Features
Impact of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy on Sri Lanka
by Neville Ladduwahetty
A document on the United States Indo-Pacific Strategy issued by the White House, in February 2022 states: “The United States will pursue five objectives in the Indo-Pacific – each in concert with our allies and partners, as well as with regional institutions”. “We will:
* ADVANCE A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC
* BUILD CONNECTIONS WITHIN AND BEYOND THE REGION.
* DRIVE REGIONAL PROSPERITY.
* BOLSTER INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY
* BUILD REGIONAL RESILIENCE TO TRANSNATIONAL THREATS”.
Continuing, the document states “Our collective efforts over the next decade will determine whether the PRC (Peoples Republic of China) succeeds in transforming the rules and norms that have benefitted the Indo-Pacific and the world. For our part, the United States is investing in the foundations of our strengths at home, aligning our approach with those of our allies and partners abroad, and competing with the PRC (Peoples Republic of China) to defend the interests and vision for the future that we share with others … Our objective is not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favourable to the United States our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share”.
As far as the Pacific is concerned, with the conclusion of World War II the US has been developing, what the document describes as “ironclad treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Thailand”. Treaty arrangements of a similar order do not exist with countries in and around the Indian Ocean. Consequently, it is in the interest of the US to “support a strong India as a partner” to “Bolster Indo-Pacific stability”. In such a context the US strategy is to “strengthen the Quad as a premier regional grouping and ensure it delivers on issues that matter to the Indo-Pacific”. With the US, India, Japan and Australia making up the Quad and Japan and Australia being in the Pacific, it remains for India to be the “premier” member of the Quad to deliver on matters of interest to the Quad in and around the Indian Ocean.
IMPLICATIONS of ‘A STRONG
INDIA’ on SRI LANKA
Since the stated strategy of the US is to build influences that would be ‘maximally favourable to the US, and if India is to be the ‘premier’ partner in the equation there is no doubt that Sri Lanka would not be able to escape unscathed. It is in such a background that the report in The Island titled “India, SL close to sealing three defence-related pacts to boost maritime security” (February 25, 2022), should be treated with extreme caution. Continuing the HT report cited in The Island states: “While a USD 1 billion line of credit to be provided by India to Sri Lanka to purchase food, medicine and essential items will be the focus of Minister Rajapaksa’s visit, the two sides are close to finalising three defence-related agreements and arrangements that will bolster the capabilities the capabilities of Sri Lanka’s armed forces and boost corporation for maritime security”.
“In addition to arrangements for the purchase of two Dornier aircraft and the acquisition of a 4,000 tonne naval floating dock by Sri Lanka, Colombo has agreed to post a naval liaison officer at the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram … The centre tracks merchant shipping and monitors threats such as maritime terrorism and piracy in regional waters. The Sri Lankan liaison officer will join counterparts from 10 of India’s partner nations, including Australia, France, Japan the Maldives, Singapore, the UK and the US. The naval floating dock is a facility equipped with automated systems for the quality and swift repairs of warships. Such docks have the capability to lift large ships such as frigates and destroyers, and are designed to be berthed alongside a jetty or moored in calm waters to carryout planned or emergency repairs of ships”.
“Another potential area for defence corporation is the expansion of training for Sri Lankan military personnel in Indian facilities and institutions. Along with the erstwhile Afghan national security forces, Sri Lanka has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of military training programmes offered by India”.
“Over the past few months, India has extended financial assistance to Sri Lanka as part of a four pillar package decided during Minister Rajapaksa’s las visit to New Delhi in December. The Indian side has provided a USD 500 million line of credit for purchasing fuel and a currency swap of USD 400 million under Saarc facility. It has also deferred the payment of USD 515 million due to the Asian Clearing Union”.
“The finalization of the long-gestating project to refurbish and develop the British era Trincomalee oil farm, and 850-acre storage facility with a capacity of almost one million tonnes, has also given a boost to bilateral corporation”.
MEASURES ADOPTED TO MAKE “A STRONG INDIA”
The Trinco Oil Tank Farm deal that was signed on 06 January 2022 is claimed as a major achievement by Energy Minister Minister Gammanpila. Such a claim could be justified considering that all 99 tanks had been leased for 99 years according to the agreement signed in 2017 by the former government, and the current agreement reclaims 24 tanks to be developed and operated exclusively be Sri Lanka, and the remaining 61 tanks are to be developed and operated jointly by India and Sri Lanka.
However, it cannot be overlooked that the timing for the deal is such that it favours India’s strategic interests as the “premier’ member of the Quad in and around the Indian Ocean, more than Sri Lanka’s economic interests. Since the scope of the three defence-related agreements are not in the public domain, it is not possible to ascertain the extent to which these defence-related agreements would favour India’s strategic interests and whether they are at the expense of Sri Lanka’s interests or not.
A clear example of this is in the HT report cited above that refers to “agreements for the purchase of two Donier aircraft and the acquisition of a 4,000 tonne naval floating dock by Sri Lanka”. The question is, whose interests would be served by these assets? Since Sri Lanka already handles all repairs to naval vessels in existing dry dock facilities at the Colombo Port, why should Sri Lanka acquire a floating dock?
The strangest aspect of this arrangement would be if Sri Lanka acquires these assets through the Lines of Credit generously offered by India. Under such circumstances, why should Sri Lanka be grateful because Sri Lanka would be acquiring assets beneficial to India’s interests with money that has to be paid back to India by Sri Lanka. On the other hand, are these Lines of Credit in exchange for the West Container Terminal, in which case should Sri Lanka be grateful because it is a case of pure balancing. Instead, if Sri Lanka acquires the aircraft and floating dock and grants the West Container Terminal to India as well, Sri Lanka would be a big-time loser and it will be a win-win for India.
As far as Lines of Credit (LoC) arrangements go, a reported experience with India was the delivery of items for the Sri Lanka Railway. According to media reports the carriages were not only made of inferior material but also that they cannot run on the existing tracks. This means Sri Lanka has decided to accept substandard goods from India without a murmur unlike its response to China for the delivery of sub-standard fertilizer.
LoCs are essentially arrangements where a loan is advanced to a country to facilitate the sale of goods of the lender that cannot face competition in the open market. In short, it is a loan given to advance the lender’s products and self-interest. In such a context, acquisition of a floating dock by Sri Lanka and mooring it the Trinco harbour to service the ships that serve the restored oil tank farm would serve the interests not only of India but also the wider interests of the Quad – all provided by the Credit Line offered to Sri Lanka by India.
Although the Oil Tanks at Trincomalee by themselves do not have a utilitarian value, they are transformed into a valuable asset when they are coupled with a functioning harbour. Since it is the harbour coupled with the tanks that make the Tanks a vital asset, assigning 49% shares to an Indian Oil Company is totally disproportionate. This makes the agreement of 06 January 2022 unacceptable and therefore grounds for rejection. The tanks should operate under the full control of Sri Lanka and servicing any naval vessels would then be a commercial undertaking without any strategic overtones.
If instead, the tanks and the harbour operate under the terms of the current agreement, where an Indian Company owns 49% of the shares, Sri Lanka would inadvertently be sucked into the vortex of India’s role as a “premier” partner of the Quad. How such a perception would be viewed by China is an unknown. Whatever it may be, such a perception would compromise Sri Lanka’s stated position of neutrality, because the measures that must necessarily be adopted under these agreements and arrangements would be seen as leaning towards India and away from relationships that exist between China and Sri Lanka.
Notwithstanding the exuberance of Minister Gammanpila, if he understands that the utilitarian value of the Tanks depends on the services that the Trinco Harbour is able to offer, not only in terms of direct costs associated with them but also with the cost to relations with China, he as a nationalist, should explore a different track so that the tanks could be developed without having to balance the strategic interests of major powers. That track would be to cancel the agreement of 06 January 2022 and retake all 99 tanks and develop a few tanks at a time as a national venture in keeping with the pace of development to improve the service at the Trinco harbour.
CONCLUSION
The intent of the US, declared in a document issued by the White House dated February 2022 titled Indo-Pacific Strategy states: “Our collective effort over the next decade … is not to change the PRC (People’s Republic of China) but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in a world that is maximally favorable to the United States”. To achieve this objective, the US is prepared to “support a strong India as a partner in this positive regional vision” as a premier partner of the Quad, the others being the US, Australian and Japan. The Maldives has already signed defence-related agreements with the US and India. According to a report in The Hindustan Times cited by The Island of February 25, 2022, India and Sri Lanka “are close to finalizing three defence-related agreements and arrangements that are expected to boost corporation for maritime security”. The scope of these agreements is not known to the public. The public is also not aware whether there are similar defence-related agreements with the US and China. The concern of the public however is what kind of impact these and other agreements would have on Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and independence, and to what degree all of this would compromise its stated policy of neutrality.
If the purchase of aircraft and the acquisition of a 4000 tonne floating dock is to support a strong India and assigning the West Container Terminal also to India is an attempt at strategic balancing, China is likely to perceive such developments as leaning towards India and the Quad. Such perceptions would have serious consequences on China-Sri Lanka relations. Furthermore, while China’s relations with Sri Lanka are mainly driven by strategic issues relating to its Belt and Road Initiative, in the case of India, the relationship goes beyond strategic issues because it is compounded by Sri Lanka’s nagging national question that impacts on India’s internal stability. Therefore, there cannot be strategic balancing as far as Sri Lanka’s relations are concerned with India and China. Consequently, Sri Lanka has no alternative but to stay free of being dragged into the vortex of a strong India supported by the Quad. One clear signal of staying free is to disengage from the agreements signed on January 6, 2022, and restore a few of the tanks at a time as a national venture and rent them for the storage of petroleum products.
The understanding under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was that the tanks should be developed and operated jointly with India. However, with Quad supporting a strong India the strategic environment has changed substantially from what existed at the time of the Accord. Consequently, in today’s context agreements that favour India would be perceived as leaning towards India and the Quad. Such a perception is not in the interest of Sri Lanka because it contradicts its policy of Neutrality. Therefore, Sri Lanka should stay clear of defence-related agreements with any power block, as it did with the MCC, if Sri Lanka is to be independent and to stay true to its principles and protect the sovereign rights of its people.
Features
Trump-Xi meet more about economics rather than politics
The fact that some of the US’ topmost figures in business, such as Tesla chief Elon Musk and major US chipmaker Jensen Huang of NVIDIA fame, occupied as nearly a prominent a position as President Donald Trump at the recent ‘historic and landmark’ visit by the latter to China underscores the continuing vital importance of business in US-China ties. Business seemed to outweigh politics to a considerable degree in importance during the visit although the political dimension in US-China ties appeared to be more ‘headline grabbing’.
To be sure, the political dimension cannot be downplayed. For very good reason China could be seen as holding the power balance somewhat evenly between East and West. The international politics commentator couldn’t be seen as overstating the case if he takes the position that China could exercise substantial influence over the East currently; that is Russia and Iran, in the main. The latter powers hold the key in the Eastern hemisphere to shaping international politics in the direction of further war or of influencing it towards a measure of peace.
For example, time and again China has prevented the West from ‘having its own way’, so to speak, in the UN Security Council, for instance, in respect of the ongoing conflicts involving Russia and Iran, by way of abstaining from voting or by vetoing declarations that it sees as deleterious. That is, China has been what could be seen as a ‘moderating influence’ in international politics thus far. It has helped to keep the power balance somewhat intact between East and West.
At present a meet is ongoing between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. This happened almost immediately after the Trump visit. Apparently, Beijing is in an effort to project itself as treating the US and Russia even-handedly while underscoring that it is no ‘special friend’ of the US or the West.
This effort at adopting a non-partisan stance on contentious questions in international politics is also seen in Beijing’s policy position on the Hormuz tangle and issues growing out of it. The Chinese authorities are quoted as saying in this regard, for instance, that China is for ‘a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire in the Middle East’.
Such a position has the effect of enhancing the perception that China is even-handed in its handling of divisive foreign policy posers. It is not openly anti-West nor is it weighing in with Iran and other Eastern actors that are opposed to the West in the West Asian theatre. A ‘comprehensive and lasting ceasefire’ implies that a solution needs to be arrived at that would be seen as fair by all quarters concerned.
On the highly sensitive Taiwan issue, President Xi was comparatively forthright during the Trump visit, but here too it was plain to see that Beijing was not intent on introducing a jarring, discordant note into the ongoing, largely cordial discussions with Washington. On the Taiwan question President Xi was quoted saying: ‘If mishandled, the two nations could collide even come into conflict.’ In other words, the US was cautioned that China’s interests need to be always borne in mind in its handling of the Taiwan issue.
The cautioning had the desired result because Trump in turn had reportedly conveyed to Taiwan that the latter’s concerns on the matter of independence had to be handled discreetly. He had told Taiwan plainly not to declare ‘independence.’
Accordingly, neither the US nor China had said or done anything that would have made either party lose face during their interaction. Apparently, both sides were sensitive to each others’ larger or national interests. And the economic interests of both powers were foremost among the latter considerations.
There is no glossing over or ignoring economic interests in the furtherance of ties between states. They are primal shaping forces of foreign policies and the fact that ‘economics drives politics’ is most apparent in US-China ties. That is, economic survival is fundamental.
Among the more memorable quotes from President Xi during the interaction, which also included US business leaders, was the following: ‘China’s doors will be open wider’ and US firms would have ‘broader prospects in the Chinese market.’
Xi went on to say that the sides had agreed to a ‘new positioning for ties’ based on ‘constructive strategic stability’. The implication here is that both sides would do well not to undermine existing, mutually beneficial economic relations in view of the wider national interests of both powers that are served by a continuation of these economic ties. That is, the way forward, in the words of the Chinese authorities, is ‘win-win cooperation.’
It is the above pronouncements by the Chinese authorities that probably led President Trump to gush that the talks were ‘very successful’ and of ‘historic and landmark’ importance. Such sentiments should only be expected of a billionaire US President, bent on economic empire-building.
One of the most important deals that were put through reportedly during the interaction was a Chinese agreement to buy some 200 Boeing jets and a ‘potential commitment to buy an additional 750 planes.’ However, details were not forthcoming on other business deals that may have been hatched.
Accordingly, from the viewpoint of the protagonists the talks went off well and the chances are that the sides would stand to gain substantially from unruffled future economic ties. However, there was no mention of whether the health of the world economy or the ongoing conflicts in West Asia were taken up for discussion.
Such neglect is regretful. Although the veritable economic power houses of the world, the US and China, are likely to thrive in the short and medium terms and their ruling strata could be expected to benefit enormously from these ongoing economic interactions the same could not be said of most of the rest of the world and its populations.
Needless to say, the ongoing oil and gas crisis, for instance, resulting from the conflict situation in West Asia, is taking a heavy toll on the majority of the world’s economies and the relevant publics. While no urgent intervention to ease the lot of the latter could be expected from the Trump administration there is much that China could do on this score.
China could use its good offices with the US to address the negative fallout on the poorer sections of the world from the present global economic crunch and urge the West to help in introducing systemic changes that could facilitate these positive outcomes. After all, China remains a socialist power.
Features
The Quiet Shift: China as America’s “+1” in a Changing World Order
“Everything ever said to me by any Chinese of any station during any visit was part of an intricate design”
— Henry Kissinger
That design may already be complete before this week’s , a meeting that could shape the future balance of global power.
The wind arrives quietly. By the time it is heard, history has already begun to turn. Across Asia, that wind is no longer distant. It carries with it the exhaustion of an old order and the uncertain birth of another. The question now is not whether the world will change. It is whether those who hold power possess the wisdom to guide that change toward something less violent than the century behind us.
Since 1945, the United States has carried the burden of a global order built with its Western allies. To its credit, the world avoided another direct world war between great powers. The conflicts remained contained in distant lands—proxy wars fought in the shadows of ideology, oil, and influence. From Latin America to Asia, the American century expanded not only through prosperity, but through intervention. Yet empires, even democratic ones, grow tired. Fatigue settles slowly into institutions, alliances, and public memory. The role of global policeman no longer inspires certainty in Washington as it once did.
The “rules-based order” now confronts its own contradiction: it was built to be universal, yet it often appeared selective. During my recent visit to , a young researcher asked me quietly, “Does the West itself still believe in the rules-based order?” The question lingered long after the conversation ended. The rising century demands a more inclusive architecture—one that recognises the reality of Asian power, especially China.
My three years of field research across South and Southeast Asia, documented in , revealed a transformation too significant to dismiss as temporary. China has moved beyond being merely a competitor to the United States. In trade, infrastructure, technology, cultural diplomacy, and economic influence, Beijing has established itself as what may be called the world’s “US +1.”
Great powers often search for such a partner. History shows this tendency clearly. When an empire becomes overextended—burdened by wars, alliances, sanctions, tariffs, and crises—it seeks another center of gravity to stabilize the system it can no longer manage alone. The United States today faces disorder stretching from Venezuela to Iran, from Ukraine to the unsettled Middle East. In this landscape, China emerges not simply as a rival, but as a state powerful enough to broker peace where Washington alone no longer can.
Drawing from the lessons of the Nixon–Mao era, warned that “” The United States and China are now engaged in a long-term economic, technological, political, and strategic competition. Managing that competition wisely may become the defining challenge of this century. In such a deeply polarized and unstable world, recognising China as a “US +1” partner is not surrender, but strategic realism.
Donald Trump understood this reality before boarding his flight to meet Xi Jinping. Their meeting inside Zhongnanhai—the guarded compound where China’s leadership governs—was never merely ceremonial. It symbolized a deeper recognition already acknowledged quietly within the itself: China is the nearest peer competitor the United States has ever confronted. Before departing Washington, Trump seemed to reassess not only China’s strength, but its unavoidable position as a “” shaping the future global balance.
Yet the significance of a Trump–Xi meeting extends beyond trade wars, tariffs, or diplomatic spectacle. It presents an opportunity to confront two crises shaping the century ahead: global energy insecurity and regional instability. Washington increasingly understands the limits of direct engagement with Tehran. Decades of pressure, sanctions, and confrontation have produced exhaustion rather than resolution. In that vacuum, Beijing now possesses leverage that Washington does not.
For China, this is an opportunity to evolve from a development partner into a security actor. Xi Jinping’s (GSI) was never designed merely as rhetoric. It was intended as the next phase of Chinese influence—transforming economic dependence into strategic trust. The geopolitical spillover from the Iranian conflict now offers Beijing a historic opening to project itself as a stabilising force in the region, not against the United States, but alongside it as a “US +1” partner.
If China succeeds in helping stabilise the Gulf and secure energy corridors vital to Asia, it will reshape perceptions of Chinese power globally. Beijing would no longer be seen only as the builder of ports, railways, and industrial zones, but as a guarantor of regional balance. This transition—from infrastructure diplomacy to security diplomacy—may become one of the defining geopolitical shifts of the coming decade.
Xi Jinping does not seek open confrontation. His strategy is older, more patient, and perhaps more formidable because of its restraint. Beijing speaks not of domination, but of a “,” advanced through three instruments of influence: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These are not slogans alone. Across Asia, many governments increasingly trust China as a development partner more than any other power.
India, despite its ambitions, has not matched this scale of regional penetration. In both ASEAN and South Asia, China’s economic gravity is felt more deeply. Ports, railways, technology networks, and financial dependency have altered the geopolitical map quietly, without the spectacle of war.
In , I compared three inward-looking national strategies shaping Asia today: Trump’s MAGA, Modi’s emerging economic nationalism , and Xi’s strategy. Among them, China has demonstrated the greatest structural resilience. Faced with American tariffs and decoupling pressures, Beijing diversified its supply chains across Central Asia, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Rail corridors now connect Chinese industry to European markets through Eurasia. ASEAN has surpassed the United States as China’s largest trading partner, while the European Union follows closely behind. Exports to America have declined sharply, yet China continues to expand. Trump, once defined by confrontation, now arrives seeking a new “” with China—an acknowledgment that economic rivalry alone can no longer define the relationship between the world’s two largest powers.
Unlike Washington, which increasingly retreats from multilateral institutions, Beijing presents itself as the defender of multilateralism. Whether genuine or strategic matters less than perception. In geopolitics, perception often becomes reality.
What emerges, then, is not surrender between rivals, but interdependence between powers too large to isolate one another. The future may not belong to a bipolar Cold War, but to a reluctant coexistence. The United States now recognises that China possesses diversified markets and partnerships capable of reducing dependence on America. China, in turn, understands that its long march toward global primacy still requires strategic engagement with the United States.
This is where the true geopolitical shift begins.
Many analysts continue to frame China solely as a threat. Yet history rarely moves through absolutes. The next world order may not be built through confrontation alone, but through uneasy partnership. Artificial intelligence, technological supremacy, economic stability, and global governance now demand cooperation between Washington and Beijing, whether either side admits it publicly or not.
Trump will likely celebrate his personal relationship with Xi, presenting himself as the American leader capable of negotiating a “better deal” with China than his predecessors. But beneath the rhetoric lies something larger: the gradual acceptance of China’s indispensable role in shaping the future international order.
Even the question of war increasingly returns to Beijing. If Washington seeks an understanding with Tehran, China’s influence becomes unavoidable. Iran listens to Beijing in ways it no longer listens to the West. This alone signals how profoundly the balance of power has shifted. And Xi, careful as always, refuses to openly inherit the mantle of global leadership. He delays, softens, and obscures intention. It is part of a longer strategy: to rise without provoking the final resistance of a declining hegemon too early.
History rarely announces its turning point. Empires fade slowly, while new powers rise quietly beneath the noise of the old order. Washington still holds immense power, but Beijing increasingly holds the patience, reach, and strategic depth to shape what comes after.
The century ahead may not belong to one power alone, but to the uneasy balance between Washington and Beijing. And in that silence, a new world order is already taking shape.
By Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
Features
Egypt … here I come
Chit-Chat Nethali Withanage
Three months ago, 19-year-old Nethali Withanage, with Brian Kerkoven as her mentor, walked the ramp at Colombo Fashion Week. On 06 June, she’ll walk for Sri Lanka in Hurghada, Egypt, as the country’s delegate to Top Model of the World 2026._
I caught up with Nethali as she prepares to fly out, this weekend, and here’s how our chit-chat went:
1. Tell me something about yourself?
I’m someone who blends creativity with ambition. I’ve always loved expressing myself, whether it’s through fashion, styling, or the way I present myself to the world. At the same time, I’m very driven and disciplined, especially when I was working, as a student counsellor, at Campus One, at a young age, where I’ve learned how to connect with people, understand them, and communicate with confidence. I believe I’m still evolving, and that’s what excites me the most … becoming better every single day.
2. What made you decide to be a model?
Modelling felt natural to me because it combines everything I love – fashion, confidence, and storytelling without words. I realised that modelling isn’t just about appearance, it’s about presence and how you carry your energy. I wanted to be part of an industry where I could express different sides of myself, while inspiring others to feel confident in their own skin.
3. What sets you apart from other models?
I would say my ability to connect. Whether it’s with the camera, a brand, or an audience, I bring authenticity. I also have a strong background in communication and sales, which gives me an edge in understanding how to represent a brand, not just wear it. I don’t want to just model clothes, I want to bring them to life.
4. What clothing do you prefer to model?
I enjoy modelling versatile styles, but I’m especially drawn to elegant and expressive fashion pieces that tells a story. I love looks that allow me to embody confidence and femininity, whether it’s a structured outfit or something soft and flowing.
5. What is the most important aspect of modelling?
Confidence combined with professionalism. Confidence allows you to own the moment, but professionalism ensures that you respect the work, the team, and the brand you represent. Both are equally important.
6. If you could change one thing about yourself, what would it be?
I would say I’m learning to trust myself more and not overthink. I’ve realised that growth comes from embracing who you are, not constantly trying to change it. So instead of changing something, I’m focused on becoming more confident in my own voice.
7. School?
I did my O/Ls at Seventh Day Adventist High School Kandana, and, while at school, I was actively involved in creative activities. I enjoyed participating in English Day events that allowed me to express myself and interact with others. Those experiences helped me build confidence, teamwork, and communication skills, which continue to shape who I am today.
8. Happiest moment?
One of my happiest moments is realising how far I’ve come from being unsure of myself to stepping into opportunities, like modelling, and representing myself with confidence. That feeling of growth is something I truly value, and also a dream come true!
9. Your idea of perfect happiness?
Perfect happiness for me is peace of mind, being surrounded by people I love, doing what I’m passionate about, and feeling proud of who I am becoming.
10. Your ideal guy?
My ideal partner is someone who is respectful, supportive, and confident in himself. Someone who values growth, understands my ambitions, and encourages me to be the best version of myself.
11. Which living person do you most admire?
I admire strong, self-made individuals who have built their identity through hard work and resilience. People who stay true to themselves, despite challenges, inspire me, because they show that success is not just about talent, but also about strength and consistency.
12. Your most treasured possession?
My most treasured possession is my confidence. It’s something I’ve built over time, and it allows me to face challenges, take opportunities, and believe in myself, even when things are uncertain.
13. If you were marooned on a desert island, who would you like as your companion?
I would choose someone who is calm, positive, and resourceful, someone who can turn a difficult situation into an adventure. The right mindset matters more than anything.
14. Your most embarrassing moment?
I’m 19 and still haven’t faced any most embarrassing moment. But I would say I’ve had small moments where things didn’t go as planned, but I’ve learned to laugh at myself. Those moments remind me that perfection isn’t necessary; confidence is about how you recover, not how you avoid mistakes.
15. Done anything daring?
Pursuing modelling and stepping into competitions is something I consider daring. It pushed me out of my comfort zone and challenged me to grow, both personally and professionally.
16. Your ideal vacation?
My ideal vacation would be somewhere peaceful, yet beautiful, like a beach destination where I can relax, reflect, and reconnect with myself, while enjoying nature.
17. What kind of music are you into?
I choose music that matches my mood at that time, whether it’s calm and relaxing or energetic and uplifting. Music is something that helps me express emotions and stay inspired.
18. Favourite radio station?
Usually I don’t listen to radio stations but whenever I get into a car I would search for Yes FM because it has a refined balance of contemporary hits and timeless music. I appreciate how it maintains a vibrant yet sophisticated energy, keeping listeners engaged while creating a consistently uplifting atmosphere. It’s something I enjoy because it adds a sense of positivity and elegance to my day.
19. Favourite TV station?
At the moment, I don’t have a television at home, but growing up, my favourite TV station was ‘Nickelodeon’. I genuinely loved the shows and series it aired; they were fun, creative, and full of personality. It was something I always looked forward to, and those memories still bring a sense of joy and nostalgia, whenever I think about it.
20. Any major plans for the future?
My future plans are to grow in the modelling industry, work with international brands, build a strong personal brand and finish completing a Bachelor’s Degree in Business Studies. At the same time, I want to explore my creative side further, especially in fashion and business, so I can create something of my own one day.
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