Midweek Review

How UNP dug its own grave

Published

5 years ago

2020/08/12

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The margin of the SLPP (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna) victory, at the Aug 5, 2020 general election, stunned the ruling coalition. The best possible result the SLPP expected was around 130 seats, including National List slots. SLPP Chairman and its top National List nominee, Prof. G.L. Peiris, about aproximately 30 minutes after polling commenced, countrywide, told the writer they expected around 130 seats.

About two weeks earlier, the leader of the Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) and Attorney-at-law Udaya Gammanpila, too, privately acknowledged they could secure around 130 seats.

Experienced campaigner and turncoat, S.B. Dissanayake, also of the SLPP, placed the number of seats, anticipated, a little less than 130 seats. But, they all predicted a very comfortable victory for the SLPP, though two-thirds seemed quite unrealistic.

The Aug 5 result proved a two-thirds majority was achievable, under the Proportional Representation (PR) system, though so-called experts thought otherwise. However, the margin of victory surprised even the three-and-half-year old SLPP, as well as the tattered UNP, established over 70 years ago.

For the first time, in our political history, a party (that ruled the country on several occasions) ended up without a single elected lawmaker. The UNP managed to secure one National List seat. The JVP did much better than the UNP by securing three seats, including one National List slot, but it was a comedown when compared to its previous performance at the August 2015 general election.

General Secretary of the UNP, Akila Viraj Kariyawasam, on Friday (7), blamed their worst defeat ever on their ‘own actions’ and those of others. The latter was definitely a reference to former UNP Deputy Leader Sajith Premadasa causing a split.

It would be pertinent to examine what Kariyawasam meant by ‘own actions’ in his pathetic attempt to explain the debilitating setback the once proud party suffered. The EC decision not to count preference votes, received by candidates of political parties that didn’t receive seats, saved them from further humiliation. If not, the paltry number of votes received by Ranil Wickremesinghe, Assistant Leader Ravi Karunanayake, National Organizer Navin Dissanayake, as well as financier Daya Gamage, would have become public, adding to the humiliating defeat.

The emergence of the SLPP, at the expense of the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), should be studied, taking into consideration the deliberate wrongdoings, blunders, lapses, treachery and utterly irrational policies followed by the yahapalana administration, consisting of the UNP and a section of the SLFP-led UPFA.

Before we discuss why the voting public handed over such a massive mandate to the SLPP, it would be pertinent to mention that those who served the ruinous yahapalana coalition ended-up in four groups. The largest group formed (1) the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB), (2) remained in permanently damaged UNP, (3) what was left of the SLFP and (4) those who returned to the Rajapaksa Camp, having served Maithripala Sirisena for some time.

Having publicly alleged that he would have ended up six feet under if Mahinda Rajapaksa had won the 2015 January presidential election, Maithripala Sirisena, too, returned to the Rajapaksa Camp to avoid being politically eliminated. If Sirisena’s SLFP contested the recently concluded general election, on its own, it, too, could have suffered the same fate that befell the UNP. The SLFP obviously avoided the disgraceful defeat by contesting under the flower bud symbol.

The SLFP, on its own, winning a seat in the Jaffna peninsula, is an exception. The SLFP contested the electoral districts of Jaffna and Kalutara. Final result of the Kalutara district reflected the ground situation, in 18 districts, where the SLPP recorded landslide victories. The SLFP polled 10,979 votes (1.57%), in the Kalutara district, and was placed 5th, whereas the SLPP obtained a staggering 448,699 votes (64.88%). The SLFP survived a political massacre by accepting the SLPP’s terms. The SLPP, quite rightly, dismissed the SLFP’s efforts to contest both the presidential and parliamentary polls, under a common symbol. Polonnaruwa district candidate Sirisena, in spite of being verbally abused and humiliated by fellow district SLPP candidate Roshan Ranasinghe, as well as Gampaha District SLPP leader Prasanna Ranatunga, polled the highest number of preferential votes from the Polonnaruwa District. Sirisena polled 111,137 preference votes, whereas Roshan Ranasinghe obtained 90,615. The SLFP, due to consensus with brazen SLPP, even at biased terms, has managed to save face.

‘Own actions’

The UNP suffered an irreparable setback, at the third parliamentary poll, since the conclusion of the war, in May 2009. The UNP’s loss, at the 2010 general election, was understandable. The then SLFP-led UPFA obtained 144 seats, including 17 National List slots, whereas the UNP secured 60. The UPFA taking the parliamentary election was a foregone conclusion in the wake of Mahinda Rajapaksa defeating General Sarath Fonseka at the 2010 January presidential election. But, the UNP obtained a respectable 60-member group and, five years later, used it to spearhead a high profile project to bring down Mahinda Rajapaksa.

But, the UNP, at the general election just concluded, has been reduced to just 1 National List MP. The UNP General Secretary should explain what he really meant by ‘own actions’ contributing to its downfall. Let me examine what these ‘own actions’ were as the SLPP triumph transformed the political landscape.

The SLPP can easily secure two-thirds with the backing of the SLFP (one elected from Jaffna) and three other Tamil and Muslim parties. Perhaps, it would be much better to amend the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, in consultation with the SJB (54 MPs), TNA (10), Jathika Jana Balavegaya (JJB/3) and the UNP (1) than exploiting the overwhelming majority to its advantage.

Sri Lanka is in such a political-economic mess, the SLPP should act responsibly. The formidable political power shouldn’t pursue abusive policies against the backdrop of annihilation of the Opposition. It would be a grave mistake on its part to tinker with the Constitution for its benefit. Perhaps, a consensus can be reached soon, on an amendment, to allow the President to hold the Defence portfolio.

Treasury bond scams

Having ousted Mahinda Rajapaksa, at the 2015 January presidential poll, a cocky UNP leadership brought in Singaporean Arjuna Mahendran as the Governor of the Central Bank, in January 2015. Wickremesinghe simply ignored Sirisena’s concerns as regards the appointment. Under heavy pressure, Sirisena handed over Mahendran’s letter of appointment. The Singaporean moved into the Governor’s Office, on January 26, 2016. The then Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake made the recommendation in this regard. The first Treasury bond scam was perpetrated just four weeks later.

Kariyawasam’s reference to ‘own actions’ without doubt include the 2015 Treasury bond scam and the second perpetrated 13 months later, after the 2015 general election. The government was so cocky, it not only once but twice perpetrated massive Treasury bond scams at the expense of the national economy. In spite of the then yahapalana partner, the SLFP, making a big noise about Treasury bond scams, Sirisena’s party solidly stood by the UNP. Sirisena went to the extent of dissolving parliament, on the night of June 26, 2015, to prevent the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) presenting its report on the first Treasury bond scam to parliament. Sirisena exposed himself by delaying the appointment of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) to probe the Treasury bond scams, till January 2017; over seven months after Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswamy succeeded the Singaporean.

The top UNP leadership caused the party downfall by its ‘own actions.’ The SLFP, too, contributed to the rapid deterioration of the yahapalana government by playing ball with the UNP. Having allowed the UNP to ruin the yahapalana arrangement, Sirisena resorted to a constitutional coup, in late Oct 2018, to take back control of the government. Sirisena failed miserably.

The new government now faced a huge challenge in bringing the Treasury bond scams case to a successful conclusion. Ranil Wickremesinghe and Ravi Karunanayake embroiled in Treasury bond cases are no longer lawmakers. Wickremesinghe and Karunanayake, having first entered parliament in 1977 and 1994 (National List), respectively, served as members of parliament successively until last week. Wickremesinghe and Karunanayake now face the bleak prospect of facing a long drawn out case.

Geneva betrayal

Between the February 2015 and March 2016 Treasury bond scams, the UNP betrayed the country, at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Sirisena did absolutely nothing but to publicly criticize the Geneva betrayal. The President, in spite of being the Commander-in-Chief and the Defence Minister, answerable to the people, stayed with the UNP decision. In a bid to deceive the public, the yahapalana lot replaced the then Foreign Minister, Mangala Samaraweera, who directed the then Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative in Geneva Ambassador, Ravinatha Aryasinha, to co-sponsor the controversial resolution, with Ravi Karunanayake, in May 2017. In spite of on and off public criticism, Sirisena, and those SLFPers who received ministerial portfolios, remained with the UNP. Karunanayake, embroiled in the Treasury bond scam controversy, continued with Samaraweera’s Geneva project. When Karunanayake was compelled to resign in the second week of August 2017, over shocking revelations before the Presidential Commission of Inquiry, Wickremesinghe brought back Tilak Marapana to the cabinet. One-time Attorney General Marapana, PC, took over the Foreign Ministry. Marapana, too, faithfully continued with the Geneva project. The Geneva betrayal was part of the UNP’s agreement with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and the US. Sumanthiran revealed the existence of a treacherous agreement, in June 2016, when he addressed a gathering in the US. Sumanthiran declared that he negotiated with the US and Sirisena’s government, on the Geneva resolution, and the inclusion of foreign judges in war crimes courts.

Lord Naseby, in Oct 2017, gave Sri Lanka a golden opportunity to counter war crimes allegations. Based on secret dispatches from the UK High Commission, in Colombo, in 2009 (January to May), Lord Naseby successfully countered the primary allegation, regarding the massacre of 40,000 Tamil civilians on the Vanni east front. The UNP turned a blind eye to Lord Naseby’s revelations. Yahapalana partner, the SLFP, too, followed the same policy. When the writer inquired about how the government intended to use Lord Naseby’s revelations for Sri Lanka’s defence, at the post-cabinet media briefing, co-cabinet spokesman Dayasiri Jayasekera reacted angrily, though he quickly calmed down. An irate Jayasekera accused the writer of raising unnecessary issues with a view to causing problems. Jayasekera revealed that up to the time the question was posed to him, the cabinet hadn’t at least discussed the matter. Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, as well as the SLFP spokesman Mahinda Sanarasinghe, at separate media briefings, in response to questions posed by the writer, admitted that the cabinet didn’t discuss the Geneva matter.

The Foreign Ministry’s thinking reflected the despicable UNP policy towards the armed forces. The initial Foreign Ministry response, to Lord Naseby’s Oct 2017 bid to save Sri Lanka, revealed its role in a high profile anti-Sri Lanka project. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement in response to a query posed by the writer to the then spokesperson. However, the Foreign Ministry cannot be faulted for following the instructions given by the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister, at that time.

The SLFP cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for the Geneva betrayal. Today, those SLFPers, who had fully cooperated with the UNP (2015 August –Oct 2018), are in parliament, on the SLPP ticket. They survived by contesting the Aug 5 parliamentary election on the SLPP ticket. If not, the SLFP, too, would have ended up with perhaps one National List MP, like its partner in ‘crime’ the UNP.

In the wake of the Geneva betrayal, several countries imposed travel restrictions on senior military commanders. Field Marshal Fonseka, Maj. Gen. Chagie Gallage and Army Chief Shavendra Silva are among those who were slapped with travel bans.

Now, it would be the responsibility of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government to set the record straight. The UNP and the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi-led TNA, responsible for the Geneva betrayal, suffered serious setbacks at the general election. Having campaigned for 20 seats, the one-time LTTE mouth piece was reduced to 10 seats, including one National List slot. In the last parliament, the TNA had 16 lawmakers, including two National List slots. Obviously, the Tamil electorate snubbed the TNA by causing the ITAK leader Mavai Senathirajah’s defeat. The TNA, too, plunged into crisis with a section of the former LTTE proxy demanding that Senathirajah be appointed to parliament through the National List whereas the TNA, at the behest of Sampanthan, named Chairman of Ampara Navindaveli Pradeshiya Sabha Thawarasa Kalaiarasan as their National List member.

Prez-PM failure in 2019

The Treasury bond scams (February 2015 and March 2016) and the Geneva treachery (Oct 2015) was followed by the indefensible failure to thwart the April 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. In this case, too, both the UNP and Sirisena failed the country very badly. The revelations, made before the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), in 2019, and the on-going Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI), proved beyond doubt the culpability of both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe for the Easter Sunday carnage. In spite of knowing the imminent threat, posed by Thowheed Jamaat, Sirsena went on a pilgrimage to neighbouring India. Sirisena, wife, Jayanthi Pushpa Kumari, and other members of their family, offered prayers at the hill shrine of Lord Venkateswara. Sirisena took part in the ‘Suprabhatha’ ritual and offered prayers to the presiding deity of Lord Venkateswara. From there, the Sirisenas flew to Singapore. They were on holiday when Thowheed Jamaat carried out the near simultaneous attacks. Sirisena got caught lying to the PSC regarding the delay on his part in returning to Colombo in the aftermath of the attack. The PSC, in its report released to the public in Oct 2019, revealed how Sirisena shunned two earlier Sri Lankan flights to return in the early hours of the following day on a Singapore Airlines flight.

The SLPP will have to deal with media furore when the P CoI releases its report later this year. Sirisena, who held the Defence and Law and order portfolios at the time of the attack, in addition to being the Commander-in-Chief, cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for the unprecedented security failure.

H’tota deal and FTA with Singapore

Sirisena authorized the 99-year-lease on Hambantota port, in lieu of what Sri Lanka owed China, as well as the controversial Free Trade Agreement with Singapore (FTA) during his tainted presidency. On behalf of Sri Lanka, Sirisena’s nominee, Ports and Shipping Minister, Mahinda Samarasinghe, signed the agreement with China. Sri Lanka and China finalized the Hambantota port deal, in late July 2017, and the FTA with Singapore, in January 2018. Malik Samarawickrema signed the agreement on Sri Lanka’s behalf. It was finalized after six rounds of talks. Both Sirisena and Samarasinghe re-entered parliament on the SLPP ticket. Samarasinghe even took SLPP membership in the run-up to the general election. Samarawickrema, who was accommodated on the UNP National List in the previous parliament, quit parliamentary politics.

The SLFP has conveniently forgotten that it held the post of Deputy Speaker in Parliament till May 25, 2018. Thilanga Sumathipala served as the Deputy Speaker and the Chairperson of Committees of parliament. Sumathipala was replaced by Ananda Kumarasiri, who later headed the PSC that probed the Easter Sunday carnage. The Supreme Court has been moved by seven parties, including the Government Medical Officers’ Association (GMOA), against the FTA with Singapore. The SC last heard the case in the second week of July, 2020. It will be taken up again on Nov 03, 2020. A committee, appointed by the government after the last presidential election to review the FTA with Singapore, is yet to release its final report.

Having promised to review the Hambantota deal, the incumbent administration subsequently dropped the idea after China, in no uncertain terms, objected to that move. Those who represented the previous parliament and those who elected to new parliament should keep in mind there is no difference in the 99-year-lease on Hambantota port and the outright sale of such a valuable asset.

ACSA et al

Sri Lanka first entered ACSA (Access and Cross Servicing Agreement) in March 2007. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in his capacity as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, signed ACSA on Sri Lanka’s behalf for a period of 10 years. Sirisena, in his capacity as the President, authorized signing a far more comprehensive ACSA, in August 2017. Sirisena’s government also discussed SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) with the US, in addition to finalizing the MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) Compact.

When the writer raised the issue with Wickremesinghe at the final government media briefing, at Temple Trees, two weeks before the Nov 16, 2019 presidential election, the Premier, without hesitation, declared it would be signed. Now, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government will have to decide on the controversial agreement. The government is obviously in a dilemma. Having secured a near two-thirds majority, the SLPP cannot, under any circumstances, accept the agreement in its present form against the backdrop of Prof. Lalithasiri Gunaruwan’s damning report, in Sinhala, on it. Perhaps, copies should be made available to all members of the new parliament.

Sri Lanka shouldn’t accept SOFA, under any circumstances. Instead, Sri Lanka should guarantee that it wouldn’t engage in /allow foreign activity inimical to regional or world powers. The new government cannot be unaware how the majority community reacted to the UNP’s response to ACSA, SOFA and MCC. The SLPP campaign, against US agreements, gave Gotabaya Rajapaksa a tremendous boost at the presidential poll, as well as the recently concluded general election.

Paddy at Mattala airport

Having ousted Mahinda Rajapaksa, in January 2015, and then won the 2015 August general election, the UNP brazenly stored paddy at the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA). Wickremesinghe repeatedly called Sri Lanka’s second international airport a white elephant. Storing paddy at MRIA was nothing but political suicide. It was meant to humiliate the war-winning President and his administration.

Storing paddy at MAIA is as bad as betraying the war-winning armed forces in Geneva. Five years later, the majority community, through overwhelming votes at the presidential and parliamentary polls, sent the UNP home. Sajith Premadasa and his group survived by contesting under a different symbol. Whoever secures UNP’s solitary National List slot, one UNP lawmaker in parliament would be a grim reminder to those who destroyed the once great party.

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Midweek Review

A look back at now mostly forgotten Eelam war in the aftermath of Kashmir massacre

Published

4 days ago

2025/04/30

Sahan Weerasooriya

LTTE directed two claymore mines at an overcrowded SLTB bus, at Kebithigollewa, on June 15, 2006. The blasts claimed the lives of 68 civilians. Seventeen years after the war, some interested parties sought to muddy the waters by falsely claiming the Karuna faction triggered the Kebithigollewa blasts at the behest of President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre, Pakistan offered to cooperate in what it called a neutral investigation. But India never regretted the
catastrophic results of its intervention in Sri Lanka that led to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army
from NE, Sri Lanka

In a telephone call to Indian Premier Narendra Modi, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake condemned the massacre of 26 civilians – 25 Indians and one Nepali – at Pahalgam, in the Indian controlled Kashmir, on April 22.

President Dissanayake expressed his condolences and reaffirmed, what the President’s Media Division (PMD) called, Sri Lanka’s unwavering solidarity and brotherhood with the people of India.

Having described the massacre as a terrorist attack, New Delhi found fault with Pakistan for the incident. Pakistan was accused of backing a previously unknown group, identified as Kashmir Resistance.

The Indian media have quoted Indian security agencies as having said that Kashmir Resistance is a front for Pakistan-based terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen fighting Indian rule in Kashmir. Pakistan says it only provides moral and diplomatic support.

Pakistan has denied its involvement in the Pahalgam attack. A section of the Indian media, and some experts, have compared the Pahalgam attack with the coordinated raids carried out by Hamas on southern Israel, in early October 2023.

President Dissanayake called Premier Modi on the afternoon of April 25, three days after the Pahalgam attack. The PMD quoted Dissanayake as having reiterated Sri Lanka’s firm stance against terrorism in all its forms, regardless of where it occurred in the world, in a 15-minute call.

Modi cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia as India took a series of measures against Pakistan. Indian actions included suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) governing water sharing of six rivers in the Indus basin between the two countries. The agreement that had been finalised way back in 1960 survived three major wars in 1965, 1971 and 1999.

One-time Pentagon official Michael Rubin, having likened the Pahalgam attack to a targeted strike on civilians, has urged India to adopt an Israel-style retaliation, targeting Pakistan, but not realising that both are nuclear armed.

Soon after the Hamas raid some interested parties compared Sri Lanka’s war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the ongoing Israel war on Gaza.

The latest incident in Indian-controlled Kashmir, and Gaza genocide, cannot be compared under any circumstances. Therefore, suggestions that India adopt Israel-style retaliation against Pakistan do not hold water. Also, Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE that was brought to a successful conclusion in May 2009 cannot be compared with the conflict Israel is involved in.

Sri Lanka can easily relate to the victims of the Pahalgam attack as a victim of separatist terrorism that bled the country for nearly 30 years. India, however, never bothered to express regret over causing terrorism here.

Indian-sponsored terror projects brought Sri Lanka to its knees before President JRJ made an attempt to eradicate the LTTE in May-June 1987. JRJ resorted to ‘Operation Liberation’ after Indian mediated talks failed to end the conflict. Having forced Sri Lanka to call off the largest-ever ground offensive undertaken at that time with the hope of routing the LTTE in Vadamarachchi, the home turf of Velupillai Prabhakaran, followed by India deploying its Mi 17s on July 24, 1987, to rescue the Tiger Supremo, his wife, two children and several of his close associates – just five days before the signing of the so-called Indo-Lanka peace accord, virtually at Indian gun point.

First phase of Eelam war

During the onset of the conflict here, the LTTE routinely carried out raids on predominantly Sinhala villages where civilians were butchered. That had been part of its strategy approved by ‘controllers’ based across the Palk Straits. That had been a volatile period in the run-up to the July 29, 1987, accord. Although India established half a dozen terrorist groups here, the LTTE had been unquestionably the most violent and the dominant group. To New Delhi’s humiliation all such groups supported by it were wiped out by the marauding Tigers.

Those who compared the LTTE with Hamas, or any other group, conveniently forget that the Sri Lankan group caused significant losses to its creator. India lost over 1,300 officers and men, while nearly 3,000 others suffered injuries during the Indian deployment here (July 1987-March 1990).

The world turned a blind eye to what was going on in Sri Lanka in the ’80s. The war launched by India in the early ’80s against Sri Lanka lasted till the signing of the peace accord. That can be broadly identified as phase one of the conflict (1983 July – 1987 July). That first phase can be safely described as an Indian proxy war aimed at creating an environment conducive for the deployment of the Indian Army.

Having compelled President JRJ to accept deployment of the Indian Army in the northern and eastern regions in terms of the “peace accord”, New Delhi sought to consolidate its hold here by disarming all groups, except the one it had handpicked to run the North-East Provincial Council. The Indian Army oversaw the first Provincial Council election held on Nov. 19, 1988, to elect members to the NE council. The whole exercise was meant to ensure the installation of the Varatharaja Perumal led-EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Forint) administration therein.

The second phase (1987 July – 1990 March) saw a war between the Indian Army and the LTTE. During this period, the Indian Army supervised two national elections – presidential on Dec. 19, 1988, and parliamentary on Feb. 15, 1989, that were won by Ranasinghe Premadasa and the UNP.

During that period, the UNP battled the JVP terror campaign and the South bled. The JVP that resorted to unbridled violence against the Indo-Lanka accord, at that time, has ended-up signing several agreements, including one on defence cooperation, recently, and the country is yet to get details of these secret agreements.

Raid on the Maldives

The second phase of the Eelam conflict ended when India pulled out its Army from NE Sri Lanka in March 1990. The sea-borne raid that had been carried out by Indian-trained PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) targeting Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, in Nov. 1988, is perhaps a significant development during the second phase of the conflict, though it was never examined in the right context.

No one – not even the Maldives – found fault with India for exporting terrorism to the island nation. India received accolades for swift air borne intervention to neutralise the PLOTE group. The Indian Navy sank a vessel commandeered by a section of the PLOTE raiders in a bid to escape back to Sri Lanka. The truth is that PLOTE, that had been trained by India to destabilise Sri Lanka, ended-up taking up a lucrative private assignment to overthrow President Gayoom’s administration.

India never regretted the Maldivian incident. It would be pertinent to mention that two boat loads of PLOTE cadres had quietly left Sri Lanka at a time the Indian Navy was responsible for monitoring in and out sea movements.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre, Pakistan offered to cooperate in what it called a neutral investigation. But India never regretted the catastrophic results of its intervention in Sri Lanka that led to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army from NE, Sri Lanka.

Resumption of hostilities by the LTTE in June 1990 can be considered as the beginning of the third phase of the conflict. Having battled the Indian Army and gained valuable battle experience, the LTTE, following a 14-month honeymoon with President Ranasinghe Premadasa, resumed hostilities. Within weeks the LTTE gained the upper hand in the northern theatre of operations.

In spite of India banning the LTTE, after the May 1991 assassination of Gandhi, the group continued to grow with the funds pouring in from the West over the years. Regardless of losing Jaffna in 1995, the LTTE consolidated its position, both in the Vanni and the East, to such an extent their victory seemed inevitable.

But resolute political leadership given by Mahinda Rajapaksa ensured that Sri Lanka turned the tables on the LTTE within weeks after the LTTE appeared to be making significant progress at the beginning. Within two years and 10 months (2006 August – 2009 May) the armed forces brought the LTTE to its knees, and the rest is history. As we have said in our earlier columns that victory was soon soured. Spearheaded by Sarath Fonseka, the type of General that a country gets in about once in a thousand years, ended in enmity within, for the simple reason this super hero wanted to collect all the trophies won by many braves.

Post-war developments

Sri Lanka’s war has been mentioned on many occasions in relation to various conflicts/situations. We have observed many distorted/inaccurate attempts to compare Sri Lanka’s war against LTTE with other conflicts/situations.

Unparalleled Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, triggered a spate of comments on Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. Respected expert on terrorism experienced in Sri Lanka, M.R. Narayan Swamy, discussed the similarities of Sri Lanka’s conflict and the ongoing Israel-Gaza war. New Delhi-based Swamy, who had served UNI and AFP during his decades’ long career, discussed the issues at hand while acknowledging no two situations were absolutely comparable. Swamy currently serves as the Executive Director of IANS (Indo-Asian News Service).

‘How’s Hamas’ attack similar to that of LTTE?’ and ‘Hamas’ offensive on Israel may bring it closer to LTTE’s fate,’ dealt with the issues involved. Let me reproduce Swamy’s comment: “Oct. 7 could be a turning point for Hamas similar to what happened to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka in 2006. Let me explain. Similar to Hamas, the LTTE grew significantly over time eventually gaining control of a significant portion of Sri Lanka’s land and coast. The LTTE was even more formidable than Hamas. It had a strong army, growing air force and a deadly naval presence. Unlike Hamas, the LTTE successfully assassinated high ranking political figures in Sri Lanka and India. Notably, the LTTE achieved this without direct support from any country while Hamas received military and financial backing from Iran and some other states. The LTTE became too sure of their victories overtime. They thought they could never be beaten and that starting a war would always make them stronger. But in 2006 when they began Eelam War 1V their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran couldn’t have foreseen that within three years he and his prominent group would be defeated. Prabhakaran believed gathering tens of thousands of Tamils during the last stages of war would protect them and Sri Lanka wouldn’t unleash missiles and rockets. Colombo proved him wrong. They were hit. By asking the people not to flee Gaza, despite Israeli warnings, Hamas is taking a similar line. Punishing all Palestinians for Hamas’ actions is unjust, just like punishing all Tamils for LTTE’s actions was wrong. The LTTE claimed to fight for Tamils without consulting them and Hamas claimed to represent Palestinians without seeking the approval for the Oct.7 strike. Well, two situations are not absolutely comparable. We can be clear that Hamas is facing a situation similar to what the LTTE faced, shortly before its end. Will Hamas meet a similar fate as the LTTE? Only time will answer that question.” The above was said soon after the Oct. 2023 Hamas attack.

Swamy quite conveniently refrained from mentioning India’s direct role in setting up one of the deadliest terror projects in the world here in the ’80s.

Former Editor of The Hindu, Malini Parthasarathy, who also had served as Chairperson of The Hindu Group, released a list of politicians assassinated by the LTTE, as she hit back hard at those who raged against the comparison of the Hamas to the LTTE. The list included two Jaffna District MPs, Arumugam Murugesu Alalasundaram and Visvanathan Dharmalingam, assassinated in early Sept. 1985. Slain Visvanathan Dharmalingam’s son, Dharmalingam Siddharthan, who represents the Vanni electoral district on the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), is on record as having said that the two MPs were abducted and killed by TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation.) gunmen. The list posted by Parthasarathy included PLOTE leader Uma Maheswaran, assassinated in Colombo in July 1989. The LTTE hadn’t been involved in that killing either. Maheswaran is believed to have been killed by his onetime associates, perhaps over the abortive PLOTE raid on the Maldives in Nov, 1988. India never bothered at least to acknowledge that the Maldives raid was carried out by men trained by India to destabilise Sri Lanka. There is no doubt that Maheswasran’s killers, too, were known to the Indian intelligence at that time.

Before rushing into conclusions regarding Hamas and the LTTE, perhaps a proper examination of the circumstances they emerged is necessary. The two situations – fourth phase of the Eelam conflict and the latest Hamas strike on Israel and the devastating counter attack – cannot be compared under any circumstances. Efforts to compare the two issues is more like comparing apples and oranges, though mutually Tamils and Sinhalese have so many commonalities having intermingled throughout history like the Arabs and Jews.

It is no doubt Jews are a people that suffered persecution throughout known history under Assyrians, Babylonians to Romans and so forth. Such persecution includes expulsion of Jews from England in 1290 and from Spain 1492. So what Hitler and the Germans did was to take the historic process to another extreme.

Yet to blame the Palestinians and treat them like animals and to simply butcher them for the latest uprising by Hamas for all the humiliations and suffering they have been going through non-stop since Naqba in1948, from the time of the creation of Israel is to allow the creators of the problem, including the UK, the USA and United Nations to wash all their sins on the true other victims of this conflict, the Palestinians.

It would be pertinent to mention that Israel, in spite of having one of the world’s best fighting armed forces with 100 percent backing from the West, cannot totally eradicate Hamas the way Sri Lanka dealt with the LTTE. Mind you we did not drop 2000 pound bombs supplied by the US on hapless Tamil civilians to commit genocide as is happening in Palestine in the hands of the Israelis.

The circumstances under which the LTTE launched a large-scale offensive in Aug. 2006 and its objectives had been very much different from that of Hamas. The LTTE really believed that it could have defeated the Sri Lankan military in the North by cutting off the sea supply route from Trincomalee to Kankesanthurai and simultaneously overrunning the Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil forward defence line (FDL). The total collapse of the FDL could have allowed the LTTE to eradicate isolated fighting formations trapped north of the FDL. But, in the case of the Gaza war, the Hamas strike was meant to provoke Israel to unleash a massive unbridled counter attack that caused maximum losses on the civilians. As Hamas expected the Israeli counter attack has triggered massive protests in the West against their leaders. They have been accused of encouraging violence against Palestine. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other US allies are under heavy pressure from Muslims and other horrified communities’ world over to take a stand against the US.

But in spite of growing protests, Israel has sustained the offensive action not only against Gaza but Lebanon, Yemen and Iran.

Instead of being grateful to those who risked their lives to bring the LTTE terror to an end, various interested parties are still on an agenda to harm the armed forces reputation.

The treacherous Yahapalana government went to the extent of sponsoring an accountability resolution against its own armed forces at the Geneva-based UNHRC in Oct. 2015. That was the level of their treachery.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

The Broken Promise of the Lankan Cinema:

Published

4 days ago

2025/04/30

Sahan Weerasooriya

Asoka & Swarna’s Thrilling-Melodrama – Part III

“‘Dr. Ranee Sridharan,’ you say. ‘Nice to see you again.’

The woman in the white sari places a thumb in her ledger book, adjusts her spectacles and smiles up at you. ‘You may call me Ranee. Helping you is what I am assigned to do,’ she says. ‘You have seven moons. And you have already waisted one.’”

The Seven Moons of Maali Almeida

by Shehan Karunatilaka (London: Sort of Books, 2022. p84)

(Continued from yesterday)

Rukmani’s Stardom & Acting Opportunity

Rukmani Devi is still remembered for her incomparable singing voice and her studio photograph by Ralex Ranasinghe with its hint of Film Noir mystery and seduction, and for the role of Blanch Dubois she played in Dhamma Jagoda’s Vesmuhunu, an adaptation of Tennessee Williams’ A Streetcar Named Desire. This is a role she shared on alternate nights with Irangani Serasinghe in the late 60s or early 70s. (See my Island Essays, 2024, p114) She was immensely happy to be able to act in a modern western classic directed by a visionary theatre director like Dhamma Jagoda and it was to his credit that he chose to give her that role when all acting roles had dried up for her. I observed those rehearsals held at Harrold Peiris’ open garage.

I, too, am happy that Swarna has had a chance to perform again in her 70s. The question is, how exactly has she used that very rare opportunity to act in a film that has doubled its production cost within two months, and now showing in private screenings in multiplexes in Australia with English subtitles, with ambitions to be shown on Netflix and Amazon Prime. These outlets also now fund films and make challenging mini-series. Rani has clearly been produced and marketed with this global distribution in mind. How does this important fact affect Swarna’s style of acting and the aesthetics of Asoka’s script, are the questions I wish to explore in the final section of this piece.

A Sensational-Thrilling Political & Family Melodrama

‘Melodrama’ is a popular genre with a history that goes back to 19th century theatre in the west and with the advent of film, Hollywood took it up as it offered a key set of thrilling devices known as ‘Attractions’, for structuring and developing a popular genre cinema. The word ‘Melodrama’ is a compound of the Greek word for music ‘melos’ and drama as an action, with the connotation of a highly orchestrated set of actions. The orchestration (not only with sound but also the speed and rhythm of editing, dramatic expressive lighting, ‘histrionic’ acting, etc.,) always reaches toward thrilling climaxes and at times exaggerated display of emotions. The plots are sensational, propelled by coincidences and written to reach climaxes and dramatic reversals of fortune, and sudden revelations. Hollywood was famous for its happy endings with resolution of the dramatised conflicts, while Hindi melodramas and Lankan copies often ended sadly.

In the history of cinema there are highly sophisticated melodramas within Hollywood, classical Hindi cinema and also in European art cinema. Rainer Werner Fassbinder was one of the German directors who developed a modern ‘Brechtian-Melodrama’ of extraordinary political and aesthetic power in the 70s. And of course, there are very poorly conceived melodramas too like many of the Sinhala films which were copies of Indian prototypes. Melodramatic devices inflect the different genres of Hollywood, for example the Gangster Film, the Western and created durable genre types in character, e.g. the Gangster, the Lonesome Cowboy and Indians; all national stereotypes, one embodying the underbelly of American capitalism, an anti-hero and the other the American hero actualising The American Dream. ‘The Indian,’ merely the collateral damage of this phantasy!

When the stories were centred on women the genre classification was ‘Women’s Melodrama’ as it dealt with interpersonal relations, conflicts, and sadness centred on the home primarily. Feminist film theory has developed a vast archive of scholarship on the melodramatic genre, cross-culturally, with a special focus on Hollywood and Hindi cinema decades prior to the formation we now call Bollywood, made with transnational capital and global reach. It was assumed that the audience for the family melodramas was female and that as women, we enjoy crying at the cinema, hence the condescending name ‘The Weepies’. I cut my scholarly/critical teeth studying these much-maligned melodramatic films for my doctorate, which I had enjoyed while growing up in a long-ago Ceylon.

Asoka’s Melodramatic Turn

Asoka in Alborada, but more so in Rani has made melodramatic films with his own ‘self-expressive’ variations on the structure, with an ‘Art Cinema’ gloss. He has said that Rani is more like Alborada and unlike his previous films made during the civil war. This is quite obvious. Though the advertising tag line for Alborada claimed it as a ‘Poetic film that Neruda never made’ it was a straightforward narrative film. I have argued in a long essay (‘Psycho-Sexual Violence in the Sinhala Cinema: Parasathumal & Alborada’, in Lamentation of the Dawn, ed. S. Chandrajeewa, 2022, also tr. into Sinhala, 2023), that the staging of the rape of the nameless, silent, Dalit woman is conceived in a melodramatic manner playing it for both critique and exciting thrills. This is a case of both having his cake and eating it.

Swarna’s Melodramatic Turn

The film appears to be constructed, plotted melodramatically, to demonstrate Swarna’s ability to perform dramatic scenes of high excitement in areas of taboo, the opportunity for which is unavailable to a Sinhala actress, in a Sinhala film, playing the role of a Sinhala Buddhist mother, who has lost her son to an act of terror unleashed by the Sinhala-Buddhist State terror and Sinhala-Buddhist JVP.

In short, Swarna has been given the opportunity to demonstrate how well she can perform a range of Melodramatic emotions that go from say A to, say D. She has been given the chance to move smoothly from English to Sinhala as the middle classes do; use the two most common American expletives which are part of the American vernacular; drink for pleasure but also to the point of getting drunk; offer alcohol to her baffled domestic worker; coax her son and friends to drink; dance with them in an inebriated state; pour alcohol, whisky, not arrack, like one would pour water from a bottle; chain smoke furiously; dash a full mug of tea on the floor in a rage; crumple on the floor sobbing uncontrollably; shout at her loyal aid Karu; speak with sarcasm to a police officer insisting that she is ‘Dr Manorani …’ not ‘Miss or Mrs’, like feminists did back in the day; chat intimately with a minister of the government; look angrily and scowl at President Premadasa when he comes to the funeral house to condole with her; stage Richard’s funeral in a Catholic church with a stain glass window of the Pieta; to quote a well-known Psalm of David from the Bible, ‘Oh Absalom my son, Oh my son!’; etc.

Rani is Swarna’s chance to show that she can perform in ways that no Sinhala script has allowed a Sinhala actor to do up to now, that is, behave like the Sinhala cinema’s fantasy of how the upper-class Anglophone Lankan women behave. In short not unlike, but much worse, than the ‘bad girls’ in the Sinhala melodramatic genre cinema who always ended up in a Night Club, the locus of licentiousness that tempt them. I am thinking of Pitisara Kella from the 50s and a host of other films. Sinhala cinema simply cannot convincingly present the upper-class English-speaking milieu, with any nuance and conviction, it just feels very stilted, poorly acted therefore. Saying this is not class snobbery on my part. Even Lester James Peries from this very upper class and a Roman Catholic, in Delowak Atara couldn’t do it with Irangani Serasinghe and others. The dialogue meant to be serious or just plain normal sounded stilted and even funny. But when Lester did the Walauwa as in Nidhahanaya, it was brilliant, one of our classics. Brecht it was who said (on the eve of WW2, creating a Modern Epic mode of theatre in exile, that it’s not easy to make drama about current events. It’s much easier to look back with nostalgia at a genteel aristocratic Sinhala past for sure.

In taking the opportunity to explore kinetic and emotional behaviour considered to be taboo for a Sinhala woman, a fantasy Tamil woman has been fabricated. The plot of Rani is constructed by Asoka to provide Swarna the opportunity to indulge in these very taboos. In short, the fictional Tamil Rani offers Swarna an acting opportunity to improve her career prospects in the future. In so doing she has weakened her ability, I fear, to evolve as an actress.

A Domestic Melodrama: The House Suspended in a Void

If Swarna so desired, if the script ‘allowed her’ to, she could have tried to develop a quieter, more restrained and therefore a more powerful Rani. A friend of the family, when asked, said that, “The most striking feature of Manorani was her quiet, confident dignity, before and after Richard.” To testify to such a person, Asoka and Swarna could have asked the obvious question, did she have any close friendships formed as undergraduates, who supported her during this tragedy, as there certainly were cherished friends who shared her grief. After all, she was among the elite first generations of Ceylonese women to enter University in the 1940, to medical school at that!

Asoka and Swarna have entrapped their Rani in a vacuum of a house, friendless, with a little cross on Richard’s wall to signify religion. A lot of effort has gone into the set decoration and art direction of the house, as in Alborada, to stage a fantasy/phantasy melodramatic scenario. There is no real sensory, empathetic feel and understanding of the ethos (character), of this urbane Anglophone Ceylonese-Lankan mother and son, hence the fictionalised scenarios feel synthetic, cosmetic in the best traditions of the Sinhala genre cinema’s representation of the ‘excessive and even grotesque upper-class’. Except, here the Realism of the mise-en-scene (the old-world airy house and furniture and composition of the visual components) makes claims to a realist authenticity. A little modest research would have shown that Manorani and Richard moved from one rented apartment to another in the last few years of his life and when he was abducted, lived on the upper-floor of a house, in a housing estate in Rajagiriya. Asoka said in an interview that it wasn’t possible to find in Colombo the kind of old house they required for Rani. So, they went out of town to find the ideal house suited to stage their phantasy.

I suspect that it was Swarna who called shots this time, not Asoka who was recovering from a serious illness. He said that she brought the project to him and the producer and that he had no idea of making a film on Manorani, but added that he wrote the script within 3 months. I suspect that this Rani, (this out of control, angry, scowling, bad tempered, lamenting, hysterical Rani, reaching for the alcohol and cigarettes to assuage her grief, performing one sensational, thrilling melodramatic turn after another), was Swarna’s conception, her version of Manorani that she has nursed for 28 long years. Had she resisted this temptation to display her high-intensity acting-out skills yet again, she might just have been able to tap unsuspected resources within herself which she may still have as a serious actress. Its these latent affective depths that Rukmani Devi undoubtedly tapped when she was invited to play the drunken and lost Blanche Dubois, in A Streetcar Named Desire in Sinhala, as a desperate, drunken, aristocratic lady, in Dhamma Jagoda’s Vesmuhunu (1971?).

Jagoda / Irangani

It is reported that before going on stage, Rukmani Devi went on her hands and knees to pay her respects to Dhamma, not as feudal act of deference but to acknowledge his Shilpiya Nuwana, craft knowledge/intelligence’, as one very perceptive Sinhala critic put it. That gesture of Vandeema was foreign to the Tamil Christian Rukmani Devi, but nevertheless it shows her sense of immense gratitude to Dhamma for having taken her into a zone of expression (a dangerous territory emotionally for dedicated vulnerable actors), that she had never experienced before, so late in her life. But ‘late’ is relative to gender, then she was only in her 50s!

Challenge is what serious actors yearn for, strange beings who may suggest to us intensities that sustain and amplify life, all life. Swarna might usefully think about Rukmani Devi, her life and her star persona as a Tamil star in countless sarala Sinhala films, in whose shadow and echo every single Sinhala actress has entered the limelight, Swarna more so now than any other!

As for Asoka, he needs to rest and take care of himself before he commits himself to this recent track of films which are yielding less and less with each of the two films done back to back. His body of work is too important to trash it with this kind of half thought out ‘Tales of Sound and Fury’, which is a precise definition of Melodrama at its best. This film, alas, is not one of those.

That young Tamil women, often silent and traumatised, appeared following Sinhala soldiers in Lankan ‘civil-war cinema’ of the modernists, all male, is a troubling phenomenon. A ‘Sinhala Orientalism’, an exoticising of Tamil and Dalith young women as Other, is at work in some of the civil war films, as in Alborada and Rani. And then this very elevation always leads to unleashing psycho/sexual and/or other forms of violence, because the elevation (Mother Goddess in Alborada) only feeds violent male psychosexual phantasies, which in the Sinhala cinema often leads to the violence of rape and other forms of violence towards women, both Tamil and Sinhala. (To be continued)

by Laleen Jayamanne