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Reflecting on Jathika Chintanaya

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Geoffrey Bawa

By Uditha Devapriya

Shanti Jayewardene’s fascinating study of Geoffrey Bawa discusses how art, culture, and knowledge have long been dominated by Western narratives and discourses. She charts Bawa’s evolution from colonial scion to national icon and questions his conceptions of art and architecture. She notes these as having been both hegemonic and anti-hegemonic.

Assessing Kandalama, for instance, she reflects on how it incorporated the aesthetics of Sigiriya and Buddhist giri monasteries while at the same time opening itself to allegations of disrupting and intruding on rural communities.

Jayewardene’s account is lucid, critical, and for the most, accurate. Most importantly, she undergirds her critique of Western paradigms of art and development with an equally fair critique of nativist responses to such paradigms.

In her introduction, for instance, she mentions several “modern intellectuals” in the early 20th century, who contributed in diverse ways to the formation of independent Sri Lanka. She distinguishes between those who led a revival through predominantly urban art forms such as theatre, and those who went inward to a Sinhala and Buddhist rural culture. Though the rural-urban binary can be crude and simplistic, she suggests that in Sri Lanka, both these strands were represented, if not dominated, by an urban intelligentsia.

In that sense, there is little in terms of social class and background that separates John de Silva from Anagarika Dharmapala, or from Gunadasa Amarasekara. But their visions for the country were hardly complementary. Amarasekara’s critique of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike – that he imbibed Western liberal ideas too much to give impetus to a national movement– for instance, constitutes the Sinhala nationalist critique of modernity in Sri Lanka. I would even say it constitutes an alternative reading of cultural modernity, in contrast to the visions of nationhood and nationality offered by Bawa or Lionel Wendt.

These contrasting visions of nationhood and national development surfaced in the protests against Kandalama, the campaigns against multinational companies like Coca-Cola, and, in the early 2000s, the backlash against Valentine’s Day.

Many of these were spearheaded by Jathika Chintanaya, arguably the most influential nationalist intellectual group in Sri Lanka. It is important, at the outset, not to generalise on such movements, to distinguish between different phases, to trace their lineage and chart their evolution. Doing so would help us understand not just why they came to be, but also, controversial as it may seem, why they are still relevant.

In Sri Lanka, as pretty much everywhere else, nationalist groups were born of and from the conditions of their time. Almost all of them were formed in the 1980s, when the Left had decayed and lost its credibility across much of the Global South. Many of the earliest members of these groups themselves hailed from the Left. Their renunciation of the old faith constituted an intellectual rupture.

Lionel Wendt

From their class-centrism they turned to a culture-centric vision. As Dayan Jayatilleka has noted, this owed to the failure of the Old Left to adopt the rhetoric of anticolonial struggles like the Matale Uprising. Once the Left lost mass appeal, it was only inevitable that the nationalist right would step in.

Paradoxical as it may seem, these groups were founded and initially led by intellectuals who had benefitted from the same cultural modernism and cosmopolitanism they critiqued in their work. Gunadasa Amarasekara, who was felicitated at a grand ceremony last November at the BMICH – a venue Jayewardene describes as “a Sino-Lanka version of 1950s American modernism” – epitomised this tradition better than anyone else.

A product of Peradeniya, a student of dentistry who read and was influenced by Lawrence and Proust, he nevertheless renounced that tradition, in effect disowning it.

Ironically, it was this lineage which helped Amarasekara to mould Jathika Chintanaya into something more than just the crude nationalist outfit it is viewed as, and in many ways actually is, today. It is Amarasekara, more so than Nalin de Silva, who is the author of the modern Sinhala nationalist manifesto. At various times this manifesto has been borrowed and rewritten by different actors and groups: the Sihala Urumaya in the 1990s, the Jathika Hela Urumaya in the 2000s, the Bodu Bala Sena in the 2010s.

I notice a regression from the one to the other. While I remain critical of Jathika Chintanaya in general, I admit that, at its inception, it contained a clear intellectual undercurrent. Perhaps inevitably, that has now given way to a rabid irrationality, marked by a tendency to confront rather than engage with rivals. How so?

Gunadasa Amarasekara

Whatever one may say of it, in its first few years Jathika Chintanaya was determined by Amarasekara’s vision. His vision was different to not just Geoffrey Bawa’s or Lionel Wendt’s, but also Martin Wickramasinghe’s. In his preface to Gamanaka Mula, for instance, he critiqued Wickramasinghe for having focused on the colonial elite rather than the Sinhalese rural middle-classes: the petty bourgeoisie, in Marx’s formulation.

While Marx would have disparaged this class as symbols of “rural idiocy”, Amarasekara saw them as crucial to the nation’s development. There is much to disagree with this thesis. Today, the Sinhala middle-class he valorises have become culturally nationalist and socially compradorist. They are no longer bearers of the future, or sons of the soil.

But such ideas stood out in a way that most contemporary nationalist discourses do not. The reason is not that hard to find. In Sinhala nationalism as in national politics, there has been and continues to be an intellectual decline. The nationalist movement no longer produces authentic, creative thinkers. It has instead become trapped in its echo chambers, incapable of summoning any firepower. Put simply, it no longer has an Amarasekara capable of taking it forward; it is now going downhill all the way.

What is most ironic about this is that it is the very developments that nationalists champion as having emancipated Sri Lanka – the discontinuation of English and the enthronement of Sinhala – that have prevented the nationalists themselves from fully realising their potential. Amarasekara’s interventions in the 1980s were so relevant and profound not because he shied away from contemporary intellectual discourses, but rather because he was willing and able to engage with them. From Eric Fromm to Martin Jacques, from Huntington to Fukuyama, Amarasekara chose to reflect on the writings on Western intellectuals, trying to understand the frontiers, and limits, of their work.

It is the lack of willingness to engage, the lack of capacity to absorb what is called “modern knowledge”, that has stunted the growth of the nationalist movement. The independence struggles of other countries and societies flowered so well because they had intellectuals who engaged with their rivals. Sri Lanka did not reach this potential, still less achieve it: it produced no Frantz Fanons, because its elites were too subservient or, as bad, because they searched too much inward. We refused to stick to a golden mean, the so-called middle path, and in doing so ruptured from within, becoming intellectually sterile.

This, in a nutshell, is our national tragedy.

Jayewardene ends her study of Bawa by imploring artists and intellectuals to not just think, but act: to do, and not merely be. She argues that we must subvert Eurocentric knowledge, not by critiquing it and leaving it at that, but by recognising that “local forms of modernity” were never overwhelmed or “submerged” by the West: in effect, that we possessed a form of modernity of our own, moulded by our past.

Despite my disagreement with and critique of Jathika Chintanaya, I believe that during their early years, they tried to do just that. This is no longer the case.

In that sense, I think Shanti Jayewardene should follow up her work on Bawa with one on Amarasekara. Amarasekara’s vision, to be sure, could not have been more different to Bawa’s. Yet it compels us to think radically about the country, its heritage, and its future, just as Bawa did – and just as nationalists today do not.

The writer is an international relations analyst, independent researcher, and freelance columnist who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com.



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Role of identity in the making and breaking of West Asian peace

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Negotiators at the Pakistani-negotiated preliminary peace talks. BBC

The West Asian peace effort continues waveringly amid uncertainties. The world could be considered as having ‘some breathing space’ currently in this tangled situation on account of a dip in oil prices but whether such relief would be of a long term nature is left to be seen.

Meanwhile, some vital ‘details’ in the peace process are continuing to hobble it. One such factor is the nuclear issue. While US President Donald Trump is on record that Iran’s purported nuclear programme from now on will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this assertion is being denied by the Iranian authorities who indicate that Iran will be coming under no such regime. That is, Iran will be answerable to no one with regard to its legitimate right to defend itself.

Accordingly, an early closure to the nuclear question could not be expected and the furthering of peace in the region hinges on the principal sides being of one mind on the issue. Moreover, toll-free shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is proving to be a bone of contention between the warring sides.

However, perhaps going largely unnoticed in the Middle East region are identity questions of considerable magnitude that have stood in the way of the region making some headway towards a peace settlement and which would continue to undermine such a process going forward. Identity, or a group’s self conception, is by far the most intractable of the factors in the conflict and the main sides would do well to manage it effectively before long.

US Vice President J.D. Vance, as pointed out in this column last week, fired one of the first salvos in this regard in the current peace effort. He reportedly said: ‘Regional peace and stability includes stopping the funding of “terrorist organizations” .’ He probably had in mind the Hezbollah organization which is funded and armed by Iran but, needless to say, the latter would reject this statement out of hand because it does not see the Hezbollah as terroristic in orientation.

Accordingly, the tangled issue of ‘who is a terrorist?’ would recur to hamper the West Asian peace bid. An important corollary to this matter is that Middle Eastern militants would be branding US administrations as terroristic considering the humanly costly military interventions undertaken by the latter over the decades in the world’s war zones.

It is difficult to see the main sides taking up the issue of terror and arriving at a common understanding on the problem over the next couple of months in their peace deliberations but the unresolved question could be expected to be the proverbial ‘elephant in the room’ that could even wear the sides down. Accordingly, ‘quick fixes’ to the Middle East imbroglio would need to be ruled out.

However, paring down terror to its essentials, it needs to be found that in contemporary times it is identity and issues growing out of it that keep the question alive and render it intractable. In fact the problem should be seen as igniting and sustaining a multiplicity of conflicts world wide.

So pervasive are identity questions that they are seen by some as having played a role in leading to the recent resignation of Keir Starmer as UK Prime Minister. Among other things, the latter is seen as having been incapable of managing migration related issues besides falling short in strengthening domestic social cohesion.

Identity issues came to a head in the UK in the form of the recent anti-immigrant riots in Northern Ireland. Clearly, some immigrants continue to be seen as aliens and parasitic in nature in some parts of the UK by jingoistic elements. Thus is ignited anti-foreigner violence.

That said, some of the most laudable measures for the promotion of peaceful race relations are found in the UK today. The latter’s race relations legislation could be seen as constituting a model for the rest of the world and needs to be studied and adopted by particularly the global South where identity conflicts are rampant.

Unfortunately, racial amity is not being considered a priority by the Trump administration. Under the latter immigrants are being seen by supremacist whites as the archetypal ‘Other’ who should be violently shunned. Accordingly, social cohesion in the US too is being steadily undermined and stepped-up race hate in the country shouldn’t come as a surprise.

In the West Asian region, archetypal ‘Othering’ could prove particularly pernicious and destructive. It could lead to the unraveling of the current peace talks between the adversaries and needs to be addressed by them if the negotiations are to prove productive.

For far too long the West and Israel have been viewed as archetypal enemies by Iran and its supporters. On the other hand, Palestinian militants have been habitually seen by the Far Right in the US and by hard line Israelis as sworn enemies who are best eliminated. These seemingly unresolvable divides in the Middle East could bring down the present negotiatory process.

Even if the present round of mediated negotiations between the US and Iran lead to a substantive cessation of hostilities in West Asia, the divisive mindsets of the prime antagonists, that is, the US and its ally Israel on the one side and Iran and its supportive militant groups on the other, would need to be changed for the better if enduring peace is to be given a chance. That is, mindsets would need to be transformed on both sides of the divide from mutual hostility to mutual amicability. No doubt, a long-gestation process.

It cannot be stressed enough that those mediating in this long-running conflict, themselves need to approach peace-making with unbiased minds. It needs to be realized, for example, that Israel too has been ‘hurting’ badly in this conflict over the decades to the degree to which the Palestinian side has been victimized cruelly, dispossessed and divested of dignity.

Any negotiated peaceful settlement should seek to address this persistent mindset malaise as well and turn enmity into amicability. An equitable solution that addresses the lingering grievances of both sides could lay the basis for this process of ‘Turning Spears into Ploughshares.’

‘Land and Bread’ have been at the heart of the Middle East conflict over the decades or even centuries. An equitable solution should provide these assets in equal measure for both sides. There is no getting away from the ‘Two State Solution’.

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Central bankers live on Short End Street; Economic planners live on Long End Street

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Long End Street is not a summation of Short End Streets. Eighteen short-term crises and no long-term growth in sight!

For quite some time, there has been no agency of government dealing with long-term economic and social policy questions. Nor have universities been of any help. There has been a National Planning Department in the Ministry of Finance but we have not seen any worthwhile reports from them. M. D. H. Jayawardena, in 1956, presented in Parliament the Six-Year Programme of Investment. Soloman Bandaranaike established a National Planning Council and a Planning Department, with Princy Siriwardena as its Director. They wrote the Ten-Year Plan, better known for its readability than its depth of analysis or policy content. Ten years or so later Dudley Senanayake established a Ministry of Planning and Employment with Gamani Corea (later of high international repute) as its Permanent Secretary. The Ministry was responsible for some useful analytical work and the development of a bureaucracy responsible for plan implementation. The latter was the work of a brilliant member of the Ceylon Civil Service, Godfrey Gunatilleke, who also worked in the Ministry. The major pre-occupation of the Ministry turned out to be the annual government budget and the management of direly scarce foreign exchange, all short term considerations. They set up a bureaucratic mechanism to evaluate capital expenditure in the government budget. The Ministry won plaudits for its Foreign Exchange Budget, some analytical wok on the economy, including population projections as well as education, in both schools and universities. As the 1970s wore on, planning earned a bad press and the new government of 1971 disbanded most of that and created a Department of National Planning in the Ministry of Finance, which survives to date.

A part of the purpose of this narrative has been to bring out that, all along, government has had no outfit of economists and sociologists whose job was to study long term changes in our society and the economy and in the rest of the world and propose solutions for consideration by governments. (A brilliant exception was the work on education, that was directed by Jinapala Alles, who had graduated in chemistry and was a fast learner and was at great ease with numbers. He was also an effortless leader of a small team of self-selected competent and enthusiastic public servants.) The government depended on the Central Bank for advice on long term development of the economy. Princy Siriwardena was seconded for service in the Planning Secretariat; similarly, Gamani Corea was from the Bank. Later, he was replaced with H.A.de S. Gunasekera, likely the most brilliant economics teacher in the University of Ceylon. He taught monetary economics, essentially short term. (His favourite economist Keynes famously wrote, “In the long run we are all dead”.)

When the Ministry of Planning and Employment was established in 1965, government plundered the Central Bank to staff it: Gamani Corea, R. M. Seneviratne, N. Ramachandran, Nihal Kappagoda and G. Usvatte-aratchi. Later, W. M. Tillekeratne and A. S. Jayawardena both long term employees of the Central Bank, were appointed as the chief economist of government. Jayawardena still later became the Governor of the Bank. Several other employees of the Bank, including J. B. Kelegama, P. B. Karandawela, P. B. Jayasundera worked at high levels in successive governments and that practice continued when Mahinda Siriwardena became the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance when Anura Dissanayake became the Minister of Finance. It is mysterious that the government saw no need for specialist advisers who would identify long term economic and social problems and solutions therefor, look out for markets and technology and warn of impending pitfalls, in contrast to our mighty neighbour which had a Planning Commission that handled long term problems and a Central Bank which had learnt to handle masterly, monetary problems.

Pitambar Pant, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Manmohan Singh, I. G. Patel and Raghu Ram Rajan were most distinguished economics policymakers and central bankers. Japan benefited greatly from the work of MITI. So did Korea from its counterpart. This is not to argue that had there been an outfit of that sort, Sri Lanka would now be rich but to warn that the Central Bank is neither equipped nor fit to fight those battles. If you scan the Central Bank Act of 2023, you will find stabilisation the most frequently recurring theme. Clause 6 reads ‘The primary object (objective?) of the Central Bank shall be to achieve and maintain domestic price stability.’ The most generous reading that the Bank may have anything to do with economic development is in Clause 6 (4) ‘In pursuing the primary object (objective?), the Central Bank shall take into account, inter alia, the stabilisation of output towards its potential level.’ Lawyers may have a field day with that and economists may beg for its meaning.

Amarananda Jayawardena was the last Governor of the Central Bank who had understood that the central bank was equipped to handle short term problems and that not always valiantly, and that it had neither the tools nor the resources to plan and engineer long term development. As Governor, he did not speak for the government on long term economic and social problems, although prior to assuming duties as Governor of the Bank, he had been the chief economist of the government. Jayawardena knew all too well the nature of the tools and the resources he had and how far he could confidently aim and shoot. It was simply silly to produce a Five-year Road Map (no matter how colourful the accompanying graphics), when a central bank mainly used transactions in the short-term financial assets market to move interest rates and the demand for money. The Bank of England, for most of the 20th century, used Commercial Paper with two ‘good names’ at its Discount Window. Short-term and long-term rates of interest, normally, behave in a predictable relationship, although occasionally, and in volatile times, that relationship may become inverted. (I am not well read on recent Fed and the Riks Bank market operations.)

The economists at the Central Bank are experts in monetary policy and are rarely knowledgeable about economic growth. An exception was S. B. D. de Silva and he found writing a half page note to the Centra Bank Bulletin (monthly) stultifying. He left the Bank quite young and continued studying economics until the very end of his life. As undergraduates they may have read on economic growth and development but as professionals in the central bank, it is unlikely that they kept working on problems in that area. They may also have learned, some time, that there has been no central bank credited with spearheading economic development in any country. Therefore, to pretend that they can advise the government on economic planning, is a hobby which they would be wise to desist from.

We did a splendid job of saving our new born children and their mothers as indicated in low infant mortality and maternal mortality rates. We scored an even more resounding victory in educating all our children. If we have any claim to any civilizing missions in the 20th century, these two stand out. Beside them, we have been mostly failures. The economy has advanced only laggardly. It has miserably failed to exploit excellent opportunities to sell in burgeoning markets, output employing a healthy and educated labour force. Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, south India, Ethiopia, Rwanda and several other countries, all (except Japan) late comers to the game compared to Sri Lanka, succeeded in doing just that. It is wrong to blame governments alone for poor economic growth, as many do. Most economic activity in this country is run by the private sector and leaders there have made poor use of opportunities.

When ministers of government and its employers collect bribes, private sector persons pay bribes. The markedly rapid economic growth in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Keralam and poor growth in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and many others in the north east are under the same central government dispensation, sharply pointing to differences in the quality of business leadership in the two groups. ‘Big business’ here run betting shops, supermarkets, hospitals, import and market household equipment, banks and insurance companies and, most ambitiously maintain construction companies. (In the widely watched IPL cricket matches 2026, Sri Lanka advertised regularly a Betting Centre!) Tourism in this country is the business of small-scale enterprises with low productivity. The ubiquitous kade with a stock-in-trade of less than one hundred thousand rupees, borrowed from a relative or a friend, is a sign of rampant unemployment and not of budding entrepreneurship. When you go to consult a doctor in a private hospital in Colombo and wait endless hours, count the number of men and women employees idling, supervised by a proportionately large number of idling supervisors. Where are the large-scale manufacturing and service companies, selling the world over, where economies of scale abound in the 21st century? So far as I recall, there has been no Initial Public Offering (IPO) of shares in the Colombo Stock Market during the last 7 years. Nor have multinational companies established here any large factories or offices.

Is the air we breathe deathly to enterprise?

by Usvatte-aratchi

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A Requiem for Keir Starmer rule

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Starmer

By the time Sir Keir Rodney Starmer resigned, polls showed that he had become the least popular Labour Prime Minister in living memory. His fall was all the more striking because his political beginnings had once suggested a very different trajectory. As a teenager in the Labour Party Young Socialists, and later as editor of the Marxist journal Socialist Alternatives, he had stood firmly on the radical left. As a human rights lawyer he opposed the illegal invasion of Iraq, earning a reputation for principle and moral clarity.

It was this early radicalism that his supporters later weaponised, presenting him as a unifying leftwing figure in the aftermath of the coup against the Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn. The right-wing of Labour, having spent years undermining Corbyn (including through a coordinated campaign that framed him, falsely, as anti-Semitic) found in Starmer a vessel through which they could reclaim the party while reassuring the membership that continuity with the Corbyn surge remained intact.

In his resignation speech, Starmer claimed to have inherited a politically, morally and financially bankrupt Labour Party. Yet the record shows that Corbyn had revived the party’s grassroots, drawing tens of thousands of new members back to a party embodying the tradition of Keir Hardie. The oligarchy closed ranks against this leftist heavyweight, using Starmer and the Labour right wing as their weapon. Starmer’s “Changed Labour” was not a renewal but a repudiation, embracing the very Thatcherite revisionism that had hollowed Labour out in the first place.

A Britain battered by decades of neoliberal restructuring formed the backdrop to Starmer’s rise. The cumulative effects of Maggie “milk-snatcher” Thatcher’s programme, deepened by Blair, Cameron, May, and Johnson, combined with the convulsions of Brexit to produce a profound economic, social, and political crisis. The Conservative Party imploded under the weight of its own contradictions. Starmer, offering managerial calm, an a Corbyn-lite manifesto, rode the wave of Tory collapse to a landslide victory.

But once in office, he revealed himself as a Blairite in sombre tones: a Thatcherite in Labour clothing. Within weeks he slashed winter fuel payments for pensioners, inaugurating a harsh antiworkingclass agenda. He embraced the Israeli government even as it carried out genocide in Gaza. The former human rights lawyer now used antiterror legislation to suppress dissent, particularly protests against the genocide. His immigration rhetoric, invoking an “island of strangers,” echoed the poisonous cadences of Enoch Powell.

Throughout his premiership he remained pofaced, showing little emotion even when forced into humiliating Uturns by public outrage. He displayed no visible sorrow at the mass killing of children in Gaza. Only at the prospect of losing office did he appear moved. He was, in the words of Saki, a man with “the soul of a meringue,” a mediocrity whose obedience to the oligarchic class and to Zionist backers embodied what Hannah Arendt called the banality of evil. His legacy – and that of the Tories who preceded him – is a nation distrustful of politicians of whatever hue, open to the pseudo-anti-elite, deception of the billionaire-backed racist far-right

His resignation leaves Britain at a crossroads – will it follow the fascistic path of Nigel Farage’s Reform Party, or will it go down the green-red road of Zach Polanski and Corbyn? Even replacing Starmer with the newly-elected Andy Burnham will only provide more-of-the-same Tory policies – Burnham went on record saying his first foreign visit as Prime Minister would be to Israel. These are the same policies that created a visceral hatred of Starmer and opened the gates for Reform’s surge.

When news of his resignation broke, a friend told this writer that the one who had engineered the exit of Jeremy Corbyn had been unable to complete two years in office. He added, ‘Rajakam kalath kalakam palade”-– even if you reign, your deeds will bear consequences.

And, so ends the Starmer era, not with the dignity of a statesman, but with the hollow thud of a project built on betrayal, opportunism, and the abandonment of the very principles he once claimed to uphold.

by Vinod Moonesinghe

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