Connect with us

Opinion

Need for an epistemological break

Published

on

A file photo of a People’s Struggle Alliance press conference

A critical note on People’s Struggle Alliance press briefing in Jaffna

By Ragavan

The People’s Struggle Alliance, a coalition including the Front-Line Socialist Party, the New Democratic Marxist-Leninist Party, various student activists, and individuals, held a press conference in Jaffna on July 23, 2024. This date holds symbolic significance due to the state-sponsored violence against Tamils in July 1983.

I watched the conference online and wish to critically engage with the issues addressed by the speakers. I concur with their views on the economic challenges faced by Sri Lankans and their opposition to the IMF deal for managing the debt crisis. The argument that an unmandated government entered into an agreement with the IMF, thereby burdening ordinary citizens with debt repayment while those responsible for accruing the debt face no consequences, is accurate. The Alliance strongly opposed the IMF agreement and the involvement of multinational corporations and foreign governments.

The Alliance’s stance on the majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist state structure, violence against Tamils and other minorities, the brutal conflict waged against Tamils by the armed forces, military occupation in the north and east, land grabbing under the guise of archaeological excavations using distorted history, and the lack of justice for the disappeared are all positive indicators.

Contradictory statements

However, I am deeply concerned about the contradictory statements from three Tamil speakers from the Alliance regarding the ‘national question.’ There appears to be no consistent approach to this issue. The speakers asserted that, unlike other parties, the Alliance’s political programme is genuine and people-centered, and they called on Tamils to join their struggle. However, they did not clearly define the solution to the ‘national question.’ The speakers introduced themselves as members of the Alliance and stated that the press conference aimed to briefly outline the party’s position on socio-economic issues and the ‘national question.’

One speaker, Swasthika Arulingam, mentioned that the 13th Amendment is part of the constitution and that political parties are claiming they will fully implement it. She stated that such declarations would not solve the ‘national question,’ and instead, the Alliance proposed suyadchi units (self-rule units). However, she did not explain why the 13th amendment has not been fully implemented. The Alliance also failed to clarify what these self-rule units entail. Will they retain the province as the self-rule unit as outlined in the 13th Amendment, or are they proposing a different model? Any move to relegate the unit of devolution without substantial power-sharing will likely be viewed with suspicion by Tamils in the North and East, and Muslims in these provinces may also be wary. Therefore, it is crucial for the Alliance to clarify its position on the unit of devolution, the powers to be devolved, and mechanisms to prevent the central government or the Executive President from unilaterally retracting devolved powers without the province’s consent.

My understanding is that the lack of political will in the south, coupled with the immense power vested in the executive presidential system, is a major impediment to the full implementation of the 13th amendment. Provincial Governors, appointed by the President, have the authority to dissolve Provincial Governments. The unitary government has been reluctant to grant police and land powers to Provincial Governments due to its majoritarian nature and fear of backlash from Sinhala Buddhist elements. Furthermore, if the southern polity is unwilling to fully implement the 13th Amendment, which is already part of the constitution, how does the Alliance plan to convince them that self-rule is the solution to the national question? The key political task is to campaign for the abolition of the executive presidency, advocate for devolution of powers, and disseminate a counter-hegemonic discourse to challenge the majoritarian mindset. Without creating such a discourse, these proposals have no meaning.

Meaning of Suyadchi

Let me elaborate on the meaning of Suyadchi in the Sri Lankan Tamil political parlance. The Federal Party in Sri Lanka campaigned for a federal state structure where Tamils in the north and east could form a federal government within a united Sri Lanka. However, in 1968, V. Navaratnam, a Federal Party parliamentarian, left the party and founded Tamil Suyadchi Kazhagam (Tamil Self Rule Party), advocating for an independent Tamil homeland. The LTTE leader Prabakaran was inspired by the Suyadchi Kazhagam’s campaign and formed the LTTE in the 1970s. Thus, Suyadchi implies the right to secession and the formation of an independent, sovereign state. Therefore, when a political party invokes Suyadchi, it suggests the right to self-determination and secession. A more appropriate political term might be regional autonomy (Manila Suyadchi), meaning granting more political powers to regions within a united state. However, regional autonomy should not be defined along ethnic lines, as this could create divisions among Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese within those territories.

Swasthika Arulingam did not say that suyadchi (self-rule) was based on the right of self -determination concept. She said that it was only a proposal.

In contrast, another speaker, Senthivel, stated that the ‘national question’ has long remained unresolved by the state or political parties in Sri Lanka, and the Alliance’s solution is to acknowledge the right to self-determination for Tamils and establish ‘suyadchi’ (self-rule). He also mentioned that there are four nationalities and several ethnic groups in Sri Lanka.

Unitary state structure

Another speaker, Rajeevkanth, expressed the Alliance’s position as fully opposing the unitary state structure and advocating for Suyadchi (self-rule) for Tamils. He said that Tamils have waited for a long time for Suyadchi and that the Alliance has proposed a solution for Tamils to govern themselves under Suyadchi. He emphasised that while the Alliance does not oppose the 13th Amendment, it acknowledges that the amendment does not resolve the ‘national question.’ He further stated that, unlike other southern parties, which often say one thing in Tamil regions to gain favour and propagate racism in the south, the Alliance has a written policy statement clearly defining Suyadchi as the solution for the Tamil people.

This position seems similar to Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam’s party’s ‘one country, two nations’ policy.

Furthermore, Rajeevkanth mentioned that in 1983, thousands of Tamils were killed and there has been no accountability until now. This statement is factually incorrect. When the People’s Alliance government came to power in 1994, former President Chandrika Kumaratunga made a public apology. In 2001, she appointed a truth commission, and 1, 278 people submitted claims for compensation. The commission submitted a report on the violence, accepted 949 cases, and a total of 72 million rupees was paid to the victims. In 2004, at a meeting to mark the 21st anniversary of the pogrom, she made a second public apology, declaring that every citizen in the country should collectively accept the blame and apologise to the tens of thousands who suffered. While these measures may not be sufficient and exception, at least the head of state made a public apology and accepted accountability. Tamil nationalists, however, seem to have a selective memory on this issue.

‘National question’

I do not understand Sinhala and am not fully aware of what the Sinhala speakers said about the solution to the ‘national question.’ Unfortunately, their speeches were not translated into Tamil or English (except Pathirana, who spoke in English, and Uduwaragedara, who briefly spoke in Tamil). Uduwaragedara also mentioned that the Alliance’s proposal is Suyadchi. My understanding is that the Alliance’s official position is to devolve power to regions, not based on ethnicity or identity, with regional governments established as self-governing bodies without central government interference, operating under a bicameral legislative system.

Instead of clearly presenting the Alliance’s proposals, Rajeevkanth invoked Tamil nationalist sentiments in a populist manner. Senthivel also stated that the solution was based on the right to self-determination and ‘suyadchi.’

In the Sri Lankan context, especially in the north, not only social class but also caste plays a crucial role in social stratification. The conspicuous absence of addressing caste discrimination at the press conference is notable. If the Alliance has a social justice agenda, it is questionable why caste and gender issues were not highlighted. While it is true that Tamils, Muslims, hill country Tamils, and other minorities lack political power, full democratic rights, and social justice in Sri Lanka, experience has shown that competing nationalist ideologies are often exclusive, intolerant, and undemocratic, as ethnic identities are constructed in terms of superiority and cultural uniqueness rather than equality, fraternity, and liberty. Historically, divisions between ethnic groups have deepened due to competing Sinhala and Tamil nationalisms and the war.

Lessons from the past

Lessons from the past suggest that territorialising ethnic identities has an exclusivist agenda, as evidenced by the eviction of the Muslims from the north during the LTTE rule. Therefore, while combating Sinhalisation and Buddhisisation is crucial, and any move re-draw the provincial boundaries of the Northern and Eastern provinces in a manner favouring Sinhala majoritarianism should be resisted, the demand for autonomy from the North and East should be rearticulated in regional terms as opposed to ethnic terms in order to ensure power-sharing is not exclusive to one ethnic group. There is a need to shift the discourse of resistance in the North-East of the country from one predicated on exclusivist narratives like Tamil homelands to inclusive ones that embrace all the people who currently inhabit these two provinces regardless of their ethnicity, religion, culture and language. It is through such an epistemological shift accompanied by inclusive policies and programmes that a new, robust idea of regional autonomy that can challenge the ongoing Sinhalisation and Buddhisisation of the region can be created.

Devolution of power to regions is essential for a democratic society. However, as Rosa Luxemburg warned, national self-determination can be a dangerous distraction from the imperative to collaborate with labour movements. Sri Lanka faces a severe economic crisis, debt burden, and exploitation of labour and natural resources by multinational corporations and governments. The marginalised, such as workers, peasants, plantation workers, women, LGBT+ individuals, and oppressed castes, are the most affected. The Alliance, as a progressive movement, ought to address fundamental issues such as devolution of powers and class, caste, and gender divisions, as well as exploitation and dispossession, to unite the people.

Furthermore, the most affected community in Sri Lanka is the Malayaga Tamils, especially plantation workers, who have been disenfranchised, ostracized, exploited, and marginalised. Malayaga Tamils are often overlooked in the national consciousness and treated as outsiders. The speakers were silent on Malayaga Tamils when discussing suyadchi, as if it applies only to Tamils in the north.

Therefore, the Alliance should clarify what they mean by self-governing units and their solution to the ‘national question’ (I prefer the term “question of minorities”). I also want to point out that the interpretations by Senthivel and Rajeevkanth are misleading and may reinforce the conventional belief among Tamils that the Alliance proposes self-rule for Tamils in the north and east or regional autonomy based on ethnic/linguistic lines. Additionally, any mechanism created for the implementation of regional autonomy should address caste, gender, and class-based discrimination in the north, east, and other provinces.

Marx once said, “The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a mountain on the brains of the living’. He said that it is like a beginner learning a new language tends to translate back into their mother tongue. They only truly assimilate the new language and express themselves freely when they stop recalling their native language and fully immerse themselves in the new one.

In a country like Sri Lanka, where ethno-nationalist politics has polarized the communities and made them see each other as enemies, we need a new language to talk about our political future under a framework of devolution which emphasizes inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness.

During the Aragalaya protests, a democratic atmosphere emerged organically, leading to critical reflections and engagement within Left and progressive groups regarding past injustices committed in the name of nationhood, the failures of nation-state building in the post-colonial context, and the exclusion of ethnic minorities. These issues have been extensively discussed and debated. Within the communities, there is a growing consensus that political leaders have distorted the facts to wield power, using divisive politics as their tool to deceive the people.

Although there was a crack in the Sinhala Buddhist majoritarian ideology during Aragalaya, a century old political and social discourse cannot be expected to be transformed within a short period of time.

In those protests, a fresh outlook and new modes of thought emerged, highlighting the need for progressive forces to advance the incipient ideas introduced by the youth. However, reactionary and divisive political forces are still present and may attempt to regain their influence. This is only the beginning, and building an inclusive democratic society is challenging but essential. The progressive forces within the Sinhala community have a duty to address state injustices and violence against ethnic minorities, often justified in the name of nation, patriotism, and sovereignty.

Historically, to oppose the majoritarian nationalist ideology, the Tamil political leadership in the north and east constructed a defensive Tamil nationalist ideology, which mirrors Sinhala nationalism in its discursive relationship to the minorities within the region. Tamils from these regions are depicted as a unique people with an inalienable right to a separate state. These ideologies operate within the socio-political landscape and continue to play a divisive role, framing political, social, and economic crises in reductive ways solely in ethnic terms.

It seems that the Alliance has not properly engaged with these burning issues. Instead, it is attempting to appease Tamil nationalist elements, which is counterproductive. The paramount task is to ideologically challenge the undemocratic, ethnocratic, neoliberal state structure, which is the root cause of the political and economic crisis that Sri Lanka is faced with today. Changing/ challenging the character of the state in the ideological terrain and disseminating a counter-hegemonic ideology—a new language that partially emerged during the Aragalaya — is the foremost task. Without such an epistemological shift, proposals and statements are meaningless.

Ragavan is a Tamil activist based in London who participated in Aragalaya protests in London. He is also a member of the Movement for People’s Struggle – UK, a solidary group supporting Aragalaya.



Continue Reading
Advertisement
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Opinion

Could Sri Lanka once again face an economic crisis similar to 2022?

Published

on

This article examines whether Sri Lanka faces the risk of once again moving towards a situation similar to the 2022 economic crisis. The 2022 crisis was not the result of a single cause, but a multidimensional crisis created by the combined effects of fiscal weaknesses, foreign exchange shortages, debt burdens, policy mistakes, and the weakening of the productive economy. Although foreign exchange reserves, the exchange rate, and the fiscal position have now stabilized to some extent, that stability remains fragile.

The continuity of the IMF programme, debt sustainability, investor confidence, and policy discipline are decisive factors in this regard. At the same time, poverty, the quality of employment, pressures on the SME sector, price levels, and income inequalities remain serious socio-economic challenges. Therefore, while it may not be accurate to say that the 2022 crisis will immediately recur, abandoning the reform path and failing to correct structural weaknesses could once again push Sri Lanka towards a crisis-prone path.

Recently, the Chief Executive Officer of the Advocata Institute issued an important warning regarding Sri Lanka’s economic future. That statement also received wide attention across various media platforms. His central argument was that if Sri Lanka moves away from the current path of economic reforms, there is a risk that a situation similar to the severe economic crisis experienced in 2022 could re-emerge.

This statement cannot be dismissed merely as a political or ideological remark. It is an important warning that deserves deeper consideration in relation to the country’s economic stability, policy continuity, and the future of the reform process. Therefore, the purpose of this note is to examine the strength and validity of that statement through selected macroeconomic indicators and structural economic factors.

A particularly important point to remember is that the 2022 economic crisis was not caused by a single factor or a single policy mistake. It was a complex economic crisis created by the accumulation of fiscal imbalances, excessive debt, foreign exchange shortages, weak export and investment growth, the decline of the productive economy, policy uncertainty, and weak institutional governance over many years.

Therefore, in assessing whether Sri Lanka could once again move towards such a situation, it is not sufficient to rely on a single indicator or a short-term trend. Instead, it is essential to consider a broad macroeconomic range, including the fiscal position, foreign exchange reserves, debt sustainability, investment and export performance, unemployment, poverty levels, the condition of small and medium-sized enterprises, price levels, interest rates, and the overall path of economic growth.

Our main question should not be whether the 2022 crisis will return tomorrow. The more important question is whether the fundamental structural weaknesses that caused that crisis have truly been corrected, or whether they have only been temporarily managed. Sri Lanka’s economic future will be determined by the answer to this question.

1. Foreign Exchange Reserves

By early 2022, Sri Lanka’s usable foreign exchange reserves had fallen to extremely low levels, making even payments for fuel, medicine, and other essential imports a serious challenge.

At present, foreign exchange reserves have recovered significantly, providing a stronger protective buffer compared with the situation in 2022. However, this stability could once again be weakened by a breakdown in the continuity of the IMF programme, a slowdown in foreign direct investment flows, a decline in tourism earnings or remittances, or disruptions to the debt restructuring process.

2. Exchange Rate Stability

In 2022, the rapid depreciation of the rupee was a major factor that increased import prices, production costs, and the cost of living.

Today, the exchange rate shows relative stability, but that stability depends on foreign exchange inflows, market confidence, and policy credibility. Therefore, if the IMF programme is disrupted, foreign exchange earnings decline, or investor confidence weakens, the rupee could once again come under severe pressure.

3. Fiscal Position

Among the root causes of the 2022 crisis were the collapse of government revenue, dependence on excessive borrowing, and the long-term weakening of fiscal discipline.

Under the IMF programme, the fiscal position has been strengthened to some extent through increased tax revenue and expenditure control. However, reversing tax reforms for political popularity, failing to reform loss-making state-owned enterprises, or losing control over public expenditure could once again widen fiscal imbalances.

4. Debt Sustainability

In 2022, Sri Lanka was forced to suspend external debt servicing for the first time in its history.

Although the debt restructuring process has now made considerable progress, debt sustainability depends on continuous economic growth, maintaining a primary budget surplus, and policy discipline. If these conditions weaken, concerns over debt stability could re-emerge.

5. Employment Conditions

Although the official unemployment rate appears to be under some control, problems relating to the quality of the labour market remain unresolved.

Many people have moved into low-income informal employment, while the shortage of employment opportunities among educated youth remains significant. In addition, the migration of skilled and educated workers has placed pressure on the country’s human capital and long-term productive capacity.

6. Poverty and Living Standards

With the 2022 crisis, poverty increased significantly. Although inflation has declined, the cost of living still remains a heavy burden for many families.

A large number of households continue to struggle to meet expenses related to food, transport, education, and health. Therefore, it is still difficult to say that the benefits of macroeconomic stability have adequately reached lower- and middle-income groups.

7. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

SMEs, which are a central source of employment and income generation in Sri Lanka, were severely affected by the crisis.

High interest rates, energy costs, raw material prices, and weak consumer demand forced many enterprises to close down, downsize, or become burdened with debt. The pace of economic recovery will depend heavily on the revival of this sector.

8. Weakness of the Productive Economy

A deeper structural cause of the 2022 crisis was the limited base of Sri Lanka’s productive economy.

Even today, the country remains heavily dependent on tourism earnings, remittances, and the services sector. High value-added industries, technology exports, knowledge-based services, and innovation-driven sectors have not grown at the expected pace. Without a structural transformation of the economy, long-term stability cannot be guaranteed.

9. Income and Distributional Inequalities

Although some economic groups recovered quickly after the crisis, a large section of the population has still not escaped economic pressure.

The gap between urban and rural areas, as well as between high- and low-income groups, appears to have widened. If the benefits of economic growth are not distributed more broadly, macroeconomic stability will not translate into social and political stability.

10. Price Levels and Inflation

Inflation has declined, but people are still facing price levels that have already risen and become entrenched.

A decline in inflation does not mean a decline in prices. If income growth does not keep pace with price levels, the real purchasing power and living standards of households will remain weak.

11. Interest Rates and Investment

Although interest rates have declined, private investment and new business activity have not yet grown at the expected pace.

Investment decisions are influenced not only by interest rates, but also by policy stability, legal clarity, the protection of property rights, market expectations, and investor confidence. Therefore, sustained investment growth requires broader institutional and policy stability.

12. What Could Happen If IMF Conditions Are Not Implemented?

The IMF programme is not merely a loan facility. It is a key foundation of the confidence that the international financial community places in Sri Lanka’s economic policies.

programme breaks down:

*  IMF disbursements could be suspended.

*  Support from development partners, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, could weaken.

*  Confidence among creditors and international markets could deteriorate.

*  Foreign direct investment could slow down.

*  Pressure on the rupee could increase.

*  Interest rates could rise.

*  Inflation could accelerate again.

*  Fiscal crises could re-emerge.

* Economic growth could slow down.

*  Jobs, incomes, and living standards could be adversely affected.

This does not mean that Sri Lanka would return to the 2022 situation overnight. However, it could gradually weaken the protective buffers required for economic stability and significantly increase the risk of the country being drawn back into a crisis-prone path.

by Prof. Ranjith Bandara, PhD (Qld.,)

Continue Reading

Opinion

Beware of Yanks bearing gifts

Published

on

Helicopters from the US. (Pic courtesy SLAF)

The US Government has gifted 10 Bell 206, Sea Ranger Helicopters to the SLAF for Training and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) purposes. The full specifications are as follows.

Contractor:

Bell Helicopter Textron
Date Deployed: First flight: 1961; Operational: 1968
Propulsion: One Allison 250-C20BJ turbofan engine
Length: Fuselage – 31 feet (9.44 meters); Rotors turning – 39 feet (11.9 meters)
Height: 10 feet (3.04 meters)
Rotor Diameter: 35 feet 4 inches (10.78 meters)
Weight: 1595 pounds (725kg) empty, 3200 pounds (1455 kg) maximum take-off
Airspeed: 138 miles (222 km) per hour maximum; 117 miles (188 km) per hour cruising
Ceiling: 18,900 feet (5,761 meters)
Range: 368 nautical miles (420 statute miles, 676 km)
Crew: One pilot, four students

While they are good for training, I have my serious doubts whether these helicopters are ideal for HADR. As they have only a single engine and They can’t even operate into high rise helipads in hospitals and hotels in Colombo. The law requires twin engine helicopters! What happens if there is an engine failure while operating over the sea or in a mountainous area? There will be hell to pay!

Three twin engine versions would have been better.

How many helicopter pilots does the SLAF require anyway?

Will we be stuck with junk? Like two Russian KA -26’s during the Sirimavo Government and French Aerospatiale Dauphins SLAF acquired. which were not ‘tropicalised’, during the JRJ Government.

Will the Sea Ranger Spares support be available, free of charge?

I doubt it.

There will also be other Geopolitical strings attached. There is no such thing as a free lunch.

Guwan Seeya

Continue Reading

Opinion

Will AI kill solar and wind energy?

Published

on

Global warming policies were expected to drive a rapid shift toward a renewables-based energy system dominated by wind and solar. While growth in these sources did occur, it has not matched the pace that was widely anticipated. In the United States, the rise of cheap and abundant shale natural gas significantly reshaped the energy mix, displacing coal and limiting the relative share of wind and solar in electricity generation. In China and India, the situation has been different.

Coal remains dominant because it is widely available domestically, while natural gas is more limited or expensive to secure at scale. As a result, coal has retained its central role in both countries’ power systems. Solar and wind always provide intermittent, variable power. It was widely assumed that a cost-effective, utility-scale electricity storage solution would emerge to solve this problem, but that has not yet happened at the scale originally expected. In the pre-AI era, solar and wind were typically integrated into power systems alongside more reliable sources such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy.

For example, if the sun was shining on a Monday, electricity demand could be met largely by solar power during the day. At night, coal, natural gas, or nuclear plants would supply the required electricity. If the following Tuesday was cloudy or gloomy, generation would shift back toward coal, gas, or nuclear to maintain supply. AI introduces a new and more demanding challenge. AI data centers require continuous, high-quality, always-on electricity, which solar and wind alone struggle to guarantee without large-scale storage or back-up systems. In addition, they require very large amounts of power.

As a result, the AI industry is now actively searching for new and expanded sources of reliable electricity. One of the major challenges in powering AI systems is electricity transmission. High-voltage transmission lines are expensive, slow to build, and often face regulatory and land-use constraints. As a result, some companies are exploring more localized power solutions, sometimes referred to as microgrids. These are self-contained energy systems that can operate independently from the main electricity grid. Technologies such as small modular nuclear reactors are an example of such microgrids.

In such isolated systems, the focus is on highly reliable, always available power generated close to the point of use. In this context, solar and wind are expected to play a limited role because their output is variable and depends on weather conditions, making them less suited as primary sources in fully self-contained AI-focused microgrids. The pace of AI infrastructure development is extremely rapid in both the United States and China. AI systems are widely seen as transformative technologies that promise significant new wealth creation, which is driving aggressive and sustained investment. As a result, development is moving quickly, without waiting for long-term solutions such as large-scale energy storage to mature alongside renewable energy systems.

In this environment, electricity demand is rising faster than new infrastructure can be built. In the United States, this reinforces the role of natural gas as the dominant source of reliable power. In China and India, where coal remains more established and readily available, it is likely to continue playing a central role in meeting growing demand. In India, AI data centers have not yet been built at the scale seen in the United States and China. When India does reach that stage, it will need to supply large amounts of reliable electricity. India has placed strong emphasis on solar energy in particular and has had some success in meeting the needs of ordinary consumers through renewable expansion. However, the key question is what choices will be made when large-scale AI data centers begin to arrive.

Will India rely more on coal generation, which is relatively cheap, widely available, and highly reliable, or on solar power, which is intermittent, variable, and often more expensive when reliability is taken into account? My view is that India is more likely to turn to coal to meet this demand, given its existing infrastructure and the need for dependable electricity supply. Then there is an overall question. Solar and wind were already struggling in the pre-AI days to displace coal and natural gas at the system level, despite strong expectations that they would become dominant sources of electricity. Now that AI is here and electricity demand is rising rapidly, will they push solar and wind further behind in the energy mix? (The Statesman)

(The writer is an expert on energy and contributes regularly to publications in India and overseas.)

by SUNIL SHARAN

Continue Reading

Trending