Opinion

Need for an epistemological break

Published

2 years ago

2024/08/1

Sahan Weerasooriya

A file photo of a People’s Struggle Alliance press conference

A critical note on People’s Struggle Alliance press briefing in Jaffna

By Ragavan

The People’s Struggle Alliance, a coalition including the Front-Line Socialist Party, the New Democratic Marxist-Leninist Party, various student activists, and individuals, held a press conference in Jaffna on July 23, 2024. This date holds symbolic significance due to the state-sponsored violence against Tamils in July 1983.

I watched the conference online and wish to critically engage with the issues addressed by the speakers. I concur with their views on the economic challenges faced by Sri Lankans and their opposition to the IMF deal for managing the debt crisis. The argument that an unmandated government entered into an agreement with the IMF, thereby burdening ordinary citizens with debt repayment while those responsible for accruing the debt face no consequences, is accurate. The Alliance strongly opposed the IMF agreement and the involvement of multinational corporations and foreign governments.

The Alliance’s stance on the majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist state structure, violence against Tamils and other minorities, the brutal conflict waged against Tamils by the armed forces, military occupation in the north and east, land grabbing under the guise of archaeological excavations using distorted history, and the lack of justice for the disappeared are all positive indicators.

Contradictory statements

However, I am deeply concerned about the contradictory statements from three Tamil speakers from the Alliance regarding the ‘national question.’ There appears to be no consistent approach to this issue. The speakers asserted that, unlike other parties, the Alliance’s political programme is genuine and people-centered, and they called on Tamils to join their struggle. However, they did not clearly define the solution to the ‘national question.’ The speakers introduced themselves as members of the Alliance and stated that the press conference aimed to briefly outline the party’s position on socio-economic issues and the ‘national question.’

One speaker, Swasthika Arulingam, mentioned that the 13th Amendment is part of the constitution and that political parties are claiming they will fully implement it. She stated that such declarations would not solve the ‘national question,’ and instead, the Alliance proposed suyadchi units (self-rule units). However, she did not explain why the 13th amendment has not been fully implemented. The Alliance also failed to clarify what these self-rule units entail. Will they retain the province as the self-rule unit as outlined in the 13th Amendment, or are they proposing a different model? Any move to relegate the unit of devolution without substantial power-sharing will likely be viewed with suspicion by Tamils in the North and East, and Muslims in these provinces may also be wary. Therefore, it is crucial for the Alliance to clarify its position on the unit of devolution, the powers to be devolved, and mechanisms to prevent the central government or the Executive President from unilaterally retracting devolved powers without the province’s consent.

My understanding is that the lack of political will in the south, coupled with the immense power vested in the executive presidential system, is a major impediment to the full implementation of the 13th amendment. Provincial Governors, appointed by the President, have the authority to dissolve Provincial Governments. The unitary government has been reluctant to grant police and land powers to Provincial Governments due to its majoritarian nature and fear of backlash from Sinhala Buddhist elements. Furthermore, if the southern polity is unwilling to fully implement the 13th Amendment, which is already part of the constitution, how does the Alliance plan to convince them that self-rule is the solution to the national question? The key political task is to campaign for the abolition of the executive presidency, advocate for devolution of powers, and disseminate a counter-hegemonic discourse to challenge the majoritarian mindset. Without creating such a discourse, these proposals have no meaning.

Meaning of Suyadchi

Let me elaborate on the meaning of Suyadchi in the Sri Lankan Tamil political parlance. The Federal Party in Sri Lanka campaigned for a federal state structure where Tamils in the north and east could form a federal government within a united Sri Lanka. However, in 1968, V. Navaratnam, a Federal Party parliamentarian, left the party and founded Tamil Suyadchi Kazhagam (Tamil Self Rule Party), advocating for an independent Tamil homeland. The LTTE leader Prabakaran was inspired by the Suyadchi Kazhagam’s campaign and formed the LTTE in the 1970s. Thus, Suyadchi implies the right to secession and the formation of an independent, sovereign state. Therefore, when a political party invokes Suyadchi, it suggests the right to self-determination and secession. A more appropriate political term might be regional autonomy (Manila Suyadchi), meaning granting more political powers to regions within a united state. However, regional autonomy should not be defined along ethnic lines, as this could create divisions among Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese within those territories.

Swasthika Arulingam did not say that suyadchi (self-rule) was based on the right of self -determination concept. She said that it was only a proposal.

In contrast, another speaker, Senthivel, stated that the ‘national question’ has long remained unresolved by the state or political parties in Sri Lanka, and the Alliance’s solution is to acknowledge the right to self-determination for Tamils and establish ‘suyadchi’ (self-rule). He also mentioned that there are four nationalities and several ethnic groups in Sri Lanka.

Unitary state structure

Another speaker, Rajeevkanth, expressed the Alliance’s position as fully opposing the unitary state structure and advocating for Suyadchi (self-rule) for Tamils. He said that Tamils have waited for a long time for Suyadchi and that the Alliance has proposed a solution for Tamils to govern themselves under Suyadchi. He emphasised that while the Alliance does not oppose the 13th Amendment, it acknowledges that the amendment does not resolve the ‘national question.’ He further stated that, unlike other southern parties, which often say one thing in Tamil regions to gain favour and propagate racism in the south, the Alliance has a written policy statement clearly defining Suyadchi as the solution for the Tamil people.

This position seems similar to Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam’s party’s ‘one country, two nations’ policy.

Furthermore, Rajeevkanth mentioned that in 1983, thousands of Tamils were killed and there has been no accountability until now. This statement is factually incorrect. When the People’s Alliance government came to power in 1994, former President Chandrika Kumaratunga made a public apology. In 2001, she appointed a truth commission, and 1, 278 people submitted claims for compensation. The commission submitted a report on the violence, accepted 949 cases, and a total of 72 million rupees was paid to the victims. In 2004, at a meeting to mark the 21st anniversary of the pogrom, she made a second public apology, declaring that every citizen in the country should collectively accept the blame and apologise to the tens of thousands who suffered. While these measures may not be sufficient and exception, at least the head of state made a public apology and accepted accountability. Tamil nationalists, however, seem to have a selective memory on this issue.

‘National question’

I do not understand Sinhala and am not fully aware of what the Sinhala speakers said about the solution to the ‘national question.’ Unfortunately, their speeches were not translated into Tamil or English (except Pathirana, who spoke in English, and Uduwaragedara, who briefly spoke in Tamil). Uduwaragedara also mentioned that the Alliance’s proposal is Suyadchi. My understanding is that the Alliance’s official position is to devolve power to regions, not based on ethnicity or identity, with regional governments established as self-governing bodies without central government interference, operating under a bicameral legislative system.

Instead of clearly presenting the Alliance’s proposals, Rajeevkanth invoked Tamil nationalist sentiments in a populist manner. Senthivel also stated that the solution was based on the right to self-determination and ‘suyadchi.’

In the Sri Lankan context, especially in the north, not only social class but also caste plays a crucial role in social stratification. The conspicuous absence of addressing caste discrimination at the press conference is notable. If the Alliance has a social justice agenda, it is questionable why caste and gender issues were not highlighted. While it is true that Tamils, Muslims, hill country Tamils, and other minorities lack political power, full democratic rights, and social justice in Sri Lanka, experience has shown that competing nationalist ideologies are often exclusive, intolerant, and undemocratic, as ethnic identities are constructed in terms of superiority and cultural uniqueness rather than equality, fraternity, and liberty. Historically, divisions between ethnic groups have deepened due to competing Sinhala and Tamil nationalisms and the war.

Lessons from the past

Lessons from the past suggest that territorialising ethnic identities has an exclusivist agenda, as evidenced by the eviction of the Muslims from the north during the LTTE rule. Therefore, while combating Sinhalisation and Buddhisisation is crucial, and any move re-draw the provincial boundaries of the Northern and Eastern provinces in a manner favouring Sinhala majoritarianism should be resisted, the demand for autonomy from the North and East should be rearticulated in regional terms as opposed to ethnic terms in order to ensure power-sharing is not exclusive to one ethnic group. There is a need to shift the discourse of resistance in the North-East of the country from one predicated on exclusivist narratives like Tamil homelands to inclusive ones that embrace all the people who currently inhabit these two provinces regardless of their ethnicity, religion, culture and language. It is through such an epistemological shift accompanied by inclusive policies and programmes that a new, robust idea of regional autonomy that can challenge the ongoing Sinhalisation and Buddhisisation of the region can be created.

Devolution of power to regions is essential for a democratic society. However, as Rosa Luxemburg warned, national self-determination can be a dangerous distraction from the imperative to collaborate with labour movements. Sri Lanka faces a severe economic crisis, debt burden, and exploitation of labour and natural resources by multinational corporations and governments. The marginalised, such as workers, peasants, plantation workers, women, LGBT+ individuals, and oppressed castes, are the most affected. The Alliance, as a progressive movement, ought to address fundamental issues such as devolution of powers and class, caste, and gender divisions, as well as exploitation and dispossession, to unite the people.

Furthermore, the most affected community in Sri Lanka is the Malayaga Tamils, especially plantation workers, who have been disenfranchised, ostracized, exploited, and marginalised. Malayaga Tamils are often overlooked in the national consciousness and treated as outsiders. The speakers were silent on Malayaga Tamils when discussing suyadchi, as if it applies only to Tamils in the north.

Therefore, the Alliance should clarify what they mean by self-governing units and their solution to the ‘national question’ (I prefer the term “question of minorities”). I also want to point out that the interpretations by Senthivel and Rajeevkanth are misleading and may reinforce the conventional belief among Tamils that the Alliance proposes self-rule for Tamils in the north and east or regional autonomy based on ethnic/linguistic lines. Additionally, any mechanism created for the implementation of regional autonomy should address caste, gender, and class-based discrimination in the north, east, and other provinces.

Marx once said, “The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a mountain on the brains of the living’. He said that it is like a beginner learning a new language tends to translate back into their mother tongue. They only truly assimilate the new language and express themselves freely when they stop recalling their native language and fully immerse themselves in the new one.

In a country like Sri Lanka, where ethno-nationalist politics has polarized the communities and made them see each other as enemies, we need a new language to talk about our political future under a framework of devolution which emphasizes inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness.

During the Aragalaya protests, a democratic atmosphere emerged organically, leading to critical reflections and engagement within Left and progressive groups regarding past injustices committed in the name of nationhood, the failures of nation-state building in the post-colonial context, and the exclusion of ethnic minorities. These issues have been extensively discussed and debated. Within the communities, there is a growing consensus that political leaders have distorted the facts to wield power, using divisive politics as their tool to deceive the people.

Although there was a crack in the Sinhala Buddhist majoritarian ideology during Aragalaya, a century old political and social discourse cannot be expected to be transformed within a short period of time.

In those protests, a fresh outlook and new modes of thought emerged, highlighting the need for progressive forces to advance the incipient ideas introduced by the youth. However, reactionary and divisive political forces are still present and may attempt to regain their influence. This is only the beginning, and building an inclusive democratic society is challenging but essential. The progressive forces within the Sinhala community have a duty to address state injustices and violence against ethnic minorities, often justified in the name of nation, patriotism, and sovereignty.

Historically, to oppose the majoritarian nationalist ideology, the Tamil political leadership in the north and east constructed a defensive Tamil nationalist ideology, which mirrors Sinhala nationalism in its discursive relationship to the minorities within the region. Tamils from these regions are depicted as a unique people with an inalienable right to a separate state. These ideologies operate within the socio-political landscape and continue to play a divisive role, framing political, social, and economic crises in reductive ways solely in ethnic terms.

It seems that the Alliance has not properly engaged with these burning issues. Instead, it is attempting to appease Tamil nationalist elements, which is counterproductive. The paramount task is to ideologically challenge the undemocratic, ethnocratic, neoliberal state structure, which is the root cause of the political and economic crisis that Sri Lanka is faced with today. Changing/ challenging the character of the state in the ideological terrain and disseminating a counter-hegemonic ideology—a new language that partially emerged during the Aragalaya — is the foremost task. Without such an epistemological shift, proposals and statements are meaningless.

Ragavan is a Tamil activist based in London who participated in Aragalaya protests in London. He is also a member of the Movement for People’s Struggle – UK, a solidary group supporting Aragalaya.

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Opinion

Sri Lanka’s geopolitical positioning for future prosperity

Published

23 hours ago

2026/09/25

Thilina Walpola

Kariyawasam

By Chula Goonasekera
For the LEADS Forum (admin@srilankaleads.com)

Sri Lanka’s future prosperity will depend on how effectively it positions itself within an increasingly complex global environment. At a recent LEADS Forum discussion (https://youtu.be/Bbr3e_qU1Fw), veteran diplomat Prasad Kariyawasam, former Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, High Commissioner to India, Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador /Permanent Representative to the UN in New York and Geneva —outlined the strategic choices Sri Lanka must make to secure long term stability and economic advancement. Kariyawasam offered a rare blend of historical perspective, diplomatic experience and practical guidance.

His central message was clear: Sri Lanka must exercise strategic agency—engaging all major partners while safeguarding its national interests.

Foreign Policy as an Extension of National Aspirations

Foreign policy, Kariyawasam emphasised, is inseparable from domestic priorities. As your text notes, “foreign relations often reflect the medium- and long-term aspirations of a country’s people and its leadership.” Governments must therefore craft external relations that reflect the public’s economic and social expectations, avoiding short-term political impulses that undermine long-term national interests.

For a small nation, foreign policy cannot be symbolic or personality driven. It must be purposeful, pragmatic and directed towards the security and prosperity of the people.

A History of Global Connectivity

Sri Lanka’s history demonstrates that the island has never been isolated. From ancient ties with India and Southeast Asia to Arab, Persian and Chinese maritime networks, the island prospered when connected to the wider world. We must realise that “geography creates opportunity, but geography alone does not create prosperity.” Institutions, infrastructure and policy determine whether geographic advantage becomes economic success.

Colombo’s emergence as a cosmopolitan trading hub and Galle’s role as a resupply station for Indian Ocean shipping in colonial times , illustrate how deeply Sri Lanka has been embedded in global commerce for centuries.

Lessons from Asia’s High Performers

Kariyawasam highlighted the experiences of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam. Their paths differ, but their success rests on common foundations:

• investment in human capital and infrastructure

• merit based institutions

• integration into global markets

• attraction of investment and technology

• export oriented industries

• strategic engagements with both China and Western economies

The lesson for Sri Lanka is not imitation but continuous adaptation and constructive integration with the global economy.

India: Sri Lanka’s Closest Major Partner

India’s transformation into a global economic power presents Sri Lanka with both opportunity and responsibility. India is already Sri Lanka’s largest source of tourists and a major investor. Kariyawasam states, “The larger question is how effectively Sri Lanka can participate in and benefit from India’s growth.”

A partnership should encompass modern, more open pathways for trade, investment, logistics, energy, technology, digital services, education and professional mobility—And asymmetry between the two economies must be handled with maturity and foresight, seeking special and differential treatment .

China and Other Global Partners

China remains a significant economic partner. Sri Lanka must avoid viewing this relationship through a zero sum lens. The goal should be productive and transparent engagement, ensuring better terms of trade and meaningful technology transfer.

Equally Important relations must be nurtured with the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf.

All these relationships can be vibrant partnerships that does not lead towards , dependency but mutually beneficial pragmatic arrangements .

A Fragmenting International System

Global geopolitics is becoming more volatile. Trade tensions, wars, sanctions, supply chain disruptions, climate change and technological competition increasingly shape national security. We must realise, “foreign policy cannot be separated from economic policy.”

Sri Lanka’s recent economic crisis demonstrated the importance of international confidence, access to finance and resilient supply chains. Energy security, food security, cybersecurity and digital infrastructure are now core elements of national strategy.

Strategic Agency: The Guiding Principle

Sri Lanka must avoid becoming an arena for great power competition. Strategic agency means making decisions based on national interest, expanding Sri Lanka’s choices, not restricting them.

India is essential. China is important. The United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf are important. The objective is a web of partnerships that strengthens resilience and autonomy.

Sri Lanka’s Strategic Assets

1. Location: Sri Lanka’s geography is a long standing advantage. Ports such as Colombo, Hambantota, Trincomalee and Galle can become specialised hubs—if connected to logistics, manufacturing, services and exports.

2. Digital Connectivity: Submarine cables, data centres, cloud services and cybersecurity are now as important as physical geography. Sri Lanka can turn its location into both a maritime and digital advantage.

3. Tourism and Natural Heritage: The focus should shift from tourist numbers to value creation—wellness, heritage, ecotourism, cruise tourism, education and MICE tourism.

4. Human Resources and Demographics: High literacy is no longer enough. Skills in technology, engineering, AI, logistics and advanced manufacturing are essential, especially with an ageing population.

5. Migrant Workforce: Migrant workers are a strategic asset, not merely a source of remittances. Bilateral labour agreements, skills recognition and diaspora engagement should be central to foreign policy.

Requirements for Sustained Prosperity

Sri Lanka’s future depends on:

• peace and security

• access to international markets

• productive investment

• a skilled, productive workforce

• modernised agriculture

• higher value tourism

• demographic preparedness

• climate resilience

• strong, predictable institutions

Please note that “foreign policy can open doors. Domestic institutions determine whether we can walk through them.”

The Role of the State

Sri Lanka does not need a larger state—only a more capable one. Policy continuity, professional institutions, predictable regulation and reduced corruption are essential. Geography does not change; long-term national interests do not change. Intentional relationships built over decades should not be reinvented with each election cycle.

Building Trust Internationally

Trust is a strategic asset. Sri Lanka must be known as a country that honours commitments and maintains predictable policies. This is vital not only for diplomacy but also for investment and long term partnerships.

Avoiding Zero Sum Geopolitics

Sri Lanka does not need to choose between India and China, or between Asia and the West. The task is to identify what each relationship can contribute to national development while protecting sovereignty and freedom of decision making.

Sri Lanka’s geography is an inheritance, but prosperity is not guaranteed. The world is changing rapidly—great-power competition, technological disruption, and climate vulnerability demand a foreign policy that is pragmatic, adaptive, and anchored in national interest.

Sri Lanka must build partnerships without dependencies, maintain strategic agency without isolation, and integrate with the global economy while strengthening domestic capacity.

“We cannot change where Sri Lanka is. We can, however, determine what Sri Lanka becomes because of where it is”

Opinion

A tariff deal with the US? Make haste slowly

Published

2 days ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Gomi Senadhira

Sri Lanka’s former ambassador to the United States Mahinda Samarasinghe is back in Sri Lanka lobbying for speedier finalisation of a new tariff deal with the United States. According to news reports, delivering the keynote address at the Sri Lanka Institute of Directors’ Annual Meeting last week, he stated, “I have recommended very strongly to the government that we need to conclude the agreement so that we can lock in the very favourable tariff rate that Sri Lanka has got up to now“.

I do not understand why the former ambassador is urging the government to expedite the finalisation of a new tariff deal or what is “the very favourable tariff rate” he refers to in his speech. However, given the ongoing terrible tariff turbulence in the United States and the fragile economic situation in Sri Lanka, I believe, this is not the right time to rush into finalising any trade agreement with the United States. I am also of the opinion that at this juncture Sri Lanka should maintain strategic patience and explore all available options.

Lessons from the countries that rushed for trade deals

To better comprehend this, let’s look at experiences of the countries that rushed to conclude tariff deals with the United States after President Donald Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in April 2025. As Samarasinghe stated in his keynote, “The bottom line on all these negotiations was that every country that finally agreed to sign the agreement had to give either complete duty-free access for American exports into those markets, or near complete duty-free access.” In exchange for these tariff concessions and other market access commitments these countries managed to get the newly introduced country specific “reciprocal tariffs” reduced.

However, in February 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) struck down these “reciprocal tariffs” under the IEEPA. With that, the market access gains these countries received in exchange for complete duty-free access for American exports into their markets evaporated under U.S. domestic law. By moving too fast to conclude bilateral tariff agreements with the United States these countries are now bound to strict obligations whereas the benefits they bargained from the U.S. administration are not worth the paper those were written on.

Sri Lanka’s experience

In April 2025, President Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” and labelled Sri Lanka as the worst offender, imposing one of the highest additional duties at 44%. Since then, Ambassador Samarasinghe and other negotiators have managed to negotiate this down to 20%. I do not know what the deal was through which Sri Lanka managed to reduce the 44% tariff to 20% or what we gave in return for this “concession.” However, what we received in return has absolutely no value after the decision by the SCOTUS.

Current state of US tariffs

After the decision by SCOTUS, the U.S. administration introduced a temporary 10% additional tariff on all countries for 150 days. At the end of that period, this 10% tariff was replaced by a new “forced labor tariff ” of 10% to 12.5% on all trading partners under Section 301 of U.S. trade law. Twenty-five U.S. states and several small businesses have already filed lawsuits against these tariffs in U.S. courts. This new “forced labour tariff ” on Sri Lanka was first fixed at 12.5%. Later, after President Anura Kumara Dissanayake issued a gazette notice prohibiting the importation of goods produced using forced labour, it was reduced to 10%. That means Sri Lanka has already made a substantial commitment to receive this “tariff concession,” and I presume our negotiators understand the implications of this commitment.

Make haste slowly

After President Trump imposed 44% “reciprocal tariffs” on Sri Lanka, through an article published in The Island on 25th April 2026 (), I urged the government to engage immediately with the US administration on these tariffs. However, I also emphasised that the best way to move forward was to make haste slowly.

Two millennia ago, Augustus Caesar, the first emperor of Rome, frequently used the phrase, “make haste slowly”, because he detested rashness and haste in his military commanders. It was the recurring guiding maxim that he emphasised throughout his 40-year imperial rule. After 2000 years, this classical oxymoron remains a definitive golden rule for professional trade negotiators. More importantly it is the exact blueprint required when navigating turbulence in trade negotiations with the Trump administration.

The endgame – The most dangerous moment in trade negotiation

Samarasinghe has also stated the agreement is 90% complete. Any experienced trade negotiator should know that the final 10% contains high-stakes provisions and is the most dangerous moment in a trade negotiation. A single misplaced comma or ambiguous product description in a tariff schedule can cost millions through unintended loopholes. Rushing this last stretch to secure a deal can permanently expose Sri Lanka to sudden shifts in American trade policy, heavy compliance costs, or strict enforcement under Section 301 regarding supply-chain labour standards. Hence, this is the time for strategic patience.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

Opinion

Buddhist law and constitutional amendments

Published

2 days ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Upon reading the article titled “Prof. Pieris says Buddha Dhamma recognized as source of law under Constitution” (Island, September 12, 2026), the classical Sinhala idiom “Yanne Koheda? Malle Pol” immediately comes to mind. The expression, translating literally to answering “I have coconuts in my bag” when asked “Where are you going?”, underscores a complete disconnect in logic. Because it is uncertain whether the article accurately represents the professor’s precise words, the following critique addresses the contents of the report rather than the speaker himself.

The central premise of the report concerns a statement delivered by the Chief Justice regarding a petition filed against the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution. According to the report, the Chief Justice’s observation that the determination would be made strictly on the basis of established law rather than Buddhist teachings was characterised as a “cavalier dismissal” of the Buddha Dhamma. This assertion carries a host of unexamined assumptions. Had the writer specified precisely which tenets of the Buddha Dhamma were violated, a direct legal or philosophical evaluation could take place. However, no specific Buddhist tenet or law was identified as having been transgressed, and for good reason: no such statutory legal framework exists within the Buddha’s teachings.

To understand the flaw in this argument, one must examine the constitutional context alongside the canonical meaning of the terms involved. Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka mandates that the Republic shall give Buddhism the foremost place and that it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while guaranteeing the fundamental rights of all religions under Articles 10 and 14(1)(e).

While “Buddhism” and “Buddha Dhamma” are frequently used as interchangeable terms in casual dialogue, they represent distinct concepts. “Buddhism” is an umbrella term coined by 19th-century Western scholars to classify the global institutionalised religion, incorporating its diverse sects, cultural traditions, rituals, and socio-political histories. Conversely, Sasana is the ancient term designating the structural framework established by the Buddha to preserve and transmit his teachings, comprising the monastic order (Sangha) and its supporting institutions.

In classical Theravada commentarial literature, the Sasana operates as a functional three-tiered structure. It encompasses Pariyatti Sasana, the preservation and study of sacred texts; Paṭipatti Sasana, the practical execution of the doctrine through ethical conduct and meditation; and Paṭivedha Sasana, the direct experiential realization of ultimate truth, or enlightenment. This structural breakdown raises fundamental questions about state capacity. While a state can readily support Pariyatti Sasana through academic institutions, textual preservation, and educational funding, it cannot legislate or enforce Paṭipatti or Paṭivedha. Practical engagement and spiritual realisation are inherently internal, first-person experiences. Expecting the state to codify or guarantee enlightenment is a conceptual impossibility.

Furthermore, the Buddha Dhamma refers specifically to the unconditioned truths of existence and the teachings imparted to realize them, including the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, and Dependent Origination. As the late Venerable Professor Kotagama Wachissara Thera observed, there is no rigid ideologue or “ism” in the core Dhamma. The teachings do not constitute a system of divine commandments or a legal statute enforced through reward and punishment. Rather, Buddhist ethics function as self-directed guidelines for psychological clarity and moral inquiry. Even the Vinaya Pitaka, which contains explicit rules of conduct, functions as an internal monastic code rather than a civil or criminal law intended for the laity.

Throughout the Pali Canon, guidance regarding governance focuses on the moral character of leadership and the social duties of statecraft rather than rigid legal codification. In discourses such as the Cakkavatti Sihanada Sutta (DN 26), the Buddha observes that social instability and crime cannot be eliminated solely through punitive measures, emphasising instead that states must provide economic opportunities, fair wages, and resource distribution to maintain societal balance. Crucially, in the Maha Parinibbana Sutta (DN 16), the Buddha explicitly highlights the importance of respecting established laws and traditions rather than enacting arbitrary regulations.

The natural laws articulated in the Dhamma, such as the law of cause and effect or the three characteristics of existence, govern all phenomena universally, regardless of legal statutes or personal belief. They are not human laws to be applied or suspended by a court of law. Therefore, characterizing the Chief Justice’s adherence to constitutional jurisprudence over religious doctrine as a “cavalier dismissal” lacks logical and textual foundation. Framing the judiciary’s adherence to legal precedent as an attack on the Dhamma distracts from fundamental constitutional principles and risks misguiding the public for political ends.

Geewananda
Gunawardana,
Ph.D.