Features
Port City Project – Will it generate confidence amongst investors?
By Raj Gonsalkorale
Sri Lankan politics has not witnessed bi-partisan agreement amongst the major political parties on key issues that impact on the people of the country, the present generations and many more to come.
There has never been bi-partisan agreement on foreign policy, on education, on health at least at the highest policy levels. Personality politics has dominated the political landscape and it has always been about the plaudits, or damage, a policy-decision might make on a personality and as a consequence on the party or parties that person represents, and eventually whether or not that individual or the party would win the next election, and ones after that.
This absence of bi-partisan agreement has now extended to one of Sri Lanka’s most daring, controversial to many and an out of the box venture, the Port City project. The absence of such agreement, and the statements made by the current Opposition that they will amend the Port Commission Bill is bound to unsettle many would-be investors. They will be wondering what would happen to their investments if the current regime is defeated at the next election and the terms and conditions in which they invested should change after four years or so. The investment period horizon would then be four years. It does not need an Einstein to conclude that investors would be very hesitant to invest in any long term project in such a climate.
The statement of the Opposition is not being questioned here as they have rightly said that although the constitutionality of the bill has been adjudicated by the Supreme Court, amendments made, but the policy contentions had not been addressed and amendments they had brought in had been rejected by the government. It is also not clear whether the amended bill, incorporated with the Supreme Court determined amendments, had been presented to the Parliament. The public certainly has not seen the amended bill.
Bona fides of Opposition
The bona fides of the current Opposition of course is questionable, as they were the government in 2016 when they signed a tripartite agreement with the China Harbour Engineering Company and the UDA to develop the Port City into what they termed the “Colombo International Financial City, which will be in the centre of the maritime city, will be one of the key phenomenon which will decide the future development of Sri Lanka” according to the then Megapolis Minister Champika Ranawaka at the signing of the tripartite agreement. He added that the project would also fuel the planned Maritime city, Aero city, Tech city, Industrial cities and Tourist cities. That agreement has not been made public to the best of the writer’s knowledge.
The Port City project and the Port City Commission are major undertakings that will bind many future generations to its positives, but more importantly to any possible negatives as well. It would not be out of place to say that the politics associated with this futuristic project could have been handled better in a more transparent and consultative manner.
In the first place, the origin of this project, the agreement signed with China, signed by the Presidents of China and Sri Lanka in 2014, to reclaim an area of the sea and to create a Port City, was not tabled in Parliament for discussion as far as can be ascertained.
Reports indicate that the project concept goes back to 2011 and construction was set to begin in March 2011 but due to several circumstances the project had been stopped. In mid-2012, the Sri Lankan Port Authority (SLPA) announced that the construction of the then Colombo Port City project would commence on 17 September 2014. The budget was estimated to be $15 billion.
The reclamation was to be carried out by China Harbour Engineering Corporation, who has been engaged by the investor. The land given to the government was 125 hectares (310 acres), as well as 88 hectares (220 acres), while owned by the government, was planned to be leased for 99 years to the Chinese company. Twenty hectares (49 acres) was planned to be given freehold to the Chinese company.
Construction of the Colombo Port City project was launched on 17 September 2014 by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration
The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government that was elected in 2015 suspended the project on environmental grounds, but it is understood that this was granted approval again in 2016 having agreed to pay a penalty of USD 100 million to the Chinese company for the delay encountered in proceeding with construction as per a country to country agreement. It is learnt that in exchange for not paying this penalty, the Hambantota Harbour was sold or given on a long term 99-year lease virtually on a platter.
On August 12, 2016 the tripartite pact to construct a mega port city was signed between Sri Lanka’s Urban Development Authority, the Ministry of Megapolis and Western Development and the China Harbour Engineering Company, and as far as known, this agreement too has not been tabled before the Parliament.
With the signing of the agreement, the Colombo Port City Development Project was newly renamed the Colombo International Financial City with the government stating that the project would transform Sri Lanka into an international financial hub in the Indian Ocean region.
It is still not very clear as to the extent of land involved in this project as different extents have been mentioned in different agreements. It is also not clear whether whatever land extent has been registered with the land registry. Clarity on these will be useful.
While there is no indication that any of these two agreements had been tabled and ratified by Parliament, these two occasions are not the first time Parliament had not ratified binding agreements, if indeed they had been tabled in Parliament. The Ceasefire Agreement that Prime Minister Wickramasinghe signed with LTTE Leader Prabakaran in 2002 was not tabled in Parliament, and in fact not even known to the Executive President of the country at that time Chandrika Kumaratunga who saw the agreement after it had been signed by Wickramasinghe and Prabakaran. The consequences of that agreement are well known today.
In this backdrop comes the Port City Commission bill. While it is true that there was an opportunity for litigants to go before the Supreme Court to ascertain the validity of the bill with the Constitution, the people’s representatives, however low they are in their credibility in the eyes of the people, and neither the business community, and civil society leaders, were given an opportunity to consider the policy aspects of the bill in some depth and to work together to make it a national project of great importance to the country.
The SJB, and the residue of the UNP, as well as those who supported the Yahapalanaya government in 2016, cannot afford to oppose this bill in principle while they have the right to oppose sections of it if they differ with what they agreed to in 2016. As stated earlier, the writer stands corrected if the government and the Opposition could clarify to the public whether these important agreements were in fact discussed in Parliament and whether any attempt was made to have bi-partisan agreement on them. Besides being an important consideration for the public in Sri Lanka, it would be vital to generate confidence amongst would-be investors in the Port City project, for long term projects. Unless there can be such a bi-partisan agreement, it is unlikely that the objective of large and long term investments will be met in this project.
Philosophical arguments
While some may entertain philosophical arguments against the concept of the Port City, and suspicions and fears about China getting an extended foothold in Sri Lanka, it is also true that Sri Lanka needs to raise its economic platform if the future generations are to enjoy the opportunities they need and deserve in years to come. The current economic platform, based on Tea, Rubber, Coconut and other agricultural exports, Apparel and IT products and services exports, foreign remittances, and tourism, is very volatile and inadequate to meet future challenges associated with investments required for infrastructure development, service improvements and social upliftment.
Need for different approach
The longer term future of tea and rubber is uncertain, and foreign remittances may not be long lasting even once the COVID-19 pandemic subsides. Sri Lanka needs a different approach and lateral thinking on economic policies if it is to free itself from debt and generate enough revenue to service its infrastructure development and service improvements. Besides the Port City project, there is no other innovative project that has been presented for discussion that would address the future economic needs of the country. While the management of its politics has left much room for improvement and some policy aspects may need adjustment, the fact remains that there is nothing else on the table to compare it with.
While it is not a critique of the bill itself, as the writer feels that should be left to the politicians as well as experts who are more competent to do so, there are a few questions pertaining to the clauses 64 and 65 in the agreement that needs some clarification as there appears to be a legal provision in the bill to extend the authority of the Port Commission to land associated with projects approved by the Commission, beyond the reclaimed land area that constitutes the Port City. In addition, these clauses appear to make the Board of Investments (BOI) irrelevant and an unnecessary entity as all its activities, past, present and future could easily be managed by the Port Commission.
A. Firstly, what does section 65. (1) mean? It says, “from and after the date of commencement of this Act, all land comprising the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City, shall be vested with the Commission in the manner set out in subsection (3)”. Subsection (3) reads as follows. “For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby stated that on the coming into operation of this Act, the President may, issue a Land Grant under the Crown Lands Ordinance (Chapter 454) in the name of the Commission, in respect of all land comprising the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City as set out in Schedule I to this Act.”
Lease
It is understood that President Sirisena by way of a gazette notification granted a land deed for the reclaimed land in favour of the UDA as mentioned by Presidents counsel Jayantha Weerasinghe at a recent press conference. The land given to the UDA on this grant apparently was leased out to the Chinese company by the UDA in 2016.
Is it to be understood that as per section 65, the present President is giving another grant of the same land to the Port Commission under section 65 when the land is owned by the UDA and leased to the Chinese company? This convoluted situation may not be accurate, and it would be good if the government could clarify this.
None of these land deeds have been registered as far as known and therefore no one has been able to peruse them and ascertain the status of the grants and deeds. No wonder the Public is confused. It is also understood that the gazette which contains the deed signed by President Sirisena has the new plan as per the tripartite agreement under Cadastral system. It would be helpful if these documents are made available to the public. If the above confusion could be cleared, this subsection and what is referred to in Section 65 of the gazette notification looks harmless and innocuous if it is read as it is without any reference to any other Section.
B. However, a question does arise as to what this Section (65) and Subsection (3) mean in effect?
Is it that only the reclaimed land area referred to as the Port City, will be vested with the Commission? If not, what other land?
Some confusion and doubt does occur when it is read in conjunction with Section 64 which reads as follows. Clause 64
(1) The Commission may, where it considers necessary to do so, as an interim measure, permit an authorised person to engage in business from a designated location in Sri Lanka, outside the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City, as may be approved by the President or in the event that the subject of the Colombo Port City is assigned to a Minister, such Minister, for a period not exceeding five years from the date of commencement of this Act. Such business shall, for such period of five years be entitled to all the privileges accorded to, and be deemed for all purposes to be, a business situated within and engaged in business, in and from, the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City.
(2) Where an authorised person has been permitted to engage in business from a designated location in Sri Lanka, outside the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City in terms of subsection (1), such business shall be subject to the provisions of this Act and any regulations made hereunder.
This Section raises two questions
1. Would such a project have to be approved by the Authority, meaning, will it have to be a new project and not an existing project? Does this not virtually open any part of the country for such a project to be located for five years? If so, effectively, the Authority has islandwide authority for five years for approved projects. In this event, what is the role of the BOI, and why should projects seek approval from the BOI?
2. When this is read in conjunction with Section 65 and subsection (3) does it mean that not only the reclaimed land but also any land allocated for an approved project for five years under clause 64 could also be vested with the Authority for five years with President issuing a Land Grant under the Crown Lands Ordinance (Chapter 454) in the name of the Commission?
C. Section 65, subsection (2) reads as follows – “Where any deed of transfer, indenture of lease, agreement or other similar document has been executed in respect of any land situated within the Area of Authority of the Colombo Port City, prior to the date of commencement of this Act, by the Urban Development Authority, established under the Urban Development Authority Law, No. 41 of 1978, such deed of transfer, lease, agreement or other similar document shall, from and after the date of the commencement of this Act, be deemed for all purposes to be a document executed by the Commission, in terms of the provisions of this Act and be valid and effectual as if executed hereunder.”
The Port Commission Act has just been passed by the Parliament. In relation to this clause, besides the land that was leased to the Chinese company by the UDA in 2016, is it to be understood that there are projects approved by the UDA or any other body on land within the Area of the Authority? Is this clause to be understood as extending to projects already approved by the UDA, with some projects located outside the Port City precincts (as per Section 64) the benefits referred to in Section 65?
It would be useful if the government tables a list of such projects so approved and their operational locations as the country has a right to know which project, located where, is to benefit from terms in Section 65.
These clauses, their meaning and effects need clarification as confusion does arise about the extent of authority the Port Commission has over land outside the Port city itself, even if it’s for five years. The potential does exist for the Port Commission to approve investment projects with say the headquarters office located in the Port City, but actual projects located anywhere else in the country, and enjoying all privileges and benefits accorded to the project irrespective of where its operations are located. Theoretically, far-fetched it may be, the possibility exists for hundreds of foreign companies to have their projects approved by the Port Commission, with their operations located in any part of the country. The consequences of this possibility needs to be considered especially from the point of view of the impact on local farmers (if the projects are agriculture based) or industrialists who will not enjoy the benefits enjoyed by projects registered with the Port Commission.
Considering all of above, the extraordinary powers granted to the President of the country to make far reaching and binding decisions on what may turn out to be a sizeable component of the country’s economy could have the potential to be detrimental rather than beneficial to the long term interests of the country should the Presidency be in the hands of a person not entirely suitable to hold that office. Avenues for greater accountability of decisions made by the Port Commission and the President of the country have to be considered from this point of view.
Features
Federalism and paths to constitutional reform
S. J. V. Chelvanayakam: Visionary and Statesman
S. J. V. Chelvanayakam KC Memorial Lecture Delivered at Jaffna Central Collage on Sunday, 26 April, by Professor G. L. Peiris – D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D. (Sri Lanka); Rhodes Scholar, Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London; Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.
I. Life and Career
Had Mr. Chelvanayakam been with us today, he would no doubt be profoundly unhappy with the state of our country and the world.
Samuel James Velupillai Chelvanayakam was born on 31 March, 1898, in the town of Ipoh, in Malaya. When he was four years of age, he was sent by his father, along with his mother, for the purpose of his education to Tellippalai, a traditional village at the northern tip of Sri Lanka, or Ceylon as the country was then called, in close proximity to the port of Kankesanturai. He attended three schools, Union College in Tellippalai, St John’s College Jaffna and S. Thomas’ College Mount Lavinia, where he was a contemporary of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, with whom he was later destined to sign the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact.
He graduated in Science as an external student of the University of London, in 1918. In 1927, he married Emily Grace Barr-Kumarakulasinghe, daughter of the Maniyagar, or administrative chief for the area, appointed by the colonial government. He had four sons and a daughter. His son, S. C. Chandrahasan, worked closely with me during my time as Foreign Minister on the subject of repatriation of refugees from India. Chandrahasan’s wife, Nirmala, daughter of Dr. E. M. V. Naganathan, was a colleague of mine on the academic staff of the University of Colombo.
Mr. Chelvanayakam first contested the Kankesanturai constituency at the parliamentary election of 1947. His was a long parliamentary career. He resigned from his parliamentary seat in opposition to the first Republican Constitution of 1972, but was re-elected overwhelmingly at a by-election in 1975. He died on 26 April, 1977.
There are many strong attributes which shine through his life and career.
He consistently showed courage and capacity for endurance. He had no hesitation in resigning from employment, which gave him comfort and security, to look after a younger brother who was seriously ill. As his son-in-law, Professor A.J. Wilson remarked, he learned to move in two worlds: a product of missionary schools, he was a devout Christian who never changed his religion for political gain. He was, quite definitely, a Hindu by culture, and never wished to own a house in Colombo for fear that his children would be alienated from their roots.
Gentle and self-effacing by disposition, he manifested the steel in his character by not flinching from tough decisions. Never giving in to expediency, differences of principle with Mr. G. G. Ponnambalam, the leader of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, of which Mr. Chelvanayakam was a principal organiser, led him to break away from the Congress and to form a new party, the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, or the Federal Party.
During the disturbances in March and April, 1958, he was charged in the Magistrate’s Court in Batticaloa and sentenced to a week’s imprisonment. He was also subject to house arrest, but he never resorted to violence and used satyagraha to make his voice heard. When, in 1961, he was medically advised to travel to the United Kingdom for surgical treatment, he had to be escorted to the airport by the police because he was still under detention. Although physically frail and ailing in health during his final years, he lost none of the indomitable spirit which typified his entire life.
II. Advocacy of Federalism: Origins and Context
At the core of political convictions he held sacrosanct was his unremitting commitment to federalism. A moment of fruition in his life was the formation of the Federal Party, Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, on 18 December, 1949.
Contrary to popular belief, however, federalism in our country had its origin in issues which were not connected with ethnicity. At its inception, this had to do with the aspirations, not of the Tamils, but of the Kandyan Sinhalese. The Kandyan National Assembly, in its representations to the Donoughmore Commission, in November, 1927, declared: “Ours is not a communal claim or a claim for the aggrandizement of a few. It is the claim of a nation to live its own life and realise its own destiny”.
Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, soon after his return from Oxford, as a prominent member of the Ceylon National Congress, was an ardent advocate of federalism. He went so far as to characterise federalism as “the only solution to our political problems”. With Thomas Hobbes in his famous work, The Leviathan, he conceived of liberty as “political power broken into fragments”. Bandaranaike went on to state in a letter published in The Morning Leader on 19 May, 1926: “The two clashing forces of cooperation and individualism, like that thread of golden light which Walter Pater observed in the works of the painters of the Italian Renaissance, run through the fabric of civilisation, sometimes one predominating, sometimes the other. To try and harmonise the two has been the problem of the modern world. The only satisfactory solution yet discovered is the federal system”.
Federalism had a strong ideological appeal, from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. The constitutional proposals, addressed by the Communist Party of Ceylon to the Ceylon National Congress on 18 October, 1944, go very far indeed. They envisioned the Sinhalese and the Tamils as two distinct “nations” or “historically evolved nationalities”. The high watermark of the proposals was the assertion that “Both nationalities have their right to self-determination, including the right, if they so desire, to form their own separate independent state”.
These proposals received further elaboration in a memorandum submitted to the Working Committee of the Ceylon National Congress by two leading members of the Communist Party, Mr. Pieter Keuneman and Mr. A. Vaidialingam. Their premise was set out pithily as follows: “We regard a nation as a historical, as opposed to an ethnographical, concept. It is a historically evolved, stable community of people living in a contiguous territory as their traditional homeland”.
The Soulbury Commission, which arrived in the country in December, 1944, had no hesitation in recognising that “The relations of the minorities – the Ceylon Tamils, the Indian Tamils, Muslims, Burghers and Europeans, with the Sinhalese majority – present the most difficult of the many problems involved in the reform of the Constitution of Ceylon”.
They took fully into account the apprehension expressed by the All Ceylon Tamil Congress that “The near approach of the complete transfer of power and authority from neutral British hands to the people of this country is causing, in the minds of the Tamil people, in common with other minorities, much misgiving and fear”.
III. Constitutional Provisions at Independence
The Souldbury Commission, like the Donoughmore Commission before it, was not friendly to the idea of federalism, principally because of their commitment to the unity of the body politic. Opting for a solution, falling short of federalism, they adopted the approach that, if the underlying fear related to encroachment on seminal rights by capricious legislative action, this anxiety could be convincingly assuaged by enshrining in the Constitution a nucleus of rights placed beyond the reach of the legislature.
The essence of the solution, which commended itself to the Soulbury Commission, was a carefully crafted constitutional limitation on the legislative competence of Parliament, encapsulated in Article 29(2) of the Independence Constitution. The gist of this was incorporation of the principle of non-discrimination against racial or religious communities by explicit acknowledgement of equal protection under the law.
The assumption fortifying this expectation was the attribution of an imaginative role to the judiciary in respect of interpretation. It was lack of fulfillment in this regard that precipitated a setback which time could not heal. Judicial attitudes, including those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which constituted at the time the highest tier of the judicial hierarchy, were timid and diffident.
When the Citizenship Act of 1948, by means of a new definition, sought to deprive Tamils of Indian origin of the suffrage, no protection was forthcoming from the courts on the ground of impermissible discrimination. This refusal of intervention was premised on an implausibly narrow construction of the word “community”, in that, according to the Courts’ reasoning, in the landmark case of Kodakkan Pillai v. Madanayake, Indian Tamils were not identifiable as a community distinct from the larger community of the Tamils of Ceylon. It is hard to disguise the reality that this was, at bottom, a refusal to deal with the substantive issues candidly and frontally.
The resulting vulnerability of minority rights, which judicial evasion laid bare, was a major contributory cause of the erosion of confidence on the part of minority groups. This mood of suspicion and despair, arising from an ostensibly weak method of protection of human rights, presaged ensuing developments.
IV. Further Quest for a Constitutional Solution

Chelvanayakam
The central theme of this lecture, in honour of a statesman who was an epitome of restraint and moderation, is that the deterioration of ethnic relations, which culminated in a war of unrivalled savagery over a span of three decades, was progressive and incremental. There was no inevitability about the denouement. It was gradual and potentially reversible. At several crucial points, there was opportunity to arrest a disastrous trend. These windows of opportunity, however, were not utilised: extremist attitudes asserted themselves, and polarisation became the outcome. This trajectory was, no doubt, met with dismay by far-sighted leaders of the calibre of Mr. Chelvanayakam.
The formation of the Federal Party was a turning point. With Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, King’s Counsel, as founder-president, and Dr. E.M.V. Naganathan and Mr. V. Navaratnam as joint secretaries, the party embarked on a journey which marked a radical departure from the conventional thinking of the past. This was plain from the text of seven resolutions adopted at the national convention of the party held in Trincomalee in April, 1951. The foundation of these resolutions was the call to establish a Tamil state within the Union of Ceylon, and the uncompromising assertion that no other solution was feasible.
The path was now becoming manifest. The demand up to now had been for substantial power sharing within a unitary state. This was now giving way to a strident demand for the emergence of a federal structure, destined to be expanded in the fullness of time to advocacy of secession.
Although standing out boldly as a landmark in constitutional evolution, the Federal Party resolutions did not carry on their face the hallmark of finality or immutability. The call of the Tamil leadership for secession yet being some years away, the ensuing decades saw further attempts by different governments to resolve the vexed issues around power sharing.
The first of these was the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact, signed by the Prime Minister and the leader of the Federal Party on 26 July, 1957. There was an air of uneasy compromise surrounding the entire transaction. This was evident from the structure of the pact, which, as one of its integral parts, contained a section not reduced to writing in any form, but consisting of a series of informal understandings.
The essence of the pact was the proposed system of regional councils which were envisaged as an intermediary tier between the central government and local government institutions. This did break new ground. Not only did the pact confer on the people of the North and East a substantial measure of self-governance through these innovative councils, including in such inherently controversial areas as colonisation, irrigation and local management, but territorial units were conceived of as the recipients of devolved powers. Of particular significance, the regional councils were to be invested with some measure of financial autonomy. The blowback, however, was so intense as to compel the government to abrogate the pact.
The next attempt, eight years later, was by the United National Party, which had vehemently opposed the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact. This was the Dudley Senanayake–Chelvanayakam Pact, signed between the leader of the United National Party, at the time Leader of the Opposition, and the leader of the Federal Party. It differed from the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact, both contextually and substantively.
As to context, it was signed on 24 March, 1965, on the eve of a parliamentary election, to ensure for the United National Party the support of the Federal Party. A disheartening feature was the plainly evident element of duplicity. Once in government, the Prime Minister’s party showed little interest in implementing the pact. Within three years, the Federal Party left the government, and its representative in the cabinet, Mr M. Tiruchelvam QC, Minister of Local Government, relinquished his portfolio.
Substantively, the lynchpin of the pact was a system of district councils, but there was entrenched control of these bodies by the central government, even in regard to action within their vires. This was almost universally seen as a sleight of hand.
Despite the collapse of these efforts, room for resilience and accommodation had by no means disappeared. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the events which led up to the drafting and adoption of the “autochthonous” Constitution of 1972. This involved the historic task of severing the centuries-old bond with the British Crown and bringing into being the Republic of Sri Lanka.
One of the Basic Resolutions, which eventually found expression as Article 2 of the new Constitution, characterised Sri Lanka as a unitary state. The Federal Party proposed an amendment that the word “federal” should be substituted for “unitary”. Mr. V. Dharmalingam, the spokesman for the party on this subject, in his address to the Constituent Assembly, on 16 March, 1971, showed flexibility by declaring that the powers of the federating units and their relationship to the centre were negotiable, once the principle of federalism was accepted. Indivisibility of the Republic was emphatically articulated, self-determination in its external aspect being firmly ruled out.
There was no reciprocity, however. Mr. Sarath Muttettuwegama, administering a sharp rebuke, declared: “Federalism has become something of a dirty word in the southern parts of this country”. The last opportunity to halt the inexorable march of events was spurned.
The pushback came briskly, and with singular ferocity. This was in the form of the Vaddukoddai Resolution adopted by the Tamil United Liberation Front at its first national convention held on 14 May, 1976. The historic significance of this document is that it set out, for the first time, in the most unambiguous terms, the blueprint for an independent state for the Tamil nation, embracing the merged Northern and Eastern Provinces. The second part of the Resolution contained the nucleus of Tamil Eelam, its scope extending beyond the shores of the Island. The state of Tamil Eelam was to be home not only to the people of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but to “all Tamil-speaking people living in any part of Ceylon and to Tamils of Eelam origin living in any part of the world who may opt for citizenship of Tamil Eelam”.
The most discouraging element of this sequence of events was the timid and evasive approach adopted by prominent actors at crucial moments. The District Development Councils Act of 1980 presented a unique opportunity. Disappointingly, however, the Presidential Commission, presided over by Mr. Victor Tennekoon QC, a former Chief Justice and Attorney General, lacked the courage even to interpret the terms of reference as permitting allusion to the ethnic conflict. Despite the persevering efforts of Professor A.J. Wilson, son-in-law of Mr. Chelvanayakam, and a confidant of President J.R. Jayewardene, and Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, the majority of the members were inclined to adopt a narrow, technical interpretation of the terms of reference. The setting of the legislation was one in which Tamil formations, such as the Tamil United Liberation Front, were struggling to maintain their moderate postures in an increasingly polarised environment, with pressure from radical elements proving almost irresistible.
The whole initiative paled into insignificance in comparison with a series of tragic events, including the burning of the Jaffna library during the run-up to the District Development Council elections in the North and the calamitous events of Black July 1983. Policymakers, at a critical juncture, had, once again, let a limited opportunity slip through their fingers.
The next intervention occurred in the sunset years of the United National Party administration. This was the Parliamentary Select Committee on the ethnic conflict, known after its Chairman as the Mangala Moonesinghe Committee, appointed in August, 1991.
The Majority Report made a detailed proposal which was intended to serve as the basis of a compromise between two schools of thought—one stoutly resisting any idea of merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and the other demanding such merger as the indispensable basis of a viable solution. An imaginative via media was the concept of the Apex Council, which formed the centrepiece of the Majority Report. It adopted as a point of departure two separate Provincial Councils for the North and the East. This dichotomy would characterise the provincial executive as well: each Provincial Council would have an Executive Minister as the head of the Board of Ministers. However, over and above these, the two Provincial Councils together would constitute a Regional Council for the entire North-East region. Although presenting several features of interest, as a pragmatic mediating mechanism, the proposal did not enjoy a sufficiently broad support base for implementation. (To be concluded)
Features
Procurement cuts, rising burn rates and shipment delays deepen energy threat
Coal crisis far worse than first feared
Sri Lanka’s coal supply crisis is significantly deeper than previously understood, with senior engineers and energy analysts warning that a dangerous combination of reduced procurement volumes, rising coal consumption and shipment delays could place national power generation at serious risk.
Information reviewed by The Island shows that Lanka Coal Company (LCC) had originally planned to secure 2.32 million metric tons of coal for the relevant supply period to meet generation requirements at the Lakvijaya coal power complex.
Following procurement discussions, the final arrangement was to obtain 840,000 metric tons from Potencia, including a 10 percent optional quantity, and 1.5 million metric tons from Trident, equivalent to 25 vessels.
However, subsequent decisions resulted in the cancellation of four Potencia shipments, reducing that supplier’s volume to 627,000 metric tons. This brought the total expected procurement down to 2.16 million metric tons, creating an immediate 160,000 metric ton deficit, even before operational demand is considered.
“This is a major shortfall in any generation planning model,” a senior engineer familiar with coal operations said. “When stocks are planned to the margin, a reduction of this scale can have serious consequences.”
Power sector sources said the deficit becomes more critical because coal consumption rates have increased by more than 10 percent, meaning larger volumes are now required to generate the same electricity output.
“In simple terms, the system is burning more coal for less efficiency,” an energy analyst told The Island. “That means the real shortage may be substantially larger than the paper shortage.”
Experts attributed the higher burn rate to ageing equipment, maintenance constraints and operating inefficiencies at the Norochcholai plant.
A third concern has now emerged in the form of shipment delays and possible unloading constraints, raising fears that even contracted supplies may not arrive in time to maintain safe reserve levels.
“If vessel schedules slip or unloading is disrupted, stocks can fall very quickly,” another senior engineer warned. “At that point, the country has little choice but to shift to costly thermal oil generation.”
Such a move would sharply increase electricity generation costs and place additional pressure on public finances.
Analysts said the convergence of three separate risks — procurement reductions, higher-than-expected consumption and delivery uncertainty — had created a serious energy planning challenge.
“This is no longer a routine procurement issue,” one industry observer said. “It has become a national power security issue.”
Calls are growing for authorities to disclose current coal inventories, incoming vessel schedules and contingency measures to reassure the public and industry.
With electricity demand expected to remain high and hydro resources dependent on rainfall, engineers caution that delays in addressing the coal gap could expose the country to avoidable supply disruptions in the months ahead.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
Lake Gregory boat accidents: Need to regulate water adventure tourism
LETTER
The capsizing of two boats in Lake Gregory on 19 April was merely an isolated incident. It has come as a stark and urgent warning that a far more serious tragedy is imminent unless decisive action is taken without delay.
Mayor of Nuwara Eliya, Upali Wanigasekera has publicly stated that stringent measures have been introduced to prevent similar occurrences. However, it must be noted that such measures are unlikely to yield meaningful results in the absence of a comprehensive regulatory framework governing Inland Water Adventure Tourism (IWAT) in Sri Lanka.
For decades, this sector has operated without any regulation. Despite repeated calls for reform, there remains no structured legal mechanism to oversee operational standards, safety compliance, or accountability. Consequently, there is chaos particularly in critical operational aspects of this otherwise vital tourism segment.
The situation in Lake Gregory is not unique. Other prominent inland tourism destinations, such as Kitulgala and Madu Ganga, face similar risks. Without urgent intervention, it is only a matter of time before a major calamity occurs, placing both local and foreign tourists in grave danger.
At present, there appear to be no enforceable legal requirements governing:
* The fitness for navigation of vessels
* Mandatory safety standards and equipment
* Certification and competency of boat operators
The display of permits issued by local authorities is often misleading. These permits function merely as revenue licences and should not be misconstrued as certification of compliance with safety or technical standards.
Furthermore, local authorities themselves appear constrained. The Nuwara Eliya Mayor is reportedly limited in his ability to enforce meaningful improvements due to the absence of legal backing. Compounding this issue is the proliferation of unauthorised operators at Lake Gregory, functioning with minimal oversight.
Disturbingly, there are credible concerns that some boat operators function under the influence of intoxicants, while enforcement authorities appear to maintain a lackadaisical stance. The parallels with the unregulated private transport sector are both evident and alarming.
In the absence of a proper legal framework, any victims of such incidents are left with no recourse but to pursue lengthy and uncertain claims under common law against individual operators.
The Minister of Tourism, this situation demands your immediate and personal intervention.
A robust regulatory framework for Inland Water Adventure Tourism must be urgently introduced and enforced. This should include licensing standards, safety regulations, operator certification, regular inspections, and strict penalties for non-compliance.
Failure to act now will not only endanger lives but also severely damage Sri Lanka’s reputation as a safe and responsible tourist destination.
The time for incremental measures has passed. What is required is decisive policy action.
Athula Ranasinghe
Public-Spirited Citizen
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S. J. V. Chelvanayakam KC Memorial Lecture Delivered at Jaffna Central Collage on Sunday, 26 April, by Professor G. L. Peiris – D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D. (Sri Lanka); Rhodes Scholar, Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London; Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.