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The Wellawaya attack – on April 4 one day before D-day

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A personal story as recalled by Capt F.R.A.B. Musafer 4th Regt SLA (Retd)

(Continued from last week)

There were other instances where we found persons with very old unlicensed shotguns and unauthorized women in their company. There was always an excuse to explain their presence.On one occasion we were led to a unused well in the Amaduwa area which borders the Yala sanctuary in which was concealed a large consignment of old tins for the explicit purpose of making bombs. The police took a young man into custody and charged him. A few days later I bumped into him near the Hambantota town where he told me the Magistrate had just discharged him as it was no offence to store old cans. Justice well served in the context of the law as at that time!

On another occasion we were taken to a house inhabited by two youths allegedly involved in the movement. The father of the boys appeared and told us that he did not know the whereabouts of his sons and had no trust in them. He took us into the verandah of his house and showed us a coffin stored across some beams of the roof. This, he said is because “I don’t trust them and don’t expect my sons will even bury me. So please believe me.”

By day we were very conspicuous and made our presence felt as we traveled extensively across the towns and villages in the Hambantota district causing concern to regimental headquarters that our fuel consumption was excessive. During the nights we used to patrol along the main roads and stop by the wayside and monitor the movements of people and vehicles. Whilst there was hardly any night time traffic we were intrigued by groups of cyclists traveling further south at night on a daily basis. They maintained that they were practising for the National cycling championships and carried nothing on themselves. Our suspicions were that they were couriers conveying messages but there was nothing we could do about it.

Ground Realities

On most occasions when we stopped at the police stations and chatted with the reserve constable over cups of plain sugarless tea, we were told of threats received via the post. It was common knowledge among the police that they were to be attacked and most likely at night. These threats were not taken seriously.

Being the son of a police officer who had served in that region renowned for its high crime rate I was aware that the reserve PC on duty was always by himself, in some instances with only a kerosene lamp for light. He would always be an easy target of any attack and the key to acquiring weapons. With due credit to the police it provided a 24-hour service to the community in the remotest of areas. Perhaps the police was safe as they commanded some respect and trust among the locals.

Based on the information provided on an informal basis, I realized that if any attack was to take place it would be at night to exploit the element of surprise. My mind raced back to an article I read in the Readers Digest of the methods used in Latin and South America in the 1960’s where guerrilla groups in addition to robbing banks blew up electricity pylons, cut lines of communications and also stormed police and military outposts to secure their supply of weapons all done under the cover of darkness. The likelihood that insurgents would attack in waves to overrun their objectives with sheer numbers as done by the Vietcong was also well documented.

On one of my daily briefings with the GA I drew this to his attention. The GA being a very thoughtful person showed some serious concern and asked me what I intended to do about it. I suggested that we send a signal (wireless message) to Temple Trees requesting flares and equipment as an aid for night fighting. At that time we did not even have any army issue battery operated torches.

The GA had a direct Army wireless link to Temple Trees the official residence and command centre of the Prime Minister. He agreed and a signal was sent to Temple Trees requesting flares to light up the sky in the dark in the event of likely night attacks on the police stations. There was no response to the signal sent.

Some months later I was told by Capt Samaratunga, one of a few of the trusted and handpicked officers on duty at Temple Trees, that some of the other officers at Temple Trees had virtually laughed and ridiculed me on the signal sent by me and had said that I had got the jitters and was afraid. About a week later there was panic at Temple Trees when news of the Wellawaya attack that had taken place at night was received. He said it was no laughing matter then and all hell broke loose when news of a number of police stations fell into the hands of the insurgents that night and in the subsequent nights.

Meanwhile we continued to work with the police by day but at night patrolled the roads ourselves. During this period we never arrested anyone. Our only suspicions were on the cyclists. Inspector Arthanayake, the OIC at Tissamaharama police station, filled me in with information that parents had reported certain young family members had gone missing. Some had said that their children had gone to Diyatalawa for training.

He had arrested a youth who had been to such a camp and was trained to assemble and dismantle weapons. The matter had been referred to the CID but nothing had eventuated. There were mixed messages that there was something in the air but no intelligence to pin point any real threat on How, When and Where?

The poster campaigns

One of the effective ways the JVP conveyed their propaganda was by way of posters and slogans written on the walls of private and public buildings. They were everywhere and with a bit of boredom creeping up I thought I should exercise some initiative and embarked on a cleanup operation that got me into trouble. I got my men and some bystanders around the Hambantota bus stand to tear down the posters and obliterate the messages written on the walls.

This did not go on for long as I was soon summoned by the GA Mr Sonny Goonewardene who in no uncertain terms asked me as to who gave me permission to carry out the cleanup operation. He was very angry and upset as among the people whom I had asked to participate in the clean up was a senior employee of his staff. He very politely but sternly told me that in future he would provide me with the labour I needed. I realized that I had erred in my judgment and apologized to the GA.

I had a lot of respect for the GA not only as a superior official but for his calmness and insight and wisdom he imparted on me. The message was simple, loud and clear I did not have the license to do as I pleased in a military uniform even under the state of Emergency that prevailed.

The poster campaign was not confined to the JVP. I came across one that was amusing and said ” Do not write or urinate on my wall, socialism doesn’t begin here”.

Whilst we roamed the length and breath of the Hambantota district there was nothing eventful that happened except that my wife turned up on April 2 and announced that she was at the Hambantota rest house. I had not been in communication with her since mid March. Capt Ratnasabapathy had arranged accommodation at a discounted rate (I think it was Rs 50 per day) and assured her that it was safe, which prompted her to hitch a lift in a Browns Group car coming to their hotel at Amaduwa. She based herself at the rest house and was busy visiting friends and relatives at Hambantota which had a fair sized Malay community.

On April 4 evening she point blank refused to stay at the rest house saying that there had been some strange bearded and unshaven characters drinking and lurking around at the rest house during the day. This compelled me to put her up at Weerawila in Army style accommodation, making her sleep on the floor on a mat.

April 5 morning when it all began

On April 5, 1971 I had to go to Matara to drop a few of my men going on leave which included Gunner Brohier who had lost his brother in a snake bite accident. My wife too was in the vehicle (unauthorized) when as usual we encountered a herd of wild elephants near the salt pans, which was a frightful real life experience for her.

At the Matara Railway station I met Capt Naleem, Adjutant of 3V Gemunu Watch Regiment who was going to Colombo to attend a conference at Army Headquarters. He told me the Army was expecting trouble and plans were afoot to deploy more troops to most parts of the island.

Whilst returning from Matara I was stopped opposite the Hambantota Police station and was informed that the Wellawaya police station had been attacked and that I was to return to Wirawila immediately and contact my regiment. At Weerawila I got on to the wireless set and got in touch with the adjutant, Capt Samarakoon, who told me that the police station at Wellawaya had been attacked and there were casualties but details were sketchy as all communications had been cut off.

I was ordered to proceed to Wellawaya immediately and report back on the situation. I quickly gathered some soldiers, a wireless set and headed for Wellawaya post haste in a jeep and a truck. When I approached the police station the area around it was like a battlefield littered with spent shotgun cartridges, empty tins and items of clothing and footwear. The police station had taken a battering, the telephone and power lines were cut.

Eye witnesses had confirmed that a large group of insurgents some dressed in blue uniforms had carried out the attack. To this day I regret that I did not have a camera (they were hard to come by during that period) to capture the scene before my eyes. It was unbelievable that such an outrageous raid had been conducted against the state and was certainly a critical moment in history.

There was the body of the reserve police constable lying at the entrance of the police station. The police were dumbfounded and in a state of shock after their ordeal. Some expressed that they were lucky to be alive. There had been another policeman who had been shot and had died in hospital. We were told that a few policemen had just returned from a patrol and as customary the arms and ammunition were locked up in the strong room by the reserve PC on duty. He had then ventured out to the verandah to have a smoke when a group of Che Guveras who had surrounded the police station opened fire killing him.

With the police station under fire and no access to any firearms there was very little the police could do until a brave policeman to crawled up to the dead constable and retrieved the keys enabling them to retaliate and return fire. After a few hours the attack was repulsed and with the break of dawn the insurgents retreated taking with them their dead and injured leaving behind fired and unspent shotgun cartridges. It was strange that the insurgents with their numbers did not storm the police station during the lull, perhaps they lacked decisive leadership..

Whilst walking around the compound of the police station I was alerted to the fact that there was a dead insurgent. A closer look revealed he had a huge exit wound in the back of his chest as a result of a bullet fired from a rifle and had lost a lot of blood. Someone noticed a slight twitch in his body and shouted that he was alive. No sooner was this said a rifle was raised by a policeman to smash his skull; this was thwarted by one of the soldiers who pushed him off balance.

The policeman had a point in saying that there was no point in letting him live. It may have been improbable that he could have survived anyway. However it was not a question of pity but one of anger and hurt on the part of the policeman who reacted that way. This was quite understandable considering what they had gone through that he reacted in this manner. We despatched the injured man in the army truck to hospital but he was confirmed as dead on arrival.

Although we as “Gunners” were the first Army personnel on the scene there was nothing further we could do but report back on the situation. To do this I was in a dilemma as radio transmission and reception on my set was impossible and there was no way I could contact my Headquarters. I was told that I could go to Moneragala as the GA there was in direct contact with Temple Trees. Wellawaya in fact came under the jurisdiction of the GA Moneragala. I decided to race back to Weerawila leaving the soldiers and the truck behind.

I reported back to regimental headquarters as to what I had seen and heard about the attack. I asked for instructions and if it was necessary for me to pursue the insurgents who had retreated to the jungles. Permission was refused. I was told that two platoons of reinforcements from the 1st battalion Gemunu Watch based at Diyatalawa was being sent and that a helicopter would be arriving at the location with senior Army and Police officials. On arrival of the platoons from Diyatalawa I was to return to Weerawila.

Having raced back to Wellawaya I awaited the arrival of the chopper which landed shortly. There was Maj Gratiaen Silva, DIG Rudra Rajasingham, The GA Moneragala, Mr Fernando, and the Magistrate. Soon after the helicopter had landed the two platoons of the first battalion Gemunu Watch under the command of Captain Lalin Fernando and Lt Gibbrey Muthalib arrived at the scene.

Lt Muthalib was subsequently seriously wounded and suffered serious head injuries and had to be airlifted to Colombo. He survived and retired as a Major General as did Capt Lalin Fernando.

Whilst the inquiries were being conducted in the police station premises I accompanied the two Airforce pilots, Flight Lieutenants Rahim and Manoharan, and was showing them around when I heard some movement in a bush nearby and drew my revolver on instinct. suddenly two youths ran out putting their hands up and pleading not to shoot them as they had come only yesterday. ” Vedi thiyanna epa, eeyay apu gaman”. Capt Lalin had also drawn his revolver and raced towards the youths and managed to get hold of one of them by his collar, the other made no attempt to escape.

They were both subjected to a good beating by some of the policemen who took them into custody. They were very young and clad in shirt and sarong and what they had in their possession was a bag with two home made bombs (Molotov cocktails ) but no matches to light the bombs. I felt sorry for them as they may have hidden in the bushes in fear during the attack with all the gunfire and bombs exploding and had left it till too late to escape. If perhaps they had waited for another hour or so they may have made their escape under the cover of darkness. Being there without food and water throughout the day in the intense heat may have been too much to bear. To this date I wonder what their fate was?

A few years ago I met Flt Lt Rahim in Canada. He retired as a Group Captain and when reminiscing on this incident recalled that the helicopter could not get back to Katunayake but forced to land at Ratmalana as they were running out of fuel. He mentioned that they had to undertake a perilous journey to make their way back to Katunayake passing through a multitude of road blocks manned by very jittery armed police and servicemen.

The insurgents had planned to carry out their attacks under the cover of darkness and stage simultaneous attacks on as many police stations islandwide on the night of April 5. Whilst the army was deployed as a proactive strategy to deter an uprising there were no plans set in place to counter simultaneous night attacks on all police stations. In fact there was a total lack of intelligence of any planned night attacks at all. It was ironical that the insurgents had themselves conveyed their intentions by way of postcards to some of the police stations. The premature and bungled date of the attack on Wellawaya took that element of surprise away.

In my opinion it was a godsend that saved the government from humiliation. Had simultaneous attacks taken place on a single night and the police stations overrun, the weapons and ground lost to the insurgents would have contributed to a more protracted and bloody conflict.

As it was late in the day and with the platoons from GW in place I headed back to Weerawila. On my drive back I was contemplating what course of action I should take? Back at camp there was no specific orders or instructions for me. There were radio broadcasts that a 24-hour curfew had been imposed as a result of the attack on the Wellawaya police station, there were no reports of any other police stations being attacked at this point of time. The news report would have certainly caused great concern to the family members about the platoon’s safety in the absence of any means of communication.

The April 5 night Weerawila was partially abandoned. On the strength of what was witnessed I made the decision to partially abandon Weerawila. It was of no strategic importance to the insurgents who would be reluctant to take on the Army. It was thought best that we visit as many police stations as possible rather than be holed up at Weerawila protecting no one. I left behind two soldiers with the wireless equipment and hit the road with all the transport at my disposal. It was a risk we had to take as we could not abandon the camp totally.

The large number of vehicles created an impression of a sizeable force although in effect there were less than 20 men. That night we stuck to the coastal belt Hambantota, Hungama Ambalantota and spent some time at these stations and left much to the disappointment of the police

With a curfew in place the roads were deserted and the night was pitch dark as we finally made our way to the Tissamaharama Police station around midnight. They were glad to see us as they were expecting an attack, in fact every police station was fearing one.. We took up positions around the police station premises which was flanked by the road in front and a small paddy field on the side.

A Light Machine gun was positioned to cover this open area as there were houses to the rear and the other side which restricted the use of this weapon, the rest of the area was covered by armed soldiers. It was a long night and a tiring one. The soldiers were struggling to stay awake when all of a sudden there was a huge crackling sound and the streetlights went off. Simultaneously the LMG also opened fire and moment later a rifle or two.

Being dark there was nothing we could see but from time to time shots were fired by a soldier or two at imaginary movements that kept the rest of the troops awake. There were no shots fired towards the police station. Daybreak was indeed a relief. It was later revealed that chains had been thrown over the power lines to short circuit the electricity network.



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Features

Who Owns the Clock? The Quiet Politics of Time in Sri Lanka

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(This is the 100th column of the Out of the Box series, which began on 6 September, 2023, at the invitation of this newspaper – Ed.)

A new year is an appropriate moment to pause, not for celebration, but to interrogate what our politics, policies, and public institutions have chosen to remember, forget, and repeat. We celebrate the dawn of another brand-new year. But whose calendar defines this moment?

We hang calendars on our walls and carry them in our phones, trusting them to keep our lives in order, meetings, exams, weddings, tax deadlines, pilgrimages. Yet calendars are anything but neutral. They are among humanity’s oldest instruments of power: tools that turn celestial rhythms into social rules and convert culture into governance. In Sri Lanka, where multiple traditions of time coexist, the calendar is not just a convenience, it is a contested terrain of identity, authority, and fairness.

Time is never just time

Every calendar expresses a political philosophy. Solar systems prioritise agricultural predictability and administrative stability; lunar systems preserve religious ritual even when seasons drift; lunisolar systems stitch both together, with intercalary months added to keep festivals in season while respecting the moon’s phases. Ancient India and China perfected this balancing act, proving that precision and meaning can coexist. Sri Lanka’s own rhythms, Vesak and Poson, Avurudu in April, Ramadan, Deepavali, sit inside this wider tradition.

What looks “technical” is actually social. A calendar decides when courts sit, when budgets reset, when harvests are planned, when children sit exams, when debts are due, and when communities celebrate. It says who gets to define “normal time,” and whose rhythms must adapt.

The colonial clock still ticks

Like many postcolonial societies, Sri Lanka inherited the Gregorian calendar as the default language of administration. January 1 is our “New Year” for financial statements, annual reports, contracts, fiscal plans, school terms, and parliamentary sittings, an imported date shaped by European liturgical cycles and temperate seasons rather than our monsoons or zodiac transitions. The lived heartbeat of the island, however, is Avurudu: tied to the sun’s movement into Mesha Rāshi, agricultural renewal, and shared rituals of restraint and generosity. The result is a quiet tension: the calendar of governance versus the calendar of lived culture.

This is not mere inconvenience; it is a subtle form of epistemic dominance. The administrative clock frames Gregorian time as “real,” while Sinhala, Tamil, and Islamic calendars are relegated to “cultural” exceptions. That framing shapes everything, from office leave norms to the pace at which development programmes expect communities to “comply”.

When calendars enforce authority

History reminds us that calendar reforms are rarely innocent. Julius Caesar’s reshaping of Rome’s calendar consolidated imperial power. Pope Gregory XIII’s reform aligned Christian ritual with solar accuracy while entrenching ecclesiastical authority. When Britain finally adopted the Gregorian system in 1752, the change erased 11 days and was imposed across its empire; colonial assemblies had little or no say. In that moment, time itself became a technology for governing distant subjects.

Sri Lanka knows this logic. The administrative layers built under colonial rule taught us to treat Gregorian dates as “official” and indigenous rhythms as “traditional.” Our contemporary fiscal deadlines, debt restructurings, even election cycles, now march to that imported drumbeat, often without asking how this timing sits with the island’s ecological and cultural cycles.

Development, deadlines and temporal violence

Modern governance is obsessed with deadlines: quarters, annual budgets, five-year plans, review missions. The assumption is that time is linear, uniform, and compressible. But a farmer in Anuradhapura and a rideshare driver in Colombo do not live in the same temporal reality. Monsoons, harvests, pilgrimage seasons, fasting cycles, school term transitions, these shape when people can comply with policy, pay taxes, attend trainings, or repay loans. When programmes ignore these rhythms, failure is framed as “noncompliance,” when in fact the calendar itself has misread society. This mismatch is a form of temporal violence: harm produced not by bad intentions, but by insensitive timing.

Consider microcredit repayment windows that peak during lean agricultural months, or school examinations scheduled without regard to Avurudu obligations. Disaster relief often runs on the donor’s quarterly clock rather than the community’s recovery pace. In each case, governance time disciplines lived time, and the least powerful bend the most.

Religious time vs administrative time

Sri Lanka’s plural religious landscape intensifies the calendar question. Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity relate to time differently: lunar cycles, solar markers, sacred anniversaries. The state acknowledges these mainly as public holidays, rather than integrating their deeper temporal logic into planning. Vesak is a day off, not a rhythm of reflection and restraint; Ramadan is accommodated as schedule disruption, not as a month that reorganises energy, sleep, and work patterns; Avurudu is celebrated culturally but remains administratively marginal. The hidden assumption is that “real work” happens on the Gregorian clock; culture is decorative. That assumption deserves challenge.

The wisdom in complexity

Precolonial South and East Asian calendars were not confused compromises. They were sophisticated integrations of astronomy, agriculture, and ritual life, adding intercalary months precisely to keep festivals aligned with the seasons, and using lunar mansions (nakshatra) to mark auspicious thresholds. This plural logic admits that societies live on multiple cycles at once. Administrative convenience won with the Gregorian system, but at a cost: months that no longer relate to the moon (even though “month” comes from “moon”), and a yearstart with no intrinsic astronomical significance for our context.

Towards temporal pluralism

The solution is not to abandon the Gregorian calendar. Global coordination, trade, aviation, science, requires shared reference points. But ‘shared’ does not mean uncritical. Sri Lanka can lead by modelling temporal pluralism: a policy posture that recognises different ways of organising time as legitimate, and integrates them thoughtfully into governance.

Why timing is justice

In an age of economic adjustment and climate volatility, time becomes a question of justice: Whose rhythms does the state respect? Whose deadlines dominate? Whose festivals shape planning, and whose are treated as interruptions? The more governance assumes a single, imported tempo, the wider the gap between the citizens and the state. Conversely, when policy listens to local calendars, legitimacy grows, as does efficacy. People comply more when the schedule makes sense in their lives.

Reclaiming time without romanticism

This is not nostalgia. It is a pragmatic recognition that societies live on multiple cycles: ecological, economic, ritual, familial. Good policy stitches these cycles into a workable fabric. Poor policy flattens them into a grid and then blames citizens for falling through the squares.

Sri Lanka’s temporal landscape, Avurudu’s thresholds, lunar fasts, monsoon pulses, exam seasons, budget cycles, is rich, not chaotic. The task before us is translation: making administrative time converse respectfully with cultural time. We don’t need to slow down; we need to sync differently.

The last word

When British subjects woke to find 11 days erased in 1752, they learned that time could be rearranged by distant power. Our lesson, centuries later, is the opposite: time can be rearranged by near power, by a state that chooses to listen.

Calendars shape memory, expectation, discipline, and hope. If Sri Lanka can reimagine the governance of time, without abandoning global coordination, we might recover something profound: a calendar that measures not just hours but meaning. That would be a reform worthy of our island’s wisdom.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)

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Medicinal drugs for Sri Lanka:The science of safety beyond rhetoric

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The recent wave of pharmaceutical tragedies in Sri Lanka, as well as some others that have occurred regularly in the past, has exposed a terrifying reality: our medicine cabinets have become a frontline of risk and potential danger. In recent months, the silent sanctuary of Sri Lanka’s healthcare system has been shattered by a series of tragic, preventable deaths. The common denominator in these tragedies has been a failure in the most basic promise of medicine: that it will heal, not harm. This issue is entirely contrary to the immortal writings of the Father of Medicine, Hippocrates of the island of Kos, who wrote, “Primum non nocere,” which translates classically from Latin as “First do no harm.” The question of the safety of medicinal drugs is, at present, a real dilemma for those of us who, by virtue of our vocation, need to use them to help our patients.

For a nation that imports the vast majority of its medicinal drugs, largely from regional hubs like India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the promise of healing is only as strong as the laboratory that verifies these very same medicinal drugs. To prevent further problems, and even loss of lives, we must demand a world-class laboratory infrastructure that operates on science, not just sentiment. We desperately need a total overhaul of our pharmaceutical quality assurance architecture.

The detailed anatomy of a national drug testing facility is not merely a government office. It is a high-precision fortress. To meet international standards like ISO/IEC 17025 and World Health Organisation (WHO) Good Practices for Pharmaceutical Quality Control Laboratories, such a high-quality laboratory must be zoned into specialised units, each designed to catch a different type of failure.

*  The Physicochemical Unit: This is where the chemical identity of a drug is confirmed. Using High-Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC) and Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (GC-MS), scientists determine if a “500mg” tablet actually contains 500mg of the active ingredient or if it is filled with useless chalk.

*  The Microbiology Suite: This is the most critical area for preventing “injection deaths.” It requires an ISO Class 5 Cleanroom: sterile environments where air is filtered to remove every microscopic particle. Here, technicians perform Sterility Testing to ensure no bacteria or fungi are present in medicines that have to be injected.

*  The Instrumentation Wing: Modern testing requires Atomic Absorption Spectrometers to detect heavy metal contaminants (like lead or arsenic) and Stability Chambers to see how drugs react to Sri Lanka’s high humidity.

*  The injectable drug contamination is a serious challenge. The most recent fatalities in our hospitals were linked to Intravenous (IV) preparations. When a drug is injected directly into the bloodstream, there is no margin for error. A proper national laboratory must conduct two non-negotiable tests:

*  Bacterial Endotoxin Testing (BET): Even if a drug is “sterile” (all bacteria are dead), the dead bacteria leave behind toxic cell wall products called endotoxins. If injected, these residual compounds cause “Pyrogenic Reactions” with violent fevers, organ failure, and death. A functional lab must use the Limulus Amoebocyte Lysate (LAL) test to detect these toxins at the parts-per-billion level.

*  Particulate Matter Analysis: Using laser obscuration, labs must verify that no microscopic shards of glass or plastic are floating in the vials. These can cause fatal blood clots or embolisms in the lungs.

It is absolutely vital to assess whether the medicine is available in the preparation in the prescribed amounts and whether it is active and is likely to work. This is Bioavailability. Sri Lanka’s heavy reliance on “generic” imports raises a critical question: Is the cheaper version from abroad as effective as the original, more expensive branded formulation? This is determined by Bioavailability (BA) and Bioequivalence (BE) studies.

A drug might have the right chemical formula, but if it does not dissolve properly in the stomach or reach the blood at the right speed, it is therapeutically useless. Bioavailability measures the rate and extent to which the active ingredient is absorbed into the bloodstream. If a cheaper generic drug is not “bioequivalent” to the original brand-named version, the patient is essentially taking a useless placebo. For patients with heart disease or epilepsy, even a 10% difference in bioavailability can lead to treatment failure. A proper national system must include a facility to conduct these studies, ensuring that every generic drug imported is a true “therapeutic equivalent” to the brand-named original.

As far as testing goes, the current testing philosophy is best described as Reactive, rather than Proactive. The current Sri Lankan system is “reactive”: we test a drug only after a patient has already suffered. This is a proven recipe for disaster. To protect the public, we must shift to a Proactive Surveillance Model of testing ALL drugs at many stages of their dispensing.

*  Pre-Marketing Approval: No drug should reach a hospital shelf without “Batch Release” testing. Currently, we often accept the manufacturer’s own certificate of analysis, which is essentially like allowing students to grade their own examination answers.

*  Random Post-Marketing Surveillance (PMS): Regulatory inspectors must have the power to walk into any rural pharmacy or state hospital, pick a box of medicine at random, and send it to the lab. This could even catch “substandard” drugs that may have degraded during shipping or storage in our tropical heat. PMS is the Final Safety Net. Even the best laboratories cannot catch every defect. Post-Marketing Surveillance is the ongoing monitoring of a drug’s safety after it has been released to the public. It clearly is the Gold Standard.

*  Pharmacovigilance: A robust digital system where every “Adverse Drug Reaction” (ADR) is logged in a national database.

*  Signal Detection: An example of this is if three hospitals in different provinces report a slight rash from the same batch of an antibiotic, the system should automatically “flag” that batch for immediate recall before a more severe, unfortunate event takes place.

*  Testing for Contaminants: Beyond the active ingredients, we must test for excipient purity. In some global cases, cheaper “glycerin” used in syrups was contaminated with diethylene glycol, a deadly poison. A modern lab must have the technology to screen for these hidden killers.

When one considers the Human Element, Competence and Integrity, the very best equipment in the world is useless without the human capital to run it. A national lab would need the following:

*  Highly Trained Pharmacologists and Microbiologists and all grades of staff who are compensated well enough to be immune to the “lobbying” of powerful external agencies.

*  Digital Transparency: A database accessible to the public, where any citizen can enter a batch number from their medicine box and see the lab results.

Once a proper system is put in place, we need to assess as to how our facilities measure up against the WHO’s “Model Quality Assurance System.” That will ensure maintenance of internationally recognised standards. The confirmed unfavourable results of any testing procedure, if any, should lead to a very prompt “Blacklist” Initiative, which can be used to legally bar failing manufacturers from future tenders. Such an endeavour would help to keep all drug manufacturers and importers on their toes at all times.

This author believes that this article is based on the premise that the cost of silence by the medical profession would be catastrophic. Quality assurance of medicinal compounds is not an “extra” cost. It is a fundamental right of every Sri Lankan citizen, which is not at all subject to any kind of negotiation. Until our testing facilities match the sophistication of the manufacturers we buy from, we are not just importing medicine; we are importing potential risk.

The promises made by the powers-that-be to “update” the testing laboratories will remain as a rather familiar, unreliable, political theatre until we see a committed budget for mass spectrometry, cleanroom certifications, highly trained and committed staff and a fleet of independent inspectors. Quality control of therapeutic medicines is not a luxury; it is the price to be paid for a portal of entry into a civilised and intensively safe healthcare system. Every time we delay the construction of a comprehensive, proactive testing infrastructure, we are playing a game of Russian Roulette with the lives of our people.

The science is available, and the necessary technology exists. What is missing is the political will to put patient safety as the premier deciding criterion. The time for hollow rhetoric has passed, and the time for a scientifically fortified, transparent, and proactive regulatory mechanism is right now. The good health of all Sri Lankans, as well as even their lives, depend on it.

Dr B. J. C. Perera  

MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paediatrics), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL) 

Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Joint Editor, Sri Lanka Journal of Child Health

Section Editor, Ceylon Medical Journal

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Rebuilding Sri Lanka Through Inclusive Governance

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Management Committee of the 'Rebuilding Sri Lanka' Fund Appointed with Representatives from the Public and Private Sectors - PMD

In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah, the government has moved swiftly to establish a Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding Sri Lanka with a core committee to assess requirements, set priorities, allocate resources and raise and disburse funds. Public reaction, however, has focused on the committee’s problematic composition. All eleven committee members are men, and all non-government seats are held by business personalities with no known expertise in complex national development projects, disaster management and addressing the needs of vulnerable populations. They belong to the top echelon of Sri Lanka’s private sector which has been making extraordinary profits. The government has been urged by civil society groups to reconsider the role and purpose of this task force and reconstitute it to be more representative of the country and its multiple  needs.

 The group of high-powered businessmen initially appointed might greatly help mobilise funds from corporates and international donors, but this group may be ill equipped to determine priorities and oversee disbursement and spending. It would be necessary to separate fundraising, fund oversight and spending prioritisation, given the different capabilities and considerations required for each. International experience in post disaster recovery shows that inclusive and representative structures are more likely to produce outcomes that are equitable, efficient and publicly accepted. Civil society, for instance, brings knowledge rooted in communities, experience in working with vulnerable groups and a capacity to question assumptions that may otherwise go unchallenged.

 A positive and important development is that the government has been responsive to these criticisms and has invited at least one civil society representative to join the Rebuilding Sri Lanka committee. This decision deserves to be taken seriously and responded to positively by civil society which needs to call for more representation rather than a single representative.  Such a demand would reflect an understanding that rebuilding after a national disaster cannot be undertaken by the state and the business community alone. The inclusion of civil society will strengthen transparency and public confidence, particularly at a moment when trust in institutions remains fragile. While one appointment does not in itself ensure inclusive governance, it opens the door to a more participatory approach that needs to be expanded and institutionalised.

Costly Exclusions

 Going  down the road of history, the absence of inclusion in government policymaking has cost the country dearly. The exclusion of others, not of one’s own community or political party, started at the very dawn of Independence in 1948. The Father of the Nation, D S Senanayake, led his government to exclude the Malaiyaha Tamil community by depriving them of their citizenship rights. Eight years later, in 1956, the Oxford educated S W R D Bandaranaike effectively excluded the Tamil speaking people from the government by making Sinhala the sole official language. These early decisions normalised exclusion as a tool of governance rather than accommodation and paved the way for seven decades of political conflict and three decades of internal war.

Exclusion has also taken place virulently on a political party basis. Both of Sri Lanka’s post Independence constitutions were decided on by the government alone. The opposition political parties voted against the new constitutions of 1972 and 1977 because they had been excluded from participating in their design. The proposals they had made were not accepted. The basic law of the country was never forged by consensus. This legacy continues to shape adversarial politics and institutional fragility. The exclusion of other communities and political parties from decision making has led to frequent reversals of government policy. Whether in education or economic regulation or foreign policy, what one government has done the successor government has undone.

 Sri Lanka’s poor performance in securing the foreign investment necessary for rapid economic growth can be attributed to this factor in the main. Policy instability is not simply an economic problem but a political one rooted in narrow ownership of power. In 2022, when the people went on to the streets to protest against the government and caused it to fall, they demanded system change in which their primary focus was corruption, which had reached very high levels both literally and figuratively. The focus on corruption, as being done by the government at present, has two beneficial impacts for the government. The first is that it ensures that a minimum of resources will be wasted so that the maximum may be used for the people’s welfare.

Second Benefit

 The second benefit is that by focusing on the crime of corruption, the government can disable many leaders in the opposition. The more opposition leaders who are behind bars on charges of corruption, the less competition the government faces. Yet these gains do not substitute for the deeper requirement of inclusive governance. The present government seems to have identified corruption as the problem it will emphasise. However, reducing or eliminating corruption by itself is not going to lead to rapid economic development. Corruption is not the sole reason for the absence of economic growth. The most important factor in rapid economic growth is to have government policies that are not reversed every time a new government comes to power.

 For Sri Lanka to make the transition to self-sustaining and rapid economic development, it is necessary that the economic policies followed today are not reversed tomorrow. The best way to ensure continuity of policy is to be inclusive in governance. Instead of excluding those in the opposition, the mainstream opposition in particular needs to be included. In terms of system change, the government has scored high with regard to corruption. There is a general feeling that corruption in the country is much reduced compared to the past. However, with regard to inclusion the government needs to demonstrate more commitment. This was evident in the initial choice of cabinet ministers, who were nearly all men from the majority ethnic community. Important committees it formed, including the Presidential Task Force for a Clean Sri Lanka and the Rebuilding Sri Lanka Task Force, also failed at first to reflect the diversity of the country.

 In a multi ethnic and multi religious society like Sri Lanka, inclusivity is not merely symbolic. It is essential for addressing diverse perspectives and fostering mutual understanding. It is important to have members of the Tamil, Muslim and other minority communities, and women who are 52 percent of the population, appointed to important decision making bodies, especially those tasked with national recovery. Without such representation, the risk is that the very communities most affected by the crisis will remain unheard, and old grievances will be reproduced in new forms. The invitation extended to civil society to participate in the Rebuilding Sri Lanka Task Force is an important beginning. Whether it becomes a turning point will depend on whether the government chooses to make inclusion a principle of governance rather than treat it as a show of concession made under pressure.

by Jehan Perera

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