Features
The NPP’s ascent and the Opposition’s descent in Sri Lanka
By Uditha Devapriya
At parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka last week, the centre-left National People’s Power (NPP) checked all lists and squared all circles, winning not just traditional seats but also polling divisions populated by minority communities.
Speaking to the media on Friday, November 15, hours after general election results were announced in Sri Lanka, Tilvin Silva, General Secretary of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the dominant member in the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that governs the country, acknowledged that his party would commit to “developing the country, eradicating corruption, and enhancing democracy with accountability.”
Silva’s remarks came in the backdrop of one of the biggest electoral landslides in the island’s political history: the NPP, reduced to three seats at the 2020 general election, gained a two-thirds majority, obtaining 159 seats and 61 percent of the vote, last week.
The achievement is all the more remarkable considering that the NPP secured a two-thirds majority without entering agreements with other parties. It also trumped expectations by winning seats in minority populated areas like the Northern Province, which had been written off as unfeasible and unwinnable for a party associated, rightly or wrongly, with Sinhala Buddhist nationalist politics. Yet by the early hours of Friday, November 15, it was clear not only that the NPP had won these areas but that they had displaced traditional communal parties: in the Tamil-dominated Jaffna district, for instance, the alliance secured three seats, while the once powerful Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) obtained just one.
The NPP’s victory is also remarkable given that, at presidential elections two months ago, the party won with 43 percent of the vote. This led commentators, including supporters of the previous Ranil Wickremesinghe administration and the main Opposition, the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB), to brand the new president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, as a minority leader. At a rally, former President Wickremesinghe, who was appointed as president by parliament instead of a popular vote in 2022, compared himself to Dissanayake, stating that both were elected as presidents without majorities. As a former State Minister posted on Twitter on Friday, however, the results have made “a nonsense of the claims made about the President being a minority president.”
A record of Opposition parties
If supporters of the NPP were flushed with victory, they were fairly subdued in expressing their feelings. In Sri Lanka, the announcement of election results is typically followed by firecrackers and much celebration on the streets. On Friday morning – a Poya day, a religious holiday for Buddhists across the island – there was no such revelry. As the results came in, however, it was clear not only that the NPP had won, but that Opposition parties, including both those positioning themselves as moderate (such as the SJB) and hardline (such as the Sarvajana Balaya, or SB), had lost heavily. The SJB, for instance, which obtained 54 seats at the 2020 parliamentary election, slid down to 40 this time around.
For many Sri Lankans, there were other reasons to celebrate. The NPP rose through the ranks promising both change and a cleanup of the political system. Before the general election, a number of MPs associated with the previous government opted out of the race, choosing to retire from politics or return to other professions.
Yet a few among them chose to remain and fight – and lost heavily. Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s coalition, the National Democratic Front, secured three seats, while the much-hyped Sarvajana Balaya, led by a powerful media mogul, failed to obtain any. The Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), led until 2022 by the ousted former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa, won two: Rajapaksa’s nephew and Mahinda’s son, Namal, has entered parliament through the party’s National List. He didn’t run for an elected seat Meanwhile, the People’s Struggle Alliance (PSA), a radical alliance of university students and activists which positioned itself to the left of the NPP, did not get through. As Harindra B. Dassanayake, co-founder of Muragala, a political research think-tank in Colombo, puts it, the results show that “Sri Lankans have spoken in one voice and placed their overwhelming trust in the NPP.”
Ever since September’s presidential election, a slew of analyses has attempted to ground the NPP’s victory solely if not mainly in its commitment to anti-corruption. The Western press, by and large, has echoed these sentiments, depicting the NPP as a Marxist-Leninist outfit committed to “clean” politics. However, Ramindu Perera, a political analyst who lectures at the Open University in Colombo, argues that this mischaracterises the NPP and overlooks its political and economic programme. In an article to Factum, a foreign policy think-tank based in Colombo, he frames the NPP’s victory as “the momentous rise of the populist left.” He also states that while anger at the then government did play a role in bringing the NPP to power, this alone does not explain why it could capitalise on the post-2022 radicalisation of the country more than other parties, including those on the Left.
The SJB’s underperformance
In the run-up to both presidential and parliamentary elections, claims of the NPP being hazy, idealistic, and impractical were fervently recycled by other parties. The SJB, for instance, portrayed itself as more committed to reform, contending that the NPP did not possess enough acumen to, for instance, negotiate with the International Monetary Fund. One leading MP from the SJB called the NPP “clueless” with regard to debt restructuring, and even dismissed the arguments of a group of economists critical of the IMF agreement, who visited Sri Lanka last May, as “conspiracy” theories.
It is clear that by making such claims, the SJB only admitted that it had no original, radical reforms of its own, and that it was content in pushing forward the policies of the previous government. The IMF agreement is widely reviled, especially outside of Colombo, and is associated with the Wickremesinghe administration, which brokered it. By defending the agreement and launching attacks on the NPP, the SJB managed to diminish its electoral prospects. That several SJB MPs and relatives of MPs engaged in red-baiting the NPP, making the most spurious claims, only worsened matters. While analysts supportive of the SJB’s leader, Sajith Premadasa, argued for a course-correction, the party paid little to no attention and instead focused on denigrating the NPP on the flimsiest grounds.
The SJB was also riddled by several internal tussles, which as political and foreign policy analyst Rathindra Kuruwita argues resulted in the party not being seen as a serious political player. The election results appear to have awakened the party: some have called for an internal inquiry and even a leadership contest. As a leading political commentator, Dayan Jayatilleka, puts it, if the SJB is to recover, it needs to do away with its commitment to the previous government’s economic reforms and position itself to the left. Ramindu Perera, however, contends that this is impractical, since the SJB is committed to the policies of the Wickremesinghe government regardless of the party leadership.
The NPP’s wooing of minority voters
If the NPP proved that it could both criticise policies such as the IMF agreement at election rallies while moderating its stances after winning elections – as of now, it has stated that it will not disrupt ongoing debt restructuring negotiations – it has also thumbed its nose at critics who claimed that it could not win minority votes. The NPP’s performance in the north and east, as Harindra Dassanayake observes, indicates that it has transcended “ethnicised electoral borders.” In polling divisions like Kopay, Kankasanturai, Nallur, Point Pedro, and Vaddukoddai, the NPP won with more 20 percent of the vote, pushing establishment parties from the south and the north to second or third place.
A number of reasons, including disenchantment with and fragmentation of older parties – particularly the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) – can help explain this trend. ITAK’s media spokesperson, M. A. Sumanthiran, who failed to secure a seat this time, attended NPP rallies and went so far as to say that his party would work with them after elections – even though the NPP declared it would not consider building coalitions with others. Nevertheless, a few days before the election, he questioned a decision by the NPP to bring in busloads of people from districts in the Northern Province to Jaffna, traditionally an ITAK stronghold, rather than going and directly talking to them. Such criticisms did not dent the NPP’s prospects among Tamils and only served to betray ITAK’s insecurities: while the latter won 33 percent in Jaffna in 2020, it obtained a little more than 11 percent this time around.
It goes without saying that the NPP’s performance with minorities – not just in the north and east but also in the Central Province, home to the country’s Hill Country Tamil population – has come as a shock to much of Colombo’s civil society circles. While we have yet to find out what drove these voters to support the NPP in large numbers, one can argue that while issues like land ownership and justice for those who died or went missing during Sri Lanka’s 30-year separatist conflict – a conflict for which the JVP, the dominant arm of the NPP, advocated a military solution – remain relevant, Tamils feel increasingly sidelined by old parties. The election of a hardliner to the leadership of the ITAK earlier this year, ITAK’s decision to field a common Tamil presidential candidate, and the later decision to enter an alliance with the SJB, reveals this only too well.
Shifting voting patterns in the north
However, it remains to be seen whether these voting patterns reflect a broader shift in Sri Lanka’s ethnic politics. Prior to the parliamentary election, JVP General Secretary Tilvin Silva accused Tamil political leaders of failing to resolve issues like land ownership and devolution of power. He added that ordinary Tamils did not prioritise such issues and that they mainly wanted “land and water for cultivation, a price for their produce, a place to sell, a school, a hospital.” Liberal commentators have critiqued Silva’s statement, noting that despite the predominance of economic problems, Tamil people still place high value on civil and political concerns such as those which Silva seemingly dismissed.
That ITAK performed less than expected even as the NPP made such statements, however, underlies a deficit in Tamil nationalist politics – one that can be seen, as political analyst Sivashanthi Sivalingam comments, in the rise of independent groups and candidates in the northern province, especially Jaffna. Indeed, many of these candidates have taken positions more hardline than either the NPP or ITAK. The NPP’s rise, in that sense, can be traced as much to disillusionment with elite politics as to a radicalisation of elite parties – as I have noted elsewhere. In the Muslim-dominated Batticaloa district in the Eastern Province, by contrast to the ITAK, and traditional parties like the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), fared better, though the NPP scored majorities in other districts in the region.
According to Rathindra Kuruwita, these shifting patterns show that the north has accepted the NPP as a “serious party.” While not dismissive of civil and political issues like land ownership, he contends that they underlie more concrete economic concerns, which he says parties like ITAK have failed to deliver on. “While Tamil political bigwigs have been accepted as representatives of their people by foreign embassies and governments and Colombo-based NGOs and civil society organisations, it is clear that they have been rejected by their communities.” As one observer has argued on Twitter, the lack of analysis on why the NPP won the north and east this time, versus the slew of commentaries when it failed to win either at presidential polls in September, shows that civil society in Colombo needs to think anew and afresh – especially in relation to minority politics.
Even before 2022, the NPP managed to galvanise opposition to establishment politics. In doing so, it became a key beneficiary of the post-2022 radicalisation of the country and the youth in particular. In the two months since it assumed the country’s presidency, the party has demonstrated that it can move to the centre on a number of issues. Contrary to what supporters of the former president and the SJB state, it has shown itself capable of handling matters of state as well, though it still is going through a learning curve.
More than anything, the NPP has won the trust of communities that have almost never been associated with it. As Omar Rajaratnam, a political and foreign policy analyst in Sri Lanka specialising in defence and public diplomacy outreach, states, “for the first time in 15 years, a president from a southern party was able to enter the north without facing protests and hostility from people there.” In the context of Sri Lankan politics, this is unprecedented and cannot just be put down to the party’s opposition to corruption. The key takeaway there is clear: Sri Lanka’s minorities have helped the NPP secure their biggest mandate yet. It is now up to the NPP, and its representatives, to honour that mandate.
Uditha Devapriya is a researcher and writer from Sri Lanka who currently works as the chief analyst of International Relations at Factum, an Asia-Pacific focused think-tank based in Colombo. He can be reached at uditha@factum.lk.
A version of this article was published by The Diplomat.
Features
Combining local resources,traditional knowledge and science to build a food-secure Sri Lanka
World Food Day 2026: Innovating today for a better food future
by Dr. Kaushalya Wijayasekara
What will be on the Sri Lankan dinner table ten years from now? Will our children be able to get nutritious food at a price their families can afford? Will farmers be able to grow enough despite changing weather and rising costs? And how much of the food we produce will actually reach the consumer, instead of being lost or wasted along the way?
These questions can’t wait. A farmer faces unpredictable weather. A family faces rising food costs. Fruit goes unsold after a good harvest. Some children do not get enough nutrition. The future of food is tied to the future of Sri Lanka itself.
World Food Day 2026 is a chance to look beyond the immediate problems and ask whether we can build a food system that feeds our people well, gives farmers better opportunities, protects the environment and makes better use of what we already have. The answer can be yes, but we will have to think differently.
We are not starting from zero. Sri Lanka has diverse crops, fisheries, traditional food knowledge, indigenous varieties, research institutions, universities and a young generation able to create new solutions. What we need is to bring these together and act. Producing more will not secure our food future on its own. It will depend on how intelligently we produce, process, preserve, distribute and consume food.
Making more of what we already have
Innovation does not always mean inventing something new. Often it means finding better uses for the resources we have.
Sri Lanka grows traditional rice varieties, kurakkan, green gram, cowpea, jackfruit, breadfruit, cassava, sweet potato, coconut and palmyrah. All of them have great potential for modern, nutritious, value-added foods. Jackfruit and breadfruit can be made into flour and other convenient products. Traditional rice varieties can go into new foods that suit changing consumer needs. Palmyrah, with its strong cultural heritage, can create new income through better processing, packaging, quality assurance and market development.
The aim is to connect our traditional food knowledge with modern consumer needs and technology, while keeping our food heritage.
Stop wasting the food we produce
Reducing food loss and waste should be a major priority. Seasonal fruits such as mango, banana, papaya and pineapple can be lost in large quantities when production exceeds demand or when storage, transport and processing facilities are inadequate. With suitable technology, these fruits can become dried products, pulps, powders, beverages and other shelf-stable foods.
Agricultural and fisheries by-products are resources too. They could be turned into food ingredients, animal feed, bio-based products and other useful materials, which would move us toward a more circular food economy.
Technology alone is not enough. We need stronger local processing facilities, cold storage, efficient transport, collection centres and market information systems, especially close to where food is produced. Cutting food loss raises the value of what our farmers and fishers already produce.
Nutrition and food safety come first
Food security means more than having enough food. People also need food that is safe and nutritious.
Sri Lanka can develop affordable, nutritious foods from local pulses, grains, vegetables, fruits and fish. Children and other vulnerable groups should get particular attention. Schoolchildren in particular deserve a focus: safe, nutritious, locally sourced products for school feeding programs would support child nutrition, local farmers and domestic food industries at the same time.
Food safety must stay at the centre of food innovation. Good hygiene, quality control, laboratory testing, traceability and appropriate food safety systems are what make new products safe as well as attractive and nutritious.
A food system that can cope with climate change
Climate change is already affecting agricultural production, water availability, crop yields and food prices. We need food systems that can handle changing conditions. That means climate-resilient crops, efficient water use, soil and water conservation, better storage and resource-efficient food processing.
Traditional knowledge matters here. Generations of Sri Lankan farmers have developed practices suited to local climates and ecosystems. Combining that experience with modern science can give us solutions that fit local conditions and are sustainable. Technology alone will not build the future of food. Science, experience and local knowledge together can.
Give young people a bigger role
Sri Lanka’s universities have an important part to play in shaping our food future. Young people should be encouraged to identify real problems in the food system and work on practical solutions in areas such as food waste, sustainable packaging, nutrition, food safety, modernising traditional foods and digital technologies.
A good research project should not always end as a research paper. Where appropriate, research should be supported to move on to products, technologies, enterprises and community solutions. That needs stronger partnerships between universities and industry, along with mentoring, research funding, business support and market connections. If young researchers and entrepreneurs can turn their ideas into viable food innovations, both consumers and producers will benefit.
A pathway designed for Sri Lanka
We do not need to copy food-system models from other countries. We can build a pathway that suits our own resources, culture and needs. It would bring together local resources, traditional knowledge, scientific research, appropriate technology and entrepreneurship, with farmers, fishers, universities, research institutions, food industries, entrepreneurs and policymakers working side by side.
The goal goes beyond selling raw materials. We need to create more value, reduce waste, improve nutrition, generate jobs and strengthen rural livelihoods. This matters especially for small and medium-scale food enterprises, which can drive local economic development when they get the right technical, financial and market support.
The choices we make today
The food future will not create itself. It will be shaped by what we grow, what we research, what we process, what we consume and what we choose not to waste.
So, the question for World Food Day 2026 is this: what can we do today so that every Sri Lankan has safe, nutritious, affordable and sustainable food tomorrow?
The answers are already around us, in our farms, fisheries, food businesses, universities, laboratories and communities. We have the resources, the traditional knowledge, the scientific expertise and talented young people. What we need now is to connect them and act.
A better food future begins with the choices we make today.
Dr. Kaushalya Wijayasekara
Senior Lecturer, Department of Biosystems Technology, Faculty of Technology, University of Ruhuna
Features
20th Anniversary of Digampathana blast – the day Sri Lanka Navy cried
By Admiral Ravindra C Wijegunaratne
WV, RWP and Bar, RSP, VSV, USP, NI (M) (Pakistan), ndc, psn, Bsc
(Hons) (War Studies) (Karachi) MPhil (Madras)
Former Navy Commander and Former Chief of Defence Staff
Former Chairman, Trincomalee Petroleum Terminals Ltd
Former Managing Director Ceylon Petroleum Corporation
Former High Commissioner to Pakistan
The Digampathana suicide truck attack on 16th October 2006 remains the deadliest single strike in Sri Lanka Navy history, leaving scars that time cannot erase.
It was a seemingly ordinary Monday morning on 16 October 2006, but the calm of that day would soon be shattered in a way none of us could have imagined. As the Commandant of the Naval and Maritime Academy and Flag Officer Commanding Naval Fleet at Trincomalee, I was aware that a number of my cadets were travelling that morning, part of a convoy of fifteen buses carrying naval personnel from Trincomalee, Colombo, and other bases, heading toward Dambulla to rendezvous with another group. The convoy also included trucks and escort vehicles, a routine movement planned and coordinated with the army to ensure the roads were clear. The morning started quietly. Some personnel greeted friends, handed over their weapons, or strolled to a nearby tea shop. It all seemed so ordinary—too ordinary for what would come next.

Sri Lanka Navy sunk LTTE Ships carrying arms, ammunition and warlike materials thousand miles away from Sri Lanka in Indian Ocean in September and October 2007.
By late morning, both convoys had reached the small ground at Digampathana, near the Sigiriya junction, and personnel mingled briefly, unaware that a carefully orchestrated act of terror was waiting. Then, suddenly, an empty half-truck veered directly into the convoy. It exploded with a ferocity I can still recall as if it were yesterday. Nuts, bolts, and high explosives tore through the air. Pandemonium erupted instantly. I later learned that 107 of our naval personnel were killed on the spot and another 153 critically injured. The scene was indescribable—bodies scattered, vehicles mangled, personal effects strewn across the ground. I remember later hearing that the head of the suicide bomber was recovered more than 100 meters away from the blast, a grim testament to the sheer force of the explosion.
I was in my office at the Naval and Maritime Academy when my mobile phone rang. A young midshipman from the 21st intake called, his voice trembling: “Sir, there was a huge explosion at the convoy point! Many are dead … my batch mate Wijesundara is among them.” I immediately jumped into my jeep with my escort Chief Petty Officer and driver and rushed to Digampathana, relying on every ounce of my driving skill to reach the scene. The journey, which usually took little more than an hour, felt endless that day, each passing mile weighed down by dread.
When I arrived, I was confronted with a sight that no training can prepare you for. The injured were being rushed to Dambulla Hospital, where doctors and nurses worked tirelessly, improvising in ways that saved lives despite the overwhelming chaos. I went back to the site after visiting the hospital. The remains of our naval personnel were scattered across the ground, and someone had begun collecting weapons and protective gear. I immediately contacted Surgeon Rear Admiral Nico Jayasekara and received his instructions: collect all body parts in separate bags and transport them to the Trincomalee Naval Hospital mortuary. This gruesome work had to be done with care and dignity, and it filled the icebox in my vehicle. Through DNA testing initiated by Rear Admiral Nico, we were able to identify every naval personnel lost that day, bringing some closure to grieving families.
The Navy Commander at the time, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, was devastated. I had worked closely with him and knew how deeply he cared for his men. He ensured that the fallen were honoured with full ceremonial naval funerals at Welisara Naval Base, attended by families and comrades. Sixty-seven funerals were conducted in a single day—a number that still haunts me.
The Digampathana attack remains the largest single loss of naval life in our history. It was a day of sorrow, but also a day that reinforced our resolve. The tragedy galvanized the Navy to target the LTTE Sea Tiger wing with renewed determination and reshaped our maritime operations forever. Every time I think of that day, I remember not just the lives lost, but the courage, professionalism, and dedication of those who survived, those who treated the injured, and those who ensured the fallen were honored properly. May the souls of our naval hero’s rest in peace, their sacrifice guiding us and inspiring generations of naval personnel to come.
Features
‘Murder at Whitby Abbey’
Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 24
I was intrigued by the title of a book I found in a book drop at the condominium of a friend, Murder at Whitby Abbey, and I brought it home with me though I will not be able to return it in the near future. It was described on the cover page as ‘a standout in the crowded medieval mystery field’, though I fear I do not know of other books in this field, apart from the Cadfael series, which I have dealt with earlier.
The book, by Cassandra Clark, is set during the reign of Richard II and has as a backdrop his precarious position, which led to his being replaced, and murdered, by his cousin Henry, who reigned as Henry IV. It is a gloomy book, the action taking place in the twelve days of Christmas leading up to the Epiphany. And the gloom is pervasive, even though this is supposed to be a time of festivity, with mummers performing, and many of those in the guest house where the heroine stays going to town to enjoy themselves, with much drinking and much music, which also fills the guesthouse.
The heroine Hildegarde is a nun, sent to try to acquire a relic being sold by Whitby Abbey, though this was also a penance set by the Abbot of the monastery that governed her abbess because she had had sex with a man. Soon after she and her companions reach the Abbey set high on a cliff, she finds that there are other bidders, and soon suspects that the hierarchy, not perhaps the Abbot who seems a weakling, but his rapacious bursar, is determined to make money, and not above creating false relics to sell to several aspirants.
After Hildegarde and her Cistercian companions – Whitby is a Benedictine Foundation – two monks, Gregory and Egbert, and a young priest Mark, reach the abbey, they find that Aelwyn, a monk they had met on their way to the guesthouse had died. This was in the apple store, and they realize, when they find the surplices of novices stuffed into the air vents, that he had been left to suffocate in the overwhelming scent of apples.
The Cistercians are asked to look into the death, perhaps because they are likely to get no cooperation from the Abbey folk, but perhaps because those in charge are keen to know what happened. And the infirmarer, an old monk, suggests Hildegarde talk to a man called Edred who worked for the bursar, and had been a friend of Aelwyn’s. But Edred too is killed, before he can keep an appointment he had made with Hildegarde, drowned in a pool near the farmhouse of the Abbey.
Meanwhile tensions arise between the fisherfolk and the abbey for the bursar wants to charge them for using the beach that technically belongs to the abbey to dry their fish and their nets. This leads to physical battles, when the guards used by the abbey, under the command it seems of the bursar whose determination to make money is not resisted by the abbot and the prior, try to storm the area where the fishermen live.
Hildegard finds out more about what had happened through two youngsters, one of whom Torold is the son of Aelwyn by a woman who worked as a prostitute for a cartel, and with whom Mark fell in love. The other works on the farm and had seen Edred meet someone near the pool, after which that someone left the place by himself. And the boy had also found in the pool a sort of dagger with the seal of the abbey.
He and his dog, and Torold who follows her, rescue Hildegarde from a man at arms who has waylaid her and tries to rape her earlier. Escaping into the abbey she was nearly been raped then by the bursar, but she managed to escape, in the process setting fire to him and the muniments room, which led, when he was rescued, to the discovery of a box with the money he said had been stolen, blame being cast on both Aelwyn and Edred.
Matters come to a head when the fisherfolk try to storm the abbey, being resisted by the men at arms stationed on the towers. But then Hildegarde realizes that behind the murders was the bursar’s clerk, whom she pursued to the cathedral. There is great drama then as she escapes from him when he tries to kill her, and then from the man at arms who had tried to both rape and kill her, but they both fall from the scaffolding she had climbed, the latter coming from a tower where he had been stationed.
Both of them think they run the rapacity of the abbey, the latter claiming to work for the nobles opposed to Richard, who is presented throughout the book as devoted to his subjects, not to power or money. But though the villains die, the bursar continues, having got over the hysteria the fire had caused and his acknowledgment then of guilt – and though the abbot and the prior seem less vicious, whether they will be able to assert themselves is questionable.
Before the climax, when the others in the guesthouse were leaving, Hildegarde found that two of them were in possession of the relic, for which they seem to have paid well. Hildegarde herself had made a derisory offer, but before she leaves the abbot gives her the relic, perhaps in gratitude for what she and her fellow Cistercians had discovered, the abbey having made as much money as it needed and more from the gullible other buyers.
Mark’s inamorata is saved from the stews because she moves in with Edred’s widow whom the bursar had thrown out of the rooms he occupied when her husband was found dead. Hildegarde had paid for lodgings, in a house run by the man who ran the brothels, but he had a kindly side and was going to finance them to make nets for the fishermen.
So, the Cistercians set off for their home as swiftly as they can to get there on the day of the Epiphany, having stopped en route to pray for King Richard whose birthday it was.
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