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Port City Project – Will it generate confidence amongst investors?

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By Raj Gonsalkorale

Sri Lankan politics has not witnessed bi-partisan agreement amongst the major political parties on key issues that impact on the people of the country, the present generations and many more to come.

There has never been bi-partisan agreement on foreign policy, on education, on health at least at the highest policy levels. Personality politics has dominated the political landscape and it has always been about the plaudits, or damage, a policy-decision might make on a personality and as a consequence on the party or parties that person represents, and eventually whether or not that individual or the party would win the next election, and ones after that.

This absence of bi-partisan agreement has now extended to one of Sri Lanka’s most daring, controversial to many and an out of the box venture, the Port City project. The absence of such agreement, and the statements made by the current Opposition that they will amend the Port Commission Bill is bound to unsettle many would-be investors. They will be wondering what would happen to their investments if the current regime is defeated at the next election and the terms and conditions in which they invested should change after four years or so. The investment period horizon would then be four years. It does not need an Einstein to conclude that investors would be very hesitant to invest in any long term project in such a climate.

The statement of the Opposition is not being questioned here as they have rightly said that although the constitutionality of the bill has been adjudicated by the Supreme Court, amendments made, but the policy contentions had not been addressed and amendments they had brought in had been rejected by the government. It is also not clear whether the amended bill, incorporated with the Supreme Court determined amendments, had been presented to the Parliament. The public certainly has not seen the amended bill.

 

Bona fides of Opposition

The bona fides of the current Opposition of course is questionable, as they were the government in 2016 when they signed a tripartite agreement with the China Harbour Engineering Company and the UDA to develop the Port City into what they termed the “Colombo International Financial City, which will be in the centre of the maritime city, will be one of the key phenomenon which will decide the future development of Sri Lanka” according to the then Megapolis Minister Champika Ranawaka at the signing of the tripartite agreement. He added that the project would also fuel the planned Maritime city, Aero city, Tech city, Industrial cities and Tourist cities. That agreement has not been made public to the best of the writer’s knowledge.

The Port City project and the Port City Commission are major undertakings that will bind many future generations to its positives, but more importantly to any possible negatives as well. It would not be out of place to say that the politics associated with this futuristic project could have been handled better in a more transparent and consultative manner.

In the first place, the origin of this project, the agreement signed with China, signed by the Presidents of China and Sri Lanka in 2014, to reclaim an area of the sea and to create a Port City, was not tabled in Parliament for discussion as far as can be ascertained.

Reports indicate that the project concept goes back to 2011 and construction was set to begin in March 2011 but due to several circumstances the project had been stopped. In mid-2012, the Sri Lankan Port Authority (SLPA) announced that the construction of the then Colombo Port City project would commence on 17 September 2014. The budget was estimated to be $15 billion.

The reclamation was to be carried out by China Harbour Engineering Corporation, who has been engaged by the investor. The land given to the government was 125 hectares (310 acres), as well as 88 hectares (220 acres), while owned by the government, was planned to be leased for 99 years to the Chinese company. Twenty hectares (49 acres) was planned to be given freehold to the Chinese company.

Construction of the Colombo Port City project was launched on 17 September 2014 by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

 

Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration

The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government that was elected in 2015 suspended the project on environmental grounds, but it is understood that this was granted approval again in 2016 having agreed to pay a penalty of USD 100 million to the Chinese company for the delay encountered in proceeding with construction as per a country to country agreement. It is learnt that in exchange for not paying this penalty, the Hambantota Harbour was sold or given on a long term 99-year lease virtually on a platter.

On August 12, 2016 the tripartite pact to construct a mega port city was signed between Sri Lanka’s Urban Development Authority, the Ministry of Megapolis and Western Development and the China Harbour Engineering Company, and as far as known, this agreement too has not been tabled before the Parliament.

With the signing of the agreement, the Colombo Port City Development Project was newly renamed the Colombo International Financial City with the government stating that the project would transform Sri Lanka into an international financial hub in the Indian Ocean region.

It is still not very clear as to the extent of land involved in this project as different extents have been mentioned in different agreements. It is also not clear whether whatever land extent has been registered with the land registry. Clarity on these will be useful.

While there is no indication that any of these two agreements had been tabled and ratified by Parliament, these two occasions are not the first time Parliament had not ratified binding agreements, if indeed they had been tabled in Parliament. The Ceasefire Agreement that Prime Minister Wickramasinghe signed with LTTE Leader Prabakaran in 2002 was not tabled in Parliament, and in fact not even known to the Executive President of the country at that time Chandrika Kumaratunga who saw the agreement after it had been signed by Wickramasinghe and Prabakaran. The consequences of that agreement are well known today.

In this backdrop comes the Port City Commission bill. While it is true that there was an opportunity for litigants to go before the Supreme Court to ascertain the validity of the bill with the Constitution, the people’s representatives, however low they are in their credibility in the eyes of the people, and neither the business community, and civil society leaders, were given an opportunity to consider the policy aspects of the bill in some depth and to work together to make it a national project of great importance to the country.

The SJB, and the residue of the UNP, as well as those who supported the Yahapalanaya government in 2016, cannot afford to oppose this bill in principle while they have the right to oppose sections of it if they differ with what they agreed to in 2016. As stated earlier, the writer stands corrected if the government and the Opposition could clarify to the public whether these important agreements were in fact discussed in Parliament and whether any attempt was made to have bi-partisan agreement on them. Besides being an important consideration for the public in Sri Lanka, it would be vital to generate confidence amongst would-be investors in the Port City project, for long term projects. Unless there can be such a bi-partisan agreement, it is unlikely that the objective of large and long term investments will be met in this project.

 

Philosophical arguments

While some may entertain philosophical arguments against the concept of the Port City, and suspicions and fears about China getting an extended foothold in Sri Lanka, it is also true that Sri Lanka needs to raise its economic platform if the future generations are to enjoy the opportunities they need and deserve in years to come. The current economic platform, based on Tea, Rubber, Coconut and other agricultural exports, Apparel and IT products and services exports, foreign remittances, and tourism, is very volatile and inadequate to meet future challenges associated with investments required for infrastructure development, service improvements and social upliftment.

 

Need for different approach

The longer term future of tea and rubber is uncertain, and foreign remittances may not be long lasting even once the COVID-19 pandemic subsides. Sri Lanka needs a different approach and lateral thinking on economic policies if it is to free itself from debt and generate enough revenue to service its infrastructure development and service improvements. Besides the Port City project, there is no other innovative project that has been presented for discussion that would address the future economic needs of the country. While the management of its politics has left much room for improvement and some policy aspects may need adjustment, the fact remains that there is nothing else on the table to compare it with.

While it is not a critique of the bill itself, as the writer feels that should be left to the politicians as well as experts who are more competent to do so, there are a few questions pertaining to the clauses 64 and 65 in the agreement that needs some clarification as there appears to be a legal provision in the bill to extend the authority of the Port Commission to land associated with projects approved by the Commission, beyond the reclaimed land area that constitutes the Port City. In addition, these clauses appear to make the Board of Investments (BOI) irrelevant and an unnecessary entity as all its activities, past, present and future could easily be managed by the Port Commission.

A. Firstly, what does section 65. (1) mean? It says, “from and after the date of commencement of this Act, all land comprising the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City, shall be vested with the Commission in the manner set out in subsection (3)”. Subsection (3) reads as follows. “For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby stated that on the coming into operation of this Act, the President may, issue a Land Grant under the Crown Lands Ordinance (Chapter 454) in the name of the Commission, in respect of all land comprising the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City as set out in Schedule I to this Act.”

Lease

It is understood that President Sirisena by way of a gazette notification granted a land deed for the reclaimed land in favour of the UDA as mentioned by Presidents counsel Jayantha Weerasinghe at a recent press conference. The land given to the UDA on this grant apparently was leased out to the Chinese company by the UDA in 2016.

Is it to be understood that as per section 65, the present President is giving another grant of the same land to the Port Commission under section 65 when the land is owned by the UDA and leased to the Chinese company? This convoluted situation may not be accurate, and it would be good if the government could clarify this.

None of these land deeds have been registered as far as known and therefore no one has been able to peruse them and ascertain the status of the grants and deeds. No wonder the Public is confused. It is also understood that the gazette which contains the deed signed by President Sirisena has the new plan as per the tripartite agreement under Cadastral system. It would be helpful if these documents are made available to the public. If the above confusion could be cleared, this subsection and what is referred to in Section 65 of the gazette notification looks harmless and innocuous if it is read as it is without any reference to any other Section.

B. However, a question does arise as to what this Section (65) and Subsection (3) mean in effect?

Is it that only the reclaimed land area referred to as the Port City, will be vested with the Commission? If not, what other land?

Some confusion and doubt does occur when it is read in conjunction with Section 64 which reads as follows. Clause 64

(1) The Commission may, where it considers necessary to do so, as an interim measure, permit an authorised person to engage in business from a designated location in Sri Lanka, outside the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City, as may be approved by the President or in the event that the subject of the Colombo Port City is assigned to a Minister, such Minister, for a period not exceeding five years from the date of commencement of this Act. Such business shall, for such period of five years be entitled to all the privileges accorded to, and be deemed for all purposes to be, a business situated within and engaged in business, in and from, the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City.

(2) Where an authorised person has been permitted to engage in business from a designated location in Sri Lanka, outside the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City in terms of subsection (1), such business shall be subject to the provisions of this Act and any regulations made hereunder.

This Section raises two questions

1. Would such a project have to be approved by the Authority, meaning, will it have to be a new project and not an existing project? Does this not virtually open any part of the country for such a project to be located for five years? If so, effectively, the Authority has islandwide authority for five years for approved projects. In this event, what is the role of the BOI, and why should projects seek approval from the BOI?

2. When this is read in conjunction with Section 65 and subsection (3) does it mean that not only the reclaimed land but also any land allocated for an approved project for five years under clause 64 could also be vested with the Authority for five years with President issuing a Land Grant under the Crown Lands Ordinance (Chapter 454) in the name of the Commission?

C. Section 65, subsection (2) reads as follows – “Where any deed of transfer, indenture of lease, agreement or other similar document has been executed in respect of any land situated within the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City, prior to the date of commencement of this Act, by the Urban Development Authority, established under the Urban Development Authority Law, No. 41 of 1978, such deed of transfer, lease, agreement or other similar document shall, from and after the date of the commencement of this Act, be deemed for all purposes to be a document executed by the Commission, in terms of the provisions of this Act and be valid and effectual as if executed hereunder.”

The Port Commission Act has just been passed by the Parliament. In relation to this clause, besides the land that was leased to the Chinese company by the UDA in 2016, is it to be understood that there are projects approved by the UDA or any other body on land within the Area of the Authority? Is this clause to be understood as extending to projects already approved by the UDA, with some projects located outside the Port City precincts (as per Section 64) the benefits referred to in Section 65?

It would be useful if the government tables a list of such projects so approved and their operational locations as the country has a right to know which project, located where, is to benefit from terms in Section 65.

These clauses, their meaning and effects need clarification as confusion does arise about the extent of authority the Port Commission has over land outside the Port city itself, even if it’s for five years. The potential does exist for the Port Commission to approve investment projects with say the headquarters office located in the Port City, but actual projects located anywhere else in the country, and enjoying all privileges and benefits accorded to the project irrespective of where its operations are located. Theoretically, far-fetched it may be, the possibility exists for hundreds of foreign companies to have their projects approved by the Port Commission, with their operations located in any part of the country. The consequences of this possibility needs to be considered especially from the point of view of the impact on local farmers (if the projects are agriculture based) or industrialists who will not enjoy the benefits enjoyed by projects registered with the Port Commission.

Considering all of above, the extraordinary powers granted to the President of the country to make far reaching and binding decisions on what may turn out to be a sizeable component of the country’s economy could have the potential to be detrimental rather than beneficial to the long term interests of the country should the Presidency be in the hands of a person not entirely suitable to hold that office. Avenues for greater accountability of decisions made by the Port Commission and the President of the country have to be considered from this point of view.



Features

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part I

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President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev after signing the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, signalling the end of the Cold War

Sri Lanka’s survival and independence have historically depended on accurately identifying foreign policy priorities, selecting viable strategies as a small island state, and advancing them with prudence. This requires an objective assessment of the shifting geopolitical landscape through a distinctly Sri Lankan strategic lens. Consequently, foreign policy has been central to Sri Lanka’s statecraft, warranted by its pivotal location in the Indian Ocean—adjacent to South Asia yet separated by a narrow stretch of water.

Amid pivotal geopolitical transformations in motion across South Asia, in the Indian Ocean, and beyond, the formulation and implementation of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has never been more critical to its national security. Despite the pressing need for a cohesive policy framework, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, over the past few decades, has struggled to effectively respond to the challenges posed by shifting geopolitical dynamics. This article examines the evolution of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and its inconsistencies amid shifting geopolitical dynamics since the end of the Cold War.

First

, the article examines geopolitical shifts in three key spaces—South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the global arena—since the end of the Cold War, from Sri Lanka’s strategic perspective. Building on this, second, it analyses Sri Lanka’s foreign policy responses, emphasising its role as a key instrument of statecraft. Third, it explores the link between Sri Lanka’s foreign policy dilemmas during this period and the ongoing crisis of the post-colonial state. Finally, the article concludes that while geopolitical constraints persist, Sri Lanka’s ability to adopt a more proactive foreign policy depends on internal political and economic reforms that strengthen democracy and inclusivity.

Shifting South Asian Strategic Dynamics

Geopolitical concerns in South Asia—Sri Lanka’s immediate sphere—take precedence, as the country is inherently tied to the Indo-centric South Asian socio-cultural milieu. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has long faced challenges in navigating its relationship with India, conditioned by a perceived disparity in power capabilities between the two countries. This dynamic has made the ‘India factor’ a persistent consideration in Sri Lanka’s strategic thinking. As Ivor Jennings observed in 1951, ‘India thus appears as a friendly but potentially dangerous neighbour, to whom one must be polite but a little distant’ (Jennings, 1951, 113).The importance of managing the ‘India Factor’ in Sri Lankan foreign policy has grown further with India’s advancements in military strength, economic development, and the knowledge industry, positioning it as a rising global great power on Sri Lanka’s doorstep.

India’s Strategic Rise

Over the past three decades, South Asia’s geopolitical landscape has undergone a profound transformation, driven by India’s strategic rise as a global great power. Barry Buzan (2002:2) foresees this shift within the South Asian regional system as a transition from asymmetric bipolarity to India-centric unipolarity. India’s continuous military advancements have elevated it to the fourth position in the Global Firepower (GFP) index, highlighting its formidable conventional war-making capabilities across land, sea, and air (Global Firepower, 2024). It currently lays claims to being the world’s third-largest military, the fourth-largest Air Force, and the fifth-largest Navy.

India consistently ranks among the fastest-growing major economies, often surpassing the global average. According to Forbes India, India is projected to be the world’s fifth-largest economy in 2025, with a real GDP growth rate of 6.5% (Forbes, January 10, 2025). India’s strategic ascendance is increasingly driven by its advancements in the knowledge industry. The country is actively embracing the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and emerging as the Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) hub of South Asia. However, India’s rise has a paradoxical impact on its neighbours. On one hand, it offers them an opportunity to integrate into a rapidly expanding economic engine. On the other, it heightens concerns over India’s dominance, leaving them feeling increasingly overshadowed by the regional giant.

Despite significant geo-strategic transformations, the longstanding antagonism and strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan have persisted into the new millennium, continuing to shape South Asia’s security landscape. Born in 1947 amid mutual hostility, the two countries remained locked in a multi-dimensional conflict encompassing territorial disputes, power equilibrium, threat perceptions, accusations of interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and divergent foreign policy approaches. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both countries in 1998 added a new dimension to their rivalry.

The SAARC process has been a notable casualty of the enduring Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Since India’s boycott of the Islamabad Summit in response to the 2016 Uri attack in Kashmir, the SAARC process has remained in limbo. Countries like Sri Lanka, which seek to maintain equally amicable relations with both India and Pakistan, often find themselves in awkward positions due to the ongoing rivalry between them. One of the key challenges for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is maintaining strong relations with Pakistan while ensuring its ties with India remain unaffected. India now actively promotes regional cooperation bodies in South Asia, excluding Pakistan, favouring broader frameworks such as BIMSTEC. While Sri Lanka can benefit greatly from engaging with these regional initiatives, it must carefully navigate its involvement to avoid inadvertently aligning with India’s efforts to contain Pakistan. Maintaining this balance will require sharp diplomatic acumen.

India’s expansive naval strategy, especially its development of onshore naval infrastructure, has positioned Sri Lanka within its maritime sphere of influence. As part of the Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan (MIPP) launched in 2015 to enhance operational readiness and surveillance capabilities, India is developing an alternative nuclear submarine base for the Eastern Command under Project Varsha (Deccan Chronicle, 22.11.2016). This base is located in Rambilli village, 50 km southwest of Visakhapatnam and 1,200 km from Colombo (Chang, 2024). Additionally, INS Dega, the naval air base at Visakhapatnam, is being expanded to accommodate Vikrant’s MiG-29K and Tejas fighter aircraft.

Another key strategic development in India’s ascent that warrants serious attention in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy formulation is India’s progress in missile delivery systems (ICBMs and SLBMs) and nuclear-powered submarines. In 1998, India made it clear that its future nuclear deterrence would be based on a nuclear triad consisting of land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers (Rehman, 2015). Since then, India has steadily advanced in this direction. The expansion of India’s missile delivery systems, including ICBMs and SLBMs, serves as a reminder that Sri Lanka exists under the strategic shadow of a major global power.

The development of India’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) accelerated after 2016. The first in this class, INS Arihant (S2), was commissioned in August 2016, followed by the launch of INS Arighat in November 2021. Designed for strategic deterrence, INS Arighat is equipped to carry the Sagarika K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), with a range of 3,500 kilometers, as well as the K-5, a long-range SLBM capable of reaching 5,000 kilometers. The submarine is based at INS Varsha (Deb, 2021).

India has significantly advanced its missile delivery systems, improving both their range and precision. In 2021, it successfully tested the Agni-5, a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers. On March 11, 2024, India joined the ranks of global powers possessing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology (The Hindu, January 4, 2022). These advancements elevate the Bay of Bengal as a pivotal arena in the naval competition between India and China, carrying profound political and strategic implications for Sri Lanka, which seeks to maintain equally friendly relations with both countries.

Further, India’s remarkable strides in space research have cemented its status as a global power. A defining moment in this journey was the historic lunar landing on 23 August 2023, when Chandrayaan-3 successfully deployed two robotic marvels: the Vikram lander and its companion rover, Pragyan. They made a graceful touchdown in the Moon’s southern polar region, making India the fourth nation to achieve a successful lunar landing. This milestone has further reinforced India’s position as an emerging great power, enhancing its credentials to assert itself more confidently in South Asian, Indian Ocean, and global power dynamics.

India envisions a stable and secure South Asia as essential to its emergence as a great power in the Indian Ocean and global strategic arenas. However, it does not consider Pakistan to be a part of this stability that it seeks. Accordingly, when India launched the ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ in 2008 to strengthen regional ties, Pakistan was excluded. India’s ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ gained renewed momentum after 2015 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. His approach to South Asia is embedded in a broader narrative emphasising the deep-rooted cultural, economic, and social exchanges between India and other South Asian countries over centuries. India’s promotion of heritage tourism, particularly the ‘Ramayana Trail’ in Sri Lanka, should be viewed through this strategic lens as part of its broader strategic narrative.

Evolving Indian Ocean Geo-political Dynamics

The Indian Ocean constitutes the next geopolitical frame for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. The Indian Ocean is a huge bay bordered by the Afro-Asian landmass and Australia on three sides and the South Asian peninsula extends into the Indian Ocean basin centrally. Situated at the southern tip of South Asia, Sri Lanka extends strategically into the heart of the Indian Ocean, shaping its geopolitical significance and strategic imperatives for maintaining sovereignty. Historically, Sri Lanka has often been caught in the power struggles of extra-regional actors in the Indian Ocean, repeatedly at the expense of its independence.

Sri Lanka’s leadership at the time of independence was acutely aware of the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean for the nation’s survival. The first Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake, who was also the Minister of Defence and External Affair, stated in Parliament that: “We are in a dangerous position, because we are on one of the strategic highways of the world. The country that captures Ceylon would dominate the Indian Ocean. Nor is it only a question of protecting ourselves against invasion and air attack. If we have no imports for three months, we would starve, and we have therefore to protect our sea and air communications” (Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Representative. Vol. I, 1 December 1947, c. 444)

As naval competition between superpowers during the Cold War extended to the Indian Ocean, following the British naval withdrawal in the late 1960s, Sri Lanka, under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, played a key diplomatic role in keeping the region free from extra-regional naval rivalry by mobilising the countries that were members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In 1971, Sri Lanka sponsored a proposal at the UN General Assembly to establish the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ). While the initiative initially gained traction, it stalled at the committee stage and ultimately lost momentum.

The maritime security architecture of the Indian Ocean entered a new phase after the end of the Cold War. The United States became the single superpower in the Indian Ocean with an ocean-wide naval presence bolstered by the fully fledged Diego Garcia base. Correspondingly, the regional strategic linkages that evolved in the context of the Cold War were eventually dismantled, giving way to new strategic relationships. Additionally, three key developments with profound implications for Sri Lanka should be noted: India’s projection of political and naval power into the deeper Indian Ocean, China’s rapid economic and military rise in the region, and the entry of other extra-regional powers into Indian Ocean politics. Although Sri Lanka adopted a broader strategic perspective and a more proactive foreign policy in the 1970s, its approach to geopolitical developments in the Indian Ocean in the post-Cold War era became increasingly shaped by domestic challenges—particularly countering the LTTE threat and addressing post-war exigencies.

India’s Expanding Naval Diplomatic Role in the Indian Ocean

Parallel to its strategic rise, India has intensified its engagement in the broader strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean with renewed vigor. This expansion extends beyond its traditional focus on the South Asian strategic theatre, reflecting a more assertive and multidimensional approach to regional security, economic connectivity, and maritime diplomacy. India’s active participation in multilateral security frameworks, infrastructure investments in critical maritime hubs and strategic alignments with major global powers signify its role in the changing naval security architecture of the Indian Ocean. India’s shifting strategic posture in the Indian Ocean is reflected in the 2015 strategy document Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. It broadens the definition of India’s maritime neighbors beyond those sharing maritime boundaries to include all nations within the Indian Ocean region (Ensuring Secure Seas, p. 23).

In 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched his signature Indian Ocean diplomacy initiative, Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) to foster trust and transparency, uphold international maritime norms, respect mutual interests, resolve disputes peacefully, and enhance maritime cooperation. Strategic engagement with the littoral states in the Indian Ocean region, especially Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius and Madagascar has emerged as a key component of India’s Indian Ocean naval diplomacy.

The Seychelles archipelago, located approximately 600 miles east of the Diego Garcia base, holds particular significance in India’s maritime strategy. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to Seychelles in March 2015, India and Seychelles signed four agreements. A key strategic outcome of the visit was Seychelles’ agreement to lease Assumption Island, one of its 115 islands, to India—a move that reinforced Seychelles’ alignment with India’s broader naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean

Similarly, Mauritius holds a central position in India’s naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Mauritius in March 2015, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Mauritius to establish a new base on North Agalega Island, a 12-kilometer-long and 1.5-kilometer-wide Island. The base is crucial for air and surface maritime patrols in the southwest Indian Ocean. It will also serve as an intelligence outpost. In September 2016, defense and security cooperation between India and Mauritius deepened alongside the signing of the ‘Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Partnership Agreement’ (CECPA).

India’s expanding strategic interests across the Indian Ocean are reflected in its growing economic, educational, and defense collaborations with Madagascar. In 2007, India established its first overseas listening post in northern Madagascar to monitor shipping activities and intercept marine communications in the Indian Ocean. This initiative provided India with a naval foothold near South Africa and key sea-lanes in the southwestern Indian Ocean. The significance of India’s defense ties with Madagascar is further highlighted by Madagascar’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As a crucial hub along the Maritime Silk Road connecting Africa, Madagascar’s strategic importance is underscored in the broader geopolitical landscape.

Another element of India’s expanding naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean is its participation in both unilateral and multilateral anti-piracy operations. India’s commitment to regional security was reinforced in 2008 when it established a ‘Strategic Partnership’ with Oman, securing berthing and replenishment facilities for its navy, along with a strategically significant listening post in the Western Indian Ocean. India’s naval presence in the Arabian Gulf gains additional significance amid reports of a new Chinese naval base in Djibouti and recent submarine deployments. Successful anti-piracy missions in the western Indian Ocean underscore India’s growing influence in the region’s evolving naval security architecture.

India increasingly views its vast Diaspora as a soft power tool to bolster its status as an Indian Ocean power. In June 2014, it launched the Mausam project to reinforce its cultural ties across the region, showcasing its heritage, traditions, and contributions to global arts, literature, cinema, yoga, and cuisine. This initiative complements India’s expanding naval diplomacy and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. Over the years, it has established listening facilities, airfields, and port infrastructure in key locations such as northern Madagascar, Agaléga Island (Mauritius), and Assumption Island (Seychelles). This has led India Today to ask: “Could this mark the emergence of an Indian ‘String of Flowers’ to counter China’s ‘String of Pearls’?” (The be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella

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Greener Pastures, Mental Health and Deception in Marriage:

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Exploring Sunethra Rajakarunanayake’s Visachakayo

Sunethra Rajakarunanayake’s Sinhala novel Visachakayo (published in 2023) is a thriller in its own sense due to its daring exploration of social themes that modern Sinhala writers fail to touch. To me, the novel is a mosaic that explores pressing issues that middle-class Sri Lankans go through in the 21st Century. The narrative is seen from the perspective of Akshara, a Tamil girl whom the reader first meets in an infamous ‘Visa Queue’ to get her passport to go to England.

Akshara lives with her grandmother ‘Ammamma’ and her aunt ‘Periyamma’ (the younger sister of her mother). Both Ammamma and Periyamma look after her in the absence of her mother, Chinthamani who passed away a long time ago. Akshara’s father lives in Jaffna, with the kids of the second marriage. Later, we are told that Akshara’s father had to marry the second wife due to the loss of his wife’s first husband, who was an LTTE cadre. The second marriage of men seems to be a common theme in the novel due to their commitments to the family as an act of duty and honour.

The most iconic character in the novel is Preethiraj, ‘the man with a big heart’ who functions as a father figure to the other characters in the novel. It is through Preethiraj’s memory that the reader becomes aware of sociological themes in the novel: displacement and immigration, the institution of marriage and mental health issues. Preethiraj (fondly known as Preethi) is the son of Pushpawathi, the second wife of Akshara’s grandfather. Preethi goes to Royal College, but he has to relocate to Jaffna in 1958. Preethi endures social injustice in both public and private spheres. His studious sister, a medical student, labels him as a ‘lunatic’, while his mother condemns him as the ‘odd one’.

The novel intersects between the three themes: immigration and displacement, mental health issues and the institution of marriage. Almost all the characters have to go through displacement, suffer from intricacies of love laws and marriage rules like in The God of Small Things by Arundathi Roy. The writer offers a nuanced analysis of these three themes. For example, take mental health issues. The novel portrays a spectrum of mental health issues, such as schizophrenia, psychosis, Othello Syndrome, depression, autism and even malingering. At times, the representation of such ailments is extremely sarcastic:

“Hm… Canadian citizenship is an easy solution to secure those opportunities. However, unless I am asked to intervene, I will not meddle with their affairs. The son of one of my friends was introduced to a pretty girl. They liked her, not because of her money, but because of her looks and her ability to play the piano. But later, they discovered she has schizophrenia. Now their son follows whatever she says to save the marriage. My friend says she has lost her son” (p.20).

“Those opportunities” refer to material wealth including money and property in Colombo. Here, Rajakarunanayake does not fail to capture the extreme materialism and consumerism. However, in general, her representation of human follies is extremely humane.

   The title ‘Visachakayo’ is another interesting coinage that reflects the plight of Sri Lankans who migrate to the ‘global north’ in search of greener pastures. Akshara’s friend, Subhani, who has migrated to England, explains that the term ‘Visachaya’ captures the in-between status of immigrants who are waiting for PR in a foreign country. Subhani mockingly says that they are equal to beggars who beg for visas. Subhani’s coinage and other accounts of Sri Lankan immigrants in England, the novel shows how difficult it is for an immigrant from the ‘global south’ to fight for a living in a country like England where immigrants come to resolve their financial struggles back home.

The novel is an eye-opener in many ways. First, it is an attempt to bridge the gap caused by the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic strife. It is also a cultural mosaic that captures both the joys and sorrows of Sinhala, Tamil and Burgher families in Sri Lanka. The novel also delves into mental health issues, categorically tied to marriage, a daring task even for a seasoned writer. However, Rajakarunanayake’s writing style compels the reader to adopt a more humane and empathetic approach towards individuals grappling with mental health challenges at various stages of their lives. The linguistic technique of using ‘ne’ tag at the end of sentences creates a conversational tone, making the narrative as if it is a conversation between a therapist and a patient. Her writing style also resembles that of Sri Lankan and Indian diasporic writers, a style that is used when writing about the motherland in exile, of which food becomes a critical trope in the narrative that unites the characters who live in exile.

Rajakarunanayake has done a commendable job in the representation of social issues, making this novel a must-read for anyone who is interested in researching social dynamics of contemporary Sri Lanka. It soon needs to be translated into English which will offer a unique experience to Sri Lankan English and international readers. A good book is something that affects the reader. Visachakayo has this quality, and it makes the reader revisit the past, reflect on the present and anticipate the future with hope for humanity just as Preethi does regardless of hardships he endured in the theatre of life.

By C. M. Arsakulasuriya

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A strategy for Mahaweli authority to meet future challenges amidst moves to close it down

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The potential available in lands under Mahaweli Project, which cover about one third of farming areas of the Dry Zone, could easily help the country become self-sufficient in healthy foods, provided it is managed properly. However, at present, the main focus of the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL) is mainly on Operation & Maintenance of Canal network feeding the farms. Main purpose of the Mahaweli Restructuring & Rehabilitation Project (MRRP) funded by the World Bank in 2000 was to diversify that objective to cover enhancement of agriculture aspects also. System H Irrigation Systems covering about 20,000 Hectares commanded under Kalawewa Tank located in the Anuradhapura District was used as a pilot area to initiate this effort. However, only the Canal Rehabilitation component of the MRRP was attended because of the government policy at that time. Restructuring component is still awaiting to be completed. Only, a strategy called Water Quota was introduced under the MRRP to initiate the restructuring component. However, the management restructuring required addressing the agriculture component expected under MRRP is still not attended.

Propose Strategy

Total length of the canal network which needs seasonal maintenance is about 1,000 Km in a typical large-scale irrigation project such as Kalawewa. Main role of the Resident Project Managers (RPM) appointed to manage such projects should be to enhance the food production jointly with the Farmer Organizations. Therefore, the abbreviation used for RPM should be redefined as Resident Production Manager. The role of a Production Manager is not limited to maintenance of canal networks as adapted presently. In the current production phase, Irrigation projects should be perceived as a Food Producing “Factory” – where water is the main raw material. Farmers as the owners of the factory, play the role of the labour force of the factory. The Production Manager’s focus should be to maximize food production, deviating from Rice Only Mode, to cater the market needs earning profits for the farmers who are the owners of the “factory”. Canal systems within the project area which need regular maintenance are just “Belts” conveying raw materials (water) in a Typical Factory.

Required Management Shift

In order to implement the above management concept, there is a need for a paradigm shift in managing large scale irrigation projects. In the new approach, the main purpose of managing irrigation systems is to deliver water to the farm gate at the right time in the right quantity. It is a big challenge to operate a canal network about 1000 KM long feeding about 20,000 Hectare in a typical Irrigation System such as Kalawewa.

It is also very pathetic to observe that main clients of irrigation projects (farmers providing labor force) are now dying of various diseases caused by indiscriminate use of agrochemicals. Therefore, there is a need to minimize the damages caused to the ecosystems where these food production factories are located. Therefore, the management objectives should also be focused on producing multiple types of organically grown crops, profitably without polluting the soil and groundwater aquifers causing diseases like Kidney Failures.

Proposed Management Structure

Existing management staff should either be trained or new recruitments having Production Engineering background, should be made. Water should be perceived as the most limited input, which needs to be managed profitably jointly with the farming community. Each Production Manager could be allocated a Fixed Volume of water annually, and their performance could be measured in terms of $s earned for the country per Unit Volume of water, while economically upgrading a healthy lifestyle of the farmers by using climate smart agriculture.

In addition to the government salary, the production management staff should also be compensated in the form of incentives, calculated in proportion to income generated by them from their management areas. It should be a Win-Win situation for both farmers as well as officers responsible for managing the food production factory. Operation of the Main Canal to cater flexible needs of each factory is the main responsibility of the Resident Production Manager. In other countries, the term used to measure their performance is $ earned per gallon of water to the country, without damaging the ecosystem.

Recent Efforts

Mahaweli Authority introduced some of the concepts explained in this note during 2000 to 2006, under MRRP. It was done by operating the Distributary canals feeding each block as elongated Village Tanks. It was known as the Bulk Water Allocation (BWA) strategy. Recently an attempt was made to digitize the same concept, by independently arranging funds from ICTA / World Bank. In that project, called Eazy Water, a SMS communication system was introduced, so that they can order water from the Main Reservoir by sending a SMS, when they need rather; than depend on time tables decided by authorities as normally practiced.

Though the BWA was practiced successfully until 2015, the new generation of managers did not continue it beyond 2015.

Conclusion

The recent Cabinet decision to close down the MASL should prompt the MASL officers to reactivate the BWA approach again. Farmer Organisations at the distributary canal level responsible for managing canal networks covering about 400 Hectares can be registered as farmer cooperatives. For example, there are about 50 farmer cooperatives in a typical irrigation project such as Kalawewa. This transformation should be a gradual process which would take at least two years. I am sure the World Bank would definitely fund this project during the transition period because it is a continuation of the MRRP to address the restructuring component which was not attended by them in 2000 because of government policy at that time. System H could be used as a pilot demonstration area. Guidelines introduced under the MRRP could be used as tools to manage the main canal. World Bank funded Agribusiness Value Chain Support with CSIAP (Climate Smart Irrigated Agriculture Project) under the Ministry of Agriculture which is presently in progress could also provide necessary guidelines to initiate this project.

by Eng. Mahinda Panapitiya
Engineer who worked for Mahaweli Project since its inception

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