Midweek Review

How UNP dug its own grave

Published

6 years ago

2020/08/12

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The margin of the SLPP (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna) victory, at the Aug 5, 2020 general election, stunned the ruling coalition. The best possible result the SLPP expected was around 130 seats, including National List slots. SLPP Chairman and its top National List nominee, Prof. G.L. Peiris, about aproximately 30 minutes after polling commenced, countrywide, told the writer they expected around 130 seats.

About two weeks earlier, the leader of the Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) and Attorney-at-law Udaya Gammanpila, too, privately acknowledged they could secure around 130 seats.

Experienced campaigner and turncoat, S.B. Dissanayake, also of the SLPP, placed the number of seats, anticipated, a little less than 130 seats. But, they all predicted a very comfortable victory for the SLPP, though two-thirds seemed quite unrealistic.

The Aug 5 result proved a two-thirds majority was achievable, under the Proportional Representation (PR) system, though so-called experts thought otherwise. However, the margin of victory surprised even the three-and-half-year old SLPP, as well as the tattered UNP, established over 70 years ago.

For the first time, in our political history, a party (that ruled the country on several occasions) ended up without a single elected lawmaker. The UNP managed to secure one National List seat. The JVP did much better than the UNP by securing three seats, including one National List slot, but it was a comedown when compared to its previous performance at the August 2015 general election.

General Secretary of the UNP, Akila Viraj Kariyawasam, on Friday (7), blamed their worst defeat ever on their ‘own actions’ and those of others. The latter was definitely a reference to former UNP Deputy Leader Sajith Premadasa causing a split.

It would be pertinent to examine what Kariyawasam meant by ‘own actions’ in his pathetic attempt to explain the debilitating setback the once proud party suffered. The EC decision not to count preference votes, received by candidates of political parties that didn’t receive seats, saved them from further humiliation. If not, the paltry number of votes received by Ranil Wickremesinghe, Assistant Leader Ravi Karunanayake, National Organizer Navin Dissanayake, as well as financier Daya Gamage, would have become public, adding to the humiliating defeat.

The emergence of the SLPP, at the expense of the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), should be studied, taking into consideration the deliberate wrongdoings, blunders, lapses, treachery and utterly irrational policies followed by the yahapalana administration, consisting of the UNP and a section of the SLFP-led UPFA.

Before we discuss why the voting public handed over such a massive mandate to the SLPP, it would be pertinent to mention that those who served the ruinous yahapalana coalition ended-up in four groups. The largest group formed (1) the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB), (2) remained in permanently damaged UNP, (3) what was left of the SLFP and (4) those who returned to the Rajapaksa Camp, having served Maithripala Sirisena for some time.

Having publicly alleged that he would have ended up six feet under if Mahinda Rajapaksa had won the 2015 January presidential election, Maithripala Sirisena, too, returned to the Rajapaksa Camp to avoid being politically eliminated. If Sirisena’s SLFP contested the recently concluded general election, on its own, it, too, could have suffered the same fate that befell the UNP. The SLFP obviously avoided the disgraceful defeat by contesting under the flower bud symbol.

The SLFP, on its own, winning a seat in the Jaffna peninsula, is an exception. The SLFP contested the electoral districts of Jaffna and Kalutara. Final result of the Kalutara district reflected the ground situation, in 18 districts, where the SLPP recorded landslide victories. The SLFP polled 10,979 votes (1.57%), in the Kalutara district, and was placed 5th, whereas the SLPP obtained a staggering 448,699 votes (64.88%). The SLFP survived a political massacre by accepting the SLPP’s terms. The SLPP, quite rightly, dismissed the SLFP’s efforts to contest both the presidential and parliamentary polls, under a common symbol. Polonnaruwa district candidate Sirisena, in spite of being verbally abused and humiliated by fellow district SLPP candidate Roshan Ranasinghe, as well as Gampaha District SLPP leader Prasanna Ranatunga, polled the highest number of preferential votes from the Polonnaruwa District. Sirisena polled 111,137 preference votes, whereas Roshan Ranasinghe obtained 90,615. The SLFP, due to consensus with brazen SLPP, even at biased terms, has managed to save face.

‘Own actions’

The UNP suffered an irreparable setback, at the third parliamentary poll, since the conclusion of the war, in May 2009. The UNP’s loss, at the 2010 general election, was understandable. The then SLFP-led UPFA obtained 144 seats, including 17 National List slots, whereas the UNP secured 60. The UPFA taking the parliamentary election was a foregone conclusion in the wake of Mahinda Rajapaksa defeating General Sarath Fonseka at the 2010 January presidential election. But, the UNP obtained a respectable 60-member group and, five years later, used it to spearhead a high profile project to bring down Mahinda Rajapaksa.

But, the UNP, at the general election just concluded, has been reduced to just 1 National List MP. The UNP General Secretary should explain what he really meant by ‘own actions’ contributing to its downfall. Let me examine what these ‘own actions’ were as the SLPP triumph transformed the political landscape.

The SLPP can easily secure two-thirds with the backing of the SLFP (one elected from Jaffna) and three other Tamil and Muslim parties. Perhaps, it would be much better to amend the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, in consultation with the SJB (54 MPs), TNA (10), Jathika Jana Balavegaya (JJB/3) and the UNP (1) than exploiting the overwhelming majority to its advantage.

Sri Lanka is in such a political-economic mess, the SLPP should act responsibly. The formidable political power shouldn’t pursue abusive policies against the backdrop of annihilation of the Opposition. It would be a grave mistake on its part to tinker with the Constitution for its benefit. Perhaps, a consensus can be reached soon, on an amendment, to allow the President to hold the Defence portfolio.

Treasury bond scams

Having ousted Mahinda Rajapaksa, at the 2015 January presidential poll, a cocky UNP leadership brought in Singaporean Arjuna Mahendran as the Governor of the Central Bank, in January 2015. Wickremesinghe simply ignored Sirisena’s concerns as regards the appointment. Under heavy pressure, Sirisena handed over Mahendran’s letter of appointment. The Singaporean moved into the Governor’s Office, on January 26, 2016. The then Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake made the recommendation in this regard. The first Treasury bond scam was perpetrated just four weeks later.

Kariyawasam’s reference to ‘own actions’ without doubt include the 2015 Treasury bond scam and the second perpetrated 13 months later, after the 2015 general election. The government was so cocky, it not only once but twice perpetrated massive Treasury bond scams at the expense of the national economy. In spite of the then yahapalana partner, the SLFP, making a big noise about Treasury bond scams, Sirisena’s party solidly stood by the UNP. Sirisena went to the extent of dissolving parliament, on the night of June 26, 2015, to prevent the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) presenting its report on the first Treasury bond scam to parliament. Sirisena exposed himself by delaying the appointment of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) to probe the Treasury bond scams, till January 2017; over seven months after Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswamy succeeded the Singaporean.

The top UNP leadership caused the party downfall by its ‘own actions.’ The SLFP, too, contributed to the rapid deterioration of the yahapalana government by playing ball with the UNP. Having allowed the UNP to ruin the yahapalana arrangement, Sirisena resorted to a constitutional coup, in late Oct 2018, to take back control of the government. Sirisena failed miserably.

The new government now faced a huge challenge in bringing the Treasury bond scams case to a successful conclusion. Ranil Wickremesinghe and Ravi Karunanayake embroiled in Treasury bond cases are no longer lawmakers. Wickremesinghe and Karunanayake, having first entered parliament in 1977 and 1994 (National List), respectively, served as members of parliament successively until last week. Wickremesinghe and Karunanayake now face the bleak prospect of facing a long drawn out case.

Geneva betrayal

Between the February 2015 and March 2016 Treasury bond scams, the UNP betrayed the country, at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Sirisena did absolutely nothing but to publicly criticize the Geneva betrayal. The President, in spite of being the Commander-in-Chief and the Defence Minister, answerable to the people, stayed with the UNP decision. In a bid to deceive the public, the yahapalana lot replaced the then Foreign Minister, Mangala Samaraweera, who directed the then Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative in Geneva Ambassador, Ravinatha Aryasinha, to co-sponsor the controversial resolution, with Ravi Karunanayake, in May 2017. In spite of on and off public criticism, Sirisena, and those SLFPers who received ministerial portfolios, remained with the UNP. Karunanayake, embroiled in the Treasury bond scam controversy, continued with Samaraweera’s Geneva project. When Karunanayake was compelled to resign in the second week of August 2017, over shocking revelations before the Presidential Commission of Inquiry, Wickremesinghe brought back Tilak Marapana to the cabinet. One-time Attorney General Marapana, PC, took over the Foreign Ministry. Marapana, too, faithfully continued with the Geneva project. The Geneva betrayal was part of the UNP’s agreement with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and the US. Sumanthiran revealed the existence of a treacherous agreement, in June 2016, when he addressed a gathering in the US. Sumanthiran declared that he negotiated with the US and Sirisena’s government, on the Geneva resolution, and the inclusion of foreign judges in war crimes courts.

Lord Naseby, in Oct 2017, gave Sri Lanka a golden opportunity to counter war crimes allegations. Based on secret dispatches from the UK High Commission, in Colombo, in 2009 (January to May), Lord Naseby successfully countered the primary allegation, regarding the massacre of 40,000 Tamil civilians on the Vanni east front. The UNP turned a blind eye to Lord Naseby’s revelations. Yahapalana partner, the SLFP, too, followed the same policy. When the writer inquired about how the government intended to use Lord Naseby’s revelations for Sri Lanka’s defence, at the post-cabinet media briefing, co-cabinet spokesman Dayasiri Jayasekera reacted angrily, though he quickly calmed down. An irate Jayasekera accused the writer of raising unnecessary issues with a view to causing problems. Jayasekera revealed that up to the time the question was posed to him, the cabinet hadn’t at least discussed the matter. Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, as well as the SLFP spokesman Mahinda Sanarasinghe, at separate media briefings, in response to questions posed by the writer, admitted that the cabinet didn’t discuss the Geneva matter.

The Foreign Ministry’s thinking reflected the despicable UNP policy towards the armed forces. The initial Foreign Ministry response, to Lord Naseby’s Oct 2017 bid to save Sri Lanka, revealed its role in a high profile anti-Sri Lanka project. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement in response to a query posed by the writer to the then spokesperson. However, the Foreign Ministry cannot be faulted for following the instructions given by the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister, at that time.

The SLFP cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for the Geneva betrayal. Today, those SLFPers, who had fully cooperated with the UNP (2015 August –Oct 2018), are in parliament, on the SLPP ticket. They survived by contesting the Aug 5 parliamentary election on the SLPP ticket. If not, the SLFP, too, would have ended up with perhaps one National List MP, like its partner in ‘crime’ the UNP.

In the wake of the Geneva betrayal, several countries imposed travel restrictions on senior military commanders. Field Marshal Fonseka, Maj. Gen. Chagie Gallage and Army Chief Shavendra Silva are among those who were slapped with travel bans.

Now, it would be the responsibility of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government to set the record straight. The UNP and the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi-led TNA, responsible for the Geneva betrayal, suffered serious setbacks at the general election. Having campaigned for 20 seats, the one-time LTTE mouth piece was reduced to 10 seats, including one National List slot. In the last parliament, the TNA had 16 lawmakers, including two National List slots. Obviously, the Tamil electorate snubbed the TNA by causing the ITAK leader Mavai Senathirajah’s defeat. The TNA, too, plunged into crisis with a section of the former LTTE proxy demanding that Senathirajah be appointed to parliament through the National List whereas the TNA, at the behest of Sampanthan, named Chairman of Ampara Navindaveli Pradeshiya Sabha Thawarasa Kalaiarasan as their National List member.

Prez-PM failure in 2019

The Treasury bond scams (February 2015 and March 2016) and the Geneva treachery (Oct 2015) was followed by the indefensible failure to thwart the April 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. In this case, too, both the UNP and Sirisena failed the country very badly. The revelations, made before the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), in 2019, and the on-going Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI), proved beyond doubt the culpability of both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe for the Easter Sunday carnage. In spite of knowing the imminent threat, posed by Thowheed Jamaat, Sirsena went on a pilgrimage to neighbouring India. Sirisena, wife, Jayanthi Pushpa Kumari, and other members of their family, offered prayers at the hill shrine of Lord Venkateswara. Sirisena took part in the ‘Suprabhatha’ ritual and offered prayers to the presiding deity of Lord Venkateswara. From there, the Sirisenas flew to Singapore. They were on holiday when Thowheed Jamaat carried out the near simultaneous attacks. Sirisena got caught lying to the PSC regarding the delay on his part in returning to Colombo in the aftermath of the attack. The PSC, in its report released to the public in Oct 2019, revealed how Sirisena shunned two earlier Sri Lankan flights to return in the early hours of the following day on a Singapore Airlines flight.

The SLPP will have to deal with media furore when the P CoI releases its report later this year. Sirisena, who held the Defence and Law and order portfolios at the time of the attack, in addition to being the Commander-in-Chief, cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for the unprecedented security failure.

H’tota deal and FTA with Singapore

Sirisena authorized the 99-year-lease on Hambantota port, in lieu of what Sri Lanka owed China, as well as the controversial Free Trade Agreement with Singapore (FTA) during his tainted presidency. On behalf of Sri Lanka, Sirisena’s nominee, Ports and Shipping Minister, Mahinda Samarasinghe, signed the agreement with China. Sri Lanka and China finalized the Hambantota port deal, in late July 2017, and the FTA with Singapore, in January 2018. Malik Samarawickrema signed the agreement on Sri Lanka’s behalf. It was finalized after six rounds of talks. Both Sirisena and Samarasinghe re-entered parliament on the SLPP ticket. Samarasinghe even took SLPP membership in the run-up to the general election. Samarawickrema, who was accommodated on the UNP National List in the previous parliament, quit parliamentary politics.

The SLFP has conveniently forgotten that it held the post of Deputy Speaker in Parliament till May 25, 2018. Thilanga Sumathipala served as the Deputy Speaker and the Chairperson of Committees of parliament. Sumathipala was replaced by Ananda Kumarasiri, who later headed the PSC that probed the Easter Sunday carnage. The Supreme Court has been moved by seven parties, including the Government Medical Officers’ Association (GMOA), against the FTA with Singapore. The SC last heard the case in the second week of July, 2020. It will be taken up again on Nov 03, 2020. A committee, appointed by the government after the last presidential election to review the FTA with Singapore, is yet to release its final report.

Having promised to review the Hambantota deal, the incumbent administration subsequently dropped the idea after China, in no uncertain terms, objected to that move. Those who represented the previous parliament and those who elected to new parliament should keep in mind there is no difference in the 99-year-lease on Hambantota port and the outright sale of such a valuable asset.

ACSA et al

Sri Lanka first entered ACSA (Access and Cross Servicing Agreement) in March 2007. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in his capacity as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, signed ACSA on Sri Lanka’s behalf for a period of 10 years. Sirisena, in his capacity as the President, authorized signing a far more comprehensive ACSA, in August 2017. Sirisena’s government also discussed SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) with the US, in addition to finalizing the MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) Compact.

When the writer raised the issue with Wickremesinghe at the final government media briefing, at Temple Trees, two weeks before the Nov 16, 2019 presidential election, the Premier, without hesitation, declared it would be signed. Now, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government will have to decide on the controversial agreement. The government is obviously in a dilemma. Having secured a near two-thirds majority, the SLPP cannot, under any circumstances, accept the agreement in its present form against the backdrop of Prof. Lalithasiri Gunaruwan’s damning report, in Sinhala, on it. Perhaps, copies should be made available to all members of the new parliament.

Sri Lanka shouldn’t accept SOFA, under any circumstances. Instead, Sri Lanka should guarantee that it wouldn’t engage in /allow foreign activity inimical to regional or world powers. The new government cannot be unaware how the majority community reacted to the UNP’s response to ACSA, SOFA and MCC. The SLPP campaign, against US agreements, gave Gotabaya Rajapaksa a tremendous boost at the presidential poll, as well as the recently concluded general election.

Paddy at Mattala airport

Having ousted Mahinda Rajapaksa, in January 2015, and then won the 2015 August general election, the UNP brazenly stored paddy at the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA). Wickremesinghe repeatedly called Sri Lanka’s second international airport a white elephant. Storing paddy at MRIA was nothing but political suicide. It was meant to humiliate the war-winning President and his administration.

Storing paddy at MAIA is as bad as betraying the war-winning armed forces in Geneva. Five years later, the majority community, through overwhelming votes at the presidential and parliamentary polls, sent the UNP home. Sajith Premadasa and his group survived by contesting under a different symbol. Whoever secures UNP’s solitary National List slot, one UNP lawmaker in parliament would be a grim reminder to those who destroyed the once great party.

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Midweek Review

A ‘partnership’ like no other!

Published

18 hours ago

2026/09/16

Sahan Weerasooriya

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh at the Indian Army memorial

Against the backdrop of the economic crisis that erupted in 2021/2022 Sri Lanka’s dependence on Indian economic and military support is growing. INS Udayagiri, Indian Navy’s indigenously built multi-role stealth frigate, that arrived at Colombo Port hours before Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh arrived here, brought essential machinery/equipment spares for Sri Lanka Navy and Sri Lanka Air Force. INS Udayagiri departed on 11 September, less than 24 hours after Singh concluded his three-day visit. The list of Indian support is long. In June this year, India swiftly transferred military stores worth USD 5.5 million to Sri Lanka Army on gratis basis from its operational stocks. India stepped in when Sri Lanka appealed for assistance to deploy over 1,000-member military contingent in Haiti under the UN command to help maintain order in that violence ridden country.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Parliament on 9 Sept. passed the Chief of Defence Staff (Repeal) Bill, over one and half years after the last Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Shavendra Silva retired.

The wartime General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the celebrated 58 Division (former Task Force 1) bid farewell to the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) on 1 January, 2025, following some record breaking achievements, leading his troops from the front in the final phase of the war to eradicate the Tiger terrorists.

Following the debate on the second reading of the Bill, on 9 Sept., the Bill was passed without a division. It clearly indicated that the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB)-led Opposition wasn’t at least interested in making an obvious issue out of it. The Bill has been introduced to repeal the Chief of Defence Staff Act, No. 35 of 2009, enacted in 2009, to carry out functions, including the coordination of activities among the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence.

Pointing out that the relevant Bill had been enacted after the conclusion of the war, the National People’s Power (NPP) government declared in Parliament that the abolition of the Office of the CDS wouldn’t harm national security. The NPP emphasised that the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration created that post to accommodate war-winning Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka after he firmly turned down the offer to accept a non-military post as Secretary to the Sports Ministry.

Amidst rapidly deepening turmoil within the government, Fonseka received the appointment as the first CDS on 15 July, 2009, in terms of the newly enacted Act. It would be pertinent to mention that the government had no option but to placate Fonseka by establishing the Office of CDS through a parliamentary Act to ensure the change of command take place, as planned.

The writer was among those assigned to cover Fonseka receiving the appointment as CDS and Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya taking over the command of the war-winning Army from Fonseka. This was against a background of Fonseka wanting Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. G.A. Chandrasiri succeeded him. Instead, the Rajapaksas brought in Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya as Fonseka’s successor. Chandrasiri was made to retire and those who had been senior to Jayasuriya sidelined as the government tightened its grip on the Army. Therefore, the creation of the Office of the CDS to accommodate Fonseka should be considered in the appropriate context.

But, Fonseka quit the CDS post in November 2009 after reaching a consensus with the UNP-JVP combine to contest the presidential election. Air Chief Marshal Roshan Goonetileke succeeded Fonseka as CDS, on 16 November, 2009, while continuing his duties as the Commander of the Air Force.

The NPP, at the inception of its administration, quite clearly wanted to abolish the post of CDS. Silva, who received the appointment as Acting CDS, on 1 January, 2020, while serving as the Commander of the Army, relinquished the substantive post on 1 June, 2022. That happened in the wake of the 9 May countrywide systematic violence unleashed by those spearheading the high profile project to oust President Gotabaya Rajapaksa after the increasingly humiliated SLPP by the siege laid by Aragalaya activists on important government institution with a foreign dictated agenda, ordered a goon attack on those Galle Face protesters.

Retired Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele, former Minister Wimal Weerawansa, foreign affairs commentator Asanga Abeyagoonasekera and Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara, who authored books on the 2022 regime change project, all pointed to external hands in the mayhem. Abeyagoonasekera went to the extent of alleging direct Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) role in the operation, while Prof. Maddumabandara named then Indian High Commissioner Gopal Baglay as the one who asked Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over the presidency, along with the backing of the likes of Omalpe Sobitha thera. That brought an end to the repeated attacks on US Ambassador Julie Chung over an alleged meeting with Abeywadena on the eve of President Rajapaksa being forced to flee the country.

India never challenged Prof. Maddumabandara’s declaration, widely believed to be based on revelation made by Abeywardena.

A significant visit

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s historic three-day official visit to Colombo coincided with the House passing the Chief of Defence Staff (Repeal) Bill. What a coincidence it was!

A rapidly deepening partnership spanning defence, economic aid, and regional connectivity under India’s Neighbourhood First policy dominates bilateral relations.

Singh, a senior member of the ruling Bharatiya Janatha Party (BJP), laid a wreath at the Indian Army memorial, in Pelawatte, Sri Jayewardenepura, on 9 September, on the second day of his visit, as the Parliament announced the repealing of the Bill. The memorial is a stark reminder of a despicable Indian destabilisation project directed at smaller, economically weak Sri Lanka in the 80s.

Singh, who is on his second term as Defence Minister, would go down in history as the first Indian Defence Minister to pay respect at the memorial built in memory of Indian Army officers and men killed in Sri Lanka. Having established a large scale terrorist project in Sri Lanka, the Congress government destabilised Sri Lanka to facilitate signing of the so-called Indo-Lanka Peace Accord after the arm twisting by its infamous ‘parippu’ drop over Jaffna, humiliating and bringing to its knees the then ‘all-powerful’ JRJ government when its powerful friends in the West turned their backs on their perennial vasal here, dubbed the ‘20th Century Fox’. The deployment of the Indian Army followed, beginning 29 July, 1987, on a mission to ostensibly disarm terrorist groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The then Indian Defence Minister K.C. Pant visited Colombo on May 30-June 1, 1988, in the run-up to the presidential election at the time the Indian Army was engaged in operations against the LTTE. India never sent another defence minister here even after Sri Lanka built a memorial near Battaramulla, in August 2008. It had been put up on a recommendation by the late Gen. Lionel Balagalle, Commander of the Army and CDS following an official visit to New Delhi in Dec., 2003.

Indian High Commissioner Ashok Kantha was the first top Indian government representative to pay floral tribute at the memorial on 15 August, 2010, over a year after Sri Lanka brought the once Indian sponsored war to a successful conclusion.

There is another Indian Army memorial in Palaly, Jaffna, built by the Indian Army in memory of 33 officers and men killed in a disastrous heli-borne assault on the LTTE, based in the Jaffna University. That assault took place on 12 Oct., 1987, at the onset of Indian operations. However, among the Indian dead inscribed on the memorial was Lieutenant Colonel Arun Kumar Chhabra who served the 10 Para (SF), elite battalion of the Parachute Regiment involved in the Jaffna University assault. Chhabra died on 14 Oct., 1989, during a gun battle with the LTTE.

The point is whatever various interested parties say today about the Indian intervention here, the truth is Premier Indira Gandhi destabilised this country in line with her strategy meant to address separatist sentiments in Tamil Nadu. India cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for the massive death and destruction caused not only in Sri Lanka but also the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who advanced his slain mother’s strategy by deploying the Indian Army here.

Indian trained terrorists, the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), almost succeeded in overthrowing Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in Nov., 1988. Two boat loads of PLOTE terrorists passed under the nose of the Indian Navy, at that time responsible for controlling all movements within Sri Lanka territorial waters, to reach the Maldives. The Indian intervention in the Maldives to save the Gayoom’s administration was hailed as a spectacular Indian military operation. No one found fault with India for sponsoring PLOTE. In fact, the PLOTE, widely believed to have been disarmed by the Indian Army in line with the Indo-Lanka peace accord signed under duress, retained weapons to mount the operation. That proved the much publicised project to disarm terrorist groups, including the LTTE and PLOTE, was more a farce than anything else.

The top BJPer’s, who recently concluded his visit to Colombo, emphasised the nearly four decades long absence of an Indian Defence Minister paying respects at the Jayewardenepura monument. Interested parties have sought to depict the monument as a testament to India sacrificing life to protect Sri Lanka. But, the truth is the monument reminds the world of a politically motivated terror project that ruined Sri Lanka, caused deaths of at least 1,200 Indian military personnel, and paved the way for a coup attempt in the Maldives. Names of 1169 Indians, including 55 officers, are inscribed therein. The catastrophic Indian project also led to the invention of suicide attacks (human bombs), a tactic now practiced in different parts of the world. India experienced the horrors of suicide bombing when a Sri Lanka woman blew up Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu, on 21 May, 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army from Sri Lanka.

Two Battaramulla memorials

Sri Lanka and Indian media reported Defence Minister Singh’s visit to the Indian Army memorial at Battaramulla. Unfortunately, print, electronic and social media failed to mention that the National War Memorial, with names of nearly 29,000 officers and men, who paid the supreme sacrifice, inscribed, is situated a walking distance from the Indian Army memorial. Perhaps the Indian Defence Minister should have laid a wreath at the National War Memorial, a gesture that may have somewhat atoned for an utterly irresponsible and reckless political decision.

The two memorials situated just 1.1 kms apart underscore the horrors of conflict engineered and sustained by regional power that almost destroyed Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was trapped in separatist terrorism and a simultaneous insurgency in the South that ripped the country apart.

Sri Lanka transformed its ceremonial armed forces to a worthy fighting formation over the years. The Office of the CDS had been in place throughout the war though it was not constituted by a specific law (Chief of Defence Staff Act, No. 35 of 2009).

As the armed forces expanded, the country needed a headquarters for better coordination among the armed forces and police. The Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established in 1985. In 1999, during the tenure of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the JOC was replaced by Joint Operations Bureau (JOB), a civilian led set up that failed miserably to meet the challenging task. In the same year, Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the Defence Minister, did away with the JOB and established Joint Operations Headquarters.

Kumaratunga created the Office of CDS in 2000 ahead of major northern battles. That functioned till the end of the war in May, 2009, and no one ever thought of enacting a specific Bill to constitute the Office of CDS. The NPP told Parliament, on 9 September, that a staggering Rs 8.7 bn had been spent on the Office of CDS, since 2009.

Multi-role stealth frigate INS Udayagiri at the Colombo port. The ship
visit coincided with Singh’s 3-day tour

The Indian political establishment largely ignored the humiliating loss of lives suffered during the mission in Sri Lanka. They conveniently forgot the disastrous intervention though the High Commissioner here visited the Battaramulla memorial in 2010. However, Modi, having captured power at the 2014 general election, initiated his own strategy. He first visited the Battaramulla memorial, in March, 2015, less than a year after becoming the Premier. He again visited the memorial in April, 2025, when he visited Colombo to sign seven Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs), including one on defence.

Having backed Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in 2022, Modi (Rajnath Singh served as the Defence Minister during the US-Indian operation in Colombo) endorsed the candidature of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in February, 2024, by extending an official invitation to the leader of the NPP, as well as the JVP. Dissanayake was given the opportunity to meet External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. The message from New Delhi was loud and clear. Although Al Jazeera described the Indian move as an unlikely invitation, those who have carefully analyzed New Delhi’s actions here may realise the importance of the unexpected rescue of Somawansa Amarasinghe, in the early 90s, as the UNP government was about to capture him. Had Amarasinghe ended up in the custody of the military, the same fate that befell other party seniors, including Rohana Wijeweera, too, would have been his.

The UNP showed no mercy at all to the JVPers. Amarasinghe escaped with Indian help in February, 1990, three months after the Army executed Wijeweera. Although some speculated about a possible Indian role in saving Amarasinghe, no one could prove it. Then, unexpectedly, Amarasinghe himself, at a rally held in Kalutara, in late 2001, disclosed how India saved his life. The revelation was made at the first rally he addressed after returning home, following a 12-year exile.

Dissanayake received a second invitation from New Delhi after his historic unlikely victory achieved, thanks to outside machinations, mainly by the West ,in the run up to the Sept. 2024 presidential election. Modi announced their consensus on entering into MoU on defence at the conclusion of Dissanayake’s Dec. 2024 visit, though the joint statement didn’t say so. India swiftly moved to finalise the Defence MoU along with six other MoUs in the first week of April 2025 when Modi visited Colombo.

By then even the JVP/NPP had forgotten that the JVP waged insurgency against the UNP over the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord. The emergence of the NPP as the undisputed political power in Colombo has facilitated the Indian strategy here. It also facilitated US strategy, as well as joint US-Indian scheme, the future of it now very much in doubt, especially with erratic actions of President Trump.

Immediately after Modi concluded his April 2025 visit, the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT), Sri Lanka’s first fully automated container terminal with an $800 million investment, officially commenced operations. The project that offered a significant boost to the maritime economy marked a major milestone in India–Sri Lanka infrastructure collaboration.

By then, India has secured the controlling interests of the Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL), a move facilitated by Japan. Although the announcement regarding Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard parting with its 51% of shares to India’s state-owned Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, supplier of warships to India et al. It was India’s first-ever acquisition of a foreign shipyard.

India never had such a hold on Sri Lanka during the war of post-conflict period. In fact, the current Indo-Lanka partnership or whatever you choose to call it seemed to be fait accompli.

The way forward

‘Yankie Dicky’s’ (JRJ was known as Yankie Dicky because of his ardent pro-American stands) nephew Ranil Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as President and Defence Minister, declared a moratorium on foreign scientific research vessels during 2024. Wickremesinghe, struggling to cope up with economic difficulties amidst being at the mercy of US and India, announced the moratorium on such ship visits. It was meant to deprive Sri Lanka of the opportunity to receive Chinese vessels. Wickremesinghe’s announcement came in the wake of US backed Indian protests over Chinese vessels Yuan Wang 5 and Shi Yan 6 vessels visiting Sri Lanka. But, Wickremesinghe’s moratorium still remains in force as the incumbent government shied away from making its position known to the public. China, having acquired the strategically situated Hambantota Port and Colombo International Container Terminals (CICT), South Asia’s premier deep water terminal, Beijing consolidated its position here. Perhaps many people do not remember that the Colombo Terminal project was awarded to a consortium involving China, in Sept, 2010, then a joint venture established under a 35-year Build–Operate and Transfer (BOT) project in 2011 and the facility inaugurated in August 2013 though construction continued till April 2014.

The Hambantota Port was acquired in 2017 during the Yahapalana government, in the wake of the Colombo Port City controversy. In spite of issues, China has established control over Colombo Port City, CICTT, as well as the Hambantota Port.

Sri Lanka may overtly take a stand that may see us as bei pro-India but at the end of the day whoever wielded political power as well as those in the Opposition wouldn’t be able to disregard Chinese interests. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa realised his folly when he declared intention to renegotiate the Hambantota Port deal. China simply dismissed the President’s proposal. The President was compelled to issue a clarification at his own expense.

The recent statement attributed by the Defence Ministry to Defence Secretary AVM (retd) Sampah Thyuyakontha regarding Sri Lanka’s readiness to seek NATO assistance drew a sharp response from General Secretary of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka Dr. G. Weerasinghe. Thuyakontha made the statement during a recent visit to Canada where he represented the government at the 28th Annual Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) Conference, held in Victoria, Canada, from 31 August to 2 September 2026.

There hadn’t been a previous instance of Sri Lanka seeking NATO assistance. The CP Chief questioned Sri Lanka’s unexpected declaration while examining post-2024 presidential polls developments. It would be pertinent to mention that it was Mahinda Rajapaksa who first entered into ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) in March, 2007. The CP, without hesitation, criticised President Rajapaksa’s action. President Sirisena extended that agreement in 2017 though he pretended he didn’t approve it. Since the change of government in 2024, the NPP has enhanced defence relations with the US and the next year’s extension of ACSA is a foregone conclusion. Sri Lanka is set to go ahead with US-India strategies though China remains a factor that cannot be ignored, under any circumstances.

Midweek Review

Feeling political sadness as signs of hope and resistance

Published

19 hours ago

2026/09/16

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Sasanka Perera
(The writer is on X as @sasmester)

A few weeks ago, a friend in India wrote to me about Ghazala Jamil’s book, What to Do with Political Sadness and Other Essays on Death, Destruction and Hauntology (2026). It had just been published by New Delhi’s Simon & Schuster India and Yoda Press. And thanks to the kindness of yet another friend, I managed to get a copy of the book. I think we are all surrounded by different forms of ‘political sadness’ both in our own country and beyond. And some of us might actually ask ourselves the same question Jamil has posed in the title of her book: What to do with political sadness? In this situation, since the book spoke to me directly, I ended up writing notes on it and reflecting on what she had to say as I read.

Globally, we live in an era governed by systemic attrition, state-sanctioned violence, and the steady dismantling of democratic institutions. In this situation, despair is frequently framed as a personal pathology or a personal tragedy that is difficult for one to reconcile with. This is particularly the case if one lives in conditions of political instability burdened with a conscience — knowing full well what is right and what is wrong but not having the power to make a difference. Contemporary neoliberal politics routinely urge the disenfranchised to practice ‘resilience’ or ‘mindfulness’ without offering serious means to deal with unbearable situations. That process helps strong-man and dictatorial politics to not only survive but also justify their destructive politics.

Ghazala Jamil thoughtfully and reflectively deals with what happens when one must deal with politics of violence up front in her collection of essays. Jamil argues that the political sadness felt by marginalized people experiencing juridical, economic, and physical destruction is neither an aberration nor a personal failure. It is, instead, a rational and ethically sound response to state power built on dispossession and intimidation. For Jamil, political sadness is a method of both perseverance in difficult conditions and a means of generating hope as well as a way of imagining a future despite being surrounded by orchestrated death, destruction and dispossession.

Rather than attempting to ‘cure’ this sadness or dismiss it as weakness, Jamil interrogates its anatomy in an attempt to locate something far more durable than passive optimism or taken-for-granted fatalism so familiar in South Asia. That is a radical, unyielding form of idealism rooted in memory and a refusal to be silenced. Idealism in this sense is increasingly becoming a scarce resource in the circumstances where most of us live and work. While reading Jamil’s essays and writing these thoughts, I was also contemplating on the unfolding politics in Sri Lanka. A recent tweet by me in response to a news item pertaining to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Margaret Satterthwaite requesting information from the Sri Lankan government’s proposed judicial reforms in Sri Lanka drew much criticism.

While I was concerned overall on the reforms meant to increase the retirement age of judges across the judicial hierarchy on matters of principle and potential impact on democratic governance in the country, my immediate concern was the UN’s established bias in responding to these kinds of issues. That is, the blatant lack of equality where people at the receiving end usually happen to be nations without a veto or the ability to control one in the UN. Many people, both known and unknown, were upset with the tweet claiming I did not know how the UN system worked or had not done my homework. My sense was, I was considered naïve or even stupid as I harboured a sense of idealism, which sadly they had lost. Jamil, on the other hand, might agree with me.

Across nineteen essays, spanning political philosophy, urban sociology, and cultural critique, the collection is based on a close reading of three primary and closely related theoretical positions buttressed by immediate life experiences in both India and beyond.

The first position deals with what might be called, mechanics of state violence. Here, Jamil explores the politics of physical and institutional mechanisms, that range from spatial segregation and legal disenfranchisement — such as the weaponisation of citizenship laws — to the degradation of public resources such as education and transport. In this situation, she considers death and destruction as essential byproducts of governance that may not however be always intended. But ultimately, such mechanisms define the nature and reach of state authority.

The second overall position she deals with has to do with bodily dissent and martyrdom. It is in this discussion that Jamil analyzes extreme forms of political protest, such as hunger strikes and suicide drawing from experiences ranging from India to Ireland. When the state strips vulnerable communities of institutional recourse to justice and fair play, the body becomes the final site of sovereignty and agency. But bodily self-sacrifice forces a public ethical showdown, demonstrating that even the dispossessed retain the agency to expose the moral bankruptcy of majoritarian power. Even so, such extreme protests do not always work, nevertheless keeping alive political sadness, and with it, reservoirs of hope.

The final position Jamil explores is focused on the idea of hauntology and futures. Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s concept of hauntology, Jamil examines the spectral presence of unfulfilled post-colonial promises. In the Indian context, the constitutional ideals of secularism, egalitarianism, and social justice have been systematically compromised or dismantled, even though their ‘ghosts’ refuse to disappear. They haunt the present, reminding us of what was promised, what was destroyed, and what remains to be reclaimed and achieved. Therefore, this also becomes a repository for hope from where futures may be imagined.

As far as my reading is concerned, the core strength of Jamil’s work lies in how she retrieves hope from the debris of political grief. Her kind of idealism rejects toxic positivity, insisting that genuine hope can only emerge after we fully confront actual histories and experiences of destruction. This, I think, is essential, and speaks to me personally and directly in a situation where such idealism has been compromised by an unfortunate combination of naivety and political foolishness.

For Jamil, hauntology acts as an engine of political memory. Ideally, the ghosts of past struggles should prevent us from normalising present atrocities. Idealism, therefore, is not an abstract dream of a utopian future. Instead, it is the stubborn refusal to allow state violence to dictate the limits of human imagination. To feel political sadness is to remember that things were supposed to be different, and that they still could be.

Though Jamil writes from her location in India augmented by theoretical arguments that are in global circulation, what she has to say speaks to the world in the present time. This makes her critique both locally grounded and regionally and globally applicable.

In so far as India is concerned, Jamil’s critique speaks to a situation marked by the relentless rise of ethno-nationalism, religious intolerance, bulldozer politics of dispossession, and the systematic marginalisation of minority identities and their sense of being. Hope in this context is found in grassroots resistance, such as the constitutional consciousness kept alive by student movements, civil rights activists, and community-led dissenters who insist on asserting full citizenship despite systemic hostility. I would locate the recent Cockroach Janta Party agitations in this context.

As far as my own location, Sri Lanka is concerned, Jamil’s exploration of hauntology provides immediate resonance and painful familiarity. Sri Lankan society is haunted by unresolved ghosts of wartime as well as post-war absence of state accountability, forced disappearances, alienation of minorities, and the catastrophic economic collapse that dismantled public security. This is without even venturing into the violence and dispossession orchestrated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Janata Vimukti Peramuna when these entities wielded power in their agitations against the state. The mass uprising of 2022 or the ‘aragalaya’ placed in context both the transformative power of collective hope and the tragic reality of state appropriation. Reading Jamil from Colombo underscores how South Asian states export and replicate tools of division, militarization, and erasure.

Beyond the subcontinent, Jamil’s writing indicates the necessity that localised grief must be connected to globally intertwined histories. From hyper-capitalist labor exploitation to climate displacement, the Global South faces a collective and ongoing crisis of hegemony. Reclaiming hope requires cross-border solidarity, recognising that struggles against authoritarianism or majoritarianism in South Asia and elsewhere constitutes part of a worldwide fight for human dignity.

For me, Ghazala Jamil’s What to Do with Political Sadness is an essential and thoughtful manual for ethical survival and the generation of hope in difficult times. It does not offer easy comfort or simple solutions. Instead, it offers something far more valuable: a framework for ethical survival and persevering with idealism and hope. Let me conclude with my 2022 poem, ‘Island Story’ (Let Us be Silent: Poems, Sarasavi, Nugegoda, 2025).

“To live in the blessed isle
close your ears
guard your tongue
freeze your heart

Then,
hell of despair

would seem
like
heaven of hope”

I attempted to deal with my unhappiness not merely by writing a poem, but by trying not to see what was obvious, as a means of dealing with pain and overshadowing the conscience. Jamil, will have none of this as she has convincingly argued throughout her book. By transforming political grief into an active analytical tool and method for hope, Jamil reminds us that our sadness is proof of our lingering moral clarity. In many ways, her effort is a conversation among theory, life experience and hope. For most of us, living under the shadow of disrupted pasts and lost futures, this book serves as a powerful reminder that as long as we remember what has been destroyed, the blueprint for a just world remains alive.

(A shorter version of this essay was published in The Wire [new Delhi] on 22 August 2026)