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IGP stakes: why’s and wherefores of old values of succession being scuttled

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BY Kingsley Wickremasuriya, Senior DIG (Retd.)

The post of Inspector-General of Police is ‘vacant’ and the government is dilly-dallying with the appointment of a successor to take over, apparently for reasons of political expediency. This is the first time in the known history of the Department that the Police had to face such a situation.

In all these years the succession to the post of the Inspector-General of Police was almost automatic being based, by and large, on the line of Seniority and Merit. The post usually went to the Senior-most Deputy Inspector-General of Police, the most experienced and respected leader in the department. To name a few, Inspectors-General of Police Aleric Abeygunawardena, John Attygalle, and Cyril Herath were officers par excellence known for their integrity and impartiality and for doing their duty according to the Rule of Law.

The road to succession was known to be either through the post of Director of Headquarters Administration (DHA) or Director of Criminal Investigation (D/CID). This was the norm accepted by the rank and file. The succession was, therefore, smooth and easy and widely accepted by the rank and file and the country at large. This time-tested process gave legitimacy to the post of Inspector-General of Police in the eyes of all the stakeholders including the Police themselves.

In a disciplined service, rank is sacrosanct. An officer has necessarily to aspire to a higher rank through performance. If his work had been of exceptional merit and distinction, he may even be considered for a special promotion. A promotion can also be posthumous where the deceased officer had been exemplary in performance and achievement. An officer will therefore naturally like to safeguard his position in the line of seniority. He will be unhappy if a junior officer is placed over him merely because the latter wields influence. It is natural for an officer in a disciplined service to jealously protect his place in the line of seniority against encroachment (Merril Gunaratna, ‘Perils of a Profession).

This paper will try to find an explanation as to why the police have failed to ‘Serve and Protect’ the citizen, which is the main purpose of a Democracy.

Police & Politics

Police have in recent times come in for sharp criticism from various quarters ostensibly for their failure to contain the lawlessness prevailing in the country and to maintain the Rule of Law, particularly in the face of mass protests that took the country by storm. Critics allege the partiality of the police as the reason for their inability to enforce the Rule of Law. It has led to a near riotous situation being created in many parts of the country by police inaction against lawbreakers.

It is commonly known that this situation has been brought about by the politicization of the Police. A review of the constitutional history will show how undue political interference in police affairs has affected the legitimacy of the Police (and the legitimacy of the government itself, whose agents the police are) contributing to the current lawlessness in the country and the resulting failure of the police to enforce the Rule of Law.

Looking at the root cause, it has been found that the beginnings of political interference in the affairs of the Public Service were a problem even before the country gained Independence from the British. It had its origins in the early 1920s. The reports on the Colebrook – Cameron Reforms, the Donoughmore and Soulbury Reforms are a testimony to the measures they proposed to protect the Public Service from the undue interference of unscrupulous politicians.

Whilst these Commissioners made continuous efforts to ensure an efficient and effective Public Service by protecting it from undue political interference, the working of the Constitution in the aftermath of the Soulbury Commission showed how the highest in the political hierarchy of the country, no less a person than the Prime Minster himself (of the time) attempted to scuttle the legally adopted constitutional provisions by his attempts to circumvent the Constitution.

The legend has it that a Prime Minster (at the time) is alleged to have said once, ‘Public Service Commission or no Commission, I get whom I want’. We also have the story going around in police circles about how the same Prime Minster exhorted the then Inspector-General of Police, Osmund de Silva that the Police should have that ’extra bit of loyalty to the Government’, and how the Inspector-General responded in return by exhorting his officers that what they should uphold is the Rule of Law although he knew that he would be falling out of favour with the premier and that it would affect his tenure.

With all these attempts behind the scenes the Public Service Commission at that time worked reasonably well without a major hiccup until the introduction of the first Republican Constitution in 1972 that vested the responsibility of appointments, transfer, dismissal, and disciplinary control of all State Officers with the Cabinet of Ministers by Article 106 and other provisions in Chapter XII of that Constitution giving a blank cheque for political interference. The best illustrations of these efforts are the Chapter XII of the Republican Constitution of 1972 and Chapter IX of the Republican Constitution of 1978. This was the start of the process of politicization of the public service in general and the Police in particular.

In the meanwhile, the effects of these constitutional provisions brought about by Article 106 and the other provisions in Chapter XII of the first Republican Constitution (1972) on the Police have had far-reaching effects on its morale, and discipline. Consequently, delivery of services to the people has suffered severely resulting in the lowering of quality and professional standards that used to be maintained in the Police previously. With the proclamation of the Second Republican Constitution, the provisions of Chapter XII were given effect to more or less completely concerning the control of the Public Service in Chapter IX (The Executive) of the 1978 Republican Constitution. The effects of that on the Police have far exceeded those referred to by the Basnayake Police Commission (1970) or the Subasinghe Committee (1979) in their reports. This is confirmed by the report produced by the Jayasinghe Committee in 1995.

Police Reforms

As far as the Police are concerned several Police Commissions/Committees were appointed by successive governments to go into Police matters and report on reforms. The Soertz Commission Report (1946), the Basnayake Police Commission Report (1970), The Subasinghe Committee Report (1979), and Jayasinghe Committee Report (1995) on Police Reforms spoke eloquently of the impact these constitutional provisions had on the Police. They all spoke of how undue political interference undermined the moral of the Service, led to a poor public image, and loss of public respect or cooperation.

Jayasinghe Committee

In 1995 once again a three-man Committee was appointed by the President headed by Mr. W. T. Jayasinghe, a former Secretary to the Ministry of Defence ‘to inquire into and report on the reorganization of the Police Service’. The Jayasinghe Committee in particular in their report said that all the officers who appeared before them agreed that undue pressure was brought to bear in the matter of appointments, promotions, postings, and even transfers. These undue pressures were mostly from politicians and those close to politicians. They also agreed that this was one of the main reasons for the breakdown of discipline, loss of morale, and high incidence of corruption in the police. The interference did not stop with personnel matters like transfers, promotions, etc. It extended even to operational matters like criminal investigations.

As a result of the increasing incidence of interference by MPs in investigations, the Committee said that some of the officers who were fair and acted impartially were removed and transferred from their stations overnight at the instance of an MP because the offender happened to be a supporter of the MP, and yet others who had a well-known track record of corruption or inefficiency were promoted over the heads of those conscientious and dedicated officers. They also pointed out how in recent years junior officers have been promoted over their seniors, ostensibly on the ground of outstanding merit. This affected the morale of the entire Service.

While tracing back the history of the police to British times in an attempt to explain this phenomenon, the Committee said that the sole function of the police during that time was to safeguard the interests of the rulers. Even after Independence, the stance of the police did not change. The prime duty of the police now became the safety of the State instead. In the process, the police saw their immediate role to be safeguarding the interests of the government in power which eventually took the form of safeguarding the interests of the Members of Parliament (MP) of the ruling party.

They then went on to show how this relationship between the Police Officer and the MP became a particularly sensitive one, much more than that with other Government Officials because of the special demands of those constituents close to him to help them escape the rigorous application of the law by the police. Since every Government is faced with this dilemma resulting from this sensitive relationship between the MP and his constituents and consequently the MP and the police, the Committee thought that in the circumstance it would help the Government and the MPs themselves if a Police Service Commission is established as recommended by the Basnayake Police Commission in 1970 by easing the constituents’ pressure on MPs on police matters on the one hand, and that it will also go a long way to restore the morale and confidence in the police themselves on the other.

Almost all the officers who appeared before the Commission were “vehemently in support of the establishing of such a Commission.” They were further of the view that the Commission should play an active role, unlike the previous PSC in laying down policies and ensuring that they are scrupulously followed. Therefore, while recommending the establishment of a Police Service Commission they were of the view that the Commission should be appointed by the Constitutional Council of the Parliament and the members of that Commission should consist of senior serving or retired administrators, judicial officers, police administrators, and academics in sociology. They also suggested that the Constitution should be suitably amended to give effect to the establishment of a Police Service Commission. The recommendations were of no avail. Once again, the government did nothing to implement these recommendations.

17th Amendment

These recommendations however lay ignored for more than three decades when suddenly came the 17th Amendment, after a long period of inaction. The 17th Amendment was not the result of any of these recommendations. It was the result of some politicians in the opposition waking up from their slumber about police reforms and thinking of acting only after they had been themselves victims of delayed reforms and at the receiving end of a series of events affecting their political interests.

The 17th Amendment was the result of a political initiative launched by Members of Parliament in the Opposition led by the United National Party in 2001. The move was prompted by the violence and alleged election malpractices that was present during the Waymaba Provincial Council Elections in 1998, where it was alleged that “massive thuggery and vote rigging took place on an unprecedented scale”. It was not surprising that the UNP should take the lead because it was, they who suffered most during the election campaign being the victims of their constitutional device introduced during the UNP regime in 1978 placing unlimited power in the hands of the President. The Amendment naturally sought to neutralize or curb those powers vested in the President by Chapter IX of the Constitution of 1978.

The Amendment had its origins in the Report of the Citizens’ Consultation on Free and Fair Elections and De-politicisation of Key Institutions, which was set up by the Leader of the Opposition. That year a Drafting Committee was set up under the chairmanship of Mr. Karu Jayasuriya, MP where the OPA was represented by its General Secretary. A report was drawn up by the Citizens’ Consultation but it lay dormant till 2000 when a first draft of the 17th amendment was made.

After further consultation with an Expert Committee where three Senior Deputy Inspectors-General assisted in Police matters, a preliminary draft was presented by the OPA to the political parties. But what ultimately came out in Parliament on October 3, 2001 was something entirely different from the OPA draft. Even then, out of all the Institutions set up under the 17th Amendment, the National Police Commission was the most criticized by the politicians in the ruling party. If not for the JVP who put pressure on the PA Government, the 17th Amendment would not have seen the light of day even in this form.

Nevertheless, the Amendment wittingly or unwittingly introduced some of the measures contained in the recommendations made by the Basnayake Police Commission and the Jayasighe Committee. One of the major recommendations of the Basnayake Commission was the establishment of a separate Police Service Commission outside the jurisdiction of the PSC with an amendment to the Constitution. The 17th Amendment has already taken this step. It has also met the condition set by Jayasinghe Committee that the Police Service Commission be appointed by a Constitutional Council.

One of the other major conditions set by the Basnayake Police Commission was the Security of Tenure of the Inspector-General. It said that “An Inspector-General who has reached the age of optional retirement or has only a few years to reach that age is haunted by the fear that if he does not please those in power he may be retired either at once or the moment he reaches the age of optional retirement.” They pointed out that the head of so important a department being haunted by such fear in the performance of his very responsible duties is not in the public interest. The Basnayake Commission, therefore, recommended that the Inspector-General should be protected against the irresponsible exercise of the power of removal.

This safeguard is now provided by the Amendment under Article 41C by way of subsequent legislation in the form of Act No. 5 of 2002 which stipulates that the Inspector-General (amongst others) shall not be removed from office except following the procedure laid down in the Act. But, the power of grating extension of service is still in the hands of the President. That has not changed and the Amendment is silent on the matter. So, he will continue to be haunted by the fear of the threat of retirement and that fear will continue to hang over the incumbent like the ‘Sword of Damocles’ in the future as well if steps are not taken to rectify this situation sooner than later.

Therefore, it will not be a matter of surprise if he continues to secure his position by pleasing those in power to stay in office despite the many safeguards provided to bring the status quo back to square one. The amendment had several other deficiencies as well (for a detailed discussion on the subject, refer to the original article written by the same author, titled ‘Police. Politics and the 17th Amendment’ published in OPA Journal Vol.22 – May 2007).

Even if this fear is effectively removed through Constitutional Amendment, recent experience has shown that this argument is somewhat flawed in the present context of things considering the tendency some incumbents have shown to overreach their term to secure their position so that they could continue to remain in office even after reaching the age of retirement. The temptation not only to prolong his stay in office as long as possible but also to try and secure high office even thereafter has been reinforced by the recent practice of the governments offering prestigious postings abroad to the retiring Inspectors- General.

This encourages a ‘you scratch my back and I scratch yours’ kind of attitude. It also vitiates all the good intentions contained in the legislation designed to ensure the impartiality of the police by securing the tenure of the Head of the Department. The remedy may, therefore, lie in the appointment of the IGP for a fixed period of the contract, say for 3-4 years (as was the practice previously but discontinued later) with a ‘Retirement Package’ that will enable him to live comfortably without the lure of extensions beyond retirement age, ambassadorial postings or another high office so that he could do his duty by the people.

These, however, are safeguards against an IGP in office. What are the safeguards against the chances of an unscrupulous aspirant getting into office through political lobbying? This has often remained an open question probably until the next IGP stakes. So, safeguards have to be built not only against undue political pressure on the incumbent IGP but also against aspirants from getting to the top post through political lobbying. All other safeguards that have been proposed would be set at naught for having secured the post through lobbying it will be natural for the incumbent to feel obliged to his political Godfathers to ensure he continues in office.

So, when we are discussing ways and means of building public confidence in the police, what should be uppermost in our minds is not only an ‘Independent Police Commission’, but also an independent Head of the Police who by the circumstances of his appointment alone can infuse confidence in the public. Selection procedures (similar to the appointment to the post of Vice Chancellor) that are transparent enough to infuse public confidence in the appointment of the Inspector General have to be put in place in the future towards this end, without delay. Therefore, the need of the hour is not to rush with deadlines for reasons of expediency but to study the problem in-depth and bring meaningful reforms that will restore public confidence in the police, in due process, and in democracy.

Conclusions

The various Commissions on Constitutional Reforms from Colebrook-Cameron to Soulbury and several Police Commissions/Committees on Police Reforms such as Basnayake Police Commission, Subasinghe Committee, and Jayasinghe Committee on Police Reforms have all repeated the ill effects of political interference in the functioning of Police (one of the watchdogs of Democracy) ad nauseam and at great length.

But the provisions in the 1972 Republican Constitution concerning transfers, promotions, etc. of the public officers and its repetition in the next constitution in 1978 demonstrated the determination that has taken the better of politicians of all hues in this country against saner counsel opposing undue political interference in government affairs. Then came the 18th Amendment putting the clock back on all that has been achieved by the 17th Amendment. It simply demonstrated the obstinacy of those in power wanting to politicize everything under the sun.

The outcome of this undue political interference is a Police that is servile, inefficient, corrupt, and pliable that has lost Public Respect. Having lost their Legitimacy in the eyes of the Public they have forfeited their right to Public Support and their Respect for the Law (and the Police themselves). What is therefore at stake is not only the legitimacy of the Police but the very legitimacy of the government itself putting Public Security in jeopardy. That is why people have taken the Law into their own hands and resorted to mass action.

This is an ominous trend that needs to be remedied without delay. What is at stake is the legitimacy of all governments as could be seen from the peoples’ ‘uprisings’ in the form of protests, demonstrations, violence, etc. which are only symptoms of the deep malaise. Police are the bulwark of a democracy. If the Police fail all else will fail in a democracy. Playing with police is playing with fire. Therefore, it is time that civil society woke up from its slumber and take timely steps without waiting to shut the stables after the horses have bolted



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Why Sri Lanka Still Has No Doppler Radar – and Who Should Be Held Accountable

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Eighteen Years of Delay:

Cyclone Ditwah has come and gone, leaving a trail of extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure, including buildings, roads, bridges, and 70% of the railway network. Thousands of hectares of farming land have been destroyed. Last but not least, nearly 1,000 people have lost their lives, and more than two million people have been displaced. The visuals uploaded to social media platforms graphically convey the widespread destruction Cyclone Ditwah has caused in our country.

The purpose of my article is to highlight, for the benefit of readers and the general public, how a project to establish a Doppler Weather Radar system, conceived in 2007, remains incomplete after 18 years. Despite multiple governments, shifting national priorities, and repeated natural disasters, the project remains incomplete.

Over the years, the National Audit Office, the Committee on Public Accounts (COPA), and several print and electronic media outlets have highlighted this failure. The last was an excellent five-minute broadcast by Maharaja Television Network on their News First broadcast in October 2024 under a series “What Happened to Sri Lanka”

The Agreement Between the Government of Sri Lanka and the World Meteorological Organisation in 2007.

The first formal attempt to establish a Doppler Radar system dates back to a Trust Fund agreement signed on 24 May 2007 between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). This agreement intended to modernize Sri Lanka’s meteorological infrastructure and bring the country on par with global early-warning standards.

The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations established on March 23, 1950. There are 193 member countries of the WMO, including Sri Lanka. Its primary role is to promote the establishment of a worldwide meteorological observation system and to serve as the authoritative voice on the state and behaviour of the Earth’s atmosphere, its interaction with the oceans, and the resulting climate and water resources.

According to the 2018 Performance Audit Report compiled by the National Audit Office, the GoSL entered into a trust fund agreement with the WMO to install a Doppler Radar System. The report states that USD 2,884,274 was deposited into the WMO bank account in Geneva, from which the Department of Metrology received USD 95,108 and an additional USD 113,046 in deposit interest. There is no mention as to who actually provided the funds. Based on available information, WMO does not fund projects of this magnitude.

The WMO was responsible for procuring the radar equipment, which it awarded on 18th June 2009 to an American company for USD 1,681,017. According to the audit report, a copy of the purchase contract was not available.

Monitoring the agreement’s implementation was assigned to the Ministry of Disaster Management, a signatory to the trust fund agreement. The audit report details the members of the steering committee appointed by designation to oversee the project. It consisted of personnel from the Ministry of Disaster Management, the Departments of Metrology, National Budget, External Resources and the Disaster Management Centre.

The Audit Report highlights failures in the core responsibilities that can be summarized as follows:

· Procurement irregularities—including flawed tender processes and inadequate technical evaluations.

· Poor site selection

—proposed radar sites did not meet elevation or clearance requirements.

· Civil works delays

—towers were incomplete or structurally unsuitable.

· Equipment left unused

—in some cases for years, exposing sensitive components to deterioration.

· Lack of inter-agency coordination

—between the Meteorology Department, Disaster Management Centre, and line ministries.

Some of the mistakes highlighted are incomprehensible. There is a mention that no soil test was carried out before the commencement of the construction of the tower. This led to construction halting after poor soil conditions were identified, requiring a shift of 10 to 15 meters from the original site. This resulted in further delays and cost overruns.

The equipment supplier had identified that construction work undertaken by a local contractor was not of acceptable quality for housing sensitive electronic equipment. No action had been taken to rectify these deficiencies. The audit report states, “It was observed that the delay in constructing the tower and the lack of proper quality were one of the main reasons for the failure of the project”.

In October 2012, when the supplier commenced installation, the work was soon abandoned after the vehicle carrying the heavy crane required to lift the radar equipment crashed down the mountain. The next attempt was made in October 2013, one year later. Although the equipment was installed, the system could not be operationalised because electronic connectivity was not provided (as stated in the audit report).

In 2015, following a UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) inspection, it was determined that the equipment needed to be returned to the supplier because some sensitive electronic devices had been damaged due to long-term disuse, and a further 1.5 years had elapsed by 2017, when the equipment was finally returned to the supplier. In March 2018, the estimated repair cost was USD 1,095,935, which was deemed excessive, and the project was abandoned.

COPA proceedings

The Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) discussed the radar project on August 10, 2023, and several press reports state that the GOSL incurred a loss of Rs. 78 million due to the project’s failure. This, I believe, is the cost of constructing the Tower. It is mentioned that Rs. 402 million had been spent on the radar system, of which Rs. 323 million was drawn from the trust fund established with WMO. It was also highlighted that approximately Rs. 8 million worth of equipment had been stolen and that the Police and the Bribery and Corruption Commission were investigating the matter.

JICA support and project stagnation

Despite the project’s failure with WMO, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) entered into an agreement with GOSL on June 30, 2017 to install two Doppler Radar Systems in Puttalam and Pottuvil. JICA has pledged 2.5 billion Japanese yen (LKR 3.4 billion at the time) as a grant. It was envisaged that the project would be completed in 2021.

Once again, the perennial delays that afflict the GOSL and bureaucracy have resulted in the groundbreaking ceremony being held only in December 2024. The delay is attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic and Sri Lanka’s economic crisis.

The seven-year delay between the signing of the agreement and project commencement has led to significant cost increases, forcing JICA to limit the project to installing only one Doppler Radar system in Puttalam.

Impact of the missing radar during Ditwah

As I am not a meteorologist and do not wish to make a judgment on this, I have decided to include the statement issued by JICA after the groundbreaking ceremony on December 24, 2024.

In partnership with the Department of Meteorology (DoM), JICA is spearheading the establishment of the Doppler Weather Radar Network in the Puttalam district, which can realize accurate weather observation and weather prediction based on the collected data by the radar. This initiative is a significant step in strengthening Sri Lanka’s improving its climate resilience including not only reducing risks of floods, landslides, and drought but also agriculture and fishery“.

Based on online research, a Doppler Weather Radar system is designed to observe weather systems in real time. While the technical details are complex, the system essentially provides localized, uptotheminute information on rainfall patterns, storm movements, and approaching severe weather. Countries worldwide rely on such systems to issue timely alerts for monsoons, tropical depressions, and cyclones. It is reported that India has invested in 30 Doppler radar systems, which have helped minimize the loss of life.

Without radar, Sri Lanka must rely primarily on satellite imagery and foreign meteorological centres, which cannot capture the finescale, rapidly changing weather patterns that often cause localized disasters here.

The general consensus is that, while no single system can prevent natural disasters, an operational Doppler Radar almost certainly would have strengthened Sri Lanka’s preparedness and reduced the extent of damage and loss.

Conclusion

Sri Lanka’s inability to commission a Doppler Radar system, despite nearly two decades of attempts, represents one of the most significant governance failures in the country’s disastermanagement history.

Audit findings, parliamentary oversight proceedings, and donor records all confirm the same troubling truth: Sri Lanka has spent public money, signed international agreements, received foreign assistance, and still has no operational radar. This raises a critical question: should those responsible for this prolonged failure be held legally accountable?

Now may not be the time to determine the extent to which the current government and bureaucrats failed the people. I believe an independent commission comprising foreign experts in disaster management from India and Japan should be appointed, maybe in six months, to identify failures in managing Cyclone Ditwah.

However, those who governed the country from 2007 to 2024 should be held accountable for their failures, and legal action should be pursued against the politicians and bureaucrats responsible for disaster management for their failure to implement the 2007 project with the WMO successfully.

Sri Lanka cannot afford another 18 years of delay. The time for action, transparency, and responsibility has arrived.

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of any organization or institution with which the author is affiliated).

By Sanjeewa Jayaweera

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Ramifications of Trump Corollary

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President Donald Trump speaks during a Cabinet meeting as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth look on, at the White House, in Washington, Dec. 2, 2025

President Trump is expected to close the deal on the Ukraine crisis, as he may wish to concentrate his full strength on two issues: ongoing operations in Venezuela and the bolstering of Japan’s military capabilities as tensions between China and Japan over Taiwan rise. Trump can easily concede Ukraine to Putin and refocus on the Asia–Pacific and Latin America. This week, he once again spilled the beans in an interview with Politico, one of the most significant conversations ever conducted with him. When asked which country currently holds the stronger negotiating position, Trump bluntly asserted that there could be no question: it is Russia. “It’s a much bigger country. It’s a war that should’ve never happened,” he said, followed by his usual rhetoric.

Meanwhile, US allies that fail to adequately fund defence and shirk contributions to collective security will face repercussions, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth declared at the 2025 Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California. Hegseth singled out nations such as South Korea, Israel, Poland, and Germany as “model allies” for increasing their commitments, contrasting them with those perceived as “free riders”. The message was unmistakably Trumpian: partnerships are conditional, favourable only to countries that “help themselves” before asking anything of Washington.

It is in this context that it becomes essential to examine the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, issued last week, in order to consider how it differs from previous strategies and where it may intersect with current US military practice.

Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy is not merely another iteration of the familiar doctrine of American primacy; it is a radical reorientation of how the United States understands itself, its sphere of influence, and its role in the world. The document begins uncompromisingly: “The purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests; that is the sole focus of this strategy.” It is the bluntest opening in any American NSS since the document became a formal requirement in 1987. Whereas previous strategies—from Obama to Biden—wrapped security in the language of democracy promotion and multilateralism, Trump’s dispenses entirely with the pretence of universality. What matters are American interests, defined narrowly, almost corporately, as though the United States were a shareholder entity rather than a global hegemon.

It is here that the ghost of Senator William Fulbright quietly enters, warning in 1966 that “The arrogance of power… the belief that we are uniquely qualified to bring order to the world, is a dangerous illusion.” Fulbright’s admonition was directed at the hubris of Vietnam-era expansionism, yet it resonates with uncanny force in relation to Trump’s revived hemispheric ambitions. For despite Trump’s anti-globalist posture, his strategy asserts a unique American role in determining events across two oceans and within an entire hemisphere. The arrogance may simply be wearing a new mask.

Nowhere is this revisionist spirit more vivid than in the so-called “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”, perhaps the most controversial American hemispheric declaration since Theodore Roosevelt’s time. The 2025 NSS states without hesitation that “The United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” Yet unlike Roosevelt, who justified intervention as a form of pre-emptive stabilisation, Trump wraps his corollary in the language of sovereignty and anti-globalism. The hemispheric message is not simply that outside powers must stay out; it is that the United States will decide what constitutes legitimate governance in the region and deny “non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities… in our Hemisphere”.

This wording alone has far-reaching implications for Venezuela, where US forces recently seized a sanctioned supertanker as part of an escalating confrontation with the Maduro government. Maduro, emboldened by support from Russia, Iran, and China’s so-called shadow fleet, frames Trump’s enforcement actions as piracy. But for Trump, this is precisely the point: a demonstration of restored hemispheric authority. In that sense, the 2025 NSS may be the first strategic document in decades to explicitly set the stage for sustained coercive operations in Latin America. The NSS promises “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere.” “Urgent threats” is vague, but in practical military planning, vagueness functions as a permission slip. It is not difficult to see how a state accused of “narco-terrorism” or “crimes against humanity” could be fitted into the category.

The return to hemispheric dominance is paired with a targeted shift in alliance politics. Trump makes it clear that the United States is finished subsidising alliances that do not directly strengthen American security. The NSS lays out the philosophy succinctly: “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” This is a direct repudiation of the language found in Obama’s 2015 NSS, which emphasised that American leadership was indispensable to global stability. Trump rejects that premise outright. Leadership, in his framing, is merely leverage. Allies who fail to meet burden expectations will lose access, influence, and potentially even protection. Nowhere is this more evident than in the push for extraordinary defence spending among NATO allies: “President Trump has set a new global standard with the Hague Commitment… pledging NATO countries to spend 5 percent of GDP on defence.”

In turn, US disengagement from Europe becomes easier to justify. While Trump speaks of “negotiating an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine”, it requires little sophistication to decode this as a form of managed abandonment—an informal concession that Russia’s negotiating position is stronger, as Trump told Politico. Ukraine may well become a bargaining chip in the trade-off between strategic theatres: Europe shrinks, Asia and Latin America expand. The NSS’s emphasis on Japan, Taiwan, and China is markedly sharper than in 2017.

China looms over the 2025 NSS like an obsession, mentioned over twenty times, not merely as a competitor but as a driving force shaping American policy. Every discussion of technology, alliances, or regional security is filtered through Beijing’s shadow, as if US strategy exists solely to counter China. The strategy’s relentless focus risks turning global priorities into a theatre of paranoia, where the United States reacts constantly, defined less by its own interests than by fear of what China might do next.

It is equally striking that, just nine days after Cyclone Ditwah, the US Indo-Pacific Command deployed two C130 aircraft—capable of landing at only three locations in Sri Lanka, well away from the hardest-hit areas—and orchestrated a highly choreographed media performance, enlisting local outlets and social media influencers seemingly more concerned with flaunting American boots on the ground than delivering “urgent” humanitarian aid. History shows this is not unprecedented: US forces have repeatedly arrived under the banner of humanitarian assistance—Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992) later escalated into full security and combat operations; interventions in Haiti during the 1990s extended into long-term peacekeeping and training missions; and Operation United Assistance in Liberia (2014) built a lasting US operational presence beyond the Ebola response.

Trump’s NSS, meanwhile, states that deterring conflict in East Asia is a “priority”, and that the United States seeks to ensure that “US technology and US standards—particularly in AI, biotech, and quantum computing—drive the world forward.” Combined with heightened expectations of Japan, which is rapidly rearming, Trump’s strategic map shows a clear preference: if Europe cannot or will not defend itself, Asia might.

What makes the 2025 NSS uniquely combustible, however, is the combination of ideological framing and operational signalling. Trump explicitly links non-interventionism, long a theme of his political base, to the Founders’ moral worldview. He writes that “Rigid adherence to non-interventionism is not possible… yet this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention.”

The Trump NSS is both a blueprint and a warning. It signals a United States abandoning the liberal internationalist project and embracing a transactional, hemispherically focussed, sovereignty-first model. It rewrites the Monroe Doctrine for an age of great-power contest, but in doing so resurrects the very logics of intervention that past presidents have regretted. And in the background, as Trump weighs the cost of Ukraine against the allure of a decisive posture in Asia and the Western Hemisphere, the world is left to wonder whether this new corollary is merely rhetorical theatre or the prelude to a new era of American coercive power. The ambiguity is deliberate, but the direction of travel is unmistakable.

[Correction: In my column last week, I incorrectly stated that India–Russia trade in FY 2024 25 was USD 18 billion; the correct figure is USD 68.7 billion, with a trade deficit of about USD 59 billion. Similarly, India recorded a goods trade surplus of around USD 41.18 billion with the US, not a deficit of USD 42 billion, with exports of USD 86.51 billion and imports of USD 45.33 billion. Total remittances to India in FY 2024 25 were roughly USD 135.46 billion, including USD 25–30 billion from the US. Apologies for the error.]

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa

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MEEZAN HADJIAR

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selfmade businessman who became one of the richest men in the Central Province

I am happy that a book about the life and contribution of Sathkorale Muhamdiramlagedara Segu Abdul Cader Hajiar Mohamed Mohideen better known as Meezan Hadjiar or Meezan Mudalali of Matale [1911—1964] written by Mohammed Fuaji -a former Principal of Zahira College Matale, has now been published by a group of his admirers and relatives. It is a timely addition to the history of Matale district and the Kandyan region which is yet to be described fully as forming a part of the modern history of our country. Coincidentally this book also marks the centenary of Meezan Hadjiars beginning of employment in Matale town which began in 1925.

Matale which was an outlier in the Kandyan Kingdom came into prominence with the growth of plantations for coffee and, after the collapse of the coffee plantations due to the ‘coffee blight’ , for other tree crops . Coffee was followed by the introduction of tea by the early British investors who faced bankruptcy and ruin if they could not quickly find a substitute beverage for coffee.They turned to tea.

The rapid opening of tea plantations in the hill country demanded a large and hardworking labour force which could not be found domestically. This led to the indenturing of Tamil labour from South India on a large scale. These helpless workers were virtually kidnapped from their native villages in India through the Kangani system and they were compelled to migrate to our hill country by the British administration .

Meezan Hadjiar

The route of these indentured workers to the higher elevations of the hill country lay through Matale and the new plantation industry developed in that region thereby dragging it into a new commercial culture and a cash economy. New opportunities were opened up for internal migration particularly for the more adventurous members of the Muslim community who had played a significant role in the Kandyan kingdom particularly as traders,transporters,medical specialists and military advisors.

Diaries of British officials like John D’oyly also show that the Kandyan Muslims were interlocutors between the Kandyan King and British officials of the Low Country as they had to move about across boundaries as traders of scarce commodities like salt, medicines and consumer articles for the Kandyans and arecanuts, gems and spices for the British. Even today there are physical traces of the ‘’Battal’’or caravans of oxen which were used by the Muslims to transport the above mentioned commodities to and from the Kandyan villages to the Low country. Another important facet was that Kandyan Muslims were located in villages close to the entrances to the hill country attesting to their mobility unlike the Kandyan villagers.

Thus Akurana, Galagedera, Kadugannawa, Hataraliyadde and Mawanella which lay in the pathways to enter the inner territory of the Kings domain were populated by ‘Kandyan Muslims’ who had the ear of the King and his high officials. The’’ Ge’’ names and the honorifics given by the King were a testament to their integration with the Sinhala polity. Meezan Hadjiars’’ Ge ‘‘name of Sathkorale Mohandiramlage denotes the mobility of the family from Sathkorale, an outlier division in the Kandyan Kingdom, and Mohandiramlage attests to the higher status in the social hierarchy which probably indicated that his forebears were honoured servants of the king.

Meezan Hadjiar [SM Mohideen] was born and bred in Kurugoda which is a small village in Akurana in Kandy district. He belonged to the family of Abdul Cader who was a patriarch and a well known religious scholar. Cader’s children began their education in the village school but at the age of 12 young Mohideen left his native village to apprentice under a relative who had a business establishment in the heart of Matale town which was growing fast due to the economic boom. It must be stated here that this form of ‘learning the ropes’ as an apprentice’was a common path to business undertaken by many of the later Sri Lankan tycoons of the pre-independence era.

But he did not remain in that position for long .When his mentor failed in his business of trading in cocoa, cardamoms, cloves and arecanuts and wanted to close up his shop young Mohideen took over and eventually made a great success of it. His enterprise succeeded because he was able to earn the trust of both his buyers and sellers. He befriended Sinhalese and Tamil producers and the business he improved beyond measure took on the name of Meezan Estates Ltd [The scales] and Mohideen soon became famous as Meezan Mudalali – perhaps the most successful businessman of his time in Matale. He expanded his business interests to urban real estate as well as tea and rubber estates. Soon he owned over 3,000 acres of tea estates making him one of the richest men in the Central Province.

With his growing influence Meezan spent generously on charitable activities including funding a water scheme for his native village of Kurugoda also serving adjoining villages like Pangollamada located in Akurana. He also gave generously to Buddhist causes in Matale together with other emerging low country businessmen like Gunasena and John Mudalali.

Matale was well known as a town in which all communities lived in harmony and tended to help each other. As a generous public figure he became strong supporter of the UNP and a personal friend of its leaders like Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawela. UNP candidates for public office-both in the Municipality and Parliament were selected in consultation with Meezan who also bankrolled them during election time. He himself became a Municipal councillor. The Aluvihares of several generations had close links with him. it was Meezan who mentored ACS Hameed – a fellow villager from Kurugoda – and took him to the highest echelons of Sri Lankan politics as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was a supporter and financier of the UNP through thick and thin.

Though his premature death at the age 53 in 1965 saved him from the worst political witch hunts under SWRD Bandaranaike who was his personal friend it was after 1970 and the Coalition regime that Meezan’s large family were deprived of their livelihood by the taking over of all their estates. Fortunately many of his children were well educated and could hold on till relief was given by President Premadasa despite the objections of their father’s erstwhile protégé ACS Hameed who surprisingly let them down badly.

It is only fitting that we, even a hundred years later, now commemorate a great self made Sri Lankan business magnate and generous contributor to all religious and social causes of his time. His name became synonymous with enterprise in Matale – a district in which I was privileged to serve as Government Agent in the late sixties.He was a model entrepreneur and his large family have also made outstanding contributions to this country which also attest to the late Meezan Hadjiars foresight and vision of a united and prosperous Srilanka.

by SARATH AMUNUGAMA.

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