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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part IX

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Kadirgamar

(Part VIII of this article appeared yesterday)

Reflections on Perplexity in Sri Lankan Foreign Policy (1990-2024)

Since the end of the Cold War, the three geopolitical spheres of Sri Lanka have been significantly shifted.  At the same time, the internal politics and the economy have also faced intense volatility, moving from war to a post-war environment. However, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy moved without a clear strategic direction, often following an inconsistent, zigzagging path. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy objectives shifted frequently, driven more by internal political winds than by a coherent long-term vision. Hence, the country’s foreign policy was proceeding without a clear strategy, pursuing immediate yet undefined goals in an ad hoc manner. As a result, contradictions and inconsistencies became the hallmark of foreign policy. Decisions were often made on the spur of the moment, with little consideration for their alignment with other policy stances within the same administration.

Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was once staffed by internationally famed, highly skilled foreign policy professionals who possessed deep understanding of global affairs and international trends. These professionals provided essential guidance to political leadership, ensuring the country’s diplomatic effectiveness. However, mirroring broader governance deficits across various sectors of the state, the MFA has later gradually lost its skilled manpower and effectiveness. In particular, following the departure of Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who sought to restore order and proper procedures to the MFA, excessive politicisation and the lack of effective refresher programmes on global affairs and diplomacy have severely undermined the ministry’s ability to fulfill its crucial role during this challenging period. As a result, the MFA has struggled to formulate and implement a coherent foreign policy. Internal feuds among staff and the pursuit of political favour for lucrative diplomatic appointments have further eroded its focus on substantive diplomatic engagement. Consequently, the MFA has become increasingly ineffective in advancing Sri Lanka’s foreign policy objectives, reflecting the overall governance deficit facing the Sri Lankan state.

Policy, in general, consists of two fundamental components: clearly identifying and prioritising goals and objectives and developing effective strategies to achieve them. These elements work together to ensure that policies are actionable and aligned with desired outcomes. Policy-making is a dynamic and evolving process that requires continuous assessment of the context in which it operates. At the same time, without viable implementation mechanisms, even the most thoughtfully crafted policies remain theoretical rather than practical. Therefore, successful policy-making demands not only clear objectives and strategies but also robust structures for execution and adaptation to ensure policies translate effectively into real-world implementation.  By the same token, even a highly skilled implementation mechanism would become impotent without clearly prioritised objectives and a well-defined implementation strategy.  During this period, Sri Lanka struggled, to varying degrees, across all three key aspects of policy-making: setting clear objectives, developing effective strategies, and ensuring successful implementation.

The core element of foreign affairs is a state’s interaction with other states within the international system. While the scope and agency of foreign policy have expanded to include other actors and factors, the state still remains the dominant player.  According to Barry Buzan’s categorization (Buzan, 1991) of weak and strong states, Sri Lanka exemplifies a weak state–not due to its military capability or size, but because of its internal structural weaknesses, particularly a lack of socio-political cohesion.  Weak states are characterized by poor governance, low political cohesion, a legitimacy deficit, and ideological instability. When a state is structurally weak and insecure—especially a small state in the Global South—this insecurity is reflected in its foreign policy. In Sri Lanka’s case, its domestic vulnerabilities directly shape its foreign policy approaches. A weak state and politically threatened regimes can hardly adopt strong foreign policy stances.

Ethno-political vulnerability has been the primary factor consuming the energy and focus of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. It remains the central weakness of the state. There were several attempts to build an inclusive state by introducing structural changes to the system Sri Lanka inherited in 1948. However, many of these efforts were abandoned midway due to a lack of political courage and will, especially in the face of opposition. The new constitution proposed in1996, which included provisions for genuine power devolution to the regions, was delayed in an attempt to gain opposition support. Ultimately, it was effectively rejected in parliament. Meanwhile, the steady erosion of democracy and the politicisation of administrative institutions gradually undermined the legitimacy of the state. Economic mismanagement and corruption further weakened the economy. As a result, three key domestic vulnerabilities became defining features of Sri Lankan polity—ethnic, economic, and political.

The hard-fought military victory and the end of the war in 2009 presented a historic opportunity to transform negative peace into a positive peace by laying the foundation for an inclusive and stable state. However, Sri Lanka failed to seize this moment. As a result, new challenges relating to ethnic reconciliation emerged with new vigor in the post-war context and state’s ethnic vulnerabilities played a crucial role in shaping foreign policy, as issues such as transitional justice, accountability, and the full implementation of the 19th Amendment shifted from being purely domestic matters to central foreign policy issues. When different political leaders within the same government express contradictory views—or when the same leaders take inconsistent positions over time—Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomats struggle to justify the country’s stance before the international community. As a small state that is both economically and politically fragile, Sri Lanka cannot pursue a strong foreign policy without effectively addressing these domestic vulnerabilities.

Sri Lanka’s economic vulnerability stems from both structural weaknesses and internal mismanagement of the economy. As a developing economy in the Global South, the country has faced deep-rooted structural weaknesses that have left it dependent on external forces for economic stability. Sri Lanka’s economy has long faced structural deficiencies, relying heavily on key sources such as tourism, export-oriented garments, and remittances. Additionally, high levels of debt—primarily due to excessive borrowing from international creditors—have created a cycle of dependency on foreign aid and international financial institutions. Clearly demarcating the internal policy sphere from the external one is difficult, as structural economic vulnerabilities both influenced policy priorities and constrained the pursuit of a strong foreign policy.

Even more pressing issue is the mismanagement of the economy and widespread corruption, both of which have severely undermined Sri Lanka’s economic stability. Especially, the post-war governments have pursued unsustainable fiscal policies, excessive borrowing, and poor allocation of public resources. Corruption has further deepened the crisis, marked by allegations of fund misappropriation using political power, a lack of financial transparency, and nepotism in economic decision-making. These issues have eroded investor confidence, discouraged foreign direct investment, and contributed to capital flight. Given Sri Lanka’s reliance on foreign assistance and international financial institutions, its ability to take strong, independent stances on economic and political matters is significantly constrained. Economic survival often depends on complying with the conditions set by lenders. Economic vulnerabilities, stemming from the governments’ economic practices, significantly impact Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, often constraining its ability to act independently.

Ultimately, these vulnerabilities are directly linked to the modus operandi of governing regimes. But why did political leadership behave in this manner? The lack of vision cannot be solely attributed to the subjective traits of individual leaders. Rather, systemic and institutional factors play a crucial role in shaping decision-making. However, this does not absolve political leaders of responsibility for foreign policy failures. Too often, they prioritize personal political interests over national priorities, leading to governance and diplomatic shortcomings.

Even after the decisive military victory over the LTTE, the regime in power remained threatened and insecure. The deployment of armed squads—both in uniform and plainclothes—and the use of force against civilians engaged in legitimate, non-violent protests are not characteristics of a stable and confident regime. Instead, such actions reflect the behaviour of a weak state and a threatened leadership. Even before the Aragalaya, successive regimes repeatedly used military force against peaceful protesters, as seen in Katunayake (June 2011), Chilaw (February 2012), and Rathupaswala (August 2013). A state that feels threatened and insecure cannot pursue a strong foreign policy.

The insecurity of regimes arises from their weak and fragile social and economic foundations. A dependent and weak economy has failed to give birth to strong, independent, and self-sustaining economic elites. Instead, these elites rely heavily on the state for their economic survival. A defining feature of Sri Lankan politics is the emergence and dominance of a political class that alternates in power. This political class coincided with the expansion of the public sector. This paved the way for the political class to siphon on state resources using political power. As a result, economic decisions have often been driven by personal interests rather than national priorities— a dynamic that is also reflected in the country’s foreign policy.

After years of war, the Sri Lankan people, regardless of ethnic divisions, are yearning for political reforms to strengthen democracy and good governance. However, successive politically insecure regimes continue to falter in implementing democratic reforms, often prioritising their own survival over long-term institutional change. This is evident in the constant vacillation of political leaders and their contradictory statements to the international community. This insecurity is evident in the constant vacillation of political leaders regarding reform efforts, as well as their contradictory statements to the international community. What we are witnessing is a steady backsliding of democracy and the rise of authoritarian tendencies, which are characteristic of a weak regime.

The Aragalaya highlighted a crucial truth: economic crises are often the result of deep-seated political failures. Sri Lanka’s financial collapse was not merely a product of mismanaged economic policies but a consequence of prolonged corruption, governance deficit, and unchecked power. The economic collapse exposed how unchecked power, lack of transparency and poor decision-making can destabilise an entire economy, underscoring the urgent need for political accountability and structural reforms.

In the short term, urgent economic measures are necessary to mitigate the impact of bankruptcy and restore some level of financial stability. Debt restructuring, securing international assistance, promoting exports, and implementing fiscal discipline are critical steps in this process. A sustainable solution requires addressing the underlying political crisis that initially triggered economic turmoil. Without political reforms—such as strengthening democratic institutions, ensuring accountability, curbing corruption, and promoting inclusive governance—economic policies will not succeed. Economic stability, investor confidence, and sustainable growth all hinge on these reforms. Political reform is the sine qua non of a strong foreign policy.

One of the key responsibilities and challenges facing the new NPP government is pursuing a strong foreign policy with a strategic perspective. This is a formidable task that requires accurately identifying foreign policy priorities, selecting viable strategies appropriate for a small island state, and advancing them prudently while carefully assessing critical developments in regional and global political spheres. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a crucial instrument for implementing foreign policy, is currently in a state of disarray and confusion. Restoring stability through the de-politicisation of its administration and strengthening the professional development of its staff through targeted programmes remain urgent priorities.

Foreign policy is a key aspect of statecraft. Given its linkages to the policy spheres, foreign policy cannot be isolated from state’s broader policy directions. A comprehensive approach with well- defined policy orientation is essential.  The significance of a coordinated foreign policy with a strategic vision aligned with national interests has grown even more critical due to pivotal developments in Sri Lanka’s external geopolitical environment, making it no longer possible to continue responding in an ad-hoc manner.  How to pursue relative autonomy vis-à-vis India while getting benefits from India’s economic and scientific advancements is decided with a clear policy direction with realistic

understanding with our strengths and weaknesses.  Our role amid the emerging power competition between great powers in the Indian Ocean needs to be decided with a clear perception of our national interests. At the global level, the global shift of power balance that made 21st century an Asian century is critically important to a strategically located small state. Navigating Sri Lanka’s position in the highly volatile Indian Ocean where the direction of global power is decided requires a proper evaluation of our national priorities, rather than advancing the narrow self-interests of the ruling class.

A strong foreign policy depends on an objective evaluation of Sri Lanka’s national interests, which in turn requires a strong state. In the Buzanian sense, a strong state—marked by institutional stability, legitimacy, and internal cohesion—enables the pursuit of a coherent and independent foreign policy. Hence, the necessity of a strong foreign policy underscores the critical importance of comprehensive state reforms.  Political reforms aimed at dismantling entrenched political authority and economic power linked to it is essential for building a strong foreign policy. In the post-war years, political reforms have been held hostage by military victory and war triumphalism. However, critical state reforms can no longer be postponed.

State reforms are integral to democratic political reform. The link between democratic governance and a strong foreign policy is undeniable. A capable, depoliticized foreign policy workforce that provides informed policy input is essential for a healthy foreign policy. However, corruption, nepotism, and governance deficits—often tied to the dominance of the political class—undermine these efforts. This same class has also been a driving force behind democratic backsliding. Institutionalizing good governance and the rule of law requires comprehensive democratic reforms in both institutions and processes.

The thrust of the National People’s Power (NPP) government’s mandate centers on implementing long-overdue democratic reforms. These reforms are essential not only for strengthening internal governance but also for shaping a credible and effective foreign policy. In the long run, the success of the NPP’s foreign policy will depend on its ability to fulfill its domestic commitments to political and institutional reforms, one that aligns with both the aspirations of its people and international democratic standards. However, achieving comprehensive democratic reform is a gradual process that requires political will, courage and strategic planning. (Concluded)

 References

Aryasinghe, Ravinatha. ‘Sri Lankawa ha kalapeeya sahayogathawa”  Jagath ha Kalapeeya Sandharbhahehila Sri Lankawa (in Sinhala), Colombo: Bandaranaike Center for International Studie, 1997.

Buzan, Barry. 2002. “South Asia moving Towards Transformation: Emergence of India as a Great Power”, International Studies, 39:1, 2.

Buzan, Barrr. 1991. People, States and Fear – Agenda for International Security Studies in the Pos-Cold War Era. Boulder, Lynn Rienner Publishers.

Chang, Michael. 2024. ” India’s Secretive Nuclear Submarine Base Takes Shape in Andhra Pradesh,” Military News, 06 June 2024. https://military.news/ins-varsha-india-s-secretive-nuclear-submarine-base-takes-shape-in-andhra-pradesh

Deb. Sheershoo. 2021, “INS Varsha: India’s Secret Nuclear Submarine base”, 2021, DefenceXP, www.defencexp.com › ins-varsha-indias-secret-submarine-nuclear-base.

Forbes India, 10 January 2025. https://www.forbesindia.com/article/explainers/top-10-largest-economies-in-the-world/86159/1

Global Firepower 2024, www.globalfirepower.com

Jayathilake, Dayan. “Premdasa: ‘Savadeshya’ & Docial Democracy,’  Colombo Telegraph, 24 June 2014

Jayawardane, Amal. 2025. “Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Challenges in the Post-War Period”, in Gamini Keerawella and Amal Jayawardane , eds., Reflections on the Continuing Crises of Post-War Sri Lanka. Colombo, Design Systems (Pvt) Ltd, 2025

Jennings, Ivor. 1951. Commonwealth in Asia. London. Oxford University Press:  P.113

Nixon.  Richard M, 1973. United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace – A Report to the Congress, GPO, 1973.

The Hindu, 04-01-2022

Pecotic, Adrian. 2019.”Whoever Predicts the Future Will Win the AI Arms Race”, Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2019.

Rehman, Iskander. 2015. Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean. Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Salter, Mark. 2015. To End a Civil War- Norway’s Peace Engagement in Sri Lanka, London, Hurst & Company.

Smith, Chris. 2003.In the Shadow of a Ceasefire: The Impact of Small Arms Availability  and Misuse in Sri Lanka – Small Arms Survey – Occasional Paper No.11 Geneva. Graduate Institute of International Studies, October 2003

World Economic Forum. 2019.  “We’ve entered the Asian Century and there is no turning back”, October 11, 2019. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/10/has-world-entered-asian-century-what-does-it-mean/

by Gamini Keerawella



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Opinion

Pot calling the kettle black?

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Doctor Upul Wijayawardhana (eminent physician), posed a riddle for us. He wrote about that island Sri Lanka as ‘ this little dot in the ocean’ when deriding the remark of President Dissanayake who had said that Sri Lanka was a hunduva , a term that indicated a small volume: me hunduve inna puluvan da? (Can you live in this restricted space?) Most sensible people, even uneducated, judge that the volume of a little drop (of whatever) is smaller than that of a hunduva; so is weight. When the learned doctor emphatically maintains ‘….we are not a hunduva’ but ‘… a little dot in the ocean…’, is the pot calling the kettle black or worse?

Physically and population wise, Sri Lanka is neither ‘a little dot’ nor ‘a hunduva. This is all in the rich imaginations of Dissanayake and Wijayawardhana. I once counted that there were more than 50 members of the UN who were smaller than Sri Lanka in physical and population size. England was a sizeable island with a small population in the northwest corner of Europe in late 18th century when it began to become what China, with 1.3 billion people and jutting out to the Pacific, is now. From about 1850, when the population of Great Britain was about 20 million, less than that of Sri Lanka in 2026, it ruled more than half the world. Besides, do not forget Vanuatu, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Lesotho and New Zealand (who habitually beats us at cricket). New Zealand with 5 million population played against 1.5 billion population India (1:300) for the T20 cricket championship a few weeks ago. I quietly wished New Zealand would win; so much for crap about dots in the Indian Ocean or the south Pacific.

Dr. Wijayawardhana also wrote about history and about ‘The achievements of Hunduwa’. The massive reservoirs and extensive irrigation systems in rajarata and ruhuna as well as the stupa are indeed tremendous works of irrigation and bear witness to superior ingenuity and organising ability, for the time they were built. They compare very well among structures elsewhere in the ancient world. Terms like ‘granary of the East’ must be taken with more than a grain of salt. Facile use of such terms does not take account of whatever shreds of evidence there is of adversity in those times. Monsoon Asia over the ages has more or less regularly suffered from floods, droughts and consequent famines. The last dire famine was in Bengal in 1944. The irrigation works in Lanka were a magnificent response to those phenomena. The modern response has been scientific agriculture making India a major grain exporter, from near famine conditions in 1973-74. Recall Indira Gandhi’s garibi hatao (eliminate poverty) speech to the General Assembly of the UN, that year.

The bhikkhu who wrote down the tripitaka in aluvihara did so because there was the threat of a severe famine in the course of which learned bhikkhu might have come to harm. Buddhist thought over centuries had been passed from generation to generation vocally (saamici patipanno bhagavato savaka (listener) sangho) and the departure from that tradition must have required a major threat of famine. There are stories of bhikkhu from Lanka fleeing from dire straits. In the same vein, while the mahavamsa speaks of kings and their valiant deeds, there is little account of the large mass of little people who lived then. Sensible teaching of the history of a people must include the history of as much of the people as possible and some idea of the history of other peoples in comparable times to avoid feeling dangerously smug and arrogant, which we have seen many times over.

Usvatte-aratchi

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Ministerial resignation and new political culture

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Kumara Jayakody

The resignation of Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody comes after several weeks of controversy over his ministerial role. The controversy sharpened when the minister was indicted by the Commission on Bribery and Corruption for a transaction he was involved in ten years ago as a government official in the Fertiliser Corporation. The other issue was the government’s purchase of substandard coal from a new supplier. Minister Jayakody’s resignation followed the appointment of a Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry to investigate coal and petroleum purchases. The minister who resigned, along with the Secretary to the Ministry of Energy, Udayanga Hemapala, stated that they did not wish to compromise the integrity of the investigation to be undertaken by the Commission of Inquiry.

The government’s initial resistance to holding the minister accountable for the costly purchase was based on the argument that the official procedure had been followed in ordering the coal. However, the fact that the procedure permitted a disadvantageous purchase which has come to light on this occasion suggests a weakness in the process. The government’s appointment of the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry to examine purchases as far back as 2009 follows from this observation. In this time 450 purchases are reported to have been made, and if several of them were as disadvantageous as this one, the cost to the country can be imagined. The need to investigate transactions since 2009 also arises from the possibility that loopholes in official government procedures in the past would have permitted private enrichment at a high cost to the country.

Concerns have been expressed in the past that the purchase of coal and petroleum, often on an emergency basis, enabled the use of emergency procurement processes which do not require going through the full tender procedures. The government has pledged to eradicate corruption as its priority. As a result, the general population would expect it to do everything within its power to correct those systems that permitted such corruption. Accountability is not only forward looking to ensure non-corrupt practices in the present, it is also backward looking to ensure that corrupt practices of the past are discontinued. This would be a matter of concern to those who headed government ministries and departments in previous governments. Those who have misapplied the systems can be expected to do their utmost to resist any investigation into the past.

Politically Astute

One of the main reasons for the government’s continuing popularity among the general population, as reflected in February 2026 public opinion poll by Verité Research, has been its willingness to address the problem of corruption. Public opinion studies have consistently shown that corruption remains one of the top concerns of citizens in Sri Lanka. The arrests and indictments of members of former governments have been viewed with general satisfaction as paving the way to a less corrupt society. At the same time, the resignations of Minister Kumara Jayakody and Secretary Udayanga Hemapala are an indication that not even government members will be spared if they are found to have crossed red lines. This is an important signal, as public confidence depends not only on holding political opponents to account but also on demonstrating fairness and consistency within one’s own ranks.

There appears to be a strategy on the part of the opposition to target government leaders and allege corruption so that ministers will be forced to step down. Organised protests against other ministers, and demonstrations outside their homes, are on the rise. The government appears not to want to give in to this opposition strategy and therefore delayed the resignation of Minister Jayakody until it had itself established the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry. It enabled the minister to step down without it seeming that the government was yielding to opposition pressure. In political terms, this was a calibrated response that sought to balance the need for accountability with the need to maintain authority and coherence in governance.

The demand by opposition parties to focus attention on the coal problem could also be seen as an attempt to shift the national debate from the corruption of the past to controversies in the present. The opposition’s endeavour would be to take the heat off themselves in regard to the corruption of the past and turn it onto the government by making it the focus of inquiries into corruption. The decision to set up a Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry accompanied by the resignation of the minister and the ministry secretary was a politically astute way of demonstrating that the government will have no tolerance for corruption. It will also help to remind the general public about the rampant corruption of past governments which prevents the opposition’s corruption accusations against the government from gaining traction amongst the people.

New Practice

The resignation of a government minister who faces allegations but has not been convicted is still a relatively new practice in Sri Lanka. The general practice in Sri Lanka up to the present time has been for those in government service, if found to be at fault, to be transferred rather than removed from office. This is commonly seen in the case of police officers who, if found to have used excessive force or engaged in abuse, are transferred to another station rather than subjected to more serious disciplinary action. A similar pattern was seen in the case of former minister Keheliya Rambukwella, who faced allegations of corruption in the health field but was reassigned to a different portfolio rather than removed from government.

Against this background, the present resignation assumes greater importance. It signals a willingness to break with past practices and to establish a higher standard of conduct in public office. However, a single instance does not in itself create a lasting change. What is required is the consistent application of the same principle across all cases, irrespective of political affiliation or convenience. This is where the government has an opportunity to strengthen its credibility. By ensuring that the same standards of accountability are applied to its own members as to those of previous governments, it can demonstrate that its commitment to good governance is not selective.

The establishment of the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry, the willingness to accept ministerial resignation, and the recognition of systemic weaknesses in procurement are all steps in the right direction. The challenge now is to ensure that these steps are followed through with determination and consistency. If the investigations are conducted impartially and lead to meaningful reforms, the present controversy could mark a turning point. The resignation of the minister should not be seen as an isolated event but as the beginning of a new practice. If it becomes part of a broader pattern of accountability, it can contribute to a new political culture and to restoring public trust in government.

by Jehan Perera

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Opinion

Shutting roof top solar panels – a crime

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The Island newspaper’s lead news item on the 12th of April 2026 was on the CEB request to shut down rooftop solar power during the low demand periods. Their argument is that rooftop solar panels produce about 300 MW power during the day and there is no procedure to balance the grid with such a load.

We as well as a large academic and industrial consortium members have been trying to promote solar energy as a viable and sustainable power source since the early 1990’s. We formed the Solar Energy Society and made representations to Government politicians about the need to have solar power generation. This continuous promotional work contributed to the rapid increase in PV solar companies from three in the early 1990’s to over 650 active PV solar companies established today in the country. These companies have created tens of thousands of high-quality jobs, as well as moving in the right direction for sustainable development.

However, all these efforts appear to have been in vain since the CEB policy makers have continuously rejected solar energy as a viable alternative. Their power generation plans at that time did not include solar energy at all but only relied on imported coal power plants and diesel power generation. Even at the meetings where CEB senior staff were present, we emphasised the importance of installation of battery storage facilities and grid balancing for which they have done nothing at all over the past three decades. Now they have grudgingly accepted the need to include solar energy, which was an election promise of the present government. The government policy is that Sri Lanka should go for renewables to satisfy 70% of its energy needs by 2030 and soon move towards the green hydrogen technology by using solar and wind energy.

The question is why the diesel generators and hydropower stations cannot be shut off one by one to accommodate the solar power generated during the daytime. Unlike a coal-fired plant, diesel generators and hydro power plants can be shut off in a relatively shorter period of time. Norochchalai Lakvijaya power plant produces around 900 MW of power while the total country requirement is 2500 MW on a daily basis. The remainder is provided by diesel generators, hydro and other renewable energy sources.

The need for work to achieve this goal of grid balancing should be the primary responsibility of the CEB. Modern grid balancing systems are in operation in countries such as Germany where around 56% of its energy come from renewable sources. They also plan to increase this to reach 80% of the energy required through renewables by 2030. Our CEB is hell bent on diesel power plants. Who benefits from such emergency power purchases is anybody’s guess?

The Government and the CEB should realise that all roof top solar plants are privately financed through personal funds or bank loans with no financial burden on the Government. It is a crime to request them not to operate these solar panels and get the necessary credits for the power transmitted to the national grid. It appears that the results of CEB’s lack of grid balancing experience and unwillingness to learn over three decades have now passed to the privately-funded rooftop solar panel owners. It is unfortunate that the Government is not considering the contributions of ordinary individuals who provide clean power to the national grid at no cost to the Government. Over 150,000 rooftop solar panels owners are severely affected by these ruthless decisions by the CEB, and this will lead to the un-popularity of this new government in the end.

by Professors Oliver Ileperuma and I M Dharmadasa

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