Features
Democracy Building Initiatives under Yahapalanaya Regime: Lessons learned
By Prof. Gamini Keerawella
(This article is based on the research conducted by RCSS in collaboration with the University of South Carolina Rule of Law Collective (ROLC). The research team consisted of Prof. Gamini Keerawella, Prof. Sarjoon Athambawa, Dr. Menik Wakkambura, Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy, Ms. Nimmi Jayathilake, Ms. Shavini de Silva.)
1. The democracy-building initiatives during the National Unity Government (2015-2019), commonly known as Yahapalanaya regime, represent the first concerted attempt taken towards political reforms in post-war Sri Lanka. At the end of the war in 2009, historic opportunity was available for Sri Lanka to embark on a new political journey by revitalising democratic institutions and processes. However, the continuation of democratic backsliding and faltering on the path of national reconciliation even after the end of the war created a need and conditions for a regime change in 2015.
It was a collective attempt to transform the negative peace (absence of armed conflict) into a foundation for positive peace. Democracy building is by no means a smooth and lineal process. Even though, the vigor of political reforms and democratic impulses of the National Unity Government dissipated by the end of its tenure, the initiatives taken at the beginning in establishing good governance and democracy-building marked a timely break in the authoritarian trend in Sri Lanka. These initiatives widened the space for a new discourse on democracy against the backdrop of long-term travails of democracy.
2. The regime change in 2015 and democratic reforms initiated under the NUG highlighted the potential of the people in halting the authoritarian trends and taking steps towards democracy building in the country. Unpacking these initiatives helps understand the workings of democratic political dynamics and the peoples’ power in post-war Sri Lanka. Before 2015, a perception was meticulously cultivated throughout the country that President Mahinda Rajapaksa was so strong and popular that he cannot be defeated. The driving force that destroyed that perception was civil society organisations.
The regime change in 2015 was interpreted as a victory of people for democracy against authoritarian abuse of power. Experiences under the Yahapalana regime also highlighted the certain limitations of peoples’ intervention beyond elections. After the initial enthusiasm for regime change was over, the people did not sustain their interests. In the main, they withdrew from political process allowing the political leaders to set the tone of political narrative. It highlighted the importance of constant vigilance and effective intervention throughout on the part of civil society.
3. The interest and commitment of the National Unity Government to fulfill the mandate of democratic reforms and good governance on which it was elected disappeared rapidly after taking initial strides. There was no roadmap for the government to move forward on the path of good governance.
The vacillation and bewildering delay in many key policy domains become the hallmark of the NUG. Even before two years, the cracks within the regime came to the surface and the co-habitation arrangement proved to be a failure. However, the democracy-building endeavour in the period 2015-2019 was not at all a sterile venture. Even though many initiatives did not retain after November 2019, its impact could not be erased so easily. The freedom of information has been added to the Fundamental Rights Chapter so that it became a judicially enforceable right. One of the durable legacies of the NUG has been the Right to Information Act.
4. The experiences under the NUG also highlighted the constraints and problems faced by democracy building in a country like Sri Lanka. Democracy building is not a linear process. It is also important to unpack what accounts for setbacks of the democracy-building endeavours of the NUG. The personality clash between the President and the Prime Minister contributed by no small measure to the downfall of the NUG. But the disagreements and conflicts between the two centres of power in the NUG cannot be relegated simply to personality factors. All the forces and groups who made the regime change in 2015 possible are responsible for its downfall, too. When disagreements and divergence between the two centres of power in the NUG surfaced there was no effective internal mechanism for de-escalation, containment, and conflict resolution.
The untimely demise of Ven. Maduluwawe Sobitha affected severely the civil controlling power of the political leadership. The Remaining leadership of CSOs did not have the charismatic stature and legitimacy that Ven. Maduluwawe Sobitha had to intervene effectively. The experience also highlighted the certain weakness of the civil society organisations in Sri Lanka. There was no central leadership for CSOs after the passing away of Ven. Maduluwawe Sobitha. At first, their energy was channeled to a single target: to defeat the Rajapaksa regime. Once it was achieved, the different interests among CSOs surfaced.
5. It is also important to note that the civil-political movement for democratic reforms is a process and discourse with different waves. The particular wave that brought the Rajapaksa regime down in 2015 slowly emerged from 2011. In the face of many constraints and problems due to the repressive measures of the regime and some structural weaknesses of the civil society itself, the movement was progressing slowly in the first three years.
It witnessed momentum at the beginning of 2014, but it is still a Colombo and other main cities-centered movement that had a long way to go in getting rooted in the rural countryside. By the time of the declaration of early Presidential Elections in November 2014, the democracy reform agenda and its road map of the civil-political movement were not fully developed. In 2014, a qualitatively different phase in democratic reform discourse unfolded with the discussions between NMJS and the political parties. More intensive discussions and debates on main aspects of constitutional reforms, going beyond the slogan of the abolition of Executive Presidency, was taking place. Intentionally or not, the early call for Presidential Election detailed the process.
The pro-democratic reform civil groups and political parties were in agreement on the common candidate for the presidential race. He was hurriedly selected. There was no detailed discussion between the common candidate and the CSOs and other political parties before he was selected. The MOU was signed hurriedly. In the context of the election campaign rush, there was no time and space for a comprehensive agreement between the common candidate and the democratic forces on the political roadmap, except a hurriedly prepared 100-day programme. These shortcomings contributed to the setbacks and hiccups in the democratic reform agenda after the NUG came to power.
6. In the context of internationalisation of the ethnic problem and human rights issue, how to handle the external actors remained a key challenge that Sri Lanka faced in 2015. Having deviated from the hostile attitude towards the international Human Rights bodies, the NUG expressed its willingness to work closely with the international community, especially the UN. the NUG handled external actors satisfactorily and tried to come to some understanding with them.
In analyzing the role of external actors, first of all, the NUG took multiplicity of external actors into account. Further more, external actors remained a key variable exerting influence as a critical maneuver for democratic reforms in Sri Lanka in the period 2015-2019, especially in the peace-building sector and achieving of minority rights. However, the sustainability of democratic reforms seemed dependent on the cooperation between external actors and the political leadership of the NUG and domestic political dynamism that shaped image building of the external actors.
The failure of external actors to take into account domestic political dynamics often resulted in the erosion of credibility and effectiveness of their role. This becomes a sensitive yet crucial factor in dealing with the democratic reforms in Sri Lanka.
Further, the external influences on peace building often showed a sense of coerciveness, such as requirement of regular reporting to international monitoring bodies like UNHRC. Sri Lanka’s agreement to co-sponsor the post-war peace-building resolutions was interpreted as a naïve and inappropriate move without taking ground realities into account. Moreover, the time-line of UNHRC resolutions was viewed as unrealistic. The external role, depending on the context and modus operandi, could be counter productive and generates unintended constrains, derailing the entire process.
7. The NUG prioritised reconciliation as an overarching policy frame. The approach of the National Unity Government regarding the process of reconciliation takes into account four broad area: truth seeking; right to justice: reparation and; non-recurrence. It is also emphasized that the mechanisms to be established in order to address issues in these four areas must be independent, credible and empowered.
One of the major shortcomings of national reconciliation was the lack of a long-term national plan for repairing the damage caused by the 26-year-long civil war, where psychological damage, hatred, and memory prevailed in communities as barriers to sustainable reconciliation. Moreover, there was a lack of visionary leadership and institutional structures that could foster reconciliation, such as the functions of the Office of Missing Persons, the reparation bill and its execution, and various judicial and non-judicial actions for non-recurrence were also not effective.
8. The UNF has failed in building a minimal winning connected coalition – which considers more than numbers and focuses also on ensuring that there is a sufficient shared ideology among the members of a coalition to and pursue policy change – what achieved was ‘minimal winning coalitions’- a coalition that is no bigger than necessary to have a majority in government.
The NUG failed to abolish the Executive Presidency while the arrangement made in the 19th amendment to control the powers of President induced for power competition between the President and the Prime Minister.
9. Another important lesson learned from the democratic experiences during 2015-2019 was that it is rather difficult to go forward with the democratic reforms without breaking the dominance of the political class. The social and political force behind the authoritarian political project of the political class that came forward after the 1956 political change. The real political force behind the Rajapaksa regime was the political class. This explains why President Mahinda Rajapaksa commanded a considerable support base in the country except for the North and the East despite his authoritarian stance. NUG failed to overcome the dominance of the well-stretched political class who has been the real driving force behind the authoritarian political project. Breaking the dominance of the political class is not easy; nevertheless, it is essential for the progress of democratic political reforms. The attempts taken in the direction of state reforms to strengthen good governance failed because they touched only the outer ditch of the authoritarian social and political structures of the state. Antonio Gramsci describes the state as ‘an outer ditch, behind which there stands a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks’. The political class that is the champion of the authoritarian political culture represents the fortress and earthwork of the authoritarian state. Figuring out how to mobilize social forces to break not only the outer ditch but also the fortresses and earthworks of the authoritarian state with comprehensive political reforms is the fundamental problem in democratic reforms in Sri Lanka.
10. The NUG experiences highlighted the fact that democracy building must be an integral element of a broader political project of state reforms, aimed at developing an inclusive ideology for the state, related institutional frame, and building democratic citizenship. In the post-war context, national reconciliation, a political solution to the ethnic problem, and building an inclusive state must receive priority in democracy building. For National reconciliation to be effective and sustainable, it should be carried out with a clear strategic vision and plan to politically and socially empower the communities who were marginalized and alienated from the main political process. Democracy is not only a system of government by also a way of life, a mode of behavior, and an ideology. In a multi-ethnic country, majoritarian political culture is an anti-thesis to democratic norms and practices. The majoritarian political culture that prevailed in the body politic of Sri Lanka is a grave hindrance to democratic reforms to ensure the integration of minorities in the decision-making process done based on equality and partnership. NUG failed to launch an effective campaign to promote democratic culture in countering the majoritarian mindset. Ultimately, NUG also became a hostage of the majoritarian political culture and faltered in taking critical decisions to show the minority community it is genuine in promoting national reconciliation. Some aspects of besieged and island mentality of the majority community are often used to fan the support for an authoritarian political project. Having failed to effectively address key main barriers to democratic reforms, namely, the majoritarian political thinking and the power of the political class, the democracy-building initiatives appeared to be only cosmetic without getting rooted in the body politic. The vacillation and bewildering delay in many key policy domains including national reconciliation, the emergence of two centers of power, and lack of articulation between the two which crippled the general efficacy of administration gave renewed currency to a cry of ‘National Security State’ at the expense of the democracy-building political project, especially after the Easter Sunday carnage.
11. Democracy-building experiences during 2015-2019 highlighted the importance of the role of political leaders in implementing the mandate for democratic reforms and also the constant vigilance on the part of the citizens to check and monitor whether the political leaders adhere to the mandate. Their commitment to the principles of good governance and democratic reforms quickly faded away once in power. In this context, constant vigilance on the part of the civic democratic process is an essential condition for the continuation of democratic reforms. Why did the commitment of the political leadership of NUG to democratic political reforms disappear rapidly after taking a few initial strides? Why did the civil forces fail to intervene effectively, except at the beginning, when the leaders were vacillating and evading the implementation of the expected reforms? At the end of the day, the political leaders who stood with the democratic reform movement at the 2015 Presidential Election seemed to have used evolving urge of the people for democratic reforms only as a political slogan to come to power. How certain key appointments were made soon after NUG assumed power indicated that they were have not deviated from the practice of nepotism of the previous regime. The civil forces did not effectively intervene to check such behavior. The experiences under NUG indicated that it was not easy to proceed with the existing political leadership who were tempered in the corrupt political practices for years in pursuing substantive democratic reforms. The Central Bank bond scam and how others in the government came forward to conceal it destroyed the good governance credibility of the NUG, substantiating the above indication. The importance of building a new generation of political leaders who are truly committed to democratic reforms in Sri Lanka are highlighted by many.
12. Another lesson to be learned from the democratic building initiatives under NGU is that it is rather difficult to count on Sri Lankan business elites to promote democratic reforms. Ideologically and socially powerful business community could play a vital role as a driving force for democracy building. The economic dependency and political impotency of the Sri Lankan bourgeoisie, mainly of the business upper class, were clearly illustrated in the period 2015-2019. The establishment of the rule of war, transparency, independence of the judiciary, and controlling the excessive power of the Executive with the intuitional check and balance system would benefit the business community in no small measure. Sri Lanka’s state-dependent business community counts on the state for protection, support and subsidies for its survival. As a result, they are incapable of playing an independent and strong role in influencing the political authority as far as democracy. They are always subservient to the regime in power. They failed to play an independent role as a bulwark of democracy in pushing forward the democratic reform agenda.
13. It is also important to note that ‘traditional’ trade unions that were at the forefront in the struggle for democracy in the past did not play a significant role in democratic building initiatives during 2015-2019. The changed behavior of the conventional trade union sector can be explained due to the structural changes witnessed in the industrial and service sectors of the economy and the decline of old Left ideology in the trade union movement. In the changed political and economic environment, a new brood of professional groups/organizations and the youth have come forward to fill the vacuum created by inaction of the moribund traditional trade union sector. The democracy-building attempts need to take these changes into serious consideration and should count on the new social forces, especially the youth and professional groups, and mobilizing them by using social media and art/music in which they are quite savvy.
Features
Why Sri Lanka Still Has No Doppler Radar – and Who Should Be Held Accountable
Eighteen Years of Delay:
Cyclone Ditwah has come and gone, leaving a trail of extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure, including buildings, roads, bridges, and 70% of the railway network. Thousands of hectares of farming land have been destroyed. Last but not least, nearly 1,000 people have lost their lives, and more than two million people have been displaced. The visuals uploaded to social media platforms graphically convey the widespread destruction Cyclone Ditwah has caused in our country.
The purpose of my article is to highlight, for the benefit of readers and the general public, how a project to establish a Doppler Weather Radar system, conceived in 2007, remains incomplete after 18 years. Despite multiple governments, shifting national priorities, and repeated natural disasters, the project remains incomplete.
Over the years, the National Audit Office, the Committee on Public Accounts (COPA), and several print and electronic media outlets have highlighted this failure. The last was an excellent five-minute broadcast by Maharaja Television Network on their News First broadcast in October 2024 under a series “What Happened to Sri Lanka”
The Agreement Between the Government of Sri Lanka and the World Meteorological Organisation in 2007.
The first formal attempt to establish a Doppler Radar system dates back to a Trust Fund agreement signed on 24 May 2007 between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). This agreement intended to modernize Sri Lanka’s meteorological infrastructure and bring the country on par with global early-warning standards.
The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations established on March 23, 1950. There are 193 member countries of the WMO, including Sri Lanka. Its primary role is to promote the establishment of a worldwide meteorological observation system and to serve as the authoritative voice on the state and behaviour of the Earth’s atmosphere, its interaction with the oceans, and the resulting climate and water resources.
According to the 2018 Performance Audit Report compiled by the National Audit Office, the GoSL entered into a trust fund agreement with the WMO to install a Doppler Radar System. The report states that USD 2,884,274 was deposited into the WMO bank account in Geneva, from which the Department of Metrology received USD 95,108 and an additional USD 113,046 in deposit interest. There is no mention as to who actually provided the funds. Based on available information, WMO does not fund projects of this magnitude.
The WMO was responsible for procuring the radar equipment, which it awarded on 18th June 2009 to an American company for USD 1,681,017. According to the audit report, a copy of the purchase contract was not available.
Monitoring the agreement’s implementation was assigned to the Ministry of Disaster Management, a signatory to the trust fund agreement. The audit report details the members of the steering committee appointed by designation to oversee the project. It consisted of personnel from the Ministry of Disaster Management, the Departments of Metrology, National Budget, External Resources and the Disaster Management Centre.
The Audit Report highlights failures in the core responsibilities that can be summarized as follows:
· Procurement irregularities—including flawed tender processes and inadequate technical evaluations.
· Poor site selection
—proposed radar sites did not meet elevation or clearance requirements.
· Civil works delays
—towers were incomplete or structurally unsuitable.
· Equipment left unused
—in some cases for years, exposing sensitive components to deterioration.
· Lack of inter-agency coordination
—between the Meteorology Department, Disaster Management Centre, and line ministries.
Some of the mistakes highlighted are incomprehensible. There is a mention that no soil test was carried out before the commencement of the construction of the tower. This led to construction halting after poor soil conditions were identified, requiring a shift of 10 to 15 meters from the original site. This resulted in further delays and cost overruns.
The equipment supplier had identified that construction work undertaken by a local contractor was not of acceptable quality for housing sensitive electronic equipment. No action had been taken to rectify these deficiencies. The audit report states, “It was observed that the delay in constructing the tower and the lack of proper quality were one of the main reasons for the failure of the project”.
In October 2012, when the supplier commenced installation, the work was soon abandoned after the vehicle carrying the heavy crane required to lift the radar equipment crashed down the mountain. The next attempt was made in October 2013, one year later. Although the equipment was installed, the system could not be operationalised because electronic connectivity was not provided (as stated in the audit report).
In 2015, following a UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) inspection, it was determined that the equipment needed to be returned to the supplier because some sensitive electronic devices had been damaged due to long-term disuse, and a further 1.5 years had elapsed by 2017, when the equipment was finally returned to the supplier. In March 2018, the estimated repair cost was USD 1,095,935, which was deemed excessive, and the project was abandoned.
COPA proceedings
The Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) discussed the radar project on August 10, 2023, and several press reports state that the GOSL incurred a loss of Rs. 78 million due to the project’s failure. This, I believe, is the cost of constructing the Tower. It is mentioned that Rs. 402 million had been spent on the radar system, of which Rs. 323 million was drawn from the trust fund established with WMO. It was also highlighted that approximately Rs. 8 million worth of equipment had been stolen and that the Police and the Bribery and Corruption Commission were investigating the matter.
JICA support and project stagnation
Despite the project’s failure with WMO, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) entered into an agreement with GOSL on June 30, 2017 to install two Doppler Radar Systems in Puttalam and Pottuvil. JICA has pledged 2.5 billion Japanese yen (LKR 3.4 billion at the time) as a grant. It was envisaged that the project would be completed in 2021.
Once again, the perennial delays that afflict the GOSL and bureaucracy have resulted in the groundbreaking ceremony being held only in December 2024. The delay is attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic and Sri Lanka’s economic crisis.
The seven-year delay between the signing of the agreement and project commencement has led to significant cost increases, forcing JICA to limit the project to installing only one Doppler Radar system in Puttalam.
Impact of the missing radar during Ditwah
As I am not a meteorologist and do not wish to make a judgment on this, I have decided to include the statement issued by JICA after the groundbreaking ceremony on December 24, 2024.
“In partnership with the Department of Meteorology (DoM), JICA is spearheading the establishment of the Doppler Weather Radar Network in the Puttalam district, which can realize accurate weather observation and weather prediction based on the collected data by the radar. This initiative is a significant step in strengthening Sri Lanka’s improving its climate resilience including not only reducing risks of floods, landslides, and drought but also agriculture and fishery“.
Based on online research, a Doppler Weather Radar system is designed to observe weather systems in real time. While the technical details are complex, the system essentially provides localized, uptotheminute information on rainfall patterns, storm movements, and approaching severe weather. Countries worldwide rely on such systems to issue timely alerts for monsoons, tropical depressions, and cyclones. It is reported that India has invested in 30 Doppler radar systems, which have helped minimize the loss of life.
Without radar, Sri Lanka must rely primarily on satellite imagery and foreign meteorological centres, which cannot capture the finescale, rapidly changing weather patterns that often cause localized disasters here.
The general consensus is that, while no single system can prevent natural disasters, an operational Doppler Radar almost certainly would have strengthened Sri Lanka’s preparedness and reduced the extent of damage and loss.
Conclusion
Sri Lanka’s inability to commission a Doppler Radar system, despite nearly two decades of attempts, represents one of the most significant governance failures in the country’s disastermanagement history.
Audit findings, parliamentary oversight proceedings, and donor records all confirm the same troubling truth: Sri Lanka has spent public money, signed international agreements, received foreign assistance, and still has no operational radar. This raises a critical question: should those responsible for this prolonged failure be held legally accountable?
Now may not be the time to determine the extent to which the current government and bureaucrats failed the people. I believe an independent commission comprising foreign experts in disaster management from India and Japan should be appointed, maybe in six months, to identify failures in managing Cyclone Ditwah.
However, those who governed the country from 2007 to 2024 should be held accountable for their failures, and legal action should be pursued against the politicians and bureaucrats responsible for disaster management for their failure to implement the 2007 project with the WMO successfully.
Sri Lanka cannot afford another 18 years of delay. The time for action, transparency, and responsibility has arrived.
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of any organization or institution with which the author is affiliated).
By Sanjeewa Jayaweera
Features
Ramifications of Trump Corollary
President Trump is expected to close the deal on the Ukraine crisis, as he may wish to concentrate his full strength on two issues: ongoing operations in Venezuela and the bolstering of Japan’s military capabilities as tensions between China and Japan over Taiwan rise. Trump can easily concede Ukraine to Putin and refocus on the Asia–Pacific and Latin America. This week, he once again spilled the beans in an interview with Politico, one of the most significant conversations ever conducted with him. When asked which country currently holds the stronger negotiating position, Trump bluntly asserted that there could be no question: it is Russia. “It’s a much bigger country. It’s a war that should’ve never happened,” he said, followed by his usual rhetoric.
Meanwhile, US allies that fail to adequately fund defence and shirk contributions to collective security will face repercussions, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth declared at the 2025 Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California. Hegseth singled out nations such as South Korea, Israel, Poland, and Germany as “model allies” for increasing their commitments, contrasting them with those perceived as “free riders”. The message was unmistakably Trumpian: partnerships are conditional, favourable only to countries that “help themselves” before asking anything of Washington.
It is in this context that it becomes essential to examine the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, issued last week, in order to consider how it differs from previous strategies and where it may intersect with current US military practice.
Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy is not merely another iteration of the familiar doctrine of American primacy; it is a radical reorientation of how the United States understands itself, its sphere of influence, and its role in the world. The document begins uncompromisingly: “The purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests; that is the sole focus of this strategy.” It is the bluntest opening in any American NSS since the document became a formal requirement in 1987. Whereas previous strategies—from Obama to Biden—wrapped security in the language of democracy promotion and multilateralism, Trump’s dispenses entirely with the pretence of universality. What matters are American interests, defined narrowly, almost corporately, as though the United States were a shareholder entity rather than a global hegemon.
It is here that the ghost of Senator William Fulbright quietly enters, warning in 1966 that “The arrogance of power… the belief that we are uniquely qualified to bring order to the world, is a dangerous illusion.” Fulbright’s admonition was directed at the hubris of Vietnam-era expansionism, yet it resonates with uncanny force in relation to Trump’s revived hemispheric ambitions. For despite Trump’s anti-globalist posture, his strategy asserts a unique American role in determining events across two oceans and within an entire hemisphere. The arrogance may simply be wearing a new mask.
Nowhere is this revisionist spirit more vivid than in the so-called “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”, perhaps the most controversial American hemispheric declaration since Theodore Roosevelt’s time. The 2025 NSS states without hesitation that “The United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” Yet unlike Roosevelt, who justified intervention as a form of pre-emptive stabilisation, Trump wraps his corollary in the language of sovereignty and anti-globalism. The hemispheric message is not simply that outside powers must stay out; it is that the United States will decide what constitutes legitimate governance in the region and deny “non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities… in our Hemisphere”.
This wording alone has far-reaching implications for Venezuela, where US forces recently seized a sanctioned supertanker as part of an escalating confrontation with the Maduro government. Maduro, emboldened by support from Russia, Iran, and China’s so-called shadow fleet, frames Trump’s enforcement actions as piracy. But for Trump, this is precisely the point: a demonstration of restored hemispheric authority. In that sense, the 2025 NSS may be the first strategic document in decades to explicitly set the stage for sustained coercive operations in Latin America. The NSS promises “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere.” “Urgent threats” is vague, but in practical military planning, vagueness functions as a permission slip. It is not difficult to see how a state accused of “narco-terrorism” or “crimes against humanity” could be fitted into the category.
The return to hemispheric dominance is paired with a targeted shift in alliance politics. Trump makes it clear that the United States is finished subsidising alliances that do not directly strengthen American security. The NSS lays out the philosophy succinctly: “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” This is a direct repudiation of the language found in Obama’s 2015 NSS, which emphasised that American leadership was indispensable to global stability. Trump rejects that premise outright. Leadership, in his framing, is merely leverage. Allies who fail to meet burden expectations will lose access, influence, and potentially even protection. Nowhere is this more evident than in the push for extraordinary defence spending among NATO allies: “President Trump has set a new global standard with the Hague Commitment… pledging NATO countries to spend 5 percent of GDP on defence.”
In turn, US disengagement from Europe becomes easier to justify. While Trump speaks of “negotiating an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine”, it requires little sophistication to decode this as a form of managed abandonment—an informal concession that Russia’s negotiating position is stronger, as Trump told Politico. Ukraine may well become a bargaining chip in the trade-off between strategic theatres: Europe shrinks, Asia and Latin America expand. The NSS’s emphasis on Japan, Taiwan, and China is markedly sharper than in 2017.
China looms over the 2025 NSS like an obsession, mentioned over twenty times, not merely as a competitor but as a driving force shaping American policy. Every discussion of technology, alliances, or regional security is filtered through Beijing’s shadow, as if US strategy exists solely to counter China. The strategy’s relentless focus risks turning global priorities into a theatre of paranoia, where the United States reacts constantly, defined less by its own interests than by fear of what China might do next.
It is equally striking that, just nine days after Cyclone Ditwah, the US Indo-Pacific Command deployed two C130 aircraft—capable of landing at only three locations in Sri Lanka, well away from the hardest-hit areas—and orchestrated a highly choreographed media performance, enlisting local outlets and social media influencers seemingly more concerned with flaunting American boots on the ground than delivering “urgent” humanitarian aid. History shows this is not unprecedented: US forces have repeatedly arrived under the banner of humanitarian assistance—Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992) later escalated into full security and combat operations; interventions in Haiti during the 1990s extended into long-term peacekeeping and training missions; and Operation United Assistance in Liberia (2014) built a lasting US operational presence beyond the Ebola response.
Trump’s NSS, meanwhile, states that deterring conflict in East Asia is a “priority”, and that the United States seeks to ensure that “US technology and US standards—particularly in AI, biotech, and quantum computing—drive the world forward.” Combined with heightened expectations of Japan, which is rapidly rearming, Trump’s strategic map shows a clear preference: if Europe cannot or will not defend itself, Asia might.
What makes the 2025 NSS uniquely combustible, however, is the combination of ideological framing and operational signalling. Trump explicitly links non-interventionism, long a theme of his political base, to the Founders’ moral worldview. He writes that “Rigid adherence to non-interventionism is not possible… yet this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention.”
The Trump NSS is both a blueprint and a warning. It signals a United States abandoning the liberal internationalist project and embracing a transactional, hemispherically focussed, sovereignty-first model. It rewrites the Monroe Doctrine for an age of great-power contest, but in doing so resurrects the very logics of intervention that past presidents have regretted. And in the background, as Trump weighs the cost of Ukraine against the allure of a decisive posture in Asia and the Western Hemisphere, the world is left to wonder whether this new corollary is merely rhetorical theatre or the prelude to a new era of American coercive power. The ambiguity is deliberate, but the direction of travel is unmistakable.
[Correction: In my column last week, I incorrectly stated that India–Russia trade in FY 2024 25 was USD 18 billion; the correct figure is USD 68.7 billion, with a trade deficit of about USD 59 billion. Similarly, India recorded a goods trade surplus of around USD 41.18 billion with the US, not a deficit of USD 42 billion, with exports of USD 86.51 billion and imports of USD 45.33 billion. Total remittances to India in FY 2024 25 were roughly USD 135.46 billion, including USD 25–30 billion from the US. Apologies for the error.]
by Nilantha Ilangamuwa
Features
MEEZAN HADJIAR
selfmade businessman who became one of the richest men in the Central Province
I am happy that a book about the life and contribution of Sathkorale Muhamdiramlagedara Segu Abdul Cader Hajiar Mohamed Mohideen better known as Meezan Hadjiar or Meezan Mudalali of Matale [1911—1964] written by Mohammed Fuaji -a former Principal of Zahira College Matale, has now been published by a group of his admirers and relatives. It is a timely addition to the history of Matale district and the Kandyan region which is yet to be described fully as forming a part of the modern history of our country. Coincidentally this book also marks the centenary of Meezan Hadjiars beginning of employment in Matale town which began in 1925.
Matale which was an outlier in the Kandyan Kingdom came into prominence with the growth of plantations for coffee and, after the collapse of the coffee plantations due to the ‘coffee blight’ , for other tree crops . Coffee was followed by the introduction of tea by the early British investors who faced bankruptcy and ruin if they could not quickly find a substitute beverage for coffee.They turned to tea.
The rapid opening of tea plantations in the hill country demanded a large and hardworking labour force which could not be found domestically. This led to the indenturing of Tamil labour from South India on a large scale. These helpless workers were virtually kidnapped from their native villages in India through the Kangani system and they were compelled to migrate to our hill country by the British administration .
The route of these indentured workers to the higher elevations of the hill country lay through Matale and the new plantation industry developed in that region thereby dragging it into a new commercial culture and a cash economy. New opportunities were opened up for internal migration particularly for the more adventurous members of the Muslim community who had played a significant role in the Kandyan kingdom particularly as traders,transporters,medical specialists and military advisors.
Diaries of British officials like John D’oyly also show that the Kandyan Muslims were interlocutors between the Kandyan King and British officials of the Low Country as they had to move about across boundaries as traders of scarce commodities like salt, medicines and consumer articles for the Kandyans and arecanuts, gems and spices for the British. Even today there are physical traces of the ‘’Battal’’or caravans of oxen which were used by the Muslims to transport the above mentioned commodities to and from the Kandyan villages to the Low country. Another important facet was that Kandyan Muslims were located in villages close to the entrances to the hill country attesting to their mobility unlike the Kandyan villagers.
Thus Akurana, Galagedera, Kadugannawa, Hataraliyadde and Mawanella which lay in the pathways to enter the inner territory of the Kings domain were populated by ‘Kandyan Muslims’ who had the ear of the King and his high officials. The’’ Ge’’ names and the honorifics given by the King were a testament to their integration with the Sinhala polity. Meezan Hadjiars’’ Ge ‘‘name of Sathkorale Mohandiramlage denotes the mobility of the family from Sathkorale, an outlier division in the Kandyan Kingdom, and Mohandiramlage attests to the higher status in the social hierarchy which probably indicated that his forebears were honoured servants of the king.
Meezan Hadjiar [SM Mohideen] was born and bred in Kurugoda which is a small village in Akurana in Kandy district. He belonged to the family of Abdul Cader who was a patriarch and a well known religious scholar. Cader’s children began their education in the village school but at the age of 12 young Mohideen left his native village to apprentice under a relative who had a business establishment in the heart of Matale town which was growing fast due to the economic boom. It must be stated here that this form of ‘learning the ropes’ as an apprentice’was a common path to business undertaken by many of the later Sri Lankan tycoons of the pre-independence era.
But he did not remain in that position for long .When his mentor failed in his business of trading in cocoa, cardamoms, cloves and arecanuts and wanted to close up his shop young Mohideen took over and eventually made a great success of it. His enterprise succeeded because he was able to earn the trust of both his buyers and sellers. He befriended Sinhalese and Tamil producers and the business he improved beyond measure took on the name of Meezan Estates Ltd [The scales] and Mohideen soon became famous as Meezan Mudalali – perhaps the most successful businessman of his time in Matale. He expanded his business interests to urban real estate as well as tea and rubber estates. Soon he owned over 3,000 acres of tea estates making him one of the richest men in the Central Province.
With his growing influence Meezan spent generously on charitable activities including funding a water scheme for his native village of Kurugoda also serving adjoining villages like Pangollamada located in Akurana. He also gave generously to Buddhist causes in Matale together with other emerging low country businessmen like Gunasena and John Mudalali.
Matale was well known as a town in which all communities lived in harmony and tended to help each other. As a generous public figure he became strong supporter of the UNP and a personal friend of its leaders like Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawela. UNP candidates for public office-both in the Municipality and Parliament were selected in consultation with Meezan who also bankrolled them during election time. He himself became a Municipal councillor. The Aluvihares of several generations had close links with him. it was Meezan who mentored ACS Hameed – a fellow villager from Kurugoda – and took him to the highest echelons of Sri Lankan politics as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was a supporter and financier of the UNP through thick and thin.
Though his premature death at the age 53 in 1965 saved him from the worst political witch hunts under SWRD Bandaranaike who was his personal friend it was after 1970 and the Coalition regime that Meezan’s large family were deprived of their livelihood by the taking over of all their estates. Fortunately many of his children were well educated and could hold on till relief was given by President Premadasa despite the objections of their father’s erstwhile protégé ACS Hameed who surprisingly let them down badly.
It is only fitting that we, even a hundred years later, now commemorate a great self made Sri Lankan business magnate and generous contributor to all religious and social causes of his time. His name became synonymous with enterprise in Matale – a district in which I was privileged to serve as Government Agent in the late sixties.He was a model entrepreneur and his large family have also made outstanding contributions to this country which also attest to the late Meezan Hadjiars foresight and vision of a united and prosperous Srilanka.
by SARATH AMUNUGAMA.
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