Connect with us

Midweek Review

Rajavarothiam Sampanthan’s legacy

Published

on

Air Force personnel carry TNA leader R. Sampanthan’s coffin from a Y 12 transport aircraft to a waiting hearse at the Palaly air base. On the government directive, the SLAF deployed the Y 12 on July 4 morning to move the coffin from the Ratmalana air base to Palaly. On the following day, the Y 12 took the coffin from Palaly to China Bay, for the conduct of the last rites in Trincomalee on Sunday (07), after public veneration in his home electorate.

The TNA (Parliament recognizes TNA as ITAK [Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi]) won 22 seats in the Northern and Eastern Provinces under Rajavarothiam Sampanthan’s leadership at the April 2004 General Election. It was their best performance. That achievement was made at the height of the LTTE’s conventional military power. By the time the TNA contested the next general election, the LTTE didn’t exist, hence the drop in their performance. The TNA only managed to secure 14 seats at the April 2010 General Election as the Tigers were no longer there to stuff ballot boxes on its behalf. At the August 2015 General Election, the TNA obtained 16 seats but suffered quite a setback at the last parliamentary poll when it was reduced to 10 seats. What would be their fate at the next general election scheduled for 2025? Against the backdrop of Sampanthan’s demise, would TNA think afresh and formulate new strategy or continue on the same path.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Just a few weeks before the 2015 presidential election, the late Rajavarothiam Sampanthan admitted that the annihilation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) freed his political party – the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) – from the clutches of the ruthless Tigers.

The lawyer-turned-politician wouldn’t have said so willingly under any circumstances. Never. Sampanthan, who led the alliance during a turbulent 23 years, had no option but to acknowledge the truth as the writer raised the issue at a special press conference called by the TNA at Hotel Janaki, Fife Road, Colombo 05 to announce its decision to back Maithripala Sirisena’s candidature at the 2015 presidential election (Declaring backing for MS, Sampanthan admits: War freed TNA from clutches of ruthless Tigers, The Island, Dec 31, 2014).

Sampanthan was flanked by the then Northern Provincial Councillor Dharmalingham Siddarthan (PLOTE leader), Vanni District MP Nadeshu Sivashakthi Annamalai (EPRLF), Vanni District MP Selvam Adaikkalanathan (TELO leader), Jaffna District MP Mavai Senathirajah (Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi leader) and its National List MP, M.A. Sumanthiran.

Sampanthan earlier declined to answer that question when the writer contacted him over the phone several weeks after the combined armed forces brought the war to an end on May 19, 2009. The Island raised the same issue again in January 2010 after Sampanthan declared the TNA’s support for the then General Sarath Fonseka’s candidature at the 2010 presidential poll. The veteran politician side-stepped the issue but he couldn’t have declined to answer pointed questions at a major media briefing.

Canada-based D.B.S. Jeyaraj, perhaps the foremost Tamil political commentator, despite some grave blunders like openly claiming that the Tigers would turn the tide of war against the Army almost till the eleventh hour, posted The Island report on dbsjeyaraj.com on Dec 30, 2014, even before the print edition was available. He headlined the story ‘Sampanthan Admits that TNA has been Freed from the Clutches of the Ruthless Military Organization LTTE.’

Why did Sampanthan take so long to appreciate the armed forces’ victory over the LTTE? Interestingly, no other local print or electronic media reported Sampanthan’s much belated declaration on the LTTE.

At the time the TNA declared its support for Maithripala Sirisena, its parliamentary group consisted of 14 MPs. The TNA was the third largest group in Parliament. The first, second and fourth places were held by the UPFA (SLFP-led United People’s Freedom Alliance), UNF (UNP-led United National Front) and DNA (JVP-led Democratic National Alliance), respectively.

The Island sought explanation from Sampanthan as regards the following issues: (1) Did the TNA probe its own conduct as a political party, particularly its 2001 controversial decision to recognise the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people (2) Why did the TNA ask the Tamil electorate to boycott the Nov 2005 presidential election (3) Circumstances leading to the TNA backing retired General Sarath Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election.

Sampanthan sort of hesitated before he compared the situation before and after May 2009, when the war was brought to a successful conclusion.

The Trincomalee District lawmaker declared that both the government and the Opposition had the freedom because the LTTE no longer existed. Sampanthan stressed that the LTTE had been a ruthless militant organization. The MP grudgingly admitted that the TNA, too, had been freed from the clutches of the LTTE.

The TNA leader justified the recognition of the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people on the basis that both the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s government and the UNP wanting to have talks with the group. That was a blatant lie. The LTTE had been on the offensive after taking the upper hand in fighting in the northern theatre.

Commenting on the Nov 2005 polls boycott, Sampanthan claimed that the Tamil electorate had no option but to abide by the LTTE directive. Sampanthan didn’t comment on the TNA having to issue that directive on behalf of the LTTE.

Without elaborating, Sampanthan referred to allegations regarding the UPFA engineering the LTTE’s decision.

The TNA Chief said that the Tamil community had to move on. People living in the Northern and Eastern Provinces as well as other areas had faith in the TNA. Therefore, the party received the right to decide on their behalf.

Prez Polls boycott

In the wake of a joint declaration made by the LTTE-TNA combine to ensure Ranil Wickremesinghe’s defeat at the 2005 presidential polls, the writer contacted Sampanthan on the night of Nov 15, 2005. Sampanthan’s reaction was sought immediately after Batticaloa-based TNA lawmaker Joseph Pararajasingham confirmed the decision taken in consultation with the LTTE in Kilinochchi to call on Tamil voters to boycott the poll.

Sampanthan declared that there hadn’t been any developments after the Kilinochchi announcement. “Nothing worthwhile would be achieved by supporting either of the two leading candidates, Mahinda Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe.” Both Pararajasingham and Sampanthan declared that the Tamil speaking people were not interested in the election (CBK calls off last Cabinet meeting: TNA refuses to change poll boycott stance, The Island, Nov 16, 2005).

The LTTE-TNA decision was meant to engineer Wickremesinghe’s defeat. There cannot be any doubt about that. Those who had accused the Rajapaksas of bribing the LTTE to influence the polls boycott in mid-Nov 2005 should explain why the group resumed landmine attacks less than three weeks later. When the writer interviewed Kumaran Pathmanathan, or ‘KP’ as he was widely known, in late 2009, one-time the LTTE’s international weapons procurer declared the LTTE was sure of taking the upper hand in the north within two years. Pathmanathan, who had been in the custody of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) at that time he shed light on the LTTE’s thinking in the run-up to all-out war in August 2006.

The late Sampanthan knew what he was doing. He fully realized that the LTTE was dragging the Tamil community to a destructive war but went along with the despicable strategy. Lawmaker Sumanthiran, who had been seated with Sampanthan at the Janaki Hotel media briefing on Dec 30, 2014, recently commented on the 2005 polls boycott. The comment was made in the presence of President Ranil Wickremesinghe in Jaffna. The Presidential Media Division (PMD) quoted Sumanthiran as having told the gathering: “It is possible that the challenges in the North may have impeded your journey in 2005, a fact that I believe is now regretfully acknowledged by the people of the region.”

Sumanthiran may not have at least considered entering politics at the time the LTTE-TNA ordered the polls boycott. Sumanthiran, in a statement issued to coincide with the Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day this year, shamelessly contradicted Sampanthan’s stand on the LTTE announced on Dec 30, 2014.

The truth is the annihilation of the LTTE paved the way for the TNA to resume political activity. The late Sampanthan, in spite of being under tremendous pressure by the LTTE at that time, must be held accountable for utterly irresponsible decisions.

Unfortunately, the other political parties represented in Parliament never bothered to take up the TNA’s despicable anti-democratic actions. They conveniently turned a blind eye even after the European Election Observation Mission declared the partnership between the LTTE and the TNA resulted in the former openly stuffing ballot boxes on behalf of the latter. The EU made the disclosure in its report on the 2004 general election. The bombshell EU report on the general election conducted on April 02, 2004, released in Colombo on June 17, 2004, declared in no uncertain terms that the group secured 22 seats with the direct involvement of the LTTE. Leader of now defunct TULF V. Anandasangaree was the only politician to comment on the EU report (TULF leader applauds EU for unmasking LTTE proxy, The Island, June 23, 2004). All others remained silent. Actually, the Parliament should have taken up this issue. The media, too, ignored the EU comments on the despicable LTTE-TNA partnership. The late Sampanthan led the TNA at that time. Later, Sangaree told the writer that the LTTE engaged in large scale and systematic vote rigging to such an extent, the TNA’s 22 MPs had absolutely no moral right to serve as parliamentarians (Monitors should have called for fresh poll in North and East – TULF, The Island, June 26). Actually, the TNA should have been summoned by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges.

TNA’s role in ISGA initiative

Indian Premier Narendra Modi has condoled the demise of. Sampanthan. In an X post, the Prime Minister said: “My deepest condolences to the family and friends of veteran TNA leader R. Sampanthan. Will always cherish fond memories of meetings with him. He relentlessly pursued a life of peace, security, equality, justice and dignity for the Tamil nationals of Sri Lanka. He will be deeply missed by his friends and followers in Sri Lanka and India.”

In the post-LTTE era, the TNA should have examined its own conduct to identify its role in the destructive Eelam War IV (August 2006 to May 2009) that only led to unnecessary further suffering by innocent people. India, where terrorism originated, should have studied the TNA role in the LTTE’s overall strategy.

The TNA at the behest of the LTTE, undermined the India-backed Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) arranged by Norway in February 2002. The TNA relentlessly supported the LTTE’s call for the institutionalization of the Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) to facilitate the resumption of talks. The TNA took up ISGA with the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on LTTE’s behalf. The LTTE proxy went to the extent of threatening the government that the LTTE wouldn’t return to the negotiating table unless President Kumaratunga accepted the ISGA with powers to raise taxes, maintain law and order, control internal and external trade, negotiate foreign loans and the absolute control over marine and offshore resources of the adjacent seas and the undisputed power to regulate access.

The LTTE quit the negotiating table in April 2003 following six rounds of talks with the government. That move, perhaps taken in consultation with the TNA, set the stage for the final war. The TNA can never disassociate itself from the LTTE’s murderous actions that corralled ordinary people as a human shield as part of its overall war strategy when it was being pursued by the security forces.

The TNA, until the very end, remained committed to the LTTE’s despicable strategy. Having granted the LTTE unprecedented status of sole representative of the Tamil speaking people, that party remained mum as the people were forced to retreat towards Mullivaikkal with the depleted LTTE fighting cadre. The TNA never publicly asked the LTTE to let the people go. The Tiger proxy TNA did not utter a word to the LTTE on behalf of horror struck people held as its human shield.

When the relentless Sri Lankan military drive forced the LTTE to retreat from all fronts, Velupillai Prabhakaran dragged the civilian population to the Vanni east where they were deployed as a human shield. Let me reproduce a letter written by the wartime Norwegian Ambassador here. It explains the mindset of the LTTE.

Ambassador Hattrem’s note, dated Feb 16, 2009, to Basil Rajapaksa, revealed Norway’s serious concern over the LTTE’s steadfast refusal to release the civilians. The Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem, underscored the developing crisis on the Vanni east front. The following is the text of Ambassador Hattrem’s letter, addressed to Basil Rajapaksa: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it does not seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.”

There wasn’t any positive LTTE response and the military went ahead with the final phase of the operation which was completed 15 years ago this month. Perhaps, the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), inquiring into wartime and post-conflict accountability issues, should try to identify several channels through which Ambassador Hattrem tried to convince the LTTE. Did Ambassador Hattrem seek the late Sampanthan’s help to convince Prabhakaran? Did the Norwegian seek the intervention of any other TNA MP? If not, the Norwegians believed that there was no point in even getting in touch with the TNA regarding this particular matter.

The diabolical LTTE-TNA partnership, finalized in late 2001, cannot be examined without taking into consideration the elimination of top Tamil political leadership by the LTTE. At least two ex-parliamentarians were killed in Sept 1985 by TELO at the behest of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).

The LTTE assassinated Appapillai Amirthalingam in July 1989. Along with the foremost Sri Lankan Tamil political leader and former Opposition leader, the LTTE killer squad shot dead ex-Jaffna MP Vettivelu Yogeswaran. Ex-Nallur MP Murugesu Sivasithamparam was shot and wounded at 342/2, Bauddhaloka Mawatha/Bullers Road in Colombo 7.

In spite of initial reluctance, those who represented the TNA had no qualms in working with the top LTTE leadership responsible for the assassination of Amirthalingham. The killing took place during the LTTE-Premadasa honeymoon, 11 months before the eruption of Eelam War IV. The truth is the LTTE wanted Amirthalingham eliminated as Prabhakaran knew his monstrous group would never receive recognition as sole representative of Tamil speaking people as long as the political veteran lived.



Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Midweek Review

A look back at now mostly forgotten Eelam war in the aftermath of Kashmir massacre

Published

on

LTTE directed two claymore mines at an overcrowded SLTB bus, at Kebithigollewa, on June 15, 2006. The blasts claimed the lives of 68 civilians. Seventeen years after the war, some interested parties sought to muddy the waters by falsely claiming the Karuna faction triggered the Kebithigollewa blasts at the behest of President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre, Pakistan offered to cooperate in what it called a neutral investigation. But India never regretted the
catastrophic results of its intervention in Sri Lanka that led to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army
from NE, Sri Lanka

In a telephone call to Indian Premier Narendra Modi, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake condemned the massacre of 26 civilians – 25 Indians and one Nepali – at Pahalgam, in the Indian controlled Kashmir, on April 22.

President Dissanayake expressed his condolences and reaffirmed, what the President’s Media Division (PMD) called, Sri Lanka’s unwavering solidarity and brotherhood with the people of India.

Having described the massacre as a terrorist attack, New Delhi found fault with Pakistan for the incident. Pakistan was accused of backing a previously unknown group, identified as Kashmir Resistance.

The Indian media have quoted Indian security agencies as having said that Kashmir Resistance is a front for Pakistan-based terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen fighting Indian rule in Kashmir. Pakistan says it only provides moral and diplomatic support.

Pakistan has denied its involvement in the Pahalgam attack. A section of the Indian media, and some experts, have compared the Pahalgam attack with the coordinated raids carried out by Hamas on southern Israel, in early October 2023.

President Dissanayake called Premier Modi on the afternoon of April 25, three days after the Pahalgam attack. The PMD quoted Dissanayake as having reiterated Sri Lanka’s firm stance against terrorism in all its forms, regardless of where it occurred in the world, in a 15-minute call.

Modi cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia as India took a series of measures against Pakistan. Indian actions included suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) governing water sharing of six rivers in the Indus basin between the two countries. The agreement that had been finalised way back in 1960 survived three major wars in 1965, 1971 and 1999.

One-time Pentagon official Michael Rubin, having likened the Pahalgam attack to a targeted strike on civilians, has urged India to adopt an Israel-style retaliation, targeting Pakistan, but not realising that both are nuclear armed.

Soon after the Hamas raid some interested parties compared Sri Lanka’s war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the ongoing Israel war on Gaza.

The latest incident in Indian-controlled Kashmir, and Gaza genocide, cannot be compared under any circumstances. Therefore, suggestions that India adopt Israel-style retaliation against Pakistan do not hold water. Also, Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE that was brought to a successful conclusion in May 2009 cannot be compared with the conflict Israel is involved in.

Sri Lanka can easily relate to the victims of the Pahalgam attack as a victim of separatist terrorism that bled the country for nearly 30 years. India, however, never bothered to express regret over causing terrorism here.

Indian-sponsored terror projects brought Sri Lanka to its knees before President JRJ made an attempt to eradicate the LTTE in May-June 1987. JRJ resorted to ‘Operation Liberation’ after Indian mediated talks failed to end the conflict. Having forced Sri Lanka to call off the largest-ever ground offensive undertaken at that time with the hope of routing the LTTE in Vadamarachchi, the home turf of Velupillai Prabhakaran, followed by India deploying its Mi 17s on July 24, 1987, to rescue the Tiger Supremo, his wife, two children and several of his close associates – just five days before the signing of the so-called Indo-Lanka peace accord, virtually at Indian gun point.

First phase of Eelam war

During the onset of the conflict here, the LTTE routinely carried out raids on predominantly Sinhala villages where civilians were butchered. That had been part of its strategy approved by ‘controllers’ based across the Palk Straits. That had been a volatile period in the run-up to the July 29, 1987, accord. Although India established half a dozen terrorist groups here, the LTTE had been unquestionably the most violent and the dominant group. To New Delhi’s humiliation all such groups supported by it were wiped out by the marauding Tigers.

Those who compared the LTTE with Hamas, or any other group, conveniently forget that the Sri Lankan group caused significant losses to its creator. India lost over 1,300 officers and men, while nearly 3,000 others suffered injuries during the Indian deployment here (July 1987-March 1990).

The world turned a blind eye to what was going on in Sri Lanka in the ’80s. The war launched by India in the early ’80s against Sri Lanka lasted till the signing of the peace accord. That can be broadly identified as phase one of the conflict (1983 July – 1987 July). That first phase can be safely described as an Indian proxy war aimed at creating an environment conducive for the deployment of the Indian Army.

Having compelled President JRJ to accept deployment of the Indian Army in the northern and eastern regions in terms of the “peace accord”, New Delhi sought to consolidate its hold here by disarming all groups, except the one it had handpicked to run the North-East Provincial Council. The Indian Army oversaw the first Provincial Council election held on Nov. 19, 1988, to elect members to the NE council. The whole exercise was meant to ensure the installation of the Varatharaja Perumal led-EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Forint) administration therein.

The second phase (1987 July – 1990 March) saw a war between the Indian Army and the LTTE. During this period, the Indian Army supervised two national elections – presidential on Dec. 19, 1988, and parliamentary on Feb. 15, 1989, that were won by Ranasinghe Premadasa and the UNP.

During that period, the UNP battled the JVP terror campaign and the South bled. The JVP that resorted to unbridled violence against the Indo-Lanka accord, at that time, has ended-up signing several agreements, including one on defence cooperation, recently, and the country is yet to get details of these secret agreements.

Raid on the Maldives

The second phase of the Eelam conflict ended when India pulled out its Army from NE Sri Lanka in March 1990. The sea-borne raid that had been carried out by Indian-trained PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) targeting Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, in Nov. 1988, is perhaps a significant development during the second phase of the conflict, though it was never examined in the right context.

No one – not even the Maldives – found fault with India for exporting terrorism to the island nation. India received accolades for swift air borne intervention to neutralise the PLOTE group. The Indian Navy sank a vessel commandeered by a section of the PLOTE raiders in a bid to escape back to Sri Lanka. The truth is that PLOTE, that had been trained by India to destabilise Sri Lanka, ended-up taking up a lucrative private assignment to overthrow President Gayoom’s administration.

India never regretted the Maldivian incident. It would be pertinent to mention that two boat loads of PLOTE cadres had quietly left Sri Lanka at a time the Indian Navy was responsible for monitoring in and out sea movements.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre, Pakistan offered to cooperate in what it called a neutral investigation. But India never regretted the catastrophic results of its intervention in Sri Lanka that led to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army from NE, Sri Lanka.

Resumption of hostilities by the LTTE in June 1990 can be considered as the beginning of the third phase of the conflict. Having battled the Indian Army and gained valuable battle experience, the LTTE, following a 14-month honeymoon with President Ranasinghe Premadasa, resumed hostilities. Within weeks the LTTE gained the upper hand in the northern theatre of operations.

In spite of India banning the LTTE, after the May 1991 assassination of Gandhi, the group continued to grow with the funds pouring in from the West over the years. Regardless of losing Jaffna in 1995, the LTTE consolidated its position, both in the Vanni and the East, to such an extent their victory seemed inevitable.

But resolute political leadership given by Mahinda Rajapaksa ensured that Sri Lanka turned the tables on the LTTE within weeks after the LTTE appeared to be making significant progress at the beginning. Within two years and 10 months (2006 August – 2009 May) the armed forces brought the LTTE to its knees, and the rest is history. As we have said in our earlier columns that victory was soon soured. Spearheaded by Sarath Fonseka, the type of General that a country gets in about once in a thousand years, ended in enmity within, for the simple reason this super hero wanted to collect all the trophies won by many braves.

Post-war developments

Sri Lanka’s war has been mentioned on many occasions in relation to various conflicts/situations. We have observed many distorted/inaccurate attempts to compare Sri Lanka’s war against LTTE with other conflicts/situations.

Unparalleled Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, triggered a spate of comments on Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. Respected expert on terrorism experienced in Sri Lanka, M.R. Narayan Swamy, discussed the similarities of Sri Lanka’s conflict and the ongoing Israel-Gaza war. New Delhi-based Swamy, who had served UNI and AFP during his decades’ long career, discussed the issues at hand while acknowledging no two situations were absolutely comparable. Swamy currently serves as the Executive Director of IANS (Indo-Asian News Service).

‘How’s Hamas’ attack similar to that of LTTE?’ and ‘Hamas’ offensive on Israel may bring it closer to LTTE’s fate,’ dealt with the issues involved. Let me reproduce Swamy’s comment: “Oct. 7 could be a turning point for Hamas similar to what happened to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka in 2006. Let me explain. Similar to Hamas, the LTTE grew significantly over time eventually gaining control of a significant portion of Sri Lanka’s land and coast. The LTTE was even more formidable than Hamas. It had a strong army, growing air force and a deadly naval presence. Unlike Hamas, the LTTE successfully assassinated high ranking political figures in Sri Lanka and India. Notably, the LTTE achieved this without direct support from any country while Hamas received military and financial backing from Iran and some other states. The LTTE became too sure of their victories overtime. They thought they could never be beaten and that starting a war would always make them stronger. But in 2006 when they began Eelam War 1V their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran couldn’t have foreseen that within three years he and his prominent group would be defeated. Prabhakaran believed gathering tens of thousands of Tamils during the last stages of war would protect them and Sri Lanka wouldn’t unleash missiles and rockets. Colombo proved him wrong. They were hit. By asking the people not to flee Gaza, despite Israeli warnings, Hamas is taking a similar line. Punishing all Palestinians for Hamas’ actions is unjust, just like punishing all Tamils for LTTE’s actions was wrong. The LTTE claimed to fight for Tamils without consulting them and Hamas claimed to represent Palestinians without seeking the approval for the Oct.7 strike. Well, two situations are not absolutely comparable. We can be clear that Hamas is facing a situation similar to what the LTTE faced, shortly before its end. Will Hamas meet a similar fate as the LTTE? Only time will answer that question.” The above was said soon after the Oct. 2023 Hamas attack.

Swamy quite conveniently refrained from mentioning India’s direct role in setting up one of the deadliest terror projects in the world here in the ’80s.

Former Editor of The Hindu, Malini Parthasarathy, who also had served as Chairperson of The Hindu Group, released a list of politicians assassinated by the LTTE, as she hit back hard at those who raged against the comparison of the Hamas to the LTTE. The list included two Jaffna District MPs, Arumugam Murugesu Alalasundaram and Visvanathan Dharmalingam, assassinated in early Sept. 1985. Slain Visvanathan Dharmalingam’s son, Dharmalingam Siddharthan, who represents the Vanni electoral district on the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), is on record as having said that the two MPs were abducted and killed by TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation.) gunmen. The list posted by Parthasarathy included PLOTE leader Uma Maheswaran, assassinated in Colombo in July 1989. The LTTE hadn’t been involved in that killing either. Maheswaran is believed to have been killed by his onetime associates, perhaps over the abortive PLOTE raid on the Maldives in Nov, 1988. India never bothered at least to acknowledge that the Maldives raid was carried out by men trained by India to destabilise Sri Lanka. There is no doubt that Maheswasran’s killers, too, were known to the Indian intelligence at that time.

Before rushing into conclusions regarding Hamas and the LTTE, perhaps a proper examination of the circumstances they emerged is necessary. The two situations – fourth phase of the Eelam conflict and the latest Hamas strike on Israel and the devastating counter attack – cannot be compared under any circumstances. Efforts to compare the two issues is more like comparing apples and oranges, though mutually Tamils and Sinhalese have so many commonalities having intermingled throughout history like the Arabs and Jews.

It is no doubt Jews are a people that suffered persecution throughout known history under Assyrians, Babylonians to Romans and so forth. Such persecution includes expulsion of Jews from England in 1290 and from Spain 1492. So what Hitler and the Germans did was to take the historic process to another extreme.

Yet to blame the Palestinians and treat them like animals and to simply butcher them for the latest uprising by Hamas for all the humiliations and suffering they have been going through non-stop since Naqba in1948, from the time of the creation of Israel is to allow the creators of the problem, including the UK, the USA and United Nations to wash all their sins on the true other victims of this conflict, the Palestinians.

It would be pertinent to mention that Israel, in spite of having one of the world’s best fighting armed forces with 100 percent backing from the West, cannot totally eradicate Hamas the way Sri Lanka dealt with the LTTE. Mind you we did not drop 2000 pound bombs supplied by the US on hapless Tamil civilians to commit genocide as is happening in Palestine in the hands of the Israelis.

The circumstances under which the LTTE launched a large-scale offensive in Aug. 2006 and its objectives had been very much different from that of Hamas. The LTTE really believed that it could have defeated the Sri Lankan military in the North by cutting off the sea supply route from Trincomalee to Kankesanthurai and simultaneously overrunning the Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil forward defence line (FDL). The total collapse of the FDL could have allowed the LTTE to eradicate isolated fighting formations trapped north of the FDL. But, in the case of the Gaza war, the Hamas strike was meant to provoke Israel to unleash a massive unbridled counter attack that caused maximum losses on the civilians. As Hamas expected the Israeli counter attack has triggered massive protests in the West against their leaders. They have been accused of encouraging violence against Palestine. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other US allies are under heavy pressure from Muslims and other horrified communities’ world over to take a stand against the US.

But in spite of growing protests, Israel has sustained the offensive action not only against Gaza but Lebanon, Yemen and Iran.

Instead of being grateful to those who risked their lives to bring the LTTE terror to an end, various interested parties are still on an agenda to harm the armed forces reputation.

The treacherous Yahapalana government went to the extent of sponsoring an accountability resolution against its own armed forces at the Geneva-based UNHRC in Oct. 2015. That was the level of their treachery.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Continue Reading

Midweek Review

The Broken Promise of the Lankan Cinema:

Published

on

Asoka & Swarna’s Thrilling-Melodrama – Part III

 “‘Dr. Ranee Sridharan,’ you say. ‘Nice to see you again.’

The woman in the white sari places a thumb in her ledger book, adjusts her spectacles and smiles up at you. ‘You may call me Ranee. Helping you is what I am assigned to do,’ she says. ‘You have seven moons. And you have already waisted one.’” 

The Seven Moons of Maali Almeida 

by Shehan Karunatilaka (London: Sort of Books, 2022. p84) 

(Continued from yesterday)

Rukmani’s Stardom & Acting Opportunity

Rukmani Devi is still remembered for her incomparable singing voice and her studio photograph by Ralex Ranasinghe with its hint of Film Noir mystery and seduction, and for the role of Blanch Dubois she played in Dhamma Jagoda’s Vesmuhunu, an adaptation of Tennessee Williams’ A Streetcar Named Desire. This is a role she shared on alternate nights with Irangani Serasinghe in the late 60s or early 70s. (See my Island Essays, 2024, p114) She was immensely happy to be able to act in a modern western classic directed by a visionary theatre director like Dhamma Jagoda and it was to his credit that he chose to give her that role when all acting roles had dried up for her. I observed those rehearsals held at Harrold Peiris’ open garage.

I, too, am happy that Swarna has had a chance to perform again in her 70s. The question is, how exactly has she used that very rare opportunity to act in a film that has doubled its production cost within two months, and now showing in private screenings in multiplexes in Australia with English subtitles, with ambitions to be shown on Netflix and Amazon Prime. These outlets also now fund films and make challenging mini-series. Rani has clearly been produced and marketed with this global distribution in mind. How does this important fact affect Swarna’s style of acting and the aesthetics of Asoka’s script, are the questions I wish to explore in the final section of this piece.

A Sensational-Thrilling Political & Family Melodrama

‘Melodrama’ is a popular genre with a history that goes back to 19th century theatre in the west and with the advent of film, Hollywood took it up as it offered a key set of thrilling devices known as ‘Attractions’, for structuring and developing a popular genre cinema. The word ‘Melodrama’ is a compound of the Greek word for music ‘melos’ and drama as an action, with the connotation of a highly orchestrated set of actions. The orchestration (not only with sound but also the speed and rhythm of editing, dramatic expressive lighting, ‘histrionic’ acting, etc.,) always reaches toward thrilling climaxes and at times exaggerated display of emotions. The plots are sensational, propelled by coincidences and written to reach climaxes and dramatic reversals of fortune, and sudden revelations. Hollywood was famous for its happy endings with resolution of the dramatised conflicts, while Hindi melodramas and Lankan copies often ended sadly.

In the history of cinema there are highly sophisticated melodramas within Hollywood, classical Hindi cinema and also in European art cinema. Rainer Werner Fassbinder was one of the German directors who developed a modern ‘Brechtian-Melodrama’ of extraordinary political and aesthetic power in the 70s. And of course, there are very poorly conceived melodramas too like many of the Sinhala films which were copies of Indian prototypes. Melodramatic devices inflect the different genres of Hollywood, for example the Gangster Film, the Western and created durable genre types in character, e.g. the Gangster, the Lonesome Cowboy and Indians; all national stereotypes, one embodying the underbelly of American capitalism, an anti-hero and the other the American hero actualising The American Dream. ‘The Indian,’ merely the collateral damage of this phantasy!

When the stories were centred on women the genre classification was ‘Women’s Melodrama’ as it dealt with interpersonal relations, conflicts, and sadness centred on the home primarily. Feminist film theory has developed a vast archive of scholarship on the melodramatic genre, cross-culturally, with a special focus on Hollywood and Hindi cinema decades prior to the formation we now call Bollywood, made with transnational capital and global reach. It was assumed that the audience for the family melodramas was female and that as women, we enjoy crying at the cinema, hence the condescending name ‘The Weepies’. I cut my scholarly/critical teeth studying these much-maligned melodramatic films for my doctorate, which I had enjoyed while growing up in a long-ago Ceylon.

Asoka’s Melodramatic Turn

 

Asoka in Alborada, but more so in Rani has made melodramatic films with his own ‘self-expressive’ variations on the structure, with an ‘Art Cinema’ gloss. He has said that Rani is more like Alborada and unlike his previous films made during the civil war. This is quite obvious. Though the advertising tag line for Alborada claimed it as a ‘Poetic film that Neruda never made’ it was a straightforward narrative film. I have argued in a long essay (‘Psycho-Sexual Violence in the Sinhala Cinema: Parasathumal & Alborada’, in Lamentation of the Dawn, ed. S. Chandrajeewa, 2022, also tr. into Sinhala, 2023), that the staging of the rape of the nameless, silent, Dalit woman is conceived in a melodramatic manner playing it for both critique and exciting thrills. This is a case of both having his cake and eating it.

Swarna’s Melodramatic Turn

The film appears to be constructed, plotted melodramatically, to demonstrate Swarna’s ability to perform dramatic scenes of high excitement in areas of taboo, the opportunity for which is unavailable to a Sinhala actress, in a Sinhala film, playing the role of a Sinhala Buddhist mother, who has lost her son to an act of terror unleashed by the Sinhala-Buddhist State terror and Sinhala-Buddhist JVP.

In short, Swarna has been given the opportunity to demonstrate how well she can perform a range of Melodramatic emotions that go from say A to, say D. She has been given the chance to move smoothly from English to Sinhala as the middle classes do; use the two most common American expletives which are part of the American vernacular; drink for pleasure but also to the point of getting drunk; offer alcohol to her baffled domestic worker; coax her son and  friends to drink; dance with them in an inebriated state; pour alcohol, whisky, not arrack, like one would pour water from a bottle; chain smoke furiously; dash a full mug of tea on the floor in a rage; crumple on the floor sobbing uncontrollably; shout at her loyal aid Karu; speak with sarcasm to a police officer insisting that she is ‘Dr Manorani …’ not ‘Miss or Mrs’, like feminists did back in the day; chat intimately with a minister of the government; look angrily and scowl at President Premadasa when he comes to the funeral house to condole with her; stage Richard’s funeral in a Catholic church with a stain glass window of the Pieta; to quote a well-known Psalm of David from the Bible, ‘Oh Absalom my son, Oh my son!’; etc.

Rani is Swarna’s chance to show that she can perform in ways that no Sinhala script has allowed a Sinhala actor to do up to now, that is, behave like the Sinhala cinema’s fantasy of how the upper-class Anglophone Lankan women behave. In short not unlike, but much worse, than the ‘bad girls’ in the Sinhala melodramatic genre cinema who always ended up in a Night Club, the locus of licentiousness that tempt them. I am thinking of Pitisara Kella from the 50s and a host of other films. Sinhala cinema simply cannot convincingly present the upper-class English-speaking milieu, with any nuance and conviction, it just feels very stilted, poorly acted therefore. Saying this is not class snobbery on my part. Even Lester James Peries from this very upper class and a Roman Catholic, in Delowak Atara couldn’t do it with Irangani Serasinghe and others. The dialogue meant to be serious or just plain normal sounded stilted and even funny. But when Lester did the Walauwa as in Nidhahanaya, it was brilliant, one of our classics. Brecht it was who said (on the eve of WW2, creating a Modern Epic mode of theatre in exile, that it’s not easy to make drama about current events. It’s much easier to look back with nostalgia at a genteel aristocratic Sinhala past for sure.

In taking the opportunity to explore kinetic and emotional behaviour considered to be taboo for a Sinhala woman, a fantasy Tamil woman has been fabricated. The plot of Rani is constructed by Asoka to provide Swarna the opportunity to indulge in these very taboos. In short, the fictional Tamil Rani offers Swarna an acting opportunity to improve her career prospects in the future. In so doing she has weakened her ability, I fear, to evolve as an actress.

A Domestic Melodrama: The House Suspended in a Void

If Swarna so desired, if the script ‘allowed her’ to, she could have tried to develop a quieter, more restrained and therefore a more powerful Rani. A friend of the family, when asked, said that, “The most striking feature of Manorani was her quiet, confident dignity, before and after Richard.” To testify to such a person, Asoka and Swarna could have asked the obvious question, did she have any close friendships formed as undergraduates, who supported her during this tragedy, as there certainly were cherished friends who shared her grief.  After all, she was among the elite first generations of Ceylonese women to enter University in the 1940, to medical school at that!

Asoka and Swarna have entrapped their Rani in a vacuum of a house, friendless, with a little cross on Richard’s wall to signify religion. A lot of effort has gone into the set decoration and art direction of the house, as in Alborada, to stage a fantasy/phantasy melodramatic scenario. There is no real sensory, empathetic feel and understanding of the ethos (character), of this urbane Anglophone Ceylonese-Lankan mother and son, hence the fictionalised scenarios feel synthetic, cosmetic in the best traditions of the Sinhala genre cinema’s representation of the ‘excessive and even grotesque upper-class’. Except, here the Realism of the mise-en-scene (the old-world airy house and furniture and composition of the visual components) makes claims to a realist authenticity. A little modest research would have shown that Manorani and Richard moved from one rented apartment to another in the last few years of his life and when he was abducted, lived on the upper-floor of a house, in a housing estate in Rajagiriya. Asoka said in an interview that it wasn’t possible to find in Colombo the kind of old house they required for Rani. So, they went out of town to find the ideal house suited to stage their phantasy.

I suspect that it was Swarna who called shots this time, not Asoka who was recovering from a serious illness. He said that she brought the project to him and the producer and that he had no idea of making a film on Manorani, but added that he wrote the script within 3 months. I suspect that this Rani, (this out of control, angry, scowling, bad tempered, lamenting, hysterical Rani, reaching for the alcohol and cigarettes to assuage her grief, performing one sensational, thrilling melodramatic turn after another), was Swarna’s conception, her version of Manorani that she has nursed for 28 long years. Had she resisted this temptation to display her high-intensity acting-out skills yet again, she might just have been able to tap unsuspected resources within herself which she may still have as a serious actress. Its these latent affective depths that Rukmani Devi undoubtedly tapped when she was invited to play the drunken and lost Blanche Dubois, in A Streetcar Named Desire in Sinhala, as a desperate, drunken, aristocratic lady, in Dhamma Jagoda’s Vesmuhunu (1971?).

Jagoda / Irangani

It is reported that before going on stage, Rukmani Devi went on her hands and knees to pay her respects to Dhamma, not as feudal act of deference but to acknowledge his Shilpiya Nuwana, craft knowledge/intelligence’, as one very perceptive Sinhala critic put it. That gesture of Vandeema was foreign to the Tamil Christian Rukmani Devi, but nevertheless it shows her sense of immense gratitude to Dhamma for having taken her into a zone of expression (a dangerous territory emotionally for dedicated vulnerable actors), that she had never experienced before, so late in her life. But ‘late’ is relative to gender, then she was only in her 50s!

Challenge is what serious actors yearn for, strange beings who may suggest to us intensities that sustain and amplify life, all life. Swarna might usefully think about Rukmani Devi, her life and her star persona as a Tamil star in countless sarala Sinhala films, in whose shadow and echo every single Sinhala actress has entered the limelight, Swarna more so now than any other!

As for Asoka, he needs to rest and take care of himself before he commits himself to this recent track of films which are yielding less and less with each of the two films done back to back. His body of work is too important to trash it with this kind of half thought out ‘Tales of Sound and Fury’, which is a precise definition of Melodrama at its best. This film, alas, is not one of those.

That young Tamil women, often silent and traumatised, appeared following Sinhala soldiers in Lankan ‘civil-war cinema’ of the modernists, all male, is a troubling phenomenon. A ‘Sinhala Orientalism’, an exoticising of Tamil and Dalith young women as Other, is at work in some of the civil war films, as in Alborada and Rani. And then this very elevation always leads to unleashing psycho/sexual and/or other forms of violence, because the elevation (Mother Goddess in Alborada) only feeds violent male psychosexual phantasies, which in the Sinhala cinema often leads to the violence of rape and other forms of violence towards women, both Tamil and Sinhala. (To be continued)

by Laleen Jayamanne 

Continue Reading

Midweek Review

Thirty Thousand and Counting….

Published

on

Many thousands in the annual grades race,

Are brimming with the magical feel of success,

And they very rightly earn warm congrats,

But note, you who are on the pedestals of power,

That 30,000 or more are being left far behind,

In these no-holds-barred contests to be first,

Since they have earned the label ‘All Fs’,

And could fall for the drug-pusher’s lure,

Since they may be on the threshold of despair…

Take note, and fill their lives with meaning,

Since they suffer for no fault of theirs.

By Lynn Ockersz

Continue Reading

Trending