Features
Iran after Raisi
By Uditha Devapriya
At the time of his death on May 19, in a helicopter crash that has yet to be fully investigated, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi had risen through the ranks. Sanctioned by the West and nicknamed the “Butcher of Tehran” for his uncompromising attitude to protesters, he was seen as the successor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Under his watch Iran went through some pretty turbulent times, including a spate of protests in 2021 following the death in custody of a 22-year-old woman. But it also saw through a transformation in its foreign relations, signalling an outreach to Asia and the Global South.
Raisi’s death raises speculation about what will follow in Iran. He had been virtually groomed for succession after Khamenei’s death. Under him, Iran became more conservative, one could say less tolerant of dissent. But he also raised the country’s profile in the Global South, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and becoming a member of BRICS. External developments, including of course the Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Gaza War, reinforced its links with not just Russia and China, but also India.
Donald Trump’s unilateral abrogation of the US-Iran nuclear agreement signalled to Tehran that the US could not be trusted. Joe Biden’s silent manoeuvres following his election – he became president around the same time Raisi did in Iran – did little to mend the damage. What Western analysts miss out in their commentaries on the deal and its subsequent breakdown is that the Iranian government could not be forced to buy the agreement: it would accept it only if the deal could be sold to hardline conservative elements. Trump’s belligerence more or less made it impossible to do so.
Then there was the COVID-19 pandemic. With the restoration of Western sanctions, Iran’s health sector came to a screeching halt. Rather than doing what any superpower capable of a great many things would have done, which is relaxing sanctions, Washington chose to continue them. Analysts who pontificate on human rights violations in Iran – which are real, as they are in countries like ours – ignore the hatred of the West that spread across Iran because of US policies. Ebrahim Raisi’s tenure should be seen in light of these developments, even if, as reports indicate, certain Iranians did celebrate his death.
How exactly has the country responded to the death of their president? The truth is that we don’t know. Any open celebration of his passing will almost certainly be censored and suppressed. But more than one Western media outlet has taken a handful of incidents as representative of the mood across the country. This is debatable.
On the other hand, it is plausible that many protesters are celebrating the fact that Raisi will not succeed Khameini. Yet even considering this, it is questionable whether, as one protester puts it, “The death of Raisi has made the people of Iran very happy.”
The bottom line is that Iranian society, with or without Raisi, cannot be understood without a wider understanding of its modern history, specifically the geopolitical intrigues which shaped the theocratic State to what it is today. From the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup to the Revolution, from the Iran-Iraq War to the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear programme, Western officials and analysts seem to have short memories. Iranian politics today is a consequence of these developments, just as American politics today is a consequence of the polarisations which have grown in American society since 9/11.
In 2009, at the height of protests against then President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian noted that, despite the many criticisms one could make of it, the Islamic Republic had withstood Western pressure for three full decades. Dismissing four commonly cited reasons for this – the numerous cleric-sponsored reigns of terror, the Iran-Iraq War, oil revenues, and the appeal of Shi’ism – he argued that Iran had been able to continue the way it has because of the clerics’ ability to appropriate the populist rhetoric of the radical intelligentsia minus their secular cosmopolitanism.
Critics of the Islamic Republic tend to consider pre-1979 Iranian society as having been qualitatively better for citizens in general and women in particular. But this would be like claiming that Russia before Stalin and the Bolsheviks was better for all. Iran under the Shah was oppressive and authoritarian. The 1979 Revolution, not unlike the aragalaya in Sri Lanka, drew in every political group opposed to the Shah. For a while, this movement became dominated by radical-secular progressives. Raisi figured in among the Islamists who usurped the progressives while advocating for a more egalitarian social order. In this, they succeeded beyond expectations; as Abrahamian points out,
“In three decades, the regime has come close to eliminating illiteracy among the post-revolutionary generations, reducing the overall rate from 53 percent to 15 percent. The rate among women has fallen from 65 percent to 20 percent. The state has increased the number of students enrolled in primary schools from 4,768,000 to 5,700,000, in secondary schools from 2.1 million to over 7.6 million, in technical schools from 201,000 to 509,000, and in universities from 154,000 to over 1.5 million. The percentage of women in university student populations has gone up from 30 percent to 62 percent.”
The situation has improved steadily since then. World Bank data, for instance, show a rise in youth female literacy from 66 percent in 1985 to 99 percent in 2022. This underlies perhaps the most enduring paradox in Iranian society today, its concurrent entrenchment of social welfare and religious conservatism, especially in relation to women. Such paradoxes cannot be understood without reference to the 1953 coup, which sowed among Islamist groups a perpetual suspicion of the West and put those groups in the same league as radical anti-imperialist progressives. And they cannot be resolved by resorting to the typical Western solution of Colour Revolutions and Arab Springs.
For these reasons, Raisi’s death hasn’t actually led to a fluttering of hope among Western analysts. The consensus seems to be that his death will do nothing to stall the further Islamisation of Iranian society, and that he will be succeeded by an even more conservative and anti-Western leader. Meanwhile, the world order, specifically in the Global South, is changing so fast that Western narratives no longer cut it.
With or without Raisi, there is unlikely to be a revival of the Obama nuclear agreement, notwithstanding Joe Biden’s gestures. That was a one-hit wonder which did little to assuage Islamist fears of the West or the American right’s deep-seated Islamophobia. In itself, it was not a failure. But like all such initiatives, it was ultimately doomed to failure. Raisi’s tenure marked a heightening of tensions with the West in general, and the US in particular, in light of its abrogation. This will continue, for a long time.
Uditha Devapriya is a writer, researcher, and analyst based in Sri Lanka who contributes to a number of publications on topics such as history, art and culture, politics, and foreign policy. He can be reached at .
Features
‘There are no private universities in Sri Lanka’ – some considerations for higher education reform
Academics involved in education policy like to say that there is no such thing as a private university in Sri Lanka. The only ‘universities’ in the country are state universities; anything else offering degrees is a private higher education institution (HEI). This position is technically accurate. Yet, in the discourse and imagination of the public, private universities are very real – people teach in them, students register in them, families pay fees, and such degree holders enter job markets in Sri Lanka and outside.
For decades, activists concerned for public higher education have ignored or resisted looking at private HEIs, as if such scrutiny would taint them. Others have worked in both types of institutions, carrying practices from each to the other. The apex body governing state universities, the UGC, has, meanwhile, ignored the concept of conflict of interest and appointed individuals in private higher education in committees and leadership positions. It is unsurprising then that some of the ideologies informing private higher education appear in reform agendas in the state sector.
This is a good time then to consider the varying types of private HEIs around us, and to take a look at some of the issues within them in the hope that higher education reform agendas will include private, as well as state higher education.
What is a ‘private university’?
First, some clarifications. In the public imaginary, a ‘private university’ is typically an institution that provides a foreign or local degree for which the student makes a payment. But this broad classification encompasses a host of diverse institutions and types of degrees which I detail below.
The Non-State Higher Education Division (NSHE) of the Ministry of Education has recognised 295 degrees by 32 institutions. Most of these are private companies and include a handful of established, well-known private HEIs that are ‘university like’. The degrees are local degrees conferred by the institutions accredited by the NSHE Division. While private HEIs conferring local degrees must be accredited by the NSHE Division, there appears to be no legal consequence for not doing so. In addition, there are several permutations of the private degree that miss the net of this Division and the Standing Committee on Accreditation and Quality Assurance (SCAQA) that assists this Division.
For one, degrees conferred by foreign universities offered, via these same private HEIs, are not vetted by the NSHE Division. Secondly, there is a growing plethora of private HEIs which have either no physical presence locally or only a dubious presence. The University Grants Commission has notified the public, through their website, that foreign universities listed in the Commonwealth Universities Yearbook and the World Higher Education Database are recognised, but refrained from giving any other details – which degrees? Offered by what modes? These details are not known. Some of the foreign universities in the lists may be legitimate entities in their own land but the degrees conferred locally, in their name, may not adhere to curriculum or teaching specifications of the NSHE Division or the UGC.
Another troubling phenomenon is the ‘top up degree’, which appears to work on the same principle as that of a pre-paid mobile connection: if I have a Diploma or an HND of a sort, I am eligible to complete a course of study which provides me with a degree, usually from a foreign university. The idea that someone who does not initially qualify for a degree programme should be able to work their way towards one is a progressive notion. This is the concept that open and distance learning (ODL) was based on initially, but which is now sadly exploited. ODL models are expected to provide opportunity for learning for those who may be excluded from traditional learning institutions. In Sri Lanka, however, we have seen ODL become a marketplace offering easy to obtain, for-fee qualifications by institutions with little commitment to superior teaching and learning.
Finally, a perusal of the many types of private HEIs and their varied degrees bring to mind another question – how should the private degrees, provided by state institutions (that are not educational institutions), be regulated? Who should do so?
All of these create a host of problems for the public – for hopeful students and parents and trusting employers. For the higher education sector, recruitment of academic staff, too, has become difficult due to this plethora of ambiguous higher education qualifications, as I discussed in a previous Kuppi article (‘Recruiting academics to state universities’).
Some issues in private HEIs – a bellwether for change in state universities
In this second part of this article, I will discuss some aspects of work in private HEIs – albeit the more established institutions – given that such issues may appear in reform agendas in future.
Across state universities, all permanent staff of a specific category are paid according to the same criteria. The picture is not so clear when it comes to private HEIs since they are different entities legally, typically companies. Private HEIs have salary scales and financial incentives that are different to each other. The more established private HEIs reportedly have attractive renumeration packages, possibly a reason for academics of state universities migrating eagerly to such institutions during sabbatical years and on retirement. This may not of course be the case with other less established, or improperly registered HEIs of which we know little. Academic staff of these more accepted private HEIs seem to value the high financial remuneration they receive (in comparison to state universities) as something that makes their work rewarding.
Attractive remuneration is important to sustain the good life and is at times seen as the institution’s way of encouraging good work. Yet, this has implications for the future of the institution: to continue to deliver on promised financial packages, institutions must continue to have large profit margins. One strategy has been to enroll multiple cohorts of students per year, even up to three or four intakes per year. This can result in exploitative work conditions, since staff must cater to all these cohorts in that same year. If there is inadequate staff, employees are further burdened. On the other hand, if there is a sudden drop in enrolments (degrees can go out of fashion) unexpected layoffs occur. Similar to other sectors that employ short-term contract staff – including state universities – in private HEIs, too, individual teachers, who are on short term contracts that need regular renewal, can feel pressured to work under difficult or exploitative conditions.
At the same time, even in the more established private HEIs, work norms differ from those of state universities in that they include promotional work that keeps the institution’s name in the eye of the public. The Marketing (or similarly named) unit comes up in conversations as one of the most important departments. It appears to weigh in on decision-making related to the number of staff, the amount of re-sits per exams, and other pedagogically important matters. This is a worrying example of how financial rationales interfere with pedagogically or academically sound processes, resulting in problematic results in the classroom. On the plus side, junior colleagues, who had experience in both state and private HEIs, also felt that they faced less harassment in private HEIs – primarily due to the private HEIs ability to take swift action in reported cases of harassment. This is a real indictment on state institutions and their reluctance to address chronic issues of harassment in our universities.
Yet, while we hear much about problems in state universities, we hardly hear of problems that staff in private HEIs face. One rationale for a lack of public expressions by staff is that expressions of discontent might lead to trouble given the importance of reputation for private HEIs. The worry about reputational damage is a growing concern in state universities, too, as evidenced by social media policies and internal conversations on reputational damage, consequent to negative publicity. Institutional worries of reputational damage are harmful in the long run since these impact not only freedom of expression by student and staff, but also research that is possible in and about the education sector.
Some thoughts at the end…
A close look at the private higher education sector is important given its strong presence in the country. Impending reform needs to regulate this diverse array of higher education offerings in the private sector, as well as the state institutions that offer privately-funded options of higher education (a topic for a separate Kuppi on its own). It is time we carefully considered how to build a whole system of higher education out of this broken mess.
Kaushalya Perera is a senior lecturer at the University of Colombo.
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Ready for solo spotlight
Singer Nish Peiris is set to take the next big step in her music journey.
The talented vocalist, who has been seen and heard in the scene here for a short while, and was also featured with the now-defunct band, Inner Vision, has announced that she will be fully committing to her solo career, after completing her degree this year.
“I’m finishing my degree this year, and after that I’ll be fully committing to my solo music career,” Nish told The Island.
“I’ve already got a few tours lined up for next year, so I’m really excited for what’s ahead.”
Fans, no doubt, will remember Nish for her smooth voice and stage presence, and the good news is that she is now ready to chart her own path and bring new music to audiences at home and abroad.
With tours already planned for 2027, the year 2026 promises to be an exciting year for the young artiste as she steps into the spotlight on her own.
We wish Nish every success in this new chapter!
Features
Exclusive musical evening for Sri Lankans in Toronto
While Sri Lankan music lovers, in Dubai, are eagerly looking forward to being a part of the action on Saturday, 25th July, with Rajiv Sebastian in the limelight, Sri Lankans, in Toronto, Canada, are equally excited and are anxiously awaiting the arrival of Sri Lanka’s famous singer/entertainer Sohan Weerasinghe.
Having done the needful with The X-Periments, the legendary performer has now embarked on an exciting new chapter – a solo career – and Toronto, Canada, will see him do the needful, on Friday, 31st July, 2026, from 8.00 pm to 12.00 am, at the Angus Glen Golf Club.
Reports indicate that it’s a ‘sold out’ event – naturally with Sohan in the spotlight.
Having built his reputation through years of unforgettable performances, and hits that became part of our musical fabric, Sohan is ready to bring his own vision, sound, and stories directly to the audience, in Toronto, Canada, backed by the phenomenal Toronto Ceymphony Live Band.
Says Gamini Hemalal, who has been instrumental in reviving the Sri Lankan entertainment scene, in that part of the world:
“The countdown begins for the most exclusive musical event of the summer! Join us for a premium night of incredible music, elite hospitality, and a lavish buffet as the legendary Sohan Weerasinghe takes the stage live in Toronto!
“This is a high-end event, designed for those who appreciate exceptional entertainment and great food.”
Gamini, who is also a member of the Toronto Ceymphony Live Band, mentioned that it’s going to be an intimate musical evening with the celebrated Sohan Weerasinghe.
From packed auditoriums to intimate shows, Sohan continues to prove why he remains one of Sri Lanka’s most beloved entertainers.
For decades, Sohan Weerasinghe has been a household name in Sri Lankan entertainment.
Known for his captivating smooth voice and charismatic stage presence, Canada will experience it all on Friday, 31st July.
Next on the list of events, Gamini Hemal is working on, is Halloween night and he says “what we plan to do will be very interesting and unique … with a surprise guest star, as well!”
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