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Midweek Review

Province-based Devolution in Sri Lanka: a Critique

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by G H Peiris

 

1. Preamble

This article is prompted by the recent announcement that the Cabinet will soon consider a proposal to conduct Provincial Council (PC) elections without delay. The article is intended to urge that the PC system should be abolished and replaced by constitutional devices to ensure: (a) genuine sharing of political power among all primordial, áscriptive and associational groups that constitute the nation of Sri Lanka; and (b) the statutory protection of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity which the PC system, as long as it is permitted to last, will remain in dire peril. The article is also intended to stimulate the memory of those who appear to have forgotten the circumstances that culminated in the enactment of legislation in 1987 to establish PCs. There appears to prevail a measure of complacency among some of our present political stalwarts based on the notion that, with their two-thirds majority in Parliament, and with the 20th Amendment in place, they ought to let the status quo remain intact. This, I think, is quite silly. Apart from the fact that landslide electoral victories tend often to be brittle, those who were in the forefront of empowering the present regime are already reacting with dismay to the decision to re-establish the PCs.

 

2. Indo-Lanka Accord – the Indian Intervention

It is often forgotten that the government of India employed the most diabolical forms of diplomatic, military and economic coercion a powerful country could conceivably brought to bear upon a supposedly friendly nation with which it shares many cultural traits.

Omitting (for the sake of brevity) the vicissitudinous political career of Smt. Indira Gandhi during the 1970s, my elaboration of the foregoing observation begins with the commencement of her second spell of office as Prime Minister of India (January 1980 to October 1984) in the course of which she made no secret about her intense antipathy towards the JRJ-led government of Sri Lanka. This prompted certain emissaries of the ‘Tamil United Liberation Front’ (TULF) to suggest to her the desirability of launching an armed intervention in Sri Lanka of the type she had so successfully achieved at the “Liberation” of Bangladesh in 1971. That did not happen, probably because the JRJ regime had the backing of the West and the tragic end of her life in 1984. Regarding her malignant imprint on the constitutional affairs of Sri Lanka, however, it is worth citing the testimony of J. N. Dixit, Delhi’s High Commissioner in Colombo when (in his own words) he was “… involved in the most important and critical phase of Indo-Lanka relations; a period during which India’s mediatory efforts reached its peak culminating in the signing of the Indo-Lanka Agreement of 29 July 1987”. (Dixit, 1998: xvi):

“Once Mrs. Gandhi decided to be supportive of the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils on the basis of Indian interests and strategic considerations, the rest of the process which culminated in the Indo-Lanka Agreement and the induction of the IPKF was more or less inevitable”. (emphasis added)

Several reasons, partly conjectural, have been adduced for Smt. Gandhi’s hostility towards the government of Sri Lanka. For instance, She might have been resentful of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy leanings towards the ‘West’, and the reciprocal support which JRJ was attracting in abundance from some of the leading global powers for the mammoth development projects being implemented within the framework of ‘economic liberalisation’. Another explanation is that, with the worsening of relations between the Federal government and State governments of Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and West Bengal, Smt. Gandhi placed priority on consolidating her electoral support in Tamilnadu, which meant, among other things, greater concern on the demands of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. My own hunch is that it was a Shakespearian display of “Hell hath no fury as a woman scorned” towards JRJ, allegedly for an absurd insult he had hurled at her in the course of an ‘After Dinner’ speech as the Janatha government’s PM, Moraji Desai’s, guest of honour.

Be that as it may, Smt. Gandhi began to provide clandestine aid (financial, material and training in guerrilla offensives) to groups of Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents, even after it was made public knowledge through prestigious Indian journals. This is relevant background to an understanding of the disastrous anti-Tamil riot that occurred in Sri Lanka in July 1983.

The riot caused extensive damage to life and property, and a massive displacement of the Sri Lankan Tamil population in the Sinhalese-majority areas ̶ one which included a large outflow of refugees from the country. It disrupted the economy aand brought the ‘liberalisation’ boom to an abrupt end. It tarnished the image of Sri Lanka abroad, generated a global tide of sympathy towards the Tamils, and attracted international attention and concern towards Tamil grievances. It paved the way for the direct intervention of India (untrammelled by pressures from the ‘West’) in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka, culminating in the introduction in 1987 of a massive Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF). It also represented a major turning point in the history of Tamil politics in Sri Lanka, with the militant groups and their strategy of armed confrontation and terrorism gaining ascendancy over the older Tamil political parties and their proclaimed commitments to peaceful agitation and protest. The militants became a power in their own right, abandoning their earlier role as the ‘boys’ of the Tamil leadership in the political mainstreams.

 

Indian Intervention after the Convulsions of ‘Black July’

Smt. Indira Gandhi’s offer to “mediate” in the Sri Lankan imbroglio (pre-empting other global powers from claiming that role) could not have been turned down by the beleaguered President Jayewardene.

The process of mediation commenced with the arrival of the Indian diplomat, Parthasarathi Rao. It took the form of coercing the Sri Lanka government to change its policy of decentralisation of ‘development administration’ to devolution of political power, and to change the spatial framework for such devolution from the District to the Province, along with an amalgamation of the Northern Province and the Eastern Province. His “mission” ended with the production of document referred to in subsequent negotiations as ‘Annexure C’ which he took back to Delhi. To what this document was annexed, and whether there were other “Annexures” are not known.

‘Annexure C’, and Sri Lanka government’s own proposals were presented to an ‘All Party Conference (APC) summoned by JRJ at which there was vehement opposition to certain sections of that Annexure. But the government extracted from the APC proceedings a draft Ordinance providing for (a) “a revitalised District Councils” system and (b) the establishment of a Second Chamber, and tabled the drafts for further dialogue with the TULF (the SLFP delegates having withdrawn from the APC). Up to about the end of the year, the TULF leadership maintained that the draft ordinance did form the basis of an acceptable settlement. But, thereafter, in a sudden volte-face, they rejected it outright.

Smt. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh militants on 31 October 1984. Her son, Rajiv was sworn in as PM later on the same day. Critics have maintained that this caused a change in Indo-Lanka relations in the sense that Rajiv tended to be less “imperial” than his late mother in his approach to conflict resolution both within and outside India.

Despite Rajiv’s affable demeanour, the policy transformation brought about by his succession was less tangible than what most observers would have us believe.

For instance:

(a) the Delhi government made available through the State government of Tamilnadu a grant of US$ 3.2 million to the LTTE leadership; (b) as Lalith Athulathmudali (Sri Lanka’s Minister of Security and Defence) had observed, a leaked RAW document indicated the continuing existence of training camps and bases for Sri Lankan Tamil separatist activists and; (c) despite repeated requests by JRJ, Delhi did not adopt coastal surveillance measures to curtail clandestine movement of people and commodities across Palk Strait.

Meanwhile the Tamil militants escalated their terrorist onslaught, the most horrendous event of which was the slaughter by LTTE operatives of 148 devotees (most of them elderly women) at the premises of the Sri Maha Bōdhi shrine in the sacred city of Anuradhapura, and another 16 civilians in the course of their retreat into the wilds of Wilpattu on May 14, 1985. There was media speculation that firearms used by the Tigers in this massacre were purchased by the LTTE with the aforesaid Indian grant.

Romesh Bhandari, Rajiv’s Foreign Secretary, initiated peace negotiations between the government and delegates of the secessionist groups at a forum staged in July/August 1985 in the capital of Bhutan, and thus labelled as the ‘Thimpu Talks’. It provided a forum to Tamil militants for worldwide propaganda for their ‘liberation’ demands that were set out as follows (lawyer N. Balendran acting as their spokesman):

“It is our considered view that any meaningful solution to the national question of the island must be based on the following four cardinal principles:

(1) Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality,

(2) Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity,

(3) Based on the above, recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation,

(4) Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who look upon the island as their home.”

The Sri Lanka delegation response, as presented by H. L. de Silva (recorded in Balendran’s monograph on the ‘Thimpu Talks’) was as follows:

“First, we observe that there is a wide range of meanings that can attach to the concepts and ideas embodied in the four principles, and our response to them would accordingly depend on the meaning and significance that is sought to be applied to them. Secondly, we must state quite emphatically that if the first three principles are to be taken at their face value and given their accepted legal meaning they are wholly unacceptable to the government. They must be rejected for the reason that they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka; they are detrimental to a united Sri Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the several communities, ethnic and religious in our country”.

The collapse of ‘Thimpu Talks’ prompted Bhandari, in barely concealed personal disgust at the arrogance and recalcitrance of Mr. Balendran and his entourage of secessionist militants, to summon a follow-up negotiations in Delhi at which he restricted Sri Lanka participation to delegates of the government and of the TULF. At the conclusion of that effort in August 1985 a document named the ‘Delhi Accord’, “initialled” by representatives of the two governments, was released to the media by India’s Foreign Office. It claimed that a measure of consensus was reached on ‘Province’ as the unit of devolution’ and on the powers to be devolved. The Delhi Accord was rejected by the LTTE. By the end of the year the TULF leadership had also rejected the ‘Delhi Accord’.

Thereafter there was a series of discussions between representatives of the two governments. A. P. Venkateswaran, appointed Foreign Secretary in January 1987, attempted unilaterally to make the ‘Delhi Accord’ more acceptable to the TULF by bringing the Accord offers close to a federal form of government.

Perhaps the greatest betrayal of the trust which the government of Sri Lanka had placed in the Rajiv regime was represented by Delhi’s reaction to the military campaign termed ‘Operation Liberation’ launched by the government on 26 May 1987 in the face of which the Tiger cadres, abandoned their Thalaivar’s bravado, and fled in disarray. An SOS appeal conveyed by the LTTE leadership to Tamilnadu resulted in a flotilla of fishing vessels sailing out in the guise of a “spontaneous” civilian response but, in fact, with the backing of the central and state governments. That maritime invasion was foiled by the Sri Lanka Nsavy. Thereupon, in a blatant violation of international law and Sri Lanka’s air space, a convoy of Mirage-2000 combat planes dropped 20 tons of food and medical supplies on Jaffna, ostensibly as a ‘mercy mission’, but in reality, a demonstration of what Delhi could do unless Sri Lanka obeys. At the commencement of ‘Operation Liberation’, Dixit informed Lalith Athulathmudali that India would not stand idly by if the Sri Lanka Army attempts to capture Jaffna (K. M. de Silva, 1994: 631).

The JRJ-Rajiv dialogue at the ‘SAARC Summit’ conducted at Bangalore in early 1987; discussions between Indian VIPs like Dinesh Singh and P. Chidambaran and Sri Lanka ministers like Lalith Athulathmudali, Gamini Dissanayake and A C S Hameed; and, more geerally, the enforcement of his will on senior bureaucrats in Colombo by J N Dixit (who, by this stage, had earned for himself the epithet ‘India’s Viceroy’) were among the Indo-Lanka interactions that brought about the signing of the agreement.

What I have sketched above is only the bare outline of how and why the aging President JRJ, nudging 80, succumbed to the ruthless Indian onslaught, disillusioned as he was, by the disintegration of his inner circle of loyalists, the aggressive extra-parliamentary campaign led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and the ethos of anarchy and violence created by the JVP whose oft repeated theme, disseminated through the calligraphically unique poster campaign, was ‘jay ăr maramu’ (‘let’s kill JR’). Soon after the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, the JVP almost succeeded in doing that in a grenade attack on UNP parliamentary group meeting.

 

Indo-Lanka Accord’: Its Political Backdrop in Sri Lanka

Politics of insurrection gathered momentum in Jaffna at least from about a decade earlier than the signing of the said ‘Accord’ when the mainstream Tamil parties began to pursue a strategy of nurturing insurgent groups, and inculcating the notion of Sinhalese oppression (rather than inequities inherent to the mismanaged economy being experienced by all ethnic groups, and the blatant Caste-based oppression endemic to the Sri Lankan Tamil social milieu) being the root cause for their deprivations. It should also be recalled that the benefits of economic buoyancy that ushered in by the policy transformation of ‘liberalization of the economy’ from the earlier pseudo-socialist shackles, initiated by the government elected to office in 1977, were scarcely felt in the predominantly Tamil areas of the north.

It was in the context of intensifying turbulence that the leaders of Ilangai Tamil Arasi Kachchi (ITAK), All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) and Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) formed a coalition named the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). At its inaugural session conducted in May 1976, the TULF adopted the so-called ‘Vaddukodai Resolution’, the opening statement of which reads as follows:

“The convention resolves that the restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular state of TAMIL EELAM based on the right of self-determination inherent to every nation has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country”.

The concluding paragraphs of that ‘Resolution’ (copied below) should, in retrospect, be understood as epitomising a formal decision to launch of an ‘Eelam War’.

“This convention calls upon its ‘LIBERATION FRONT’ to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation.”, followed by more specific belligerence,

“And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully in the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not until the goal of a sovereign state of TAMIL EELAM is reached”.

The campaign rhetoric of the TULF was somewhat more vicious than its belligerence at Vaddukoddai.. At a public rally conducted shortly after the formation in 1976 of the ACTC-ITAK alliance with qualified support from Arumuga Thondaman’s ‘Ceylon Workers Congress’, the person who could have been called the ‘First Lady’ of that alliance said in the course of her speech: “I will not rest until I wear slippers turned out of Sinhalese skins”. Unbelievable? If it is, look up the ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry’ into the communal disturbances of 1977 conducted by a former Supreme Court Judge (a person belonging to the Burgher community), published as Sessional Paper XII of 1980.

The data tabulated below show that the TULF appeal did not get the expected response even from the people living in the ‘North-East’. It is, of course, true that all contestants fielded by the TULF did win their seats in the Northern Province, securing comfortable majorities in the districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Vavuniya; but elsewhere in the province, the margins of victory were wafer-thin. The polling outcome of the Eastern Province probably shocked the TULF leadership and certainly caused widespread surprise, especially since less than one-third of the voters of Batticaloa District (where Tamils accounted for 72%, and the ‘Sri Lankan Tamils 71% the district population) only 32% had endorsed the ‘Eelam’ appeal.

By the early 1980s, several groups had taken control over acts of terrorism and sabotage in Jaffna peninsula. The violence perpetrated by the insurgents and the retaliatory acts of the security forces reached fever-pitch on the eve of elections to the newly instituted District Development Councils. It resonated in other parts of the country in the form of two relatively brief waves of mob attacks on Tamil civilians, one in 1980 and the other in 1981. The victims included ‘Indian Tamils’.

The economic upsurge in the first 6 years of the JRJ-led government was short lived, and the political hopes proved to be illusory. The Jaffna peninsula turbulence was perceived by the government as a ‘law and order problem’ ̶ which a police contingent led by a Deputy Inspector General of Police Rudhra Rajasingham, a Tamil officer of impeccable repute, was ordered by the President to “eradicate within three months”. It failed in the face of massive protest campaigns, intensifying guerrilla attacks on government institutions and the security forces, and harsh retaliatory action by the security forces.

 

The ‘Eelam War’ for which the groundwork had been laid by the TULF was triggered off by the anti-Tamil riot of unprecedented brutality that took place in July 1983. Its damning repercussions were referred to earlier in this memorandum. JRJ reacted by proscribing several parties and incarcerating a few among his more articulate detractors, some, on the basis of barely credible evidence. Yet another blunder by him at this state was the holding of a national referendum in order to extend the life of the parliament (with the 4/5th majority under his command) by another 6 years. Apart from the rampant malpractices that features this poll, it did look like the fulfilment of his euphoric pledge in the aftermath of his victory to “roll back the electoral map”.

The youth unrest in the Northeast which was mobilised for electoral gain by the TULF began to be replicated in earnest elsewhere in the island in the form of the second wave of insurrection launched by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP/Peoples Liberation Front). In the economic recession that prevailed, and with the incessant Television displays of unattainable luxury restricted to the life styles of a small minority, increasing numbers of youth suffering from “frustration aggression” were attracted to the JVP fold. By 1985, they engaged in raids for the collection of money and arms, crippling the economy with frequently enforced curfews, and a range of terrorist violence such as intimidation, torture and the murder of persons identified as collaborators of the government.

 

The Province as a Unit of Devolution

The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms of 1833 that introduced a network of 5 Provinces was intended to consolidate British rule over the island which remained tenuous even after the suppression of the rebellion of 1818. The spatial pattern of provinces was changes from time to time until it was finalised in 1889 against the backdrop of the mid-Victorian imperial glory and the absence of any challenge to British supremacy in ‘Ceylon’. The population of the island at that time was only 3 million; and, despite the ongoing deforestation of the Central Highlands, at least about 70% of the island territory was uncharted wilderness.

 

To be Continued

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Midweek Review

‘Perils of a Profession’ jolts scandal-ridden police

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By Shamindra Ferdinando

Retired Senior Deputy Inspector General (SDIG) Merril Gunaratne quoted the then Air Force Commander Air Marshal Walter Fernando as having said at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, chaired by the then President JRJ, in the mid-80s: “It is not a laughing matter for me.” Fernando was responding to the late Lalith Athulathmudali, the then National Security Minister whose comment on an incident in Vavuniya that claimed the lives of several airmen dismayed the Air Marshal. Gunaratne had been there as the top intelligence representative.

Fernando served as the Commander of the Air Force from May 1, 1986, to July 1, 1990. Fernando retired a few weeks after the eruption of Eelam War II. It would be pertinent to mention his only son Squadron Leader A.P.W. Fernando, was among those killed when the LTTE brought down the Chinese-built Y8 flying over the Elephant Pass area, on July 5, 1992.

The revealing anecdote was one among many such disclosures in Gunaratne’s latest book ‘Perils of a Profession’ launched this month. Gunaratne asserted that the Air Force Commander resented the Minister’s comment that apparently belittled the service.

The author of two previous books ‘Dilemma of an Island ‘ and ‘Cop in the Cross Fire,’ released in 2001 and 2011, respectively, the outspoken retired top cop couldn’t have launched his third at a better time than when the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PcoI), into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, is on the verge of concluding its high profile inquiry. Gunaratne certainly didn’t mince his words when he appeared before the PCoI last year.

The question is whether perhaps the worst ever intelligence failure facilitated the coordinated suicide attacks on six targets on the morning of April 21, 2019? Or could it have been thwarted if the Attorney General’s Department acted swiftly, and decisively, when the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) brought the growing threat, posed by the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) leader Zahran Hashim, to its notice, in July 2017?

 

Kudos from retired Maj. Gen.

In his latest work, Gunaratne, whose illustrious career spanning 35 years included a significant period with the premier intelligence service, dealt with precision the deterioration of the once proud police service. In spite of ‘Perils of a Profession’ being rather short, the revelations, therein, are certainly explosive. There hadn’t been such disclosure in the past, by any other retired law enforcement officer.

Gunaratne’s writing skills received the acclaim of retired Maj. Gen. Lalin Fernando, an admirable writer himself. In a brief commendation of Gunaratne’s third book, Fernando asserted: “No gazetted police officer has shown his ability to write as lucidly on real concerns of the police, from professional competence to welfare of the beat constable.”

Having joined the police, in July 1965, Gunaratne served the department during a turbulent time, before leaving the service, as a Senior DIG. Sri Lanka brought the war to a successful conclusion nine years after the author’s retirement, in 2000.

Perils of a Profession’ dealt aggressively with the deterioration of the service, over the years, resulting in an unprecedented crisis. The writer, without hesitation, blamed the politicians and the police for the degeneration of the department to such a pathetic state that today the once proud Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB) is under investigation for dealing in heroin.

Retired Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, now in charge of the police, in his capacity as the Public Security Minister, should peruse ‘Perils of a Profession’ without further delay. There hadn’t been a previous instance of the police coming under a retired military officer, though the last government made a desperate bid to secure the then President Maithripala Sirisena’s consent to Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka as Law and Order Minister. The senior partner of the yahapalana administration wanted Fonseka to replace Sagala Ratnayake, one of the beleaguered UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s close associates. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa not only brought the police under a retired Rear Admiral, he named retired Gen. Jagath Alwis, his first choice as the Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), as the new Secretary, Ministry of Public Order.

Against that background, another disclosure made by Gunaratne, regarding certain law enforcement officers thwarting Minister Ratnayake’s efforts at reforming the police, should be examined. That particular anecdote revealed how serving officers resented Ratnayake’s bid to secure the retired intelligence officer’s expertise. Perhaps Ratnayake hadn’t been aware of Wickremesinghe’s resentment towards Gunaratne whose controversial assessments on matters of national importance exasperated him.

Cop in the Cross Fire’ revealed how Wickremesinghe’s own views on national security matters clashed with those of Gunaratne during the latter’s tenure as an ‘advisor’ – 2002-2004. Gunaratne’s bold assessment, in his capacity as an ‘advisor’ on the rapid increase in the fighting cadre of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), after the signing of the highly controversial Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), finalized in Feb 2002, without the knowledge of President Kumaratunga, and much of his own government, quite angered the then Premier Wickremesinghe.

 

Athulathmudali’s intervention

Gunaratne questioned security/intelligence strategies that had been in place, or were in the process of development when the NTJ struck in April 2019, in spite of receiving specific information from neighbouring India. The writer dealt expertly with the weakening of the police, including the premier intelligence apparatus over the years under whatever name it was called. In Chapter 7, titled ‘Moving into intelligence from normal police work,’ Gunaratne disclosed how Athulathmudali re-named what was then called Intelligence Services Division (ISD). Whatever, the country’s premier intelligence network was called, a senior policeman had been always at its helm.

In Gunaratne’s assessment, the Special Branch (SB) of the CID and the Military Intelligence (MI) played a relatively lower role when compared with that of the premier apparatus, called the State Intelligence Service (SIS), at the time the NTJ struck. That resulted in the SIS being placed under Maj. Gen. Suresh Sally, formerly of the MI. Interestingly, the then Premier Wickermesinghe found fault with the then Brigadier Sally for the writer’s reportage of the recovery of explosives in the north and the arrest of some suspects in the early 2016. The premier intelligence service had always been under a senior police officer. At the time the NTJ struck, SDIG Nilantha Jayawardena had been at the helm of the SIS. The proceedings undertaken by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) and the on-going PCoI revealed the existence of a special relationship between the then President Maithripala Sirisena and the SIS Chief.

Did the close association between the Commander-in-Chief and his spy chief, too, contribute to the overall deterioration of the security setup? The PSC, in its report tabled in Parliament on Oct 23 found fault with Jayawardena for the pathetic handling of the available Indian intelligence until the NTJ terrorists went on the rampage.

Gunaratne blamed an appointment of a novice as the head of the premier intelligence service, after the 1994 presidential election, for the rapid deterioration of the apparatus. Although, the author refrained from naming the officer, the recipient of the coveted post of Director, SIS, was the late retired Senior Superintendent of Police T.V. Sumanasekera.

Nilantha Jayawardena, who is now literally on the mat for the Easter Sunday intelligence failure, too, had served  the SIS even then. Gunaratne’s reference to SIS having wiretapping apparatus is certainly not necessary as the premier intelligence outfit couldn’t perform its legitimate duties without that particular capacity.

The deterioration of politics can be certainly compared with the current political setup. Having read, utterly contemptuous account of the top political leadership and members of the Parliament, the police and the Parliament seemed to be in the same predicament.

 

UNP faulted

According to Gunaratne, the rot had set in the wake of the UNP landslide, in 1977. The author compared his experience as SSP, Kelaniya and SSP Kurunegala during the period 1977-1978 and how some of those who were represented in parliament violated the laws of the land, misused police and political interference made at the highest levels. Among those miscreants who had been named by the retired cop was the late Minister Cyril Mathew. Gunaratne explained how the UNP cleverly used and abused the police in its diabolical project. An influential section of the police, for obvious reasons, cooperated with the then political leadership much to the dismay of those who struggled to thwart constant and belligerent political interference. Gunaratne earned the wrath of some UNP lawmakers for refusing to cooperate with the ruling party’s strategy. Some took up Gunaratne’s conduct with no less a person than JRJ and in some instances with Premier Ranasinghe Premadasa.

With the UNP enjoying an unprecedented 5/6 parliamentary power, the dictatorial UNP administration expected the police to fall in line. They largely did. The situation deteriorated further in the wake of the 1982, more or less, rigged referendum, that allowed the UNP to retain a monstrous overwhelming 2/3 majority, till 1988.

The late Dingiri Banda Wijetunga’s short tenure as the President during the period 1993-1994 in the wake of Ranasinghe Premadasa’s May Day 1993 assassination, never really received much public attention. Wijetunga oversaw the party in the run-up to parliamentary and presidential polls in August and November, 1994, respectively. Wijetunga thwarted Wickremesinghe by facilitating the return of rebel Gamini Dissanayake back to the party. The author refrained from discussing Wijetunga’s political moves though he dealt harshly with the President’s destructive policy as regards the police. Gunaratne explained how the successful Commandant of the elite Special Task Force (STF), the late Lionel Karunasena, failed to prevent Wijetunga’s interference. The author examined Karunasena’s failure against the backdrop of his success in convincing JRJ and Premadasa not to interfere with the elite unit.

Gunaratne’s allegation, with regard to the shortsighted increase of the DIG cadre, from 11 to 30, overnight, and the number of Senior DIGs, from three to five, contributed to the overall deterioration of law enforcement, should be thoroughly examined. The accusation that Wijetunga lacked even the basic understanding of law enforcement thereby caused chaos in the overall administrative setup, by constant interference, should prompt a reappraisal of the whole department. Successive governments played politics with the police to varying degrees. After the change of governments, those who even vacated posts, or were moved out on disciplinary grounds, manipulated the utterly corrupt system to return to the service and secure backdated promotions. Backdoor promotions were routine and so widespread, higher ranks could be secured outside, what Gunaratne called, eligibility criteria.

 

A righteous IGP

‘Perils of a Profession’ explained how successive governments, since the 1977 general election, contributed to the ruination of the police department. Backdoor promotions had been a major cause of concern. Having dealt how he personally took up an alleged move to overtake him in the seniority line to pave the way for another, with President Premadasa, at an STF circuit bungalow, Gunaratne paid a glowing tribute to Cyril Herath, as the only IGP who had the strength to quit the service than play politics.

Gunaratne claimed he was present when Herath turned down an offer of an ambassadorial post from the then Defence Secretary Gen. Sepala Attygalle in the wake of the former’s decision to resign.

Gunaratne has quoted Herath as having told Attygalle: “Sir, I have not come to you with my resignation letter to canvas for an ambassadorial post.”

During PSC and PCoI proceedings, the alleged offer made by President Sirisena to the disgraced IGP Pujith Jayasundera to accept the responsibility for the Easter Sunday carnage in return for a diplomatic posting, transpired. Obviously, Jayasundera declined the treacherous offer. The previous Rajapaksa administration named Mahinda Balasuriya, Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to Brazil, after he accepted responsibility for the police firing at a group of protesting Katunayake Free Trade Zone (FRZ) workers.

There certainly cannot be any other instance of a senior retired police officer coming out so strongly against the system at his own expense. Have you ever heard of any retired public servant objecting to a scheme that certainly benefited him at the taxpayers’ expense? Gunaratne discussed the controversial move to assign police personnel to retired IGPs and SDIGs for what the Association of Police Chiefs (APC) described as an effort to ‘maintain their reputation and dignity.’ The APC proposal that had been approved by the National Police Commission (NPC) on April 23, 2020, was the brainchild of retired SDIG Gamini Navaratne. The whole exercise was meant to provide a controversial facility on the basis that senior retired military officers enjoyed such a privilege.

Gunaratne’s thought-provoking opinions on law enforcement operations should be seriously examined. If the Public Security Ministry is genuinely interested in reforms, perhaps the Minister and Secretary can seek a Presidential Commission to make recommendations. Actually, Gunaratne has made some excellent proposals, first to arrest the decline and then improve the service. The police service has deteriorated to such an extent, it would be a herculean task to restore the standards to the pre-1977 period.

In fact, the blatant role the Office of the President had played, since the introduction of the JRJ Constitution in the ruination of the once public friendly service, shouldn’t be swept under the carpet. The deterioration of the police should be examined, taking into consideration extremely serious lapses on the part of the Attorney General’s Department in the run up to the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks. Although, Gunaratne never referred to the AG’s Department lapses that may have given the NTJ the time and the space to mount near simultaneous suicide attacks on six unprotected targets.

 

A shocking injustice

‘Perils of a Profession’ is the story of incredulity. Having suffered in the hands of the UNP as a result of him being dubbed an SLFPer, Gunaratne, in the wake of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s victory in 1994, was targeted over his alleged role in the Batalanda torture chamber. In spite of Gunaratne being cleared by way of an investigation carried out by the police at the behest of the Presidential Commission that probed Batalanda, the top cop was placed on compulsory leave. Gunaratne speculated whether the then government sent him on compulsory leave to pave the way for Lucky Kodituwakku to succeed retiring IGP Rajaguru. Gunaratne questioned how Kodituwakku, having resigned, following a rather short career, returned in the wake of the People’s Alliance (PA) victory to take the top post.

Gunaratne had no qualms in discussing perks and privileges enjoyed by the senior officers. The top layer seems to be having a good time. With a section of the department given special status, the others appear to be going ahead with their own projects. Last year’s exposure of the Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB) dealing in heroin is a grim reminder of the appalling state of affairs. The releasing of Easter Sunday terror suspect, Riyaj Bathiudeen, held by the CID in late Oct 2020, raised many an eyebrow. Let us hope the ‘Perils of a Profession’ really jolts the Public Security Ministry.

However, some may not buy Gunaratne’s narration. Critics may find fault with Gunaratne simply because some of the people he is now freely writing about are no longer alive. The author cannot deny the fact that he enjoyed the ride as the head of intelligence, under the UNP, for quite a long period, at a time the NIB was dubbed No Information Bureau.

The police top brass cannot absolve themselves of their failure to prevent the ‘83 riots. Sri Lanka paid a very heavy price for that dastardly violence. Were the police taking orders from outside interests to cause a calamity here? The same thing happened in the run up to the Easter Sunday carnage and thereafter when Sinhala mobs went after ordinary Muslims. Both the police and the Army simply did not act even when mobs came in their hundreds on motorcycles from outside to places like Minuwangoda. Did the cops fire a single shot towards those rampaging mobs? Even our then big talking Army Commander Mahesh Senanayake did nothing.

Police had been always bumming those in power and this was a practice coming down from the colonial period. They were no angels prior to ‘77.

Whatever the shortcomings of President Wijetunga, he should receive the kudos for refusing to fix the election against Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, in 1994. Normally the UNP was famous for stealing elections up to then.

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Midweek Review

The Curtain Falls

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By Lynn Ockersz

Battered by ghoulish violence,

The towering citadel of democracy,

Stands desolate and forlorn,

Its glow dramatically dulled,

Its iconic status seriously in doubt,

And the realization dawns fast,

That a ruling idea has come crashing down.

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Midweek Review

Artistic mitigation of viral impact on education

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PATOC 2020: Performing Arts in the Time of Corona

This international conference further created a platform for many administrators and policymakers to discuss and debate how to facilitate and develop infrastructure allowing for a better online learning experience. It also allowed academics to reconsider how Covid-19 has altered teaching, learning, and assessment methods, and how technology has intervened in the teaching and learning experience. In general, a majority of academics and researchers are still not in a position decide whether the changes happening in academic spheres and the intervention of technology to deliver subject content are to be fully accepted.

 

By Saumya Liyanage and Nipuni Sharada Pathirage

According to a recent report issued by the World Health Organization (WHO), after more than twelve months of battling the pandemic, more than 75 million people worldwide have been infected by the coronavirus while 1.6 million deaths have been reported worldwide (Who.int, 2019). In late 2019, coronavirus was first found in the Wuhan City, Hubei Province of China and within a short period, it spread rapidly around the globe, hampering human interactions and mobility. Economic, political, and social activities have slowed down, and many cities, townships, and regional areas have been isolated.

Numerous political, economic and social issues have cropped up during this health crisis (Liyanage, 2020a, Liyanage, 2020b), and the education sector is paralyded (Kaufman, Brodeur and McGlone, 2020, Asia Society, 2020). For the last twelve months, teaching in schools and universities in Sri Lanka has been affected and online learning and teaching activities have been introduced. In order to sustain undergraduate education, universities have introduced online learning platforms to engage with their teaching, learning, and assessment activities. Students are also engaging in e-learning modes and academic activities, weekly meetings, lectures, conferences, and even symposia are also being transformed into online and virtual. The face-to-face engagement and tangibility of human interactions in performing arts education are becoming scarce.

 

Performing Arts and the Pandemic

The University of Visual and Performing Arts (UVPA) is the only university in the country dedicated to undergraduate and postgraduate studies in music, dance, drama, and visual arts. The UVPA has also been affected by Covid-19 pandemic measures, and the health emergency adversely impacted the undergraduate activities in four Faculties of the University. It has particularly disrupted the teacher-disciple engagement, which is essential for learning performing arts. Live corporeal presence in performing arts learning has been altered by virtual bodily presence. These virtual bodies are accompanied by amplified human voices mixed with ambience generated through online technologies. Continual disruptions to the Internet, time lapses between the teacher and student, ambiguity of virtual presence, monologic narratives, narcissistic embarrassments, and the gaze of the ‘Other’ are becoming norms in the ‘new normalcy’ of the world.

As a premiere institution for performing arts education in Sri Lanka, UVPA has been forced to deliver subject content through online platforms. Offering university education, especially performing arts, through distance learning is still a contested and provocative idea among academics and students (Simamora, 2020). While some academics argue that the only solution to continue undergraduate education during pandemic restriction is to introduce online platforms, others are still not convinced that these online platforms could be a wiser solution to the ongoing crisis of performing arts education. However, with the advent of the pandemic and its impact upon ongoing learning activities in Universities, research on delivering performing arts through online modes such as Zoom conferencing, Learning Management Systems (LMS), Google Classroom or Microsoft Teams have become a key topic for many research papers published (Demuyakor, 2020, DeWitt et al., 2013, Kindelan, 2010, Simamora, 2020). These discussions undoubtedly contribute to the ongoing debate about online learning and virtual experience in performing arts education in the higher education sector. The culmination of this debate at the UVPA Colombo was the two-day international conference organized by the Faculty of Dance and Drama, which took place on the 21st and 22nd of December via Zoom technology.

 

PATOC 2020

Facing daily pandemic measures and also converting and continuing traditional performing arts pedagogy on an online platform was a novel but challenging task for academics at the Faculty of Dance and Drama at UVPA Colombo. The methods of distance learning and technology were relatively new to both academics and students of the Faculty. During the first wave of the pandemic, academics attended workshops and seminars to identify the capacity of distance learning and exploring new methods and strategies of delivering performing arts content online. In this context, the Dean of the Faculty of Dance and Drama, Dr Indika Ferdinando came up with the idea of an online international conference to discuss and debate on various aspects of e-learning and performance practice. The action team of the conference and the Faculty web committee decided to use this opportunity as a space for discussing the impact of Covid-19 on performing arts education and practice particularly in Sri Lankan universities and explore how other stakeholders and institutions are grappling with the current situation.

The theme of the conference was Performing Arts in the Time of Corona: The Impact of Covid-19 pandemic on Performing Arts education and practice (PATOC). The PATOC International conference invited practitioners, academics, students, and researchers all over the world to present their abstracts on the theme. The online conference commenced on 21 December 2020 with Dr Indika Ferdinando delivering the welcome speech and spelling out the objectives of the event. The chief guest of the conference, the Vice-Chancellor of UVPA, Senior Professor Rohana P. Mahaliayanaarachchi delivered the inaugural speech about the therapeutic value of performing arts. There were three keynote speeches on both days: Prof. William Peterson from Flinders University, Kalakeerthi Ravibandhu Vidyapathy and Professor Adrian McNeil from Monash University delivered their keynote speeches. The first event of the PATOC conference was the keynote by Prof. William Peterson from Flinders University, South Australia and this session was chaired by Prof. Saumya Liyanage. Prof. Peterson discussed how a group of artists challenges the codependency of Covid-19 and suggests new ways of living, and practices creative arts in this pandemic time. The afternoon session of the day started with the keynote speech of one of the eminent dance practitioners and artists in Sri Lanka, Ravibandhu Vidyapathy, who suggested that dance practitioners should move to open spaces, use basic technical devices to create minimalist dance that glorify the aesthetics of artistically extended human movements and celebrate the dance art. This keynote session was chaired by Dr Anasuya Subasinghe. The second day of the conference started with another keynote speech delivered by Prof. Adrian McNeil from Monash University, Australia. This keynote session was chaired by Dr Priyeshni Peiris. Prof. McNeil discussed the impact of Covid-19 on the music industry considering two music festivals: St. Kilda Festival in Melbourne and the Swar Samrat Festival in Kolkata. Taking them as case studies, he concluded that universities have responsibilities to sustain and practice diverse musical heritages and find ways to cope with social and natural catastrophes.

Each day was designed with two parallel sessions consisting of blind-reviewed papers selected by a group of academics. Eight-minute-long PowerPoint presentations were recorded by researchers, and during the sessions the technical staff played them to avoid technical interruptions. There was a five-minute online Q&A session after each presentation and the presenter was asked to be online at this point to respond to the comments and questions for the presentation. To conclude the two-day online conference, a panel discussion was organised and it was chaired by Prof. Saumya Liyanage. The theme of the discussion was ‘Potential alternative modes of practicing and teaching performing arts during the pandemic’. Prof. William Peterson, Professor Adrian McNeil, Dr Or Kittikong and Dr. Chinthaka Maddegoda presented as panelists. Approximately 140 participants were registered for both days of the conference.

For two days, academics, practitioners, postgraduate students and undergraduates from various institutions in the country and abroad shared their thoughts and research findings at the PATOC conference. Some quantitative research was presented at the conference exploring the impact of Covid-19 on performing arts education, as well as the perspectives of academics and students on teaching-learning performing arts through online methods. Most of the papers asserted that physical distancing had affected the traditional systems of performing arts education and practice. Also these papers concluded that there are limitations of sustaining the collectiveness and the liveness of performing arts when delivering content through online modes. Some papers came up with innovative ideas to overcome these challenges. For instance a group of researchers introduced effective ways of using video materials and sound technology in performing arts education though the general conception of online technology was negative. While some papers emphasised the value and importance of embracing the new digital technology and virtual performance to sustain the industry, some researchers promoted solo performances as a new way of skill development in performing arts learning.

The role of performing arts as a medium of promoting social awareness, or as a therapy and tool for developing mental stability and reducing phobias during the pandemic were some of the key points shared. Researchers in general implied that performing arts educators and practitioners needed to adapt to the ‘new normal’ and to think out of the box to design alternative modes and practice.

Prof. Peterson at the final plenary session discussed the current crisis of arts and cultural studies in major universities in Australia and the challenges they faced in restructuring departments and reviewing existing theatre music and dance studies. It was evident that it is not only the pandemic that has challenged the existing performing arts education and industry but other socio-political forces are also in place to destabilise the sustainable progression of performing arts education. Dr Chinthaka Maddegoda, an academic working at the Faculty of Music further explored the pandemic situation and current declining gurukul or gharana traditions in teaching performing arts.

Dr Maddegoda emphasised that the current health crisis had created opportunities to liberate traditional teacher-centered learning, and opened up democratic spaces. Prof. Adrian McNeil raised several vital questions related to the declining cultural economy by comparing two global cultural venues namely Calcutta and Melbourne, Australia. As Prof. McNeil further argued, with the new normality, the reconfiguration of cultural practices and their discursive implications and reconfiguration of the idea of aesthetics in the new era of performing arts should also be revisited and reconsidered. Dr Or Kittikong from Khon Kaen University, Thailand, further discussed the limitations and also opportunities in teaching performing arts during corona pandemic measures. Her main concern was the issues pertaining to the failure of co-presence of student-teacher conundrum in the classroom setting. With governments imposing measures to maintain social distancing and other health rituals, performing arts teaching and performance practices are becoming social taboos. Some of the vital elements in performing arts such as collaborating, engaging, creating, communication, critiquing, and enacting are becoming alienated concepts.

 

Conclusion

The PATOC 2020, Performing Arts in the Time of Corona, online international conference brought various artistes, practitioners, scholars, and students who are currently working, studying, and conducting research on performing arts and its related disciplines into a single forum where they share their stories in the time of a pandemic. This international conference further created a platform for many administrators and policymakers to discuss and debate about how to facilitate and develop infrastructure allowing for a better online learning experience. It allowed academics to reconsider how Covid-19 has altered teaching, learning, and assessment methods, and how technology has intervened in the teaching and learning experience. In general, a majority of academics and researchers are still not in a position decide whether the changes happening in academic spheres and the intervention of technology to deliver subject content are to be fully accepted. However, with the pandemic situation and the lack of physical presence of students and teachers in the university premises, alternative e-learning is the only way to continue performing arts education and practice. Yet, it is worthwhile to note that the corporeal presence and its on-site contact with the audience are still vital elements for a successful development of the discipline.

 

Acknowledgements

The authors of this article wish to acknowledge the Vice Chancellor Senior Professor Rohana P. Mahaliyanaarachchi, the Dean, Faculty of Dance and Drama, Dr Indika Ferdinando, the PATOC 2020 conference committee members. Further, the authors wish to thank Himansi Dehigama and Sachini Seneviratne for proofreading this paper.

About authors: Prof. Saumya Liyanage is an actor and academic currently working as a Professor in theatre and drama, Faculty of Dance and Drama, UVPA, Colombo. Nipuni Sharada Pathirage is an actress and academic currently working as a probationary lecturer attached to the Department of Drama Oriental Ballet and Modern Dance, UVPA Colombo.

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