Features
Will the Uma Oya Multipurpose Project Impress Sri Lankan Voters?
Many are concerned about the negative environmental and social impact of the project, and see the publicity surrounding the inauguration as an election gimmick.
By Rathindra Kuruwita
On April 24 Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe and his visiting Iranian counterpart Ebrahim Raisi inaugurated the Uma Oya Multipurpose Development Project (UOMDP). Executed by Iran’s Farab Energy and Water Projects, the $514-million project was primarily financed by the Sri Lankan government.
The Uma Oya Multipurpose Development Project will water approximately 4,500 hectares of new land and 1,500 hectares of existing agricultural land in the Moneragala District, according to the President’s Media Division. Moreover, the districts of Badulla, Moneragala, and Hambantota,
which are among Sri Lanka’s poorest, will benefit from 39 million cubic meters of water for drinking and industrial purposes. Additionally, the project will contribute 290 GWh of electrical energy annually to the National Grid. These areas heavily rely on agriculture as the primary source of livelihood for most of their residents.
The Uma Oya Multipurpose Development Project sets a precedent for collaboration among nations of the global south, President Wickremesinghe said at the joint press conference in Colombo. He described the project as a testament to the enduring partnership between Iran and Sri Lanka in energy generation, irrigation, and water management.
Meanwhile, President Raisi highlighted the strides in technology that Iran has made, despite harsh sanctions over the last 30 years, and said Iran was ready to export its “technical and engineering services to Sri Lanka.”
Large-scale infrastructure projects have long served as political trump cards for governments across South Asia, where leaders often leverage such projects to trumpet their achievements to secure electoral victories. However, the success of such endeavors has become increasingly uncertain amidst a changing political landscape.
Nowhere is this uncertainty more palpable than in Sri Lanka, where the inauguration of the Uma Oya Multipurpose Development Project stands as a stark example of the potential pitfalls facing governments banking on infrastructure projects for political mileage.
The inauguration of the Uma Oya project presents both the Iranian and Sri Lankan governments with strategic PR opportunities. For Iran, amidst escalating tensions with Israel, this inauguration serves as a platform to demonstrate its regional alliances, particularly in Asia. Sri Lanka’s decision to proceed with the visit despite unofficial objections from U.S. diplomats signals that the Iranians are not isolated.
As for Sri Lanka, presidential elections are nearing and the Wickremesinghe administration is facing formidable challenges from the National People’s Power (NPP), which is leading opinion polls. Unveiling significant infrastructure projects tends to generate favorable publicity, a tactic frequently employed by Sri Lankan governments as elections draw near. Some of the government politicians had attempted to use the “success” of the project to tarnish the reputation of the NPP which had objected to the project due to environmental concerns.
However, the public reaction from Sri Lankans has been lukewarm. Most people see the publicity surrounding the event as an election gimmick and the negative environmental and social impact of the project has been massive.
The Uma Oya project was a part of the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration’s infrastructure project drive and its dream of converting Hambantota, the hometown of the Rajapaksas, into a modern metropolis and hub of industry and logistics.
The groundwork for the project was laid in 2008, when the Sri Lankan cabinet approved on February 20, 2008, a memorandum presented by the Minister of Irrigation.
Critics of the project point out that while the project cost was estimated at $250 million, the contract awarded to the Iranian Company was pegged at over $529 million. Initially, the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) was to provide $450 million and the balance of $79 million was to be paid by the Sri Lankans.
The 2010 annual report of Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Finance and Planning stated that the project would involve the construction of two reservoirs on the tributaries of the Uma Oya River and a 23-km tunnel to divert water to an underground powerhouse of 120MW further downstream. The water accumulated in these reservoirs would be diverted into the Southern Province, where Hambantota is. Work on the project had already commenced, the report said, and would be completed by 2014.
Among the projects that were to be supplied water were the Mattala Airport, Hambantota Port, Hambantota Industrial Zone, and Hambantota Oil Refinery—projects that were to turn Hambantota from a sleepy second-tier town into Sri Lanka’s hub of trade and manufacturing. It is worthwhile noting that out of all these projects, only the Hambantota Port remains a successful endeavor, mainly due to the heavy lifting by China Merchants Port Holdings.
From its inception, environmentalists said that geographical and geological features were not conducive to extensive tunneling in the area. They warned that previous governments had considered and dropped the project due to potential disastrous environmental consequences.
Environmentalist Sajeewa Chamikara from the Movement for Land and Agricultural Reform (MONLAR) told The Diplomat that the idea of an irrigation and electricity generation project utilizing Uma Oya was initially explored back in 1987. The German consulting firm LAHAMAYOR conducted the first feasibility study. Subsequently, in 1991, the Central Engineering Consulting Bureau conducted another feasibility study and presented it to the Asian Development Bank (ADB). However, the ADB rejected the proposal, citing a failure to adhere to accepted international norms.
Between 2002 and 2003, a Canadian consulting firm, SNC-LAVALIN, also conducted a feasibility study to assess the potential for a multipurpose development project centered around Uma Oya. These studies primarily focused on the feasibility of constructing two reservoirs in Puhulpola and Dayaraba. When this proposal was submitted to the ADB, it was once again rejected due to various technical issues, including concerns regarding the transfer of water between different basins.
Chamikara said that Iran, on the other hand, held the belief that providing financial resources and technical support would lead the Sri Lankan government to prioritize the welfare of its citizens. The project hit a snag in 2013 after Iran was sanctioned and was unable to continue funding the operation. While the Iranian company continued to be the project implementer, the Sri Lankan government coughed up the funding to continue the project.
The tunneling took place in areas with metamorphic rocks, which are more resistant to deformation and weathering than sedimentary rocks. And then, the worst fears of the environmentalists came true.
In December 2014, a leak occurred in the tunnel being constructed as a part of the project after the tunneling destabilized the ground, leading to cracks appearing on the surface, which in turn caused cracks to appear on the buildings in these areas. Moreover, as groundwater seeps deeper due to the destabilization, the surface water is lowered, depriving water for agriculture and general consumption.
According to Chamikara, thousands of families were affected and even now the problems faced by 17,000 families have not been solved. Once farmers, these affected people now eke out a living as day laborers and travel long distances each week in search of drinking water.
The calamities faced by tens of thousands of people can no longer be hidden due to the prevalence of social media, which has ensured that mainstream media no longer control the narrative. On Facebook and TikTok, which has become increasingly popular among Sri Lankans, social media users have been vitriolic about government politicians calling the project a success.
In South Asia, parties and politicians in power use large-scale infrastructure projects to draw mileage. However, examples from Sri Lanka show that this does not always work especially if the party in power is losing popularity.
Inaugurating the Norochcholai power plant and providing a significant electricity tariff reduction in 2014, did not stop Mahinda Rajapaksa from losing in 2015. In 2019, leaders of the then government declared open several sections of highways, but this did not stop the landslide victory of Gotabaya Rajapaksa.It is likely that the inauguration of the Uma Oya project too will not impress those about who to vote for in elections a few months down the line.
Features
Coercive laws recipe for future misrule
by Jehan Perera
The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.
The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.
But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Proposed Laws
The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.
The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.
Civil Society
The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.
Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.
The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.
Features
Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA
By Ramya Kumar
According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.
An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.
The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.
Top-down check-box activities
The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.
There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).
1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….
2: And with pictures and all…
1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”
2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..
1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…
2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!
1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.
2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…
Auditing everything but power
QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.
The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.
A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.
This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.
External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.
Rethinking university QA
Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.
QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)
. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!
Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.
Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.
The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.
Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.
The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor
Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!
This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.
Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.
Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!
For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.
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