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Kandyan kingdom: From the fringe to the centre



By Uditha Devapriya

The rise of Kandy, as a political subunit in the country, can generally be attributed to three factors: the shift from Kurunegala to Gampola as the capital city, the onslaughts made on udarata by the Aryachakravartis from Jaffna, and the rise to power of nobles and chief ministers at the time of the Gampola and Kotte kings.

Literary evidence tells us that the shift to a new capital occurred due to internal squabbles. The emergence of two, sometimes three centres of power, was inevitable: it was a necessary antidote to a harsh reality. By moving further southwest, however, the country moved away from a stable order. The new centres essentially forewent on the old stability.

At the time of the Gampola kings, udarata was known as Malayarata, and it was considered an effective barricade against foreign invasions.

In the 15th Century the capital city was, perhaps due to this, moved to Senkadagala Nuwara or Kandy. When the first Gampola era ruler, Bhuvanekabahu IV, administered the country from the new capital, his brother Parakramabahu V was ruling from Dedigama at the Four Korales.

Whether or not such a system was amenable to either ruler we do not know, but what we do know is that the Gampola kingdom regarded udarata as a link between rajarata to the north and ruhuna to the south. Hence it was in the interests of both ruler and co-ruler, not to mention their ministers, to secure it from the north.

Inscriptions at Kotagala and Lahugama tell us that the Aryachakravarti rulers frequently challenged the legitimacy of the Sinhala kings by invading this region. The first attempt is said to have failed, but by 1359, according to an inscription at Medawala in Harispattuwa, the leader of the campaign, Ariyan of Singai Nagar or Mathandan Perumal, was collecting taxes from five villages in Gampola through Brahmins on behalf of Jaffna; according to the Rajavaliya, the Aryachakravartis “cause[d] tribute to be brought from the hill country.” To stop this, a powerful unifying figure had to emerge.

For obvious reasons, the rise of such a figure was preceded by the ascent of chief ministers. The first of these ministers, records tell us, was Senadhilankara, who governed during the reign of Bhuvanekabahu IV. Because of their influence, they often became more powerful than the kings, who in return granted them high positions for reasons of realpolitik.

Senadhilankara would be succeeded by the Alagakkonara dynasty. Alakeshwara, a scion of the Alagakkonaras, proved himself to his rulers by defying the Aryachakravartis, building a fort at Jayawardenapura Kotte, and destroying a fleet of ships at Panadura when they had been despatched to quell the presumptuous minister.

The position he enjoyed in the court can be gleaned from the fact that, when news of the despatch came, Bhuvanekabahu V fled the court. Not surprisingly, the Rajavaliya describes this as a cowardly act.

However, Sri Lanka was a monarchy, not a country of chief ministers. The claims of the latter had to be put down, and they were: In the face of the leadership vacuum following the Zheng He episode, a conflict over succession ensued between Alakeshwara and Parakramabahu VI. The latter prevailed in this contest, after which he went on to rule from Raigama and later Gampola, subsequently establishing a new kingdom in Kotte.

Despite the quelling of Alakeshwara, though, the aspirations of other sub-rulers could not be stemmed forever, and though Parakramabahu VI unified the entire country (going as far as to send a nephew to Jaffna to bring the kingdom under him) the threat of certain regions, especially Malayarata, seceding from the capital continued to linger.

According to the Rajavaliya the first such threat came in the king’s 52nd year from a sub-ruler or situ raja named Sojata (Joti Sitana), who “neglected payment of his yearly tribute, and rebelled,” from udarata. Parakramabahu quelled the rebellion by raising an army and committing it to a relative of his, Ambulugala kumaraya, who is then said to have proceeded to conquer the hill country. The Medawala inscription gives us the full name of the rebel as Divanawatte Lanka Adhikarin.

Whatever hopes one may have had of a unified polity soon dissipated upon the death of Parakramabahu VI. This had much to do with the leadership struggles that ensued after his death: His successor, Jayabahu II, was after the space of four years ousted and murdered by Sapumal kumaraya, who ascended the throne as Bhuvanekabahu VI and soon faced a similar attempt on him by two disgruntled noblemen (Siriwardena Patiraja and Kuragala Himi). The ambitious prince quelled this uprising by turning to Ambulugala kumaraya. Paranavitana observed that this uprising represented “an upsurge of national sentiment” against a ruler of Malayali blood, though R.A.L.H. Gunawardena disagreed.

In any case, the cycle of accession and deposal recurred upon Bhuvanekabahu’s death, and ironically this time it was the prince of Ambulugala’s turn to act as ‘ouster’: Literary sources inform us that Bhuvanekabahu was succeeded by Pandita Parakramabahu, and the aspiring kumaraya, perhaps angered at the fact that the successor had been brought up by the same people he had defeated on behalf of the previous king, collected a large force from the Four Korales, encamped in Siyana Korale, shifted to Kelaniya, fought with and killed Patiraja and Kuragala, proceeded to Kotte, killed Parakramabahu, and the next day “ascended the throne as Vira Parakramabahu.” History often can be stranger than fiction.

Given the tenuous relationship between successors and aspirants in Kotte it comes to no surprise that sub-rulers in Kandy would take advantage of the turmoil and try to establish an independent kingdom. To ensure the loyalty of the Kandyan regions and the stability of the union, both Parakramabahu VI and Bhuvanekabahu IV married princesses from the region. This practice continued for a long time. They also extracted rajakariya from the inhabitants. If those inhabitants failed to deliver on such services, the rulers would issue threats ranging from mild punishment to political and military intervention.

These were artful, if not shrewd, means of guaranteeing continuity and order, and they were successful for some time. Yet they could not stem the hopes and wishes of the inhabitants of declaring independence.

The founding father of Kandy, udarata as a distinct administrative kingdom, is usually considered to be Senasammata Vikramabahu. Vikramabahu came to power as ruler of the Kandyan kingdom when Bhuvanekabahu IV ascended Kotte. The Palkumbura Sannasa and inscriptions at Aluthnuwara and Gadaladeniya contain details about him: His reign seems to have lasted from 1473 or 1474 to 1510, after which his son Jayavira succeeded him, while by the time of his ascent there udarata had lacked a king and “the state elephant, let loose to find one, discovered a young prince with his mother at Asgiriya.”

The continuation of the Mahavamsa puts down a different date for his ascension, at 1542 or 1543. We can agree that this is erroneous and is not supported by other evidence. However, the Mahavamsa tell us of his lineage, which is supposed to have begun with a princess Mayuravati who was “born of a peahen’s egg” and from whom originated the Mehenavara-vamsa. Vikramabahu was apparently the grandson of Jayamahalena Savulu Parakramabahu, a descendant of this princess.

According to popular lore from then, “Senkhanda nam Siriwardenapura” is said to have been Vikramabahu’s “birthright” (jamma-praveni), and he proceeded there after conquering his enemies. He is also said to have constructed several religious shrines, among them the Poya Maluva at the Malvatte Viharaya. To consolidate his legitimacy he went on pilgrimages to Adam’s Peak, supported attempts of the Maha Nayaka Dharmakirti to purify the sangha, and made several offerings to the Tooth Relic of the Buddha.

In fact, the honorific ‘Senasammata’ points at the importance he attached to gaining the trust of his cohorts: He was indebted to the army for having supported him in his endeavour to secede from Kotte, and to this end, as the Gadaladeniya inscription tells us, he made a promise that no loss of life would be inflicted by his chiefs on the army.

The chiefs, unsurprisingly, happened to be his stooges: The Siduruvana Kaidam-Pota informs us that he “suppressed the troubles” fermented by the headmen of the region, known as Bandaras, deprived them of their power, and gave them the lesser title of Mudliyars, before declaring Senkandha the new capital of the country. In other words, the history of Kandy commences, ironically enough, with the suppression of the Bandaras.

(The writer can be reached at

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Singarasa Case should guide GoSL’s Geneva policy



BY Dharshan Weerasekera

In 2005, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court ruled in the seminal case Singarasa v. Attorney General (SC/SPLA/182/99) that the U.N. Human Rights Commission (the predecessor of today’s U.N. Human Rights Council) did not have jurisdiction, within Sri Lanka, to make recommendations on behalf of the petitioner. In doing so, the court decided that Sri Lanka’s accession to the optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1997 had been done in a manner contrary to the Constitution, and hence illegal.

This case has invaluable lessons to teach in regard to the present government’s ‘Geneva Policy.’ By ‘Geneva Policy,’ I mean the government’s stance to the UNHRC’s follow-up resolutions to Sri Lanka’s unilateral withdrawal, in March 2020, from the co-sponsorship of Resolution 30/1 of October 2015. In response, the Council adopted Resolution Resolution than 30/1. Among other things, it establishes an evidence-gathering mechanism to collect evidence of war crimes and other crimes against Sri Lankans.

Meanwhile, in September 2022, the High Commissioner released a report on Sri Lanka’s progress in implementing the recommendations of Resolution 46/1. The government has officially rejected both, Resolution 46/1 and the High Commissioner’s report, on grounds that they were done without Sri Lanka’s consent and, therefore, contrary to the founding principles of the Council. (See A/HRC/51/G/1, paras 1.1, 1.2). However, the Foreign Ministry, in its response, lists various things that the government is doing to comply with Resolution 46/1.

I argue that the government, continuing to comply with the Resolution while, at the same time, rejecting it in principle, without first obtaining a definitive interpretation of the relevant legal position, from an international forum, or even the Sri Lankan Supreme Court, creates a dangerous precedent. Given the fact that state practice is one of the sources of customary international law, the government’s conduct has the potential to do irreparable harm to the long-term interests of the country.

Unfortunately, there is little, or no, discussion of these issues in local newspapers, and academic journals, and it is in the public interest to start one. In this article, I shall discuss: i) the facts and reasoning of the Singarasa judgment, ii) the High Commissioner’s report and the government’s reply, iii) assess of the government’s position, and draw the relevant conclusions.

The Singarasa case

In 1991, the High Court of Colombo convicted Singarasa of five charges, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The charges dealt with alleged attempts by Singarasa, and others, to attack the Army camps,in Jaffna and its suburbs. Singarasa appealed against the conviction to the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court. He also complained to the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The HRC could entertain petitions under the Optional Protocol to ICCPR. Sri Lanka had ratified the ICCPR, in 1980, and acceded to the protocol, in 1997. The HRC said that, Sri Lanka was under obligation to release Singarasa.

The main issue, in this case, is whether Sri Lanka’s accession to the ICCPR, and the related protocol, gives a right to an international body to intervene in the domestic sphere to determine Singarasa’s fate. The court answers ‘no,’ because of the following reasons. The court starts with the premise that the authority for the President to enter into international agreements comes from Article 33(f) of the Constitution. Article 33(f) states: “To do all such acts as, not being inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution…he is required or authorized to do.” It follows that the President cannot agree to anything inconsistent with the Constitution.

The court then assesses the signing of the ICCPR, in 1980, and the subsequent accession to the optional protocol, in 1997, separately. The court points out that the ICCPR requires that the respective signatories adopt domestic legislation to implement the provisions of the covenant. This does not conflict with our Constitution and hence is lawful.

However, when acceding to the optional protocol, the government had issued a declaration that envisioned that the rights of Sri Lankan citizens could be adjudicated in tribunals, and forums, outside this country. The court points out that the institutions, through which Sri Lankans can vindicate their rights, within this country, are exhaustively set out in Article 105 of the Constitution, and the HRC is not one of them. Therefore, the court deems the accession to the optional protocol illegal. The court states:

“Where the President enters into a treaty or accedes to a covenant the content of which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or written law it would be a transgression of the limitation in Article 33 (f) and ultra vires—such acts of the President would not bind the Republic qua State.” (p. 11)

The High Commissioner’s report and the Government’s reply

The most disturbing aspect of the High Commissioner’s report is its description of the progress made by the impugned evidence-gathering mechanism. It states: “OHCHR continues to develop the information and evidence repository using an e-discovery platform….OHCHR commenced identifying material held by other actors and engaging with information providers. To date, the databases of two organisations have been migrated into the repository, and negotiations with other information providers are ongoing.” ((A/HRC/51/5, 4th October 2022, para 54.)

The report also details what the OHCHR plans to do with this information. It says: “To develop possible strategies for future accountability processes, the project team started mapping potential accountability process at international level, including through consultations with relevant stakeholders, in particular national authorities, victims and civil society organisations.” (para 56.)

In sum, it is clear that a vast operation is underway, not just to collect evidence against Sri Lanka but to set the groundwork to help prosecute Sri Lankans before various national and international forums. To the best of my knowledge, the founding statutes of the UNHRC, as well as the OHCHR, do not give enforcement capabilities to these institutions to prosecute or assist in the prosecution of people for violations of human rights and other offences.

Their respective mandates to protect and promote human rights are to be carried out with the consent of all nations concerned and in a spirit of “cooperation and constructive international dialogue.” Therefore, through the impugned mechanism the OHCHR has now arguably expanded its mandate to include an enforcement component, seemingly without any debate or discussion of the matter before the Council.

To turn to the government’s response, in the introductory paragraphs of the said document, the government rejects both resolution 46/1 as well as the High Commissioner’s report on grounds that they violate the UN’s founding principles. However, for much of the remainder of the report (which runs to 16 pages) the government enumerates the various things it has been doing to implement various provisions of the resolutions. For instance, the government discusses the work being done under the Office on Missing Persons, Office for Reparations, and so on.

On the OMP, the report states inter alia: “The OMP conducted panels of inquiries as part of the verification process. More than 89% of persons (1207 of 1370 applicants invited for inquiries) met with members of the panel and their testimonials were recorded.” (A/HRC/51/G/1, 9th September 2022, para 46)

Meanwhile, on the Office for Reparations, the report says, “The office processed 5964 claims for payment, by the end of 2021, and paid a sum of Rs. 399.8 million in settlement, out of the allocated sum of Rs. 800 million….Upto the end of 2022, the OR received Rs. 226 million to pay compensation and 2097 claims were settled utilizing Rs. 153 million.” (para 56)

In sum, even though the government has nominally rejected resolution 46/1 and by extension resolution 30/1 as well, the government is expending great energy, including enormous sums of money, to comply with various provisions of those resolutions.

Assessment of the policy

The Singarasa case establishes that the President, when conducting foreign policy, is exercising the power conferred under Article 33 (f) of the Constitution. One cannot suppose that it is consistent with the Constitution to comply with the provisions of a resolution that the Government itself considers to be in violation of the founding principles of the UNHRC.

Admittedly, a resolution of the UNHRC does not rise to the level of a treaty or covenant. However, there should now be a serious debate in this country about whether the reasoning above should apply to such resolutions which continue to target Sri Lanka on the world stage.

Furthermore, if, as I have suggested, the OHCHR has expanded its mandate by exploiting the provisions of Resolution 46/1 to acquire capabilities that were never envisioned in the relevant founding statutes, permitting such conduct to continue has the potential to set precedents in customary international law, with grave consequences for Sri Lanka, as well as other nations.

Therefore, Sri Lankan citizens are entitled to know the legal basis for the government’s continued compliance with provisions of Resolution 46/1, while nominally rejecting the Resolution. The only institution that can provide a legal opinion binding on the government is the Supreme Court. The President has the capacity, under Article 129 of the Constitution, to request an advisory opinion of the Supreme Court on any matter of public importance.

In these circumstances, it is incumbent on the government to seek an advisory opinion as to whether it is lawful for the government to continue complying with provisions of Resolution 46/1 unless and until the UNHRC clarifies its position in regard to the impugned mechanism.


It is in the interest of all Sri Lankans to keep a close eye on what the government is presently doing in Geneva. There is a famous legal maxim that says, “The laws assist the vigilant, not the sleepy.” Ultimately, it is the Sri Lankan people who will pay the price for any mistakes or missteps that successive governments make in regard to their “Geneva Policy.’

(The writer is an Attorney-at-Law)

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Human Papillomavirus vaccine: one that can prevent a cancer



This article has been written as a fervent plea to the parents of little girls of the eligible age group. Please make sure that your precious daughters get this vaccine. It will be an investment for their happiness in the future.

By Dr B. J. C. Perera

All vaccines by definition are substances that are used to stimulate immunity against a particular infectious disease or a specific causative organism. Such vaccines are used to prevent the occurrence of the said diseases in humans and animals. Several vaccines have been introduced to combat such infectious diseases over the last few decades. In some countries, the use of some of these vaccines has led to the elimination of dreaded diseases like Diphtheria, Tetanus, Whooping Cough or Pertussis, Polio, Measles, German Measles or Rubella, just to name a few.

Sri Lanka has a very efficient and inherently equitable system that looks after the Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI) for children and young people. In general, we have been extremely successful in this programme and can boast of over 90 per cent coverage for the vaccination of all children. We have successfully eliminated polio, the last case being confirmed as far back as 1993, and we are free of diphtheria, tetanus, measles and German measles or rubella. The success of the EPI is due to many factors that include government commitment, the unstinted dedication of parents, the promotion of the programme through all media channels and the dedicated work of all grades of healthcare personnel. The very high literacy rate of the populace of our country enables all information regarding vaccination to be most conveniently conveyed to the population. Sri Lanka has been hailed as a country that has achieved so much in this field, but with so few resources. It has been cited as a model to the entire Asian region as well as even the world.

In addition to their undoubted effectiveness in protecting against infective microorganisms, some of these vaccines have other bonus effects. At least two of the vaccines in use today have telling effects in preventing certain cancers. One is the Hepatitis B vaccine. It provides protection against liver cancer. The other is the more recent Human Papillomavirus vaccine (HPV vaccine) which protects females against cancer of the neck of the womb, which is also referred to as the cervix of the womb. That disease is generally referred to as Cervical Cancer.

The Human Papillomavirus (HPV) is sexually transmitted and most people become infected sometime during their lifetime. In the majority, it is soon after becoming sexually active. Most infections are asymptomatic and usually clear up spontaneously, accounting for remission in 90% within two years. Only 10% of persistent HPV infections with certain genotypes of HPV can persist and progress to changes in the cervix. If infection from cancer-causing HPV types persists over 10-15 years, women can go on to develop precancerous lesions that, if left untreated, develop into cervical cancer. This process takes an average of 20-30 years from infection to the development of cervical cancer.

In 1995, Dr Anne Szarewski, a renowned researcher from the United Kingdom, led a team who outlined the role of human papillomavirus in uterine cervical cancer detection and screening. Then the researchers began work on an HPV vaccine. Szarewski was also a chief investigator, principal investigator and author of key HPV vaccine trials and publications, who helped to develop the bivalent HPV vaccine. The word bivalent is used to indicate that it contains two strains of HPV. HPV infections are very common, often with minimal symptoms, but high-risk HPV strains can go on to cause other medical conditions, particularly cervical cancer.

In 2006, the first vaccine for Human Papillomavirus (HPV) to be used globally was approved. HPV vaccination has now gone on to become a key part of the effort to eliminate cervical cancer. According to the available research results, HPV vaccination could reduce the lifetime risk of cervical cancer by 35–80%; the rather wide range being due to several studies with different methods. The vaccine was initially promptly snapped up in the West, especially in the Scandinavian countries. In Sweden, the coverage of the vaccine is over 80 per cent. However, according to the data put out by the World Health Organization (WHO) in November 2022, the human papillomavirus vaccine against cervical cancer has been introduced in just 41 per cent of low-income countries, even though they represent much of the disease burden, compared to 83% of high-income countries. We have a set of 10-year data on the benefits of the vaccine and in certain Western countries, a significant drop in the morbidity and mortality rates of cervical cancer is already evident.

In Sri Lanka, the National Vaccine Summit in January 2015 recommended the usage of the HPV vaccine and the government introduced it in 2017 for girls within the age range of 10 to 13 years. That age group was decided on the premise that to get the best results, we need to introduce the vaccine before sexual activity starts. The vaccine was to be administered to the selected age groups in the schools free of charge and in the fee-levying private sector. To date, the vaccine is not available through the Immunisation Clinics of the Provinces and the MOH Clinics.

NOW HERE IS THE REAL CRUX OF THE MATTER. For a variety of reasons, the coverage of the HPV vaccine in the entire cohort of eligible girls in Sri Lanka is somewhere between 30 and 40 per cent. This is woefully inadequate coverage to get the best possible results, especially when looked upon in the light of over 90 per cent coverage of the other vaccines in the National Expanded Programme of Immunisation. Cervical cancer ranks among the five commonest cancers in women in Sri Lanka. HPV vaccine is just one of two vaccines that can prevent cancers. All children have had the Hepatitis B vaccine which protects against liver cancer, as it is given through the National Programme of Immunisation. But, and this is a BIG BUT, the only other vaccine, the HPV vaccine that can prevent cervical cancer, shows a rather low uptake.

We do need to escalate the uptake rate of the HPV vaccine to at least around 80 per cent to get reasonable benefits in the reduction of the morbidity and mortality that is currently seen in cervical cancer. I think we have to admit that due to very many reasons, the message has not gone through to the general population in the country. When inquiries are made from the mothers of eligible girls, the vast majority of them are not even aware of the existence of this vaccine and more importantly, the future beneficial potential of this endeavour. The age group selected is a rather tricky cohort. They get upset at the drop of a hat. The last thing they want is an injection. They will run away, as fast as possible, to avoid it. Some are so frightened that it is not uncommon to see them faint even at the sight of the syringe and the needle. One way of getting the cooperation of these little girls is to allow either the mother or the father to be present to hold her hand most reassuringly when the vaccine is administered. An additional initiative would be to make it widely available through the Immunisation Clinics for it to be administered to all those who have missed it when it was given in the school. This is particularly important as the vaccine is quite expensive when administered in the private sector.

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Latest position on debt restructuring process



By Jayampathy Molligoda

According to the announcement made by the Managing Director of the IMF Kristalina Georgieva, the IMF Executive board meeting will be held on 20 March to consider and hopefully approve the EFF arrangement for Sri Lanka. In the meantime, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank in consultation with IMF have finalised the latest position of Sri Lanka’s Public Debt as at end 2022 just prior to commencement of debt restructuring negotiations with creditors. Having perused the document uploaded to the Ministry of Finance (MOF website) recently, which is a comprehensive summary of debt stock as at end 2022, I have tabulated the summary of the main facts and figures (See Table). As can be seen, the total public debt stock has skyrocketed to US $ 83.6 billion, which includes total foreign debt of US$ 45.6 billion and the local debt of 38 billion in US $ equivalent. The total debt as a % of GDP as stated in the above MOF doc is 128%. The public debt is expected be reduced to 100% of GDP in order to ensure debt sustainability in line with IMF supported program parameters coupled with ‘comparability of treatment principle’ whilst ensuring equitable burden sharing for all restructured debt.

However, I have my doubts about GDP computation here. As per the MOF doc page 1, the Nominal GDP was stated as Rs. 23.7 trillion for the year 2022. The $ exchange rate used for conversion as Rs.363.10 clearly indicating that it is the year end figure, they have taken the year end Exchange rate of Rs 363.10 per US$. It is pertinent to ask the question as to why ‘year- end exchange rate’ figure to convert our annual GDP in rupee to US dollars? It should have been the ‘average exchange rate’ as in the past so many years computed by CBSL. As a result, the GDP (in US$ terms) works out to US$ 65.2 billion only. That’s why the total public debt stock of US$ 83.6 billion works out to 128% of GDP – my initial query is; why did they take year-end figure of Rs363.10 instead of taking the average exchange rate?

Besides, the real critical issue is how to reduce the debt stock to a level of 100% of GDP in the context of declining GDP (- 7.8% in 2022) and on the other hand, our debt stock is on the rise. More importantly, if we take the total ‘multilateral debt’ out, then the foreign debt is US $ 34 billion only, which includes ISBs and bilateral loans. Assuming a higher ‘haircut’ of 33% for foreign debt is agreed upon, it works out to 11 billion thus reducing the total public debt to 73 billion only.

In this regard, The President in his latest open letter dated 14 March ‘23 to Sri Lanka’s official Bilateral creditors has clearly indicated that there will be equitable treatment of burden sharing in respect of all creditors (except IMF/WB/ADB) Quote; ” ..we reiterate our commitment to a comparable treatment of all our external creditors with a view to ensuring all round equitable burden sharing for all restructured debt. To that end, we will not conclude debt treatment agreements with any official bilateral creditor or any commercial creditors or any group of such creditors on terms more favourable than those agreed. …To this end we also confirm that we have not and we will not make any side agreements with any creditor aimed at reducing the debt treatment impact on that creditor.”

In the circumstances, my own view is we are reluctantly compelled to restructure local debt i.e.; TBs and, it is inevitable that the local debt of USD equivalent of 38 billion would also need to be taken into consideration for debt restructuring – otherwise there is no way of reducing the total public debt stock to the level that is required as per IMF conditions. This would create a serious issue for our ‘finance system stability’ and all our commercial banks will be in trouble. Further the deposit holders including pension funds are badly affected. The temperature of social unrest is brought closer to the boiling point.

As stated in the global research article by Jonathan Manz recently, former Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank, and Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, has slammed the IMF for unleashing riots on nations the IMF is dealing with; he has pointed out that the riots are written into the IMF plan to force nations to agree with the average 111 conditions laid down by the IMF and they destroy a country’s democracy and independence. He has been a critique of IMF causing great damage to countries through the economic policies it has prescribed countries to follow in order to qualify for IMF loans. However, neither Stiglitz nor any other eminent economist has yet to come out with a practical and alternative policy framework to overcome the most serious economic and financial crisis faced in the 75 years of Sri Lanka’s independence.

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