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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part IV

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Sri Lankan Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War

By the end of the Cold War, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy priorities were predominantly shaped by its armed conflict with the LTTE, despite pivotal shifts in its regional and global geopolitical spaces. The significance of the country’s foreign relations was largely viewed through the lens of its strategic needs in the ongoing civil war, often overshadowing other broader regional and global developments.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 and the subsequent establishment of the Provincial Council system under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution failed to bring lasting peace and merely perpetuated the vicious cycle of violence. Meanwhile, the uprising (1987-1989) led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and its ruthless suppression deepened the political and social turmoil and tarnished the country’s democratic credentials, further constraining the government’s ability to focus and react to broad external strategic developments. As a result, the critical shifts occurring in South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the global strategic environment after the Cold War were more or less overlooked in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy decisions.

Following the decisive military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, Sri Lanka underwent a significant shift in its politico-strategic needs, marking the beginning of a new phase in the country’s foreign policy. With the conclusion of the protracted civil war, a different set of issues came to the forefront and decided Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and geopolitical priorities. Accordingly, the evolution of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era can be divided in two distinct phases, with the end of the war in 2009 acting as a pivotal turning point.

Enduring Crises and Foreign Policy

under President Premadasa

When Ranasinghe Premadasa assumed the presidency after a violence-ridden election, Sri Lanka was mired in multi-faceted crises. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), initially deployed to supervise the Peace Accord, quickly found it embroiled in violent conflict with the LTTE in the North. Maneuvering the IPKF’s withdrawal without alienating India became a delicate and daunting challenge. Meanwhile, the brutal suppression of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurgency in the South only deepened the country’s instability and culpability, further intensifying international backlash over human rights violations.

Despite facing significant challenges, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy lacked coherence and strategic direction. The government’s foreign policy responses were often reactive, addressing events in isolation rather than within a broader strategic framework. Decision-making appeared to be driven more by immediate political considerations than by long-term objectives. As a result, Sri Lanka became entrapped in a foreign policy dilemma, struggling to manage multiple crises across various fronts simultaneously.

One of President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s key achievements was persuading/pressuring  India to withdraw the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka in 1990. However, it also strained Indo-Sri Lanka relations in the short term. One of the key achievements of President Ranasinghe Premadasa was persuading India to withdraw the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka. However, this success came at the cost-damaging Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

During a public meeting on June 1, 1989, President Premadasa demanded the complete withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka by July 29, 1989, giving India just two months’ notice. India was taken aback by the manner in which this demand was made and made it clear that Sri Lanka could not impose a unilateral deadline. India was only prepared for a phased withdrawal and had limited options. In response, India made a misguided decision to train a Tamil National Army.

In an effort to pressure India into withdrawing the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka, President Premadasa sought to leverage the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In July 1989, Sri Lanka boycotted the SAARC Ministerial-level meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan. Furthermore, Sri Lanka made it clear that it would not host the SAARC Summit scheduled later that year in Colombo. The Sri Lanka informed SAARC countries that the Summit could not precede in Colombo as long as the IPKF remained stationed in the country against its will (RavinathaAryasinha, 1997: 54)

After V.P. Singh of Janata Dal became Prime Minister of India in December 1989, the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka was expedited. In contrast to Rajiv Gandhi’s position, I.K.Gujral, the External Affairs Minister in the Janata Dal government, stated that “Tamil security is an internal matter of Sri Lanka.” He expressed hope that the Sri Lankan government had learned from the lessons of history and would no longer deny the country’s ethnic minorities their due rights (Sunday Times, 29 April 1990).

However, the rescheduled Summit for Colombo in 1990 was ultimately not held there. The Maldives insisted on hosting the summit in Malé, coinciding with the 25th anniversary of it becoming a Republic. The failure of the planned 1990 summit in Colombo also reflects the complex regional dynamics at the time.

After the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) swiftly reemerged as a formidable military and political force in the North and East of Sri Lanka, setting the stage for the onset of Eelam War II in June 1990. In the 1990s, parallel to the expansion of Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, the LTTE’s international influence grew significantly.

Its front organisations in Western countries became increasingly active, openly fundraising, pressuring host governments on behalf of the LTTE, and even facilitating the transportation of arms and supplies to the conflict zones in Sri Lanka. This growing international network of support posed a substantial challenge to the Sri Lankan government. Moreover, the LTTE frequently framed its actions as a response to alleged human rights violations by the Sri Lankan government, using this narrative to justify its activities and gain international sympathy and support. The complexities of this issue—encompassing both military confrontations and political maneuvering—posed a formidable challenge that required a comprehensive strategy and sharp diplomatic acumen.

The Premadasa administration failed to fully recognise the growing significance of the international public sphere and the increasing prominence of international human rights frameworks. These were often dismissed as instruments of the LTTE’s propaganda. The Sri Lankan government held a largely negative view of Western countries that raised human rights concerns, perceiving these countries as supportive of the LTTE. This perception, coupled with a failure to distinguish between the LTTE and the broader ethnic conflict, impeded the government’s ability to formulate an effective strategy in response to international criticism.

Despite his unconventional approach, President Premadasa recognised that the Foreign Ministry was in disarray, lacking direction amidst the decisive challenges facing the country. In response, he established a Foreign Affairs Study Group, chaired by Dr. Gamani Corea, to address the situation (Dayan Jayatilleka, 2017). The group completed its report on restructuring Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and diplomatic missions, but before it could be presented, President Premadasa was tragically assassinated. Following his death, President Wijetunga, the caretaker president, assumed office but hesitated to take any new initiatives on the matter.

Change Vision and Restructuring under President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga

The efforts to instill a new policy vision and reshape the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) began after the People’s Alliance (PA) assumed power in 1995 under the leadership of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. By the time Kumaratunga assumed the presidency, the MFA was in disarray—lacking direction and burdened by excessive politicisation. To address this, President Kumaratunga appointed Lakshman Kadirgamar as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Drawing on his extensive experience as an international civil servant, Kadirgamar implemented reforms to streamline recruitment, promotions, and diplomatic postings, restoring some order to the MFA. At the same time, the government sought to bolster Sri Lanka’s democratic image on the international stage.

Strengthening the country’s credentials as a functional democracy was viewed as essential for garnering global support in addressing the LTTE military challenge. In this context, internal policy reforms were expected to provide strong backing to a foreign policy with a clear vision and direction.

The PA government marked a significant departure from the antagonistic stance of its predecessors towards international human rights bodies. Recognising the growing influence of the global public sphere on national policies, the PA government made a deliberate effort to engage with key international human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations. These engagements included open dialogues aimed at addressing concerns about Sri Lanka’s human rights situation.

The PA government’s commitment to international human rights standards and norms was demonstrated by its ratification of several major international human rights conventions. Additionally, the PA Government worked to strengthen domestic human rights institutions, particularly the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL), further solidifying its dedication to human rights both within Sri Lanka and on the international stage. These efforts were seen as essential for two reasons: promoting domestic reconciliation and enhancing Sri Lanka’s international credibility.

In light of the geopolitical implications of India’s strategic rise and changes in the South Asian geopolitical landscape, developing strong ties with India remained a key achievement of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under the People’s Alliance (PA) government. After decades of mutual suspicion,

accusations, and tensions, both countries recognised the importance of normalising their relations. President Chandrika Bandaranaike’s new vision and foreign policy approach provided a significant opportunity for a fresh start towards rapprochement. The Indian government’s diplomatic shift, marked by the Gujral Doctrine introduced by External Affairs Minister I. K. Gujral in 1996, further paved the way for improved bi-lateral relations. Indo-Sri Lanka relations had not been as cordial for decades as they were under President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. A key testament to the South Asian policy of the Kumaratunga administration was the 10th SAARC Summit held in Sri Lanka in 1998. During this summit, informal discussions between India and Pakistan, initiated through the personal efforts of President Kumaratunga, marked a critical development in the regional strategic context.

Under President Premadasa, Sri Lanka’s relations with Western powers, particularly Britain and the United States, began to deteriorate rapidly. For a small country like Sri Lanka, which was grappling with a significant internal armed conflict with international Diaspora linkages, navigating the post-Cold War global strategic landscape became a critical challenge. Nearly two-thirds of Sri Lanka’s export market was tied to the West—primarily Britain, the United States, and the European Union. At the same time, the LTTE’s international headquarters operated from Western capitals. Given this, Sri Lanka paid a steep price for its adversarial stance toward these Western powers. In contrast, one of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s notable achievements was her efforts to foster better relations with the West. By implementing internal democratic reforms and adopting the PA’s approach to the ethnic crisis, she created a more favourable environment for diplomatic engagement. This foreign policy shift paid off: In 1996, the United States resumed arms sales to Sri Lanka, and the US “Green Beret” corps began offering advanced training to the Sri Lankan security forces. This military support included specialized training missions by the US Navy SEALs, the US Air Force Special Operations Squadron, and the US Army’s Psychological Operations Group. The proscription of LTTE as a terrorist organization by the United States in October 1997, followed by similar designations from the United Kingdom in 2000 and Australia in 2001, dealt a severe blow to the LTTE international operations.

The dynamics of the crisis, however, posed significant obstacles to the continued implementation of this policy. Negotiations with the LTTE, which began in October 1994, collapsed on April 17, 1995, when the LTTE withdrew from both the talks and the ceasefire after four rounds of discussions. The hope of achieving a negotiated settlement with the LTTE was dashed within six months. The conflict with the LTTE once again became the central focus of foreign policy, but this time, the government’s
approach shifted from defensive to more assertive.

With the onset of Eelam War III, the government launched the Reviresa operation in November–December 1995 and regained control of Jaffna from the LTTE. In September 1996, the government conducted the Sath Jaya operation, which led to the recapture of Kilinochchi. However, the situation began to change in 1998. The government’s attempt to establish a land route to Jaffna failed, resulting in heavy human and material losses. By late 1998, military camps in Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Elephant Pass fell to the LTTE. Between 1999 and 2000, the Sri Lankan government forces suffered continuous setbacks on the military front.

Similarly, the proposal for the devolution of power, which had been incorporated into a draft of the new constitution, became entangled in political debates with the United National Party (UNP). The country had shown readiness to accept devolution through widespread public awareness campaigns, such as the Sudu Nelum movement. However, when the proposal was only presented to Parliament in August 2000, it was rejected by the UNP. As a result, the People’s Alliance (PA) government was unable to fulfill one of its key political promises to both the Tamil people and the international
community.

In 1999, another attempt was made to resume talks with the LTTE, this time with the prospect of third-party facilitation. President Kumaratunga explored the possibility of securing international involvement, with potential facilitators including France, a joint Commonwealth team, and the Vatican. By March 2000, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE agreed on Norway as the mediator. With Norwegian facilitation, a Ceasefire Agreement was drafted between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, scheduled to be signed on April 11, 2001. However, two days before the signing, the LTTE
unexpectedly declared that they would not proceed with the agreement, without providing any explanation for their decision.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella



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Opinion

Lakshman Balasuriya – Not just my boss but a father and a brother

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Lakshman Balasuriya

It is with profound sadness that we received the shocking news of untimely passing of our dear leader Lakshman Balasuriya.

I first met Lakshman Balasuriya in 1988 while working at John Keells, which had been awarded an IT contract to computerise Senkadagala Finance. Thereafter, in 1992, I joined the E. W. Balasuriya Group of Companies and Senkadagala Finance when the organisation decided to bring its computerisation in-house.

Lakshman Balasuriya obtained his BSc from the University of London and his MSc from the University of Lancaster. He was not only intellectually brilliant, but also a highly practical and pragmatic individual, often sitting beside me to share instructions and ideas, which I would then translate directly into the software through code.

My first major assignment was to computerise the printing press. At the time, the systems in place were outdated, and modernisation was a challenging task. However, with the guidance, strong support, and decisive leadership of our boss, we were able to successfully transform the printing press into a modern, state-of-the-art operation.

He was a farsighted visionary who understood the value and impact of information technology well ahead of his time. He possessed a deep knowledge of the subject, which was rare during those early years. For instance, in the 1990s, Balasuriya engaged a Canadian consultant to conduct a cybersecurity audit—an extraordinary initiative at a time when cybersecurity was scarcely spoken of and far from mainstream.

During that period, Senkadagala Finance’s head office was based in Kandy, with no branch network. When the decision was made to open the first branch in Colombo, our IT team faced the challenge of adapting the software to support branch operations. It was him who proposed the innovative idea of creating logical branches—a concept well ahead of its time in IT thinking. This simple yet powerful idea enabled the company to expand rapidly, allowing branches to be added seamlessly to the system. Today, after many upgrades and continuous modernisation, Senkadagala Finance operates over 400 locations across the country with real-time online connectivity—a testament to his original vision.

In September 2013, we faced a critical challenge with a key system that required the development of an entirely new solution. A proof of concept was prepared and reviewed by Lakshman Balasuriya, who gave the green light to proceed. During the development phase, he remained deeply involved, offering ideas, insights, and constructive feedback. Within just four months, the system was successfully developed and went live—another example of his hands-on leadership and unwavering support for innovation.

These are only a few examples among many of the IT initiatives that were encouraged, supported, and championed by him. Information technology has played a pivotal role in the growth and success of the E. W. Balasuriya Group of Companies, including Senkadagala Finance PLC, and much of that credit goes to his foresight, trust, and leadership.

On a deeply personal note, I was not only a witness to, but also a recipient of, the kindness, humility, and humanity of Lakshman Balasuriya. There were occasions when I lost my temper and made unreasonable demands, yet he always responded with firmness tempered by gentleness. He never lost his own composure, nor did he ever harbour grudges. He had the rare ability to recognise people’s shortcomings and genuinely tried to guide them toward self-improvement.

He was not merely our boss. To many of us, he was like a father and a brother.

I will miss him immensely. His passing has left a void that can never be filled. Of all the people I have known in my life, Mr. Lakshman Balasuriya stands apart as one of the finest human beings.

He leaves behind his beloved wife, Janine, his children Amanthi and Keshav, and the four grandchildren.

May he rest in eternal peace!

Timothy De Silva

(Information Systems Officer at Senkadagala Finance.)

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Opinion

The science of love

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A remarkable increase in marriage proposals in newspapers and the thriving matchmaking outfits in major cities indicate the difficulty in finding the perfect partners. Academics have done much research in interpersonal attraction or love. There was an era when young people were heavily influenced by romantic fiction. They learned how opposites attract and absence makes the heart grow fonder. There was, of course, an old adage: Out of sight out of mind.

Some people find it difficult to fall in love or they simply do not believe in love. They usually go for arranged marriages. Some of them think that love begins after marriage. There is an on-going debate whether love marriages are better than arranged marriages or vice versa. However, modern psychologists have shed some light on the science of love. By understanding it you might be able to find the ideal life partner.

To start with, do not believe that opposites attract. It is purely a myth. If you wish to fall in love, look for someone like you. You may not find them 100 per cent similar to you, but chances are that you will meet someone who is somewhat similar to you. We usually prefer partners who have similar backgrounds, interests, values and beliefs because they validate our own.

Common trait

It is a common trait that we gravitate towards those who are like us physically. The resemblance of spouses has been studied by scientists more than 100 years ago. According to them, physical resemblance is a key factor in falling in love. For instance, if you are a tall person, you are unlikely to fall in love with a short person. Similarly, overweight young people are attracted to similar types. As in everything in life, there may be exceptions. You may have seen some tall men in love with short women.

If you are interested in someone, declare your love in words or gestures. Some people have strong feelings about others but they never make them known. If you fancy someone, make it known. If you remain silent you will miss a great opportunity forever. In fact if someone loves you, you will feel good about yourself. Such feelings will strengthen love. If someone flatters you, be nice to them. It may be the beginning of a great love affair.

Some people like Romeo and Juliet fall in love at first sight. It has been scientifically confirmed that the longer a pair of prospective partners lock eyes upon their first meeting they are very likely to remain lovers. They say eyes have it. If you cannot stay without seeing your partner, you are in love! Whenever you meet your lover, look at their eyes with dilated pupils. Enlarged pupils signal intense arousal.

Body language

If you wish to fall in love, learn something about body language. There are many books written on the subject. The knowledge of body language will help you to understand non-verbal communication easily. It is quite obvious that lovers do not express their love in so many words. Women usually will not say ‘I love you’ except in films. They express their love tacitly with a shy smile or preening their hair in the presence of their lovers.

Allan Pease, author of The Definitive Guide to Body Language says, “What really turn men on are female submission gestures which include exposing vulnerable areas such as the wrists or neck.” Leg twine was something Princess Diana was good at. It involves crossing the legs hooking the upper leg’s foot behind the lower leg’s ankle. She was an expert in the art of love. Men have their own ways. In order to look more dominant than their partners they engage in crotch display with their thumbs hooked in pockets. Michael Jackson always did it.

If you are looking for a partner, be a good-looking guy. Dress well and behave sensibly. If your dress is unclean or crumpled, nobody will take any notice of you. According to sociologists, men usually prefer women with long hair and proper hip measurements. Similarly, women prefer taller and older men because they look nice and can be trusted to raise a family.

Proximity rule

You do not have to travel long distances to find your ideal partner. He or she may be living in your neighbourhood or working at the same office. The proximity rule ensures repeated exposure. Lovers should meet regularly in order to enrich their love. On most occasions we marry a girl or boy living next door. Never compare your partner with your favourite film star. Beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder. Therefore be content with your partner’s physical appearance. Each individual is unique. Never look for another Cleopatra or Romeo. Sometimes you may find that your neighbour’s wife is more beautiful than yours. On such occasions turn to the Bible which says, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife.”

There are many plain Janes and penniless men in society. How are they going to find their partners? If they are warm people, sociable, wise and popular, they too can find partners easily. Partners in a marriage need not be highly educated, but they must be intelligent enough to face life’s problems. Osho compared love to a river always flowing. The very movement is the life of the river. Once it stops it becomes stagnant. Then it is no longer a river. The very word river shows a process, the very sound of it gives you the feeling of movement.

Although we view love as a science today, it has been treated as an art in the past. In fact Erich Fromm wrote The Art of Loving. Science or art, love is a terrific feeling.

karunaratners@gmail.com

By R.S. Karunaratne

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Opinion

Are we reading the sky wrong?

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Rethinking climate prediction, disasters, and plantation economics in Sri Lanka

For decades, Sri Lanka has interpreted climate through a narrow lens. Rainfall totals, sunshine hours, and surface temperatures dominate forecasts, policy briefings, and disaster warnings. These indicators once served an agrarian island reasonably well. But in an era of intensifying extremes—flash floods, sudden landslides, prolonged dry spells within “normal” monsoons—the question can no longer be avoided: are we measuring the climate correctly, or merely measuring what is easiest to observe?

Across the world, climate science has quietly moved beyond a purely local view of weather. Researchers increasingly recognise that Earth’s climate system is not sealed off from the rest of the universe. Solar activity, upper-atmospheric dynamics, ocean–atmosphere coupling, and geomagnetic disturbances all influence how energy moves through the climate system. These forces do not create rain or drought by themselves, but they shape how weather behaves—its timing, intensity, and spatial concentration.

Sri Lanka’s forecasting framework, however, remains largely grounded in twentieth-century assumptions. It asks how much rain will fall, where it will fall, and over how many days. What it rarely asks is whether the rainfall will arrive as steady saturation or violent cloudbursts; whether soils are already at failure thresholds; or whether larger atmospheric energy patterns are priming the region for extremes. As a result, disasters are repeatedly described as “unexpected,” even when the conditions that produced them were slowly assembling.

This blind spot matters because Sri Lanka is unusually sensitive to climate volatility. The island sits at a crossroads of monsoon systems, bordered by the Indian Ocean and shaped by steep central highlands resting on deeply weathered soils. Its landscapes—especially in plantation regions—have been altered over centuries, reducing natural buffers against hydrological shock. In such a setting, small shifts in atmospheric behaviour can trigger outsized consequences. A few hours of intense rain can undo what months of average rainfall statistics suggest is “normal.”

Nowhere are these consequences more visible than in commercial perennial plantation agriculture. Tea, rubber, coconut, and spice crops are not annual ventures; they are long-term biological investments. A tea bush destroyed by a landslide cannot be replaced in a season. A rubber stand weakened by prolonged waterlogging or drought stress may take years to recover, if it recovers at all. Climate shocks therefore ripple through plantation economics long after floodwaters recede or drought declarations end.

From an investment perspective, this volatility directly undermines key financial metrics. Return on Investment (ROI) becomes unstable as yields fluctuate and recovery costs rise. Benefit–Cost Ratios (BCR) deteriorate when expenditures on drainage, replanting, disease control, and labour increase faster than output. Most critically, Internal Rates of Return (IRR) decline as cash flows become irregular and back-loaded, discouraging long-term capital and raising the cost of financing. Plantation agriculture begins to look less like a stable productive sector and more like a high-risk gamble.

The economic consequences do not stop at balance sheets. Plantation systems are labour-intensive by nature, and when financial margins tighten, wage pressure is the first stress point. Living wage commitments become framed as “unaffordable,” workdays are lost during climate disruptions, and productivity-linked wage models collapse under erratic output. In effect, climate misprediction translates into wage instability, quietly eroding livelihoods without ever appearing in meteorological reports.

This is not an argument for abandoning traditional climate indicators. Rainfall and sunshine still matter. But they are no longer sufficient on their own. Climate today is a system, not a statistic. It is shaped by interactions between the Sun, the atmosphere, the oceans, the land, and the ways humans have modified all three. Ignoring these interactions does not make them disappear; it simply shifts their costs onto farmers, workers, investors, and the public purse.

Sri Lanka’s repeated cycle of surprise disasters, post-event compensation, and stalled reform suggests a deeper problem than bad luck. It points to an outdated model of climate intelligence. Until forecasting frameworks expand beyond local rainfall totals to incorporate broader atmospheric and oceanic drivers—and until those insights are translated into agricultural and economic planning—plantation regions will remain exposed, and wage debates will remain disconnected from their true root causes.

The future of Sri Lanka’s plantations, and the dignity of the workforce that sustains them, depends on a simple shift in perspective: from measuring weather, to understanding systems. Climate is no longer just what falls from the sky. It is what moves through the universe, settles into soils, shapes returns on investment, and ultimately determines whether growth is shared or fragile.

The Way Forward

Sustaining plantation agriculture under today’s climate volatility demands an urgent policy reset. The government must mandate real-world investment appraisals—NPV, IRR, and BCR—through crop research institutes, replacing outdated historical assumptions with current climate, cost, and risk realities. Satellite-based, farm-specific real-time weather stations should be rapidly deployed across plantation regions and integrated with a central server at the Department of Meteorology, enabling precision forecasting, early warnings, and estate-level decision support. Globally proven-to-fail monocropping systems must be phased out through a time-bound transition, replacing them with diversified, mixed-root systems that combine deep-rooted and shallow-rooted species, improving soil structure, water buffering, slope stability, and resilience against prolonged droughts and extreme rainfall.

In parallel, a national plantation insurance framework, linked to green and climate-finance institutions and regulated by the Insurance Regulatory Commission, is essential to protect small and medium perennial growers from systemic climate risk. A Virtual Plantation Bank must be operationalized without delay to finance climate-resilient plantation designs, agroforestry transitions, and productivity gains aligned with national yield targets. The state should set minimum yield and profit benchmarks per hectare, formally recognize 10–50 acre growers as Proprietary Planters, and enable scale through long-term (up to 99-year) leases where state lands are sub-leased to proven operators. Finally, achieving a 4% GDP contribution from plantations requires making modern HRM practices mandatory across the sector, replacing outdated labour systems with people-centric, productivity-linked models that attract, retain, and fairly reward a skilled workforce—because sustainable competitive advantage begins with the right people.

by Dammike Kobbekaduwe

(www.vivonta.lk & www.planters.lk ✍️

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