Features

Purism in the era of mass politics

Published

4 years ago

2022/01/30

by Uditha Devapriya

In claiming that all mainstream parties have failed the country, the JVP-NPP has made a necessity out of virtue. The JVP has always touted itself as the better alternative, and in the present conjuncture, it feels it’s the best alternative we have.

That may explain why its manifesto, “Rapid Response”, reads like a rushed job, full of rhetoric but no real substance. It’s the policy statement of a party which tries to please everyone and ends up pleasing no one. This is a necessary offshoot of how it perceives itself: since it considers itself superior to every other outfit, it assumes that people will vote purely or exclusively on the strength of their dissatisfaction with mainstream politics.

The JVP-NPP’s political vision is, essentially, the leftwing version of Mangala Samaraweera’s Radical Centre. Like that initiative, the JVP-NPP concentrates on political systems rather than ideologies, and engages with corruption to the exclusion of more structural issues. That is why its pamphlet has more, much more, to say about bribery than about the state of the economy, the latter of which it views through the prism of post-1977 liberalisation.

This is a far cry from the approach taken by the Latin American Left, an irony considering that the JVP-NPP has more or less recommended Pink Tide strategies.

“Developments in Latin America are being closely watched by progressive groups and movements globally. Peru recently voted in a left-wing teacher as President after a closely fought election. Boric has been congratulated by the old guard of the left from Cuba, Venezuela, and Mexico. Colombia and Brazil are due to have elections in 2022 and in both countries, left-wing leaders are sensing possible victory. Most importantly, these shifts are signalling a deep dissatisfaction with the status quo and a desire for political and economic models that are less divisive and unequal.”

Laudable and accurate, but have leftwing outfits in Sri Lanka taken stock of these “developments”? We need to ask three questions here: what lessons the Sri Lankan Left should learn from the second Pink Tide, whether the Left has learnt them, and what course of action the Left, particularly the JVP-NPP, should go for to go ahead.

The way I see it, the second Latin American Pink Tide taught us three lessons. First, it saw a return to fundamental economic concerns: Peru’s Pedro Castillo, a member of that country’s marginalised indigenous community, dwelt on immediate priorities, like income and wealth inequalities and the country’s dependence on imports, putting them at the forefront of his presidency. Second, as the Mexican election showed, the Left in the region encompassed not just orthodox Marxists, but also social democrats, centre-left reformists and populists, though the latter’s backtracking, as seen in Gabriel Boric’s statements about Venezuela and Nicaragua, remains open to question.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the Latin American Left consistently portrayed itself, not as the moral superior to other political formations, but as the only viable alternative to the status quo. If ever a JVP-NPP outfit made an appearance in the Pink Tide last year, it was in Chile, where certain leftist commentators claimed that there was no “essential difference” between Boric and his rightwing opponent. Indeed, unimpressive as Boric’s compromises on foreign policy were, his camp considered these as being necessary expedients in the larger fight against rightwing neo-Pinochetianism. The tactic, in other words, wasn’t to be morally or ethically superior, but to win the race and end the war.

Perhaps the biggest issue with the first Latin American Pink Tide was its failure to connect with the European Left and to make headway with forces that had elected it to power, namely peasants and urban workers. Opposed and then supported by reactionary forces, it caved into the demands of corporate interests and ensured its own demise, culminating in Jair Bolsonaro’s election in 2019. By the looks of it, those leading the second Pink Tide seem to have learnt their lesson there, opting for a “Back to Basics” approach that highlighted material issues affecting ordinary people. Themes like bribery and corruption did enter the fray, but these did not swamp other, more important concerns.

Latin America has always been a wide canvas, a potpourri of political systems and cultures. What bound it together was its staunch anti-imperialist legacy, reinforced by decades of besiegement from its big neighbour to the north. In organising a viable opposition, then, progressive forces didn’t so much adhere to orthodox prescriptions as adapt theory to context, making use of mass electoral politics. From Cuba to Nicaragua, it was mass politics, and popular hatred of authoritarian rule, that helped overthrow rightwing regimes. This is something the heirs of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez have understood well.

Has the Sri Lankan Left picked up these lessons? History should tell us that it has not. The Old Left, which gained a reputation for debating important issues like free education and independence in and fighting over them outside the legislature, later disintegrated into almost never-ending sectarian squabbles. To its credit, the LSSP and the Communist Party acknowledged that it could not set aside Sri Lanka’s legacy as Asia’s oldest democracy in its agenda, and that any transformation of society had to involve mass politics. In ignoring these imperatives, conversely, the breakaway Left engineered its own demise long before the LSSP’s and the Communist Party’s fallout from the 1977 election.

The New Left, namely the JVP, suffered from another failure: its inability to tolerate dissent, within or without. From its inception, it embraced an adventurist spirit which caused it to shift to the extreme left under a leftwing government and to the extreme right under a rightwing government. After 1994, it entered the democratic mainstream, though without acknowledging the failures of its past, and over the next two decades it chose to pander to a burgeoning middle-class. These developments compelled it to compromise on its radical potential. Not surprisingly, the JVP-NPP today stands as a case in point for how the centre-left can lose track when responding to shifting class demographics.

The problem with oppositional forces calling themselves progressive in Sri Lanka is their almost casual disregard for mass electoral politics. The irony is that those among them who came to power, the JVP included, could not have done so without electoral politics. The yahapalana regime, for instance, would not have been able to defeat the Rajapaksas on the strength of reformist rhetoric alone; it had to listen to voters, and it had to pay attention to their more genuine concerns. In doing so, it had to pander to those concerns.

That explains why Maithripala Sirisena distanced himself from left-liberal talk of cutting down Sri Lanka’s security apparatus, declaring in an interview with Padma Rao Sunderji that any withdrawals from the north and east would be phased out and not immediate. The UNP faction of the yahapalana regime, by contrast, failed to grasp this, which explains its fallout. Slow as it was, the SLFP realised the pitfalls of the UNP’s approach and extricated itself from the UNP’s embrace, saving itself with a last-minute alliance with the SLPP.

Now, the paradox at the heart of oppositional politics in Sri Lanka today, which one simply does not find among the Latin American Left, is the disconnect between its advocacy for a fairer, better order and its casual indifference to electoral politics. Hence, while calling for the government to resign and pave the way for better leadership, the JVP-NPP’s Anura Kumara Dissanayake rejects offers to ally with not just the SJB – which has its own problems regarding its direction – but also the FSP. The latter, for its part, has been more forthcoming about its policy stances, which would make it the ideal partner for the JVP-NPP, but which has otherwise been ignored and cast aside.

Indeed, instead of listening to the people, which is what any sane opposition, leftwing or otherwise, should be doing, these outfits are gambling on the support of particular social groups, especially the forever upward-aspiring middle classes.

It’s a testament to the power and influence of Sri Lanka’s suburban and urban middle class that it continues to pull the strings of every other oppositional outfit. From the SJB’s Ranilist wing to Champika Ranawaka’s 43 Senankaya, everyone is coveting support from this class, and everyone is adjusting to its demands. To give just one example of how much the middle-class has altered the political landscape, Ranawaka’s turnaround over the abolition of the Executive Presidency, which his allies dismiss as a molehill that Marxists have turned into a mountain, echoes the Sinhala nationalist middle-class’s shift from constitutional reform to what they see as the immediate priority of overthrowing the Rajapaksas.

I have outlined the dangers of pandering to these groups from a Left perspective before in this paper, but the point needs reiterating: as long as the crisis we are in continues to radicalise the middle-class, the Left can and will win by tapping into their discontent and taking advantage of their stances on issues like political corruption. Yet the moment their radicalism slips up, obviously once the crisis comes to an end, the Left might be forced to take stands antithetical to their progressive foundation. This is where the JVP-NPP is going wrong, where the FSP has not gone wrong, and where the Left in general needs to course correct and return to a saner, and commonsensical, approach.

To usher in our own Pink Tide, we need to think beyond the rhetoric of political corruption, going back to the basics. To that end the JVP-NPP needs to wake up, and fast.

The writer can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com

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Features

Trump-Xi meet more about economics rather than politics

Published

4 hours ago

2026/05/21

Sahan Weerasooriya

President Donald Trump meets President Xi Jinping in Beijing: Mutually beneficial ties aimed at. (CNN)

The fact that some of the US’ topmost figures in business, such as Tesla chief Elon Musk and major US chipmaker Jensen Huang of NVIDIA fame, occupied as nearly a prominent a position as President Donald Trump at the recent ‘historic and landmark’ visit by the latter to China underscores the continuing vital importance of business in US-China ties. Business seemed to outweigh politics to a considerable degree in importance during the visit although the political dimension in US-China ties appeared to be more ‘headline grabbing’.

To be sure, the political dimension cannot be downplayed. For very good reason China could be seen as holding the power balance somewhat evenly between East and West. The international politics commentator couldn’t be seen as overstating the case if he takes the position that China could exercise substantial influence over the East currently; that is Russia and Iran, in the main. The latter powers hold the key in the Eastern hemisphere to shaping international politics in the direction of further war or of influencing it towards a measure of peace.

For example, time and again China has prevented the West from ‘having its own way’, so to speak, in the UN Security Council, for instance, in respect of the ongoing conflicts involving Russia and Iran, by way of abstaining from voting or by vetoing declarations that it sees as deleterious. That is, China has been what could be seen as a ‘moderating influence’ in international politics thus far. It has helped to keep the power balance somewhat intact between East and West.

At present a meet is ongoing between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. This happened almost immediately after the Trump visit. Apparently, Beijing is in an effort to project itself as treating the US and Russia even-handedly while underscoring that it is no ‘special friend’ of the US or the West.

This effort at adopting a non-partisan stance on contentious questions in international politics is also seen in Beijing’s policy position on the Hormuz tangle and issues growing out of it. The Chinese authorities are quoted as saying in this regard, for instance, that China is for ‘a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire in the Middle East’.

Such a position has the effect of enhancing the perception that China is even-handed in its handling of divisive foreign policy posers. It is not openly anti-West nor is it weighing in with Iran and other Eastern actors that are opposed to the West in the West Asian theatre. A ‘comprehensive and lasting ceasefire’ implies that a solution needs to be arrived at that would be seen as fair by all quarters concerned.

On the highly sensitive Taiwan issue, President Xi was comparatively forthright during the Trump visit, but here too it was plain to see that Beijing was not intent on introducing a jarring, discordant note into the ongoing, largely cordial discussions with Washington. On the Taiwan question President Xi was quoted saying: ‘If mishandled, the two nations could collide even come into conflict.’ In other words, the US was cautioned that China’s interests need to be always borne in mind in its handling of the Taiwan issue.

The cautioning had the desired result because Trump in turn had reportedly conveyed to Taiwan that the latter’s concerns on the matter of independence had to be handled discreetly. He had told Taiwan plainly not to declare ‘independence.’

Accordingly, neither the US nor China had said or done anything that would have made either party lose face during their interaction. Apparently, both sides were sensitive to each others’ larger or national interests. And the economic interests of both powers were foremost among the latter considerations.

There is no glossing over or ignoring economic interests in the furtherance of ties between states. They are primal shaping forces of foreign policies and the fact that ‘economics drives politics’ is most apparent in US-China ties. That is, economic survival is fundamental.

Among the more memorable quotes from President Xi during the interaction, which also included US business leaders, was the following: ‘China’s doors will be open wider’ and US firms would have ‘broader prospects in the Chinese market.’

Xi went on to say that the sides had agreed to a ‘new positioning for ties’ based on ‘constructive strategic stability’. The implication here is that both sides would do well not to undermine existing, mutually beneficial economic relations in view of the wider national interests of both powers that are served by a continuation of these economic ties. That is, the way forward, in the words of the Chinese authorities, is ‘win-win cooperation.’

It is the above pronouncements by the Chinese authorities that probably led President Trump to gush that the talks were ‘very successful’ and of ‘historic and landmark’ importance. Such sentiments should only be expected of a billionaire US President, bent on economic empire-building.

One of the most important deals that were put through reportedly during the interaction was a Chinese agreement to buy some 200 Boeing jets and a ‘potential commitment to buy an additional 750 planes.’ However, details were not forthcoming on other business deals that may have been hatched.

Accordingly, from the viewpoint of the protagonists the talks went off well and the chances are that the sides would stand to gain substantially from unruffled future economic ties. However, there was no mention of whether the health of the world economy or the ongoing conflicts in West Asia were taken up for discussion.

Such neglect is regretful. Although the veritable economic power houses of the world, the US and China, are likely to thrive in the short and medium terms and their ruling strata could be expected to benefit enormously from these ongoing economic interactions the same could not be said of most of the rest of the world and its populations.

Needless to say, the ongoing oil and gas crisis, for instance, resulting from the conflict situation in West Asia, is taking a heavy toll on the majority of the world’s economies and the relevant publics. While no urgent intervention to ease the lot of the latter could be expected from the Trump administration there is much that China could do on this score.

China could use its good offices with the US to address the negative fallout on the poorer sections of the world from the present global economic crunch and urge the West to help in introducing systemic changes that could facilitate these positive outcomes. After all, China remains a socialist power.

Features

The Quiet Shift: China as America’s “+1” in a Changing World Order

Published

4 hours ago

2026/05/21

Sahan Weerasooriya

Xi and Trump

“Everything ever said to me by any Chinese of any station during any visit was part of an intricate design”

— Henry Kissinger

That design may already be complete before this week’s , a meeting that could shape the future balance of global power.

The wind arrives quietly. By the time it is heard, history has already begun to turn. Across Asia, that wind is no longer distant. It carries with it the exhaustion of an old order and the uncertain birth of another. The question now is not whether the world will change. It is whether those who hold power possess the wisdom to guide that change toward something less violent than the century behind us.

Since 1945, the United States has carried the burden of a global order built with its Western allies. To its credit, the world avoided another direct world war between great powers. The conflicts remained contained in distant lands—proxy wars fought in the shadows of ideology, oil, and influence. From Latin America to Asia, the American century expanded not only through prosperity, but through intervention. Yet empires, even democratic ones, grow tired. Fatigue settles slowly into institutions, alliances, and public memory. The role of global policeman no longer inspires certainty in Washington as it once did.

The “rules-based order” now confronts its own contradiction: it was built to be universal, yet it often appeared selective. During my recent visit to , a young researcher asked me quietly, “Does the West itself still believe in the rules-based order?” The question lingered long after the conversation ended. The rising century demands a more inclusive architecture—one that recognises the reality of Asian power, especially China.

My three years of field research across South and Southeast Asia, documented in , revealed a transformation too significant to dismiss as temporary. China has moved beyond being merely a competitor to the United States. In trade, infrastructure, technology, cultural diplomacy, and economic influence, Beijing has established itself as what may be called the world’s “US +1.”

Great powers often search for such a partner. History shows this tendency clearly. When an empire becomes overextended—burdened by wars, alliances, sanctions, tariffs, and crises—it seeks another center of gravity to stabilize the system it can no longer manage alone. The United States today faces disorder stretching from Venezuela to Iran, from Ukraine to the unsettled Middle East. In this landscape, China emerges not simply as a rival, but as a state powerful enough to broker peace where Washington alone no longer can.

Drawing from the lessons of the Nixon–Mao era, warned that “” The United States and China are now engaged in a long-term economic, technological, political, and strategic competition. Managing that competition wisely may become the defining challenge of this century. In such a deeply polarized and unstable world, recognising China as a “US +1” partner is not surrender, but strategic realism.

Donald Trump understood this reality before boarding his flight to meet Xi Jinping. Their meeting inside Zhongnanhai—the guarded compound where China’s leadership governs—was never merely ceremonial. It symbolized a deeper recognition already acknowledged quietly within the itself: China is the nearest peer competitor the United States has ever confronted. Before departing Washington, Trump seemed to reassess not only China’s strength, but its unavoidable position as a “” shaping the future global balance.

Yet the significance of a Trump–Xi meeting extends beyond trade wars, tariffs, or diplomatic spectacle. It presents an opportunity to confront two crises shaping the century ahead: global energy insecurity and regional instability. Washington increasingly understands the limits of direct engagement with Tehran. Decades of pressure, sanctions, and confrontation have produced exhaustion rather than resolution. In that vacuum, Beijing now possesses leverage that Washington does not.

For China, this is an opportunity to evolve from a development partner into a security actor. Xi Jinping’s (GSI) was never designed merely as rhetoric. It was intended as the next phase of Chinese influence—transforming economic dependence into strategic trust. The geopolitical spillover from the Iranian conflict now offers Beijing a historic opening to project itself as a stabilising force in the region, not against the United States, but alongside it as a “US +1” partner.

If China succeeds in helping stabilise the Gulf and secure energy corridors vital to Asia, it will reshape perceptions of Chinese power globally. Beijing would no longer be seen only as the builder of ports, railways, and industrial zones, but as a guarantor of regional balance. This transition—from infrastructure diplomacy to security diplomacy—may become one of the defining geopolitical shifts of the coming decade.

Xi Jinping does not seek open confrontation. His strategy is older, more patient, and perhaps more formidable because of its restraint. Beijing speaks not of domination, but of a “,” advanced through three instruments of influence: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These are not slogans alone. Across Asia, many governments increasingly trust China as a development partner more than any other power.

India, despite its ambitions, has not matched this scale of regional penetration. In both ASEAN and South Asia, China’s economic gravity is felt more deeply. Ports, railways, technology networks, and financial dependency have altered the geopolitical map quietly, without the spectacle of war.

In , I compared three inward-looking national strategies shaping Asia today: Trump’s MAGA, Modi’s emerging economic nationalism , and Xi’s strategy. Among them, China has demonstrated the greatest structural resilience. Faced with American tariffs and decoupling pressures, Beijing diversified its supply chains across Central Asia, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Rail corridors now connect Chinese industry to European markets through Eurasia. ASEAN has surpassed the United States as China’s largest trading partner, while the European Union follows closely behind. Exports to America have declined sharply, yet China continues to expand. Trump, once defined by confrontation, now arrives seeking a new “” with China—an acknowledgment that economic rivalry alone can no longer define the relationship between the world’s two largest powers.

Unlike Washington, which increasingly retreats from multilateral institutions, Beijing presents itself as the defender of multilateralism. Whether genuine or strategic matters less than perception. In geopolitics, perception often becomes reality.

What emerges, then, is not surrender between rivals, but interdependence between powers too large to isolate one another. The future may not belong to a bipolar Cold War, but to a reluctant coexistence. The United States now recognises that China possesses diversified markets and partnerships capable of reducing dependence on America. China, in turn, understands that its long march toward global primacy still requires strategic engagement with the United States.

This is where the true geopolitical shift begins.

Many analysts continue to frame China solely as a threat. Yet history rarely moves through absolutes. The next world order may not be built through confrontation alone, but through uneasy partnership. Artificial intelligence, technological supremacy, economic stability, and global governance now demand cooperation between Washington and Beijing, whether either side admits it publicly or not.

Trump will likely celebrate his personal relationship with Xi, presenting himself as the American leader capable of negotiating a “better deal” with China than his predecessors. But beneath the rhetoric lies something larger: the gradual acceptance of China’s indispensable role in shaping the future international order.

Even the question of war increasingly returns to Beijing. If Washington seeks an understanding with Tehran, China’s influence becomes unavoidable. Iran listens to Beijing in ways it no longer listens to the West. This alone signals how profoundly the balance of power has shifted. And Xi, careful as always, refuses to openly inherit the mantle of global leadership. He delays, softens, and obscures intention. It is part of a longer strategy: to rise without provoking the final resistance of a declining hegemon too early.

History rarely announces its turning point. Empires fade slowly, while new powers rise quietly beneath the noise of the old order. Washington still holds immense power, but Beijing increasingly holds the patience, reach, and strategic depth to shape what comes after.

The century ahead may not belong to one power alone, but to the uneasy balance between Washington and Beijing. And in that silence, a new world order is already taking shape.

By Asanga Abeyagoonasekera

Features

Egypt … here I come

Published

4 hours ago

2026/05/21

Sahan Weerasooriya

Chit-Chat Nethali Withanage

Three months ago, 19-year-old Nethali Withanage, with Brian Kerkoven as her mentor, walked the ramp at Colombo Fashion Week. On 06 June, she’ll walk for Sri Lanka in Hurghada, Egypt, as the country’s delegate to Top Model of the World 2026._

I caught up with Nethali as she prepares to fly out, this weekend, and here’s how our chit-chat went:

1. Tell me something about yourself?

I’m someone who blends creativity with ambition. I’ve always loved expressing myself, whether it’s through fashion, styling, or the way I present myself to the world. At the same time, I’m very driven and disciplined, especially when I was working, as a student counsellor, at Campus One, at a young age, where I’ve learned how to connect with people, understand them, and communicate with confidence. I believe I’m still evolving, and that’s what excites me the most … becoming better every single day.

2. What made you decide to be a model?

Modelling felt natural to me because it combines everything I love – fashion, confidence, and storytelling without words. I realised that modelling isn’t just about appearance, it’s about presence and how you carry your energy. I wanted to be part of an industry where I could express different sides of myself, while inspiring others to feel confident in their own skin.

3. What sets you apart from other models?

I would say my ability to connect. Whether it’s with the camera, a brand, or an audience, I bring authenticity. I also have a strong background in communication and sales, which gives me an edge in understanding how to represent a brand, not just wear it. I don’t want to just model clothes, I want to bring them to life.

4. What clothing do you prefer to model?

I enjoy modelling versatile styles, but I’m especially drawn to elegant and expressive fashion pieces that tells a story. I love looks that allow me to embody confidence and femininity, whether it’s a structured outfit or something soft and flowing.

5. What is the most important aspect of modelling?

Confidence combined with professionalism. Confidence allows you to own the moment, but professionalism ensures that you respect the work, the team, and the brand you represent. Both are equally important.

6. If you could change one thing about yourself, what would it be?

I would say I’m learning to trust myself more and not overthink. I’ve realised that growth comes from embracing who you are, not constantly trying to change it. So instead of changing something, I’m focused on becoming more confident in my own voice.

7. School?

I did my O/Ls at Seventh Day Adventist High School Kandana, and, while at school, I was actively involved in creative activities. I enjoyed participating in English Day events that allowed me to express myself and interact with others. Those experiences helped me build confidence, teamwork, and communication skills, which continue to shape who I am today.

8. Happiest moment?

One of my happiest moments is realising how far I’ve come from being unsure of myself to stepping into opportunities, like modelling, and representing myself with confidence. That feeling of growth is something I truly value, and also a dream come true!

9. Your idea of perfect happiness?

Perfect happiness for me is peace of mind, being surrounded by people I love, doing what I’m passionate about, and feeling proud of who I am becoming.

10. Your ideal guy?

My ideal partner is someone who is respectful, supportive, and confident in himself. Someone who values growth, understands my ambitions, and encourages me to be the best version of myself.

11. Which living person do you most admire?

I admire strong, self-made individuals who have built their identity through hard work and resilience. People who stay true to themselves, despite challenges, inspire me, because they show that success is not just about talent, but also about strength and consistency.

12. Your most treasured possession?

My most treasured possession is my confidence. It’s something I’ve built over time, and it allows me to face challenges, take opportunities, and believe in myself, even when things are uncertain.

13. If you were marooned on a desert island, who would you like as your companion?

I would choose someone who is calm, positive, and resourceful, someone who can turn a difficult situation into an adventure. The right mindset matters more than anything.

14. Your most embarrassing moment?

I’m 19 and still haven’t faced any most embarrassing moment. But I would say I’ve had small moments where things didn’t go as planned, but I’ve learned to laugh at myself. Those moments remind me that perfection isn’t necessary; confidence is about how you recover, not how you avoid mistakes.

15. Done anything daring?

Pursuing modelling and stepping into competitions is something I consider daring. It pushed me out of my comfort zone and challenged me to grow, both personally and professionally.

16. Your ideal vacation?

My ideal vacation would be somewhere peaceful, yet beautiful, like a beach destination where I can relax, reflect, and reconnect with myself, while enjoying nature.

17. What kind of music are you into?

I choose music that matches my mood at that time, whether it’s calm and relaxing or energetic and uplifting. Music is something that helps me express emotions and stay inspired.

18. Favourite radio station?

Usually I don’t listen to radio stations but whenever I get into a car I would search for Yes FM because it has a refined balance of contemporary hits and timeless music. I appreciate how it maintains a vibrant yet sophisticated energy, keeping listeners engaged while creating a consistently uplifting atmosphere. It’s something I enjoy because it adds a sense of positivity and elegance to my day.

19. Favourite TV station?

At the moment, I don’t have a television at home, but growing up, my favourite TV station was ‘Nickelodeon’. I genuinely loved the shows and series it aired; they were fun, creative, and full of personality. It was something I always looked forward to, and those memories still bring a sense of joy and nostalgia, whenever I think about it.

20. Any major plans for the future?

My future plans are to grow in the modelling industry, work with international brands, build a strong personal brand and finish completing a Bachelor’s Degree in Business Studies. At the same time, I want to explore my creative side further, especially in fashion and business, so I can create something of my own one day.