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Police subservience made political interference possible

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by Merril Gunaratne,
Rtd. Senior DIG

This writing was inspired by the topical essay of Kingsley Wickramasuriya, retired Senior DIG, which dealt with the impact of politics on the police, and the pithy observation made by Rajan Phillips in his column in the Sunday Island of August 20 where he had, whilst discussing dangers that may affect provincial policing under the 13th Amendment, stated “Nothing can be done provincially unless everything is reformed nationally”.

Stature of IGPs

For a long time, total blame for political interferences has been placed at the feet of politicians. But such interferences do not occur in a vacuum. The IGP and his seniors are the guardians of the law. A sacred duty is cast upon them to resist interference with the law, and to discipline officers who seek to help extraneous forces outside the law. After all, it takes two to tango. This essay would therefore examine whether those in the highest police echelons have stood firm against transgressions.

How political interference occurs

 Upto the advent of the UNP to political power in 1977, interference with the police were relatively less. They were times when both sides protected their turfs, and did not wish to “cross the line”. Those in power structures were conscious that the service had to work within the law. A few exemplary officers such as Osmund de Silva, Sidney de Zoysa and Eleric Abeygoonewardene  were strong bulwarks against intrusions. As a result, interference was just a trickle.

From 1977, after the three stalwarts had left office, the trickle became a torrent. Many of those in power structures considered it their inherent right to acquire police acquiescence in order to harass political opponents, employ violence at by-elections, and prevail upon the police to favour supporters detected for crime, vice and violence.

Police were expected to turn a blind eye to blatant transgressions, and even in some instances watch passively whilst being present at scenes of lawlessness. In order to ensure that the police fell in step, pliant officers were recognised and posted or promoted as Officers in Charge of Stations (OICs), ASPs, SPs and DIGs. They were provided scope and space to achieve promotions in violation of the line of seniority. Those who failed to oblige political masters were not considered for plums and promotions. This tactic proved an effective bargaining chip to ensure police acquiescence for violations of the law.

This strategy over time, found permanence, and accelerated the decline of the police. All governments which followed the UNP, not only continued the adoption of this strategy, but even went to further extremes.

Examples of bad behaviour

There were countless instances where those in the highest echelons of the police submitted to interferences. I had first hand experience of the high handed conduct of political heavyweights immediately after 1977 in Kelaniya and Kurunegala. These experiences have been narrated in three books I had written in retirement. The IGP of the time did not even make contact and provide some solace for the manner in which I upheld the law.

A senior DIG who later became IGP, had said,  “Merril is causing problems to headquarters”.  In recent times, SSP Shani Abeysekera, who had conducted investigations against political heavyweights for the alleged disappearance of Prageeth  Ekneligoda, and the abduction of Keith Noyahr, was hauled up before a Presidential Commission and questioned about the manner in which investigations had been conducted.

These inquiries were reviewed as if the CID had conducted investigations with prejudice. Shani was an upright officer whose findings would have been approved by police headquarters at the time of the investigations. A retired IGP, Chandra Fernando, who sat on the Commission, should surely have been embarrassed, for he would have known about the calibre of SSP Shani Abeysekera as an investigator.

Shani was imprisoned on a questionable charge of fabrication of evidence in another case. Seniors in police headquarters abandoned a fine officer who in jail even feared for his life. Despite his incarceration and harassment, the IGP and the seniors in headquarters failed to rise in his defence. Senior DIG Ravi Seneviratne alone commiserated with him.

The period 1988 to 1995 saw large numbers of officers receiving promotions in gross violation of the line of seniority. They were favourites in whom politicians had confidence to promote their interests. Cyril Herath who became IGP in 1986, alone sought to resist interferences which had taken firm root. When the government rejected his recommendations for three DIG promotions, and instead promoted two very junior officers, he resigned in protest.

Possibly because of Cyril Herath’s recalcitrance, the government removed the IGP’s prerogative to recommend promotions to the DIG rank, and instead vested the Ministry of Defence with authority to hold interviews for promotion. This policy also helped the promotion of favourites. IGP Ernest Perera fell in line without protest.

In the late 80’s, three DIGs were retired – Rajaguru, K Wickramasuriya and Iddamalgoda – in a government bid to pave the way for a junior to be promoted IGP. The IGP did not take a strong stand against this unjust government move as well.

When the war with LTTE resumed, the IGP ordered 600 policemen in the Eastern Province to surrender to the LTTE. The latter massacred them. The IGP consulted Foreign Minister Hamid before ordering the surrender. It was not a matter for him a to have consulted the government to invoke a political direction.

Police, in the absence of directions from IGPs’ in the early 80’s, passively permitted government orchestrated mobs to torch the Public Library in Jaffna, and engage in communal violence in all parts of the country.

In the early 90’s when DB Wijethunga was President, IGP Frank de Silva obliged the request of the former for the DIG cadre to be enlarged to over 40 from a modest number. It was believed that the President wanted his Security Officer, Mahinda Balasuriya who was a junior SSP, to be promoted a DIG. The President had first made the request for a number of DIGs to be posted in police divisions to be responsible for “welfare”, to DIG HMGB Kotakadeniya. This was a ruse to expand the DIG cadre. Kotakadeniya had refused, whereupon the President had made the request to IGP Frank de Silva. The request was implemented without a discussion in police headquarters. This expansion has caused irreparable and irreversible harm to the service.

After the advent of President Kumaratunga to power, three officers who had resigned from the police previously, were reinstated and promoted to the rank of Senior DIG. One of them who was junior, and who had resigned for reasons other than political victimisation, was promoted IGP. He was a favourite of the government. It is generally believed that the decline of the service accelerated with him.

Two IGPs who served during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa, were later found to have tampered with investigations into the murder of Lasantha Wickramatunga. Such partisan conduct by IGPs in recent times is confirmation that police seniors are now far more willing to be complicit with machinations of those in power structures, than in earlier times. On May 9, 2021, an apathetic police were present at Galle Face Green when government inspired mobs attacked unarmed protestors. To add insult to injury, the IGP and Senior DIG (Western Province) accused each other for the police failure to prevent violence.

 Lessons

A system that has been entrenched for countless years, has a tendency to resist changes. The pattern of favourites being recognised, has grown in intensity since the 1970’s. IGPs’ lost control over subordinate officers, for the latter looked to politicians to help the advancement of their careers. The National Police Commission (NPC) was established in a bid to achieve the independence of the service. The NPC in recent times had been more preoccupied with efforts to pamper seniors with material benefits.

DIGs retiring from service are automatically promoted Senior DIGs, a step unheard of in any part of the world.  An abortive effort was made by the NPC for retired Senior DIGs and the IGP to be offered “valets” masquerading as security officers. Three DIGs, over 20 years after retirement, were promoted Senior DIGs. The NPC did not challenge the principle or lack of it that helped these promotions.

Senior DIGs and DIGs who stand implicated in inquiries into the explosions on Easter Sunday in 2019 are yet holding office and enjoying promotions. The NPC and the IGP had not considered it necessary to enforce provisions of the Establishment Code, and place them on Compulsory Leave or under interdiction. It is unlikely that this omission has even been influenced by politics.

The print media had recently reported that the NPC would soon be responsible for appointment, transfer, retirement and disciplinary control of police officers, commencing from OICs of police stations. It is doubtful whether these changes will help the service to regain it’s independence if the performance of the NPC in recent times is an index. It is unarguable that the achievement of police independence will be an onerous task, with those in power structures finding clever ways of overcoming whatever mechanisms are introduced to achieve it.

Just as much as the political opposition cries for the abolition of the presidency but permits its continuance if they gain political power, they may similarly like to enjoy the benefits of a complicit police if in power, despite clamouring for an independent police when in opposition.

The pernicious strategy of governments cultivating favourite police officers by helping them with promotions outside the line of seniority may have been circumvented by pointing out that “individual interests” cannot be given precedence over “service interests”, if catering to individual interests affect the efficacy of the service. This argument may have been convincing to many of those in power structures.

One definite change that could seriously be considered is for all seniors from IGP to DIG to retire at the right time without extensions. IGPs also have a tendency to look for postings after retirement. With such goals influencing them, the result would be that they would be less inclined to stand their ground against interferences. Cyril Herath stands out like a beacon for being the only IGP who voluntarily left office on a matter of principle. He even refused an ambassadorial post.

If the National Police is in the throes of a serious crisis with police officers looking more to political masters than the IGP for advancement in their careers, it is hardly likely that the provincial police would be any better. Seeing the proximate links forged by senior officers in the national police with influential politicians, it is difficult to foresee whether provincial DIGs’ under the 13th Amendment would do any better.

The nexus between the Chief Minister and the DIG is likely to be formidable. There was wisdom in the policy in practise up to the early 198’s where provincial DIGs worked from police headquarters to achieve a distance between political heavyweights in the provinces and Range DIGs. This way, the strain on police independence was far less.

The IGP’s relationship with the DIGs in the provinces may, be tenuous, with many provincial DIGs emerging as factotums of Chief Ministers. Rajan Phillips has rightly pointed out that the “National Mess” should first be remedied, prior to refining the Provincial Policing System.

Combatting subversion and terrorism

Interests connected with National Security may also suffer under provincial policing. The constable in a police station has potential to procure information because he moves with the people and has his ears to the ground. Each police station may have an intelligence cell, with the provincial police Special Branch coordinating them. The provincial police divisions would also have investigation units to inquire into subversion and terrorism.

Whilst all these cogs have to be coordinated by the provincial police DIGs and SPs, the system has to be locked effectively with the SIS, CID which combat threats nationally. Such coordination and control may have to depend to a considerable degree on the goodwill and willingness of provincial units to respond to the Centre.

Control would best be served by a central or unitary command, with national and provincial police cogs effectively coordinated. It may also be necessary to be conscious that conditions in the North and East maybe dissimilar to those in the other provinces; therefore national agencies connected with National Security may find the task of reaching up to provincial counterparts more difficult than with those in other provinces.



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Features

Rebuilding the country requires consultation

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A positive feature of the government that is emerging is its responsiveness to public opinion. The manner in which it has been responding to the furore over the Grade 6 English Reader, in which a weblink to a gay dating site was inserted, has been constructive. Government leaders have taken pains to explain the mishap and reassure everyone concerned that it was not meant to be there and would be removed. They have been meeting religious prelates, educationists and community leaders. In a context where public trust in institutions has been badly eroded over many years, such responsiveness matters. It signals that the government sees itself as accountable to society, including to parents, teachers, and those concerned about the values transmitted through the school system.

This incident also appears to have strengthened unity within the government. The attempt by some opposition politicians and gender misogynists to pin responsibility for this lapse on Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya, who is also the Minister of Education, has prompted other senior members of the government to come to her defence. This is contrary to speculation that the powerful JVP component of the government is unhappy with the prime minister. More importantly, it demonstrates an understanding within the government that individual ministers should not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings. Effective governance depends on collective responsibility and solidarity within the leadership, especially during moments of public controversy.

The continuing important role of the prime minister in the government is evident in her meetings with international dignitaries and also in addressing the general public. Last week she chaired the inaugural meeting of the Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. The composition of the task force once again reflects the responsiveness of the government to public opinion. Unlike previous mechanisms set up by governments, which were either all male or without ethnic minority representation, this one includes both, and also includes civil society representation. Decision-making bodies in which there is diversity are more likely to command public legitimacy.

Task Force

The Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka overlooks eight committees to manage different aspects of the recovery, each headed by a sector minister. These committees will focus on Needs Assessment, Restoration of Public Infrastructure, Housing, Local Economies and Livelihoods, Social Infrastructure, Finance and Funding, Data and Information Systems, and Public Communication. This structure appears comprehensive and well designed. However, experience from post-disaster reconstruction in countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami suggests that institutional design alone does not guarantee success. What matters equally is how far these committees engage with those on the ground and remain open to feedback that may complicate, slow down, or even challenge initial plans.

An option that the task force might wish to consider is to develop a linkage with civil society groups with expertise in the areas that the task force is expected to work. The CSO Collective for Emergency Relief has set up several committees that could be linked to the committees supervised by the task force. Such linkages would not weaken the government’s authority but strengthen it by grounding policy in lived realities. Recent findings emphasise the idea of “co-production”, where state and society jointly shape solutions in which sustainable outcomes often emerge when communities are treated not as passive beneficiaries but as partners in problem-solving.

Cyclone Ditwah destroyed more than physical infrastructure. It also destroyed communities. Some were swallowed by landslides and floods, while many others will need to be moved from their homes as they live in areas vulnerable to future disasters. The trauma of displacement is not merely material but social and psychological. Moving communities to new locations requires careful planning. It is not simply a matter of providing people with houses. They need to be relocated to locations and in a manner that permits communities to live together and to have livelihoods. This will require consultation with those who are displaced. Post-disaster evaluations have acknowledged that relocation schemes imposed without community consent often fail, leading to abandonment of new settlements or the emergence of new forms of marginalisation. Even today, abandoned tsunami housing is to be seen in various places that were affected by the 2004 tsunami.

Malaiyaha Tamils

The large-scale reconstruction that needs to take place in parts of the country most severely affected by Cyclone Ditwah also brings an opportunity to deal with the special problems of the Malaiyaha Tamil population. These are people of recent Indian origin who were unjustly treated at the time of Independence and denied rights of citizenship such as land ownership and the vote. This has been a festering problem and a blot on the conscience of the country. The need to resettle people living in those parts of the hill country which are vulnerable to landslides is an opportunity to do justice by the Malaiyaha Tamil community. Technocratic solutions such as high-rise apartments or English-style townhouses that have or are being contemplated may be cost-effective, but may also be culturally inappropriate and socially disruptive. The task is not simply to build houses but to rebuild communities.

The resettlement of people who have lost their homes and communities requires consultation with them. In the same manner, the education reform programme, of which the textbook controversy is only a small part, too needs to be discussed with concerned stakeholders including school teachers and university faculty. Opening up for discussion does not mean giving up one’s own position or values. Rather, it means recognising that better solutions emerge when different perspectives are heard and negotiated. Consultation takes time and can be frustrating, particularly in contexts of crisis where pressure for quick results is intense. However, solutions developed with stakeholder participation are more resilient and less costly in the long run.

Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah, addressing historical injustices faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community, advancing education reform, changing the electoral system to hold provincial elections without further delay and other challenges facing the government, including national reconciliation, all require dialogue across differences and patience with disagreement. Opening up for discussion is not to give up on one’s own position or values, but to listen, to learn, and to arrive at solutions that have wider acceptance. Consultation needs to be treated as an investment in sustainability and legitimacy and not as an obstacle to rapid decisionmaking. Addressing the problems together, especially engagement with affected parties and those who work with them, offers the best chance of rebuilding not only physical infrastructure but also trust between the government and people in the year ahead.

 

by Jehan Perera

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Features

PSTA: Terrorism without terror continues

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When the government appointed a committee, led by Rienzie Arsekularatne, Senior President’s Counsel, to draft a new law to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as promised by the ruling NPP, the writer, in an article published in this journal in July 2025, expressed optimism that, given Arsekularatne’s experience in criminal justice, he would be able to address issues from the perspectives of the State, criminal justice, human rights, suspects, accused, activists, and victims. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), produced by the Committee, has been sharply criticised by individuals and organisations who expected a better outcome that aligns with modern criminal justice and human rights principles.

This article is limited to a discussion of the definition of terrorism. As the writer explained previously, the dangers of an overly broad definition go beyond conviction and increased punishment. Special laws on terrorism allow deviations from standard laws in areas such as preventive detention, arrest, administrative detention, restrictions on judicial decisions regarding bail, lengthy pre-trial detention, the use of confessions, superadded punishments, such as confiscation of property and cancellation of professional licences, banning organisations, and restrictions on publications, among others. The misuse of such laws is not uncommon. Drastic legislation, such as the PTA and emergency regulations, although intended to be used to curb intense violence and deal with emergencies, has been exploited to suppress political opposition.

 

International Standards

The writer’s basic premise is that, for an act to come within the definition of terrorism, it must either involve “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or be committed to achieve an objective of an individual or organisation that uses “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to realise its aims. The UN General Assembly has accepted that the threshold for a possible general offence of terrorism is the provocation of “a state of terror” (Resolution 60/43). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken a similar view, using the phrase “to create a climate of terror.”

In his 2023 report on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Secretary-General warned that vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism in domestic law, often lacking adequate safeguards, violate the principle of legality under international human rights law. He noted that such laws lead to heavy-handed, ineffective, and counterproductive counter-terrorism practices and are frequently misused to target civil society actors and human rights defenders by labelling them as terrorists to obstruct their work.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stressed in its Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism that definitions of terrorist acts must use precise and unambiguous language, narrowly define punishable conduct and clearly distinguish it from non-punishable behaviour or offences subject to other penalties. The handbook was developed over several months by a team of international experts, including the writer, and was finalised at a workshop in Vienna.

 

Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023

A five-member Bench of the Supreme Court that examined the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023, agreed with the petitioners that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was too broad and infringed Article 12(1) of the Constitution, and recommended that an exemption (“carve out”) similar to that used in New Zealand under which “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person” committed the wrongful acts that would otherwise constitute terrorism.

While recognising the Court’s finding that the definition was too broad, the writer argued, in his previous article, that the political, administrative, and law enforcement cultures of the country concerned are crucial factors to consider. Countries such as New Zealand are well ahead of developing nations, where the risk of misuse is higher, and, therefore, definitions should be narrower, with broader and more precise exemptions. How such a “carve out” would play out in practice is uncertain.

In the Supreme Court, it was submitted that for an act to constitute an offence, under a special law on terrorism, there must be terror unleashed in the commission of the act, or it must be carried out in pursuance of the object of an organisation that uses terror to achieve its objectives. In general, only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” should come under the definition of terrorism. There can be terrorism-related acts without violence, for example, when a member of an extremist organisation remotely sabotages an electronic, automated or computerised system in pursuance of the organisation’s goal. But when the same act is committed by, say, a whizz-kid without such a connection, that would be illegal and should be punished, but not under a special law on terrorism. In its determination of the Bill, the Court did not address this submission.

 

PSTA Proposal

Proposed section 3(1) of the PSTA reads:

Any person who, intentionally or knowingly, commits any act which causes a consequence specified in subsection (2), for the purpose of-

(a) provoking a state of terror;

(b) intimidating the public or any section of the public;

(c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or

(d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, commits the offence of terrorism.

The consequences listed in sub-section (2) include: death; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, any public or private transportation system or any infrastructure facility or environment; robbery, extortion or theft of public or private property; serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system or network or cyber environment of domains assigned to, or websites registered with such domains assigned to Sri Lanka; destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system, including signal transmission and any other frequency-based transmission system; without lawful authority, importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, offensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, articles or things used in the manufacture of explosives or combustible or corrosive substances and biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear material, radioactive substances, or radiation-emitting devices.

Under section 3(5), “any person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the nine international treaties on terrorism, ratified by Sri Lanka, also commits the offence of terrorism.” No one would contest that.

The New Zealand “carve-out” is found in sub-section (4): “The fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not by itself a sufficient basis for inferring that such person (a) commits or attempts, abets, conspires, or prepares to commit the act with the intention or knowledge specified in subsection (1); or (b) is intending to cause or knowingly causes an outcome specified in subsection (2).”

While the Arsekularatne Committee has proposed, including the New Zealand “carve out”, it has ignored a crucial qualification in section 5(2) of that country’s Terrorism Suppression Act, that for an act to be considered a terrorist act, it must be carried out for one or more purposes that are or include advancing “an ideological, political, or religious cause”, with the intention of either intimidating a population or coercing or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.

When the Committee was appointed, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka opined that any new offence with respect to “terrorism” should contain a specific and narrow definition of terrorism, such as the following: “Any person who by the use of force or violence unlawfully targets the civilian population or a segment of the civilian population with the intent to spread fear among such population or segment thereof in furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious cause commits the offence of terrorism”.

The writer submits that, rather than bringing in the requirement of “a political, ideological, or religious cause”, it would be prudent to qualify proposed section 3(1) by the requirement that only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or are carried out to achieve a goal of an individual or organisation that employs “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to attain its objectives should come under the definition of terrorism. Such a threshold is recognised internationally; no “carve out” is then needed, and the concerns of the Human Rights Commission would also be addressed.

 

by Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel

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Features

ROCK meets REGGAE 2026

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JAYASRI: From Vienna, Austria

We generally have in our midst the famous JAYASRI twins, Rohitha and Rohan, who are based in Austria but make it a point to entertain their fans in Sri Lanka on a regular basis.

Well, rock and reggae fans get ready for a major happening on 28th February (Oops, a special day where I’m concerned!) as the much-awaited ROCK meets REGGAE event booms into action at the Nelum Pokuna outdoor theatre.

It was seven years ago, in 2019, that the last ROCK meets REGGAE concert was held in Colombo, and then the Covid scene cropped up.

Chitral Somapala with BLACK MAJESTY

This year’s event will feature our rock star Chitral Somapala with the Australian Rock+Metal band BLACK MAJESTY, and the reggae twins Rohitha and Rohan Jayalath with the original JAYASRI – the full band, with seven members from Vienna, Austria.

According to Rohitha, the JAYASRI outfit is enthusiastically looking forward to entertaining music lovers here with their brand of music.

Their playlist for 28th February will consist of the songs they do at festivals in Europe, as well as originals, and also English and Sinhala hits, and selected covers.

Says Rohitha: “We have put up a great team, here in Sri Lanka, to give this event an international setting and maintain high standards, and this will be a great experience for our Sri Lankan music lovers … not only for Rock and Reggae fans. Yes, there will be some opening acts, and many surprises, as well.”

Rohitha, Chitral and Rohan: Big scene at ROCK meets REGGAE

Rohitha and Rohan also conveyed their love and festive blessings to everyone in Sri Lanka, stating “This Christmas was different as our country faced a catastrophic situation and, indeed, it’s a great time to help and share the real love of Jesus Christ by helping the poor, the needy and the homeless people. Let’s RISE UP as a great nation in 2026.”

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