, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The recovery rate is exceptionally high, and the death rate is exceptionally low. What should be concerning, however, is whether Sri Lanka has strengthened its infrastructure and capacity to anticipate and handle future cluster eruptions. Or, has the government been resting on its old Covid laurels and wasting time and effort on an unnecessary constitutional makeover?

Worldwide, all the highly infected countries are bracing for the so called second wave, with new daily infections higher than what they were in March-April triggering the first spate of lockdowns. People are more aware of the virus now than they were during the first wave, but they are not behaving as responsibly, especially in social situations in the West. Irresponsibly infected by the virus, the American President Donald Trump, who soaks on the slogan “Make America Great Again,” has turned the White House into a “Blight House”, as the New York Daily News called it. No one wants to go there even if they cannot avoid it.

Governments are reluctant to enforce another lockdown for fear of driving businesses out of business and their employees out of livelihood. On Wednesday, the World Bank predicted that the Covid-19 pandemic will force 150 million people into extreme poverty globally, and South Asia will bear the biggest share between 49 and 57 million of them. Proportionately, based on these projections, Sri Lanka would likely have about 500,000 people driven to extreme poverty by the pandemic. The Bank makes it clear that the new poor will be in the urban, and not rural, sector, mostly comprised of people “engaged in informal services, construction, and manufacturing.” Globally, the public health crisis is expected to last at least two more years, even after a vaccine; and economic recovery could take a decade. The picture cannot be grimmer.

The public health picture in Sri Lanka has not been so grim, and the general feeling has been that the island country has somehow dodged the Covid-bullet. The worry, at least among the more informed citizens and commentators, is about the economy. For the majority of the people, however, the economic hardships are not something abstract, but have become their living misery. The government lost its head after the initial Covid containment success, and became bullish about a quick (V-shaped, no less) economic recovery despite all the evidence that a rapid and substantial economic recovery is virtually impossible in the middle of a global slowdown. After the August election and two-thirds majority, the government has needlessly got itself embroiled in a constitutional makeover, exposing in the process both political naivete and technical incompetence. It is now banking on a favourable outcome from the Supreme Court, and later even a referendum. The outbreak in Minuawngoda changes the whole picture and all the preceding calculations. Will the government change appropriately, as well? That is the question.

 

Covid response and hot spots

 

Whether or not the government will change course, it has already changed the response structure to Covid-19 that it created during the early months of the outbreak. The response structure that was in place earlier is no longer there. There were two faces to the original structure: its health face was Dr. Anil Jasinghe; and its logistics face was Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva. Dr. Jasinghe is no longer in the Health Ministry. He was administratively shuffled up as Secretary to the Ministry of the Environment soon after the election. The shuffling was apparently a part of what President Rajapaksa hailed as the new “methodical procedure to appoint Heads of Government Institutions.” After Dr. Jasinghe was dispatched, the expectation in professional circles was that Dr. Amal Harsha De Silva, would be promoted to succeed Dr. Jasinghe. There were skeptics, however, who seemed to know the games that are played in these matters despite presidential assertions to the contrary.

The skeptics were correct, it turns out. Dr. Amal Harsha de Silva did not get the promotion. In fact, no one seems to have been promoted. Dr. S. Sridharan would appear to be functioning as Acting Director General of Health Services. One of the Deputy Directors, Dr. Sudath Samaraweera, who is also the Chief Epidemiologist, has been assigned to fill the other role of Dr. Jasinghe in the National Operation Centre for Prevention of COVID-19 Outbreak (NOCPCO). It is Dr. Sudath Samaraweera who is the new Health counterpart to Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva’s military arm. There is no questioning the competence of Dr. Samaraweera, but there is a question to the government – why move medical professionals in and out of a pandemic task force while keeping the military men as immovable fixtures? Are such moves well advised, for professional morale and dedication, in the middle of a very serious public health crisis? Should Doctors be fighting the coronavirus while looking over their shoulders for political strikes?

Medical professionals are also speaking out in the wake of the 33rd cluster eruption. Opinions differ on the extent of ‘community spread’ and the exclusion of primary care physicians from the Covid-19 response system. The risks involved in speaking out have been illustrated by the removal of Dr Jayaruwan Bandara, as Director of the Medical Research Institute. His replacement Dr. Prabhath Amarasinghe, was Dr. Bandara’s Deputy Director, according to reports. Government Ministers have muddied the matter by stating in parliament that Dr. Amerasinghe is merely returning to his accredited position as Director after being out of the country for research studies. So, has Dr. Bandara been only an Acting Director all along? It is not my purpose to labour on staffing minutiae, but only to look at how President Rajapaksa’s new “methodical” appointment approach is being applied to senior medical professionals in the middle of a global pandemic.

The bigger problem after the 33rd cluster is the potential for rampant spread of the virus among the 50,000 garment factory workers employed by nearly 85 companies in the Gampaha District. From what is being reported, garment factory owners and the army and public health officials are co-ordinating the response efforts for contact tracing and quarantining quite responsibly. It turns out that in addition to the direct factory workers, there others providing ancillary services in factories through separate contractors. The problem of tracing the ancillary contract workers would seem to be more difficult than dealing with direct factory workers. The key question to the government and the Covid-response Operation Centre, is why no attention was given to potential hot spots during all the months when the virus was keeping things quiet.

Garment factory workers are an internal migrant population. Perhaps characteristic of the inelastic village and kinship ties and obligations in South Asian societies including Sri Lanka, factory workers are not atomized to permanently relocate from their natal villages to the places of factory work. The upshot is crowded living around the factories in permanently temporary arrangements. Village housing schemes undertaken by governments may not have spotted this contradiction, let alone address it. There are other social issues involving uprooted personal relationships, alcoholism, gambling, and indebtedness. Nonetheless, people would have muddled through lives, as they have been, but for the unexpected arrival of a new virus. Overnight, sources of livelihood are turned into hot spots of infection. This is not anybody’s fault, and there are no readymade solutions. Only thing that can reasonably be said to the government is that Covid-19 has made the government’s work cut out. There is no room for playing constitutional games in this situation.

Infections involving garment factory workers drive home the two prongs of the Covid assault and the responses to it, involving public health and the economy. Not only healthy working conditions, but also living conditions must be provided for garment workers to remain healthy and to continue working. The government cannot sustain the economy and the society if the garment factory workers are not working. The same premise can be extended to other sectors with due adjustments. The point is that the economic approach that is needed is to ensure basic survival through this crisis. And not the approach that is hitched to any vistas of prosperity or splendour. The only vistas staring Sri Lanka in the face now are vistas of debts, with massive repayments. The 33rd Covid cluster is a wake up call to the government. How will it respond?



Features

Export diversification: Missing the wood for the trees – Part I

Published

on

Export of Jackfruit

by Gomi Senadhira

A few recent news items prompted me to write this article. The first was in the Sinhala newspaper Divaina on jackfruits, which said that out of the 280 million jackfruits produced in Sri Lanka, only 80 million were consumed. Does this mean the rest, 200 million fruits, are just wasted every year? However, other available reports estimate that about 70% of the production is consumed and only 30 percent is wasted. Whatever the exact number, we know a substantially large number of jackfruits go to waste. The second was a more recent article in an English paper on cinnamon exports: it states that Sri Lanka is targeting US$ 300 million in cinnamon export earnings this year and aiming for annual export earnings of US$ 500 million by 2030!

Good sense

These news items reminded me of another article I read in The Island a few years ago. It was by Dr. Upatissa Pethiyagoda, a well-known Sri Lankan scientist, diplomat, and writer, about a chance encounter he had with former Prime Minister Wijayananda Dahanayake (WD) in the early 1970s at a Perera & Sons outlet in Kollupitiya, where both had stopped for iced coffee, In those days, politicians, even former prime ministers, walked around without bodyguards and could be spotted at coffee shops, like P&S, in CTB buses or on trains. After learning that Dr. Pethiyagoda was a senior researcher at the Tea Research Institute, Dahanayake quipped that Sri Lanka should focus on five key crops: paddy, sugarcane, pasture grass, coconut, and jack (kos). Dr Pethiyagoda further adds “The unsophisticated wisdom of WD still haunts. Being self-reliant in basic foodstuffs is very respectable and a base for true national pride. A Canadian slogan in support of their (salmon) fishery was “We eat what we can and can what we can’t” or the Thai advertisement line, accompanying a tantalising picture of a fruit basket was “We have got it, come and get it”. Capturing tourism and horticulture simultaneously!”

I do not know why WD advocated promoting jack instead of tea. Yet, 50 years later, while we are trying to expand cinnamon exports into an already saturated market, the global market for jackfruit has become larger than the market for Ceylon cinnamon. Hence, the slogans quoted by Dr Pethiyagada are more than appropriate to promote jackfruit exports.

“We eat what we can and can what we can’t”

Globally, the demand for jackfruit has rapidly increased in recent years due to its appeal to vegan, vegetarian, and health-conscious consumers. However, it is difficult to grasp the size of the global market for jackfruit through import/export statistics, as jackfruit doesn’t have a specific standalone customs code. Customs data, even at the HS eight-digit level, groups jackfruit along with several other tropical fruits. Hence, the numbers given in this article are from various reports available on the Internet. Although the numbers presented in those reports vary, trade dynamics point to a multi-billion-dollar global market for jackfruit which has already reached USD 2.8 billion in 2025 and is likely to reach USD 5.2 billion by 2034. This market is largely dominated by jackfruit processed products (including canned, frozen, and dried items). The market for fresh jackfruit hovers around USD 500 million a year.

“We have got it, come and get it”

With around 300,000 tons of exports annually, Thailand is the leading exporter of jackfruits, closely followed by Vietnam. Interestingly, the value of jackfruit exports from Vietnam has increased remarkably from “… just $3 million in 2015 to an impressive $236.8 million in 2023. ” The South Asian countries are also emerging as leading jackfruit exporters. India exported over 26 million kg (26,000 tons) of jackfruit valued at approximately US$40 million during the 2023-2024 fiscal year. The annual exports from Bangladesh fluctuated between 1000 to 2000 metric tons during the recent years. In contrast, jackfruit exports from Sri Lanka are estimated to be around 20 to 30 metric tons per month, which are mainly in processed form.

Main markets for jackfruits are in North America, Europe, Gulf countries, China, and Australia. Key markets for fresh jackfruits are Gulf countries and China. The governments of the main exporting countries intervene proactively to develop these markets for their exporters. For example, during the visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rehaman to China in June 2026, one of the MoUs signed was on jackfruit. Based on this MoU, Bangladesh is targeting 500 to 1,000 tons of exports to China during the next year.

Gulf market for fresh jackfruits

As the global demand for jackfruit increases, the demand for fresh jackfruit has also risen in the Gulf countries. The Indian and Bangladeshi exporters have already successfully exploited this market. However, due to perishability and the limited shelf life of fresh jackfruits, exporters from India and Bangladesh rely on air shipments for quicker delivery. Yet, as whole jackfruits are heavy with a high waste-to-edible ratio (thick rind and core), air freighting whole fruit is economically inefficient. Hence, exports are mainly in semi-processed form.

A game changer – export of fresh jackfruits by sea

This brings me to another article published early this month in Bangladesh; it says a Dhaka-based export company shipped 3.5 tons of fresh jackfruits to Dubai by sea in May this year. Though the shipment took over 26 days to reach its destination, the quality of the jackfruit remained intact. If that is so, then it is a game changer. Sea freight from Colombo to Dubai, I believe, takes only 4 to 8 days for a direct port-to-port journey, compared to 26 days from Bangladesh. Hence, exporting jackfruits and other fruits and vegetables by sea to GCC markets from Sri Lanka would be much more efficient and cost-effective.

With its plentiful supply and a lucrative market in close proximity in the Gulf countries, it is difficult to understand how Sri Lanka has not managed to capture a significant share of the market in the GCC, given that Sri Lanka began to export fruits and vegetables into that market long before Bangladesh, Thailand, or Vietnam.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

Continue Reading

Features

Insights from Chieftains of Uva: Genealogy of two Kandyan Families – Part II

Published

on

Reflections on Kandyan Genealogical Studies:

by Sena Thoradeniya

(Part I of this article appeared in The Island of 19 August 2026)

In the Kandyan territories, genealogical studies have been largely caste based on only those who belong to the so-called upper stratum – the highest echelon of the Govigama caste. Even within this group, attention is reserved for ancient office holders, illustrious figures, and socially prominent members, while non-office holders, side branches, and ordinary kin are omitted. Sub divisions of the Govigama caste, as well as families belonging to the so-called depressed castes, are almost entirely omitted. One reason for this stigmatisation lies in the absence of competition for caste supremacy within the Kandyan regions, unlike in the “low country” areas. This silences the presence of non-elite Kandyans. However, oral genealogies, folk traditions, palm-leaf manuscripts, and colonial records preserve the names of less prominent members.

On the other hand, the descendants of clan leaders, such as the Vidana Maha Durayas, Maha Balitiyannas, Maha Hulawaliyas, Mulacharis, and chiefs of Halu Apullana Henayas, do not seek to record their genealogies as all their ancestral roots have been uprooted and obliterated. In such a context, they have acquired new names, new identities, and fashion a new genealogy as their point of departure. The erasure of older identities forces these families to reconstruct a new lineage.

The only exception within my private collection is “Great Royal Artificer of the Kandyan Kingdom: Devendra Mulachari” by D. D. M. Waidyasekera (2017), which records the architectural works of the master craftsman, chiefly responsible for the design of the Paththirippuwa, Walakulu Bemma, and Mangul Maduwa.

The names of hundreds of master craftsmen and other artificers have been carefully recorded, yet their works remain largely obscure, without their corresponding works save the creations of a few celebrated Sittaras. This creates an inconsistency in cultural memory as in pre-Kandyan days.

In theory, elders are often the custodians of memory, transmitting genealogies across generations, providing names, relationships, anecdotes, and related details that written records are not available, although the memory may be selective and biased influenced by various factors. Today such elders are rare, even within our traditional villages. With the passing of elders, the cultural and historical memory tied to ancient villages was obliterated. I can illustrate this with numerous examples taken from my village.

More often genealogical records, especially those produced by descendants of noble families, are not impartial records. They conceal historical truths such as collaboration with colonial expeditions, capture of the last King, betrayal during 1818 and 1848 uprisings as some Kandyan chiefs sided with the British during the 1818 and 1848 uprisings, and their servility to British colonial rulers as junior partners in the administration. Their descendants too later held high office under colonial rule, but genealogical records often present only illustrious service. But modern historians, colonial records, and oral traditions unravel these tainted facts. Some descendants of freedom fighters who were executed or transported to the Isle of France, sometimes rose to prominence under the British.

Although genealogical writers are not historians, they can and do omit vital information if they tarnish family prestige. They can consult archival records, oral traditions, and colonial documents to augment their studies. This writer suggests a combination of all sources as explained at the beginning of this essay.

It is true that the line between genealogical study and historical research is less rigid or open. Both genealogists and researchers may use the same sources, but the distinction lies in the purpose and the method. The primary aim of genealogy is to trace lineage, kinship ties and family continuity. It is basically descriptive and compilatory, but it needs critical assessments. Genealogy becomes research when the genealogist moves beyond compiling sources, and analyzing and interpreting them, situating family history in a wider historical process.

In Kandyan genealogical studies, clashes and serious discrepancies between family records, oral traditions, colonial writings, and modern historical scholarship are common. The problem is how to weigh them against one another looking for convergences. Discrepancies arise when genealogical writers adhere to their own records for family pride or myth making, without consulting other sources, without following a more balanced approach, and allowing the reader to formulate independent perspectives. Failure to engage multiple sources perpetuates partial inquiry rather than historical inquiry.

Wanniachy faithfully traces the ancestry of the Taldena family from the era of King Devanam Piyatissa, drawing upon family history, oral tradition, and two folk poems. Yet his account remains narrowly confined, for he pays little attention to other archival sources, colonial writings, and modern historical scholarship. Works such as Paul E. Pieris’s “Sinhale and the Patriots, 1815–1818” (1950/1995), Tennakone Wimalananda’s “The Great Rebellion of 1818” (1963), are conspicuously absent from his study. Although colonial records remain largely inaccessible to the general public, the writings of modern historians reach a wider audience.

Wimalananda records that Taldena Mohottala, a chieftain of Viyaluwa, saw his house ransacked and destroyed by the British troops during the uprising of 1818. In ancient times, a Mohottala, was a scribe, a secretary, whose main function was collecting and sending the King’s and Dissave’s revenue. Mohottalas of Uva also assumed far greater powers by reason of the distance from the capital, Kandy.

The English dismembered the ancient Uva Maha Disawa, under the almost independent authority of a Maha Disava and created six Disavas, of which one was Oya Palatha.

Paul E. Pieris says that Taldena in recognition of his good work for the British, demanded the post of Disava of Oya Palatha. Owing to his collaboration with the colonial administration, he was appointed Acting Dissava of Oya Palatha. Taldena however, again fell under suspicion, was kept under detention at the Barrier Guard and the British administration thought advisable to remove him from Badulla. As he was ill under detention he could not be removed to Colombo as ordered. He was removed from his position of Oya Palata Disava and was called upon to deposit his valuables at the Badulla Kachcheri, as security for his good behaviuor. On depositing his valuables with the Agent, he was released from detention.

Wimalananda further notes that the Taldena family established marital ties with families in the Batticaloa District. A native of Pottuvil, Mutu Banda’s relative, Sama Kumarihamy alias Ramath, married G. B. Taldena; her second husband was Mutukumaru Murugesu Pillai, and their daughter was Madduma Kumarihamy.

The ancient Maha Disava of Uva was further divided. In my series of articles on the Kandyan chieftains under British rule, I have noted that in 1908 Charles Taldena was appointed Gravets Muhandiram of Kandy by J. P. Lewis, Government Agent of the Central Province. In his report, Lewis observed that this office, as had always been the case, was once again entrusted to a Kandyan, whereas previously it had been conferred upon a “lowcountry” official.

In Chapter Four of his booklet, Wanniachy turns to the history and genealogy of the Mullegama family. Though Mullegama does not belong to Uva, the family is linked to the Taldenas through intermarriage, as he explains. Mullegama itself is a village in Harispattuwa, situated about two kilometers off from the Ambatenna junction along the Kandy–Matale road. In tracing the lineage of the Mullegamas, Wanniachy relies closely on A. C. Lawrie’s Gazetteer of the Central Province of Ceylon (1898).

Mullegama, once Dissava of Wellassa and Dissava of Navayodun Korale supported the British expedition. Yet in 1818, British troops plundered his residence at Wellassa, seizing his most treasured possessions, among them gifts from Sri Vickrema, an elephant, and two horses, which were later sold in Badulla, says Paul E. Peiris. During the Uva uprising, he provided the British with valuable intelligence, and in recognition of his services he was subsequently appointed as Siyapattuwe Adhikaram, a post created by Sri Vickrema, an ironic reward for loyalty despite the plundering.

Lawrie records that the estate of the Mullegama Maha Nilame was divided, and that one grandson sold his share to Moormen of Akurana. He further notes that all the walawwa lands were eventually sold, with a Moorman of Akurana purchasing part of the walawwa, repairing it, and residing there. The pathetic decline of the Mullegama estates is poignantly reflected in Asoka M. Herath’s Sinhala novel Nindagama (2002), a symbolic resonance of the literary echo of dispossession.

I am acutely aware that independent researchers and genealogists of Kandyan families often incur the displeasure of presentday descendants, for the facts they uncover are seldom palatable. Their inquiries reveal that certain ancestors occupied the lower rungs of the royal administration yet later attained high office under the British through collaboration with the colonial regime. Such revelations, though historically significant, provoke resentment among descendants who prefer to sustain more exalted narratives of lineage. This genealogical selectivity perpetuates sanitised family histories and conceals the complexities of colonial collaboration.

In Kandyan genealogical studies compiled by kinsmen, attention is almost exclusively bestowed upon the illustrious figures who once served the king. Their descendants, even those living today, are relegated to mere entries in family trees, noted with their matrimonial alliances. Wanniachy’s book is no exception.

Why does this occur? By highlighting only those ancestors who held office or enjoyed distinction, families reinforced their claims to nobility and social standing. Descendants, unless they themselves attained prominence, were recorded routinely since their presence served only continuity but not prestige.

I thought it necessary to highlight certain technical shortcomings of the book. In the present publishing climate, design has become a matter of considerable importance. Proper book design requires attention to margins, chapter titles, and other elements of presentation. Moreover, the volume carries no ISBN, indicating that it has not been registered with the National Library. This omission prevents the work from being catalogued in the Sri Lanka National Archives, the Museum Library, the National Library, and the University of Peradeniya Library and diminishes its archival value. Another notable deficiency is the absence of the author’s address and contact information. (Concluded)

Continue Reading

Features

22nd Amendment: Proof of the pudding will be in the eating

Published

on

Superior Courts Complex

by Jehan Perera

It appears that the die has been cast on the 22nd Amendment. The government appears unshaken in its determination to ensure its passage into law. From the government’s perspective, the 22nd Amendment and associated legislation, by increasing the tenure of all judges by two years, will give them the extra time to complete their existing cases. This will do away with the need to change judges midstream and have complex legal cases go back to the beginning, which has too often been the case. The completion of these cases will be to the benefit of the victims who have waited for decades for justice in some cases. It will also be to the government’s benefit as many of the wrongdoers are those in the political opposition. In the past, human rights and democracy activists, not to mention lawyers in the field, have bemoaned the manner in which court cases have got delayed for a variety of reasons, including judges being promoted or transferred midstream or reaching the age of retirement.

Principled opposition to 22nd Amendment is articulated in terms of the ad hoc and sudden emergence of the amendment. Those who advance this argument have expressed concern that extending judges’ tenure could create a sense of indebtedness to the government and weaken judicial independence. They would prefer the extension of judges’ tenure to be part of a comprehensive package of constitutional reforms that would apply across the board to other sectors of the public service and, ideally, find its place in the new constitution that the NPP promised in its election manifesto. The question is one of timing. Public opinion surveys carried out regularly have shown that the vast majority of people consider that corruption and criminality at high levels need to be brought to an end as soon as possible. They want accountability to become real rather than remain an unfulfilled promise. The public mood today is that the era of impunity must finally end.

Investigations by law enforcement agencies into the misdeeds of politicians in the past have too often come to naught due to the lack of political will on the part of successive governments. But on this occasion there is a manifest expression of such political will, as witnessed in the seemingly endless series of corruption and criminality cases being uncovered and exposed week by week and month by month. It is equally predictable that those under investigation will seek to challenge the legitimacy of this process. Some will perceive the prosecutions as essentially being in the nature of political revenge rather than lawful accountability and argue along those lines. Others will seek to rally public opinion by questioning the independence of the institutions involved. These reactions should surprise no one. But they make it all the more important that the credibility of the institutions through which accountability is pursued be safeguarded.

Safeguard Change

There is an old saying that society is a mule, not a horse. A horse may respond to repeated use of the spurs, but a mule, if driven too hard, may throw its rider off altogether. The proverb captures an important truth about governing societies. History offers many examples of societies that succeeded in exposing wrongdoing but failed to build reconciliation afterwards. The greatest danger is not merely that the guilty will protest their innocence. That is to be expected. The greater danger is that punishment itself becomes the principal language of politics. When that happens, each change of government carries with it the expectation that today’s judgments will tomorrow be revisited, reversed or avenged.

The electoral verdicts of 2024 that swept the NPP into power brought an entirely new group of political leaders to the fore. This transition needs to take place with care to ensure that polarisation and civil conflict are contained rather than intensified. The post-22nd Amendment period will therefore require something more than legal correctness. It will require political sagacity. Accountability needs to be seen in the light of strengthening the legitimacy of institutions rather than becoming sidetracked into another arena of political contestation. If justice comes to be seen as merely the continuation of politics by legal means, even deserving convictions of wrongdoers may lose public confidence on which long lasting justice depends.

Troubling in this context has been the conduct of some opponents of the amendment. They have not only attacked the government leadership for taking forward the 22nd Amendment. They have also launched personal attacks on judges and cast sweeping aspersions on the judiciary itself. Ironically, in seeking to discredit the courts before they deliver their judgments, they risk undermining the very institution they claim to defend. The lawyers who have united against the 22nd Amendment have every right and duty to raise constitutional concerns. Opposition politicians have every right to criticise legislation. But both also carry a responsibility not to erode public confidence in the judiciary through speculative accusations that prejudge the integrity of judges before they have acted. Such argumentation weakens an institution that belongs to the entire country, not to any government or opposition.

Real Test

Sri Lanka is emerging from decades of violent conflict and deep political polarization. Too often in our history, one government’s triumph has become the next government’s point of demonization as in the once widely used phrase of the “17 year curse” by the successor government. Institutions rebuilt today must therefore survive tomorrow’s transfer of power. They must earn the confidence not only of those who celebrate today’s victories, but also of those who will one day sit in opposition. Institutions that command confidence across political divides need to become stronger and not weaker than the governments that created them.

The national challenge is no longer simply whether accountability will be pursued. It is whether accountability will restore faith in the law by ending a culture of impunity that for too long protected the powerful while denying justice to victims. The country has waited too long for that moment. It must not now be compromised by unnecessary political confrontation or irresponsible attacks on the courts. Ultimately, the strongest answer to the critics of the 22nd Amendment will not come from government ministers or parliamentary speeches. It will need to come from the judges themselves.

The extension of the tenure of members of the judiciary will place an even greater obligation upon them to demonstrate, through every judgment they deliver, that they are truly independent, impartial and beholden to no political authority. If they uphold the law without fear or favour, they will expose the predictions of the doomsayers as unfounded. Those in the legal profession, media, civil society and politics should likewise recognise that criticism of judicial decisions must not become an assault on the institution of the judiciary itself. The greatest service that all sides can render Sri Lanka at this moment is to strengthen the people’s faith that justice belongs equally to every citizen and that no one, however powerful, stands above the law.

Continue Reading

Trending