Features
IPKF’S Withdrawal: Correspondence between Premadasa and Rajiv Gandhi – Part II
ANNEXURE “H”
New Delhi
July 11, 1989
Dear Mr. President,
I have your letters of 30th June and 5th July.
I do not wish to enter into a debate on various interpretations of mutual obligations assumed by our two sovereign nations. These are quite clear. I also do not wish to go into the validity of assertions like the LTTE having resumed violence on 2nd August, 1987 whereas the arms surrender started and the amnesty letter was handed over by the Sri Lankan Government to the LTTE three days later. We should let facts speak for themselves.
There is an Agreement between our two countries. This Agreement is meant to preserve the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka and to ensure the safety, security and legitimate interests of the Tamils. Nearly a thousand Indian soldiers have made the supreme sacrifice in fulfilment of India’s obligations as a guarantor of this Agreement. Since the signing of the Agreement, not only have the Provincial Council elections been held, but also the Parliamentary and Presidential elections. The situation in the North-Eastern Province is far more settled and peaceful than elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Despite all this, the devolution package promised to the Tamils has not been implemented. These are incontrovertible facts.
Both of us agree that the IPKF should be withdrawn. Both of us agree that we had commenced the withdrawal even before you asked for it. A broad time frame for IPKF’s withdrawal had in fact been discussed. Discussions on finalising the details were proposed by your Foreign Minister at Harare only a few days prior to your unilateral announcement of 1st June.
I have repeatedly said that the IPKF’s withdrawal schedule should be worked out through joint consultations along with a simultaneous schedule for the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. We are willing to resume discussions on, this subject at any time and place of your convenience. Your colleague, the Honourable Mr. Thondaman, who met me here, would have conveyed to you our desire for friendly relations and our willingness to resolve any misunderstandings through mutual consultations. If, however, discussions for this purpose are not acceptable to you, we will have to decide the details of IPKF’s withdrawal unilaterally consistent with our responsibilities and obligations under the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.
While I reiterate Government of India’s willingness to cooperate with your Government to resolve pending issues, I must emphasise to Your Excellency that India has traditionally been mindful of the sanctity of the Agreements it signs with other countries and of commitments solemnly undertaken under such Agreements. India will under no circumstances deviate from this policy affecting our concerns.
It has been our practice to maintain the confidentiality of official correspondence, particularly ‘between Heads of State or Government, unless otherwise agreed upon. However, the gist of your messages to me was more often than not made available to the media before they reached me. Now I find that all our recent correspondence has been officially made public by the Sri Lanka Government. I may thus be constrained to depart from tradition by authorising this communication being made public, after you receive it.
His Excellency
Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Colombo
ANNEXURE “I” 12th July 1989
Dear Prime Minister
I am in receipt of your letter of 11th July 1989 which was handed-to me by your Special-Envoy.I thank you for the courtesy of sending him to Sri Lanka in an attempt to resolve the issues regarding the withdrawal of the Indian Armed Forces.
I explained to your Special Envoy and his delegation my position with-regard to the withdrawal of the Indian Armed Forces from Sri Lanka. I informed them that the discussions can continue based on the four premises set out below.
Firstly, the Indian Armed Forces arrived in Sri Lanka as a peace keeping force to assist in restoring peace. They came at the request of the President of Sri Lanka and were under his command as the Commander in Chief of the Forces of Armed Forces. Their invitation was in terms of Item 6 of the Annexure to the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement which says “that an Indian Peace Keeping Contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities if so required.” The fact that the president of Sri Lanka is the Commander in Chief of all Armed Forces in Sri Lanka has been recognised by the Government of India.
Secondly, the Agreement was between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Government of India. There were no other parties to the Agreement. In fact the LTTE protested that they were left out of the Agreement and in fact their leaders had been confined for a duration of time leading up to the signing of the Agreement.
Thirdly, the presence of the Indian Armed Forces and the devolution of powers to the Provincial Councils are totally unconnected. I have explained this to you at great length in my earlier communications. I have told your delegation that the devolution of power by the Sri Lanka Parliament is entirely an internal matter. No foreign agency can oversee the implementation of legislation enacted by or compel the Parliament of a sovereign State to enact any particular provision of law. In any case, as stated in my earlier letter of 30th June 1989 you would appreciate that devolution is essentially a long term process. There is neither any legal nor any other rational basis for the presence of any military force to ensure that the process of devolution is complete. It would therefore be incorrect and unrealistic to contend that the Indian Armed Forces were expected to remain in Sri Lanka till the process of devolution is completed.
Fourthly, the Government of India undertook not to permit Indian territory to be used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka. I was constrained to point out to your delegation that Mr Padmanabha and others who are campaigning to keep the Indian Armed Forces in Sri Lanka have not only been permitted to publicly express their intention of making a unilateral declaration of Eelam whilst being on Indian soil but also to publicise such declaration on Indian national television.
I explained further to them that the invitation extended to the Indian Armed Forces was based on assurances contained in the Agreement that the time frame required for cessation of hostilities was 48 hours from the signing of the Agreement and for the surrender of arms was 72 hours from the cessation of hostilities. You would also appreciate that the decision to invite an Indian peace Keeping Contingent was in the context of resolve that a solution to the ethnic problem should be through negotiation and not by the use of military force. As such, the invitation could not have been interpreted as being one for the Indian Peace Keeping Contingent to engage itself in the prolonged use of force.
The reassurance with which I noted the withdrawal of Indian force when I assumed office turned to disappointment when I observed that the withdrawal was not being effected as expeditiously as possible. After careful consideration I decided that the 31st July 1989 was the suitable deadline for the withdrawal of the Indian armed forces from Sri Lanka.
The President of Sri Lanka could under Article 2.16(c) of the Agreement obtain Indian military -assistance when he thinks such assistance is necessary. In my Election Manifesto I promised to solve the problem, not by the use of force but by a process of consultation, compromise and consensus. The people of this country endorsed this manifesto. The dialogue initiated under this mandate has already borne fruit. The LTTE once the most intractable of the militant groups has ceased hostilities not only against the Government, but against all the people of the North and the East and indeed against all the people of Sri Lanka. They have agreed to join the democratic process and are now committed to settling problems by negotiation. In this context continued military action by the Indian armed forces is not only unnecessary but also prejudicial to a settlement by discussion and negotiation.
Action by the Indian armed forces is also gravely prejudicial to a political settlement with the LTTE who assert their need to carry arms as long as they are being attacked by the Indian forces and other militant groups who reportedly, enjoy the support of the Indian forces. Further the very presence of the Indian armed forces in Sri Lanka has made it difficult for me to enter into any dialogue with other political groups. In the meantime, certain groups in other parts of the country are resorting to violent activity on account of what they claim to be the inability of the Government to ensure the withdrawal of the Indian armed forces. The continued presence of the Indian armed forces is driving these groups to escalating their violence to crisis proportions.
My officials will be holding discussions based on these basic premises. I shall be replying the other issues including the statement attributed to my Foreign Minister raised in your letter of 11th July 1989 at the conclusion of the discussions between your delegation and my officials.
Yours sincerely
PRESIDENT
ANNEXURE “J”
19 July 1989
Dear Prime Minister
Further to my letter of 12th July, 1989 I wish to clarify certain matters referred to in your letter of 11th July, 1989.I agree that we should not enter into a debate. The terms of the Agreement are clear. The events leading up to that Agreement and the subsequent developments are fresh in our minds.
In regard to the cessation of hostilities by the LTTE, it is a fact that the Indian Armed Forces in Sri Lanka had not been able, even after two years, to ensure such cessation and complete disarming the militants. At the time of the signing of the Agreement it was envisaged that this process would not take more than five days.
I also agree with your assertion that the Agreement involves the acceptance of mutual obligations by two sovereign and friendly nations. The objective of this Agreement was to resolve the ethnic problem and to end the violence that was a threat to the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The Agreement also sought to ensure the physical security and safety not only of the Tamil ethnic community but of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
I must thank you once again for the assistance provided by the Indian Forces in response to Sri Lanka’s request for military assistance to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities. We are sad that over a thousand Indian lives have been lost.
Sri Lanka for her part has discharged all her obligations under the Agreement and in particular taken all effective and meaningful steps towards the devolution of power.Sri Lanka has amongst other things, amended the Constitution, enacted legislation necessary to establish Provincial Councils, temporarily merged the Northern and Eastern Provinces, implemented the Official Languages policy, held the Provincial Council Elections, set up the infrastructure and provided the personnel and finances necessary for effective functioning.
I wish to reiterate that I have at all times held the view that the problems of the Tamil linguistic groups in Sri Lanka should be resolved, not by the use of force but by the process of consultation, compromise and consensus.Firm in this belief, I, as the Presidential Candidate, incorporated in my manifesto a pledge to secure the withdrawal of the Indian Armed Forces as a necessary prelude to political negotiations and a durable settlement. I did so in October/November 1988. The people of Sri Lanka, by an overwhelming majority endorsed this principle, both at the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.
The events of the past months have proved the wisdom of my approach. The LTTE once the most intractable of groups have now agreed to eschew violence and join the mainstream of political democracy.You state that “the situation in the North-Eastern Provinces is far more settled and peaceful than elsewhere in Sri Lanka.” If this be so, there would be a lesser need for offensive action by the armed forces in these areas.
Furthermore, the substantial grievance over which the other Provinces began fomenting unrest, is the continued presence of the Indian Armed Forces in Sri Lanka. As you are aware, the agitation commenced with the signing of the Agreement and continued to escalate due to the presence of the Indian Armed Forces. So that, which ever way it is looked at, the continued presence of the Indian Armed Forces is an obstacle to the restoration of peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka.
Whilst we are both agreed that the Indian Armed Forces in Sri Lanka should be withdrawn, I cannot, for the reasons more fully set out in the annex hereto, agree that the terms of the Agreement do, or can in law be interpreted to mean, that the withdrawal of the Indian Armed Forces is in any way linked with or preconditioned upon the implementation of the process of devolution, or for that matter, the performance of any other obligation cast upon Sri Lanka by the Agreement.
The continued presence of the Indian Armed Forces or the conduct of any operations by such forces within Sri Lankan territory, is conditional only upon the concurrence of the Sri Lanka Government. It would therefore be unlawful for the Government of India to continue to maintain her Armed Forces within Sri Lankan territory in the absence of such concurrence.
It would be incompatible with the sovereignty of a State to concede a right for any alien armed force to operate within its territory contrary to the wishes of the Head of State who is also the Commander-in-Chief of its forces – from whom such alien armed force is not taking orders.
You would also appreciate that any continued offensive action against a section of my people who have publicly announced a cessation of hostilities against the Government and all the people of Sri Lanka would amount to the unlawful taking of civilian lives.
As already intimated to you, with the recommencement of the withdrawal process it will be possible to set in motion consultations to accommodate any logistical constraints which may arise.You have stated that my Foreign Minister has discussed a broad time frame for the withdrawal of the IPKF. According to him the former Indian High Commissioner in Colombo had intimated that some of the IPKF would be withdrawn by 30th of June and the rest by 31st of December. It appears that this had been a tentative proposal made by your former High Commissioner and I must emphasise that we have not at any time agreed to such a time frame.
I continue to receive reports of the forcible conscription of young people in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and their training at the hands of the Indian Forces. Since I wrote to you on this matter on 30th June, the situation has been aggravated. There is now an exodus of young people from the Northern and the Eastern Provinces fleeing from this conscription. A sizeable number is being accommodated in camps in Colombo.
I am thankful for the assurance in your letter that India has traditionally been mindful of the sanctity of the principle of observing the obligations of Agreements entered into by India. I wholly endorse the principle that Agreements should be observed. In this regard I invite your attention to the express provision in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement that the provision of military assistance by the Government of India is “as and when requested” by the Government of Sri Lanka.
It should also be noted that the Agreement contemplates that the Indian Armed Forces will assist the Government of Sri Lanka and. not be operating on their own initiative.
However, if it is your view that the Agreement should be construed as creating an obligation for the Indian Armed Forces to remain in Sri Lankan territory without the concurrence and against the express wishes of the Sri Lanka Government, I as the President of an independent, sovereign Republic, would have no option but to treat the Agreement as being inimical to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and national interests.
PRESIDENT
His Excellency Shri Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of India Prime Minister’s Office New Delhi
India.
ANNEX
The entry into and the continued presence of Indian Armed Forces on Sri Lankan territory can be lawful only upon the express concurrence of the Government of Sri Lanka.
It is a peremptory norm of international law, that the presence of, or the conduct of operations by, any foreign armed force within the territory of a sovereign state, otherwise than with the express concurrence of the Government of that state amounts to an act of aggression. Such acts of aggression have not only been recognized as unlawful, but unequivocally condemned by the community of civilized nations. This principle has also been reiterated in several United Nations instruments.
In the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement several acts of co-operation are obligated upon the Government of India. The provision of military assistance is one such act of co-operation.An examination of the structure of the Agreement makes it clear, that the Agreement contemplated implementation without the use of force, that the Government of India, agreed to underwrite and guarantee the acceptance of the Agreement by the militant groups, who would then cease hostilities and surrender their arms.
The Government of Sri Lanka undertook to confine its ‘Armed Forces to barracks and to grant an Amnesty to the militants who were in custody.The rendering of military assistance is governed by Article 2.16 (c) which clearly stipulates that the affording of military assistance is “as and when” requested by the Government of Sri Lanka.
This Article makes it clear beyond argument, that the basic provision of international law regarding the necessity of the concurrence of the government of the domestic state in the entry of foreign armed forces into its territory, has been recognized and observed.
With the release of the militants from custody and the confining of the Armed Forces to barracks by Sri Lanka, and the failure to disarm the militants or to ensure cessation of hostilities, there was resumption of the violence which necessitated the request t for Indian military Assistance. Accordingly the invitation to the Indian Armed Forces was, as unequivocally stated in clause 6 of the Annexure, “to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities”.
Any attempt to” construe this invitation as providing a mandatory’ right for the Armed Forces so invited to “protect” minorities or to oversee the devolution of power would be an untenable construction of the Agreement.Such a construction would neither accord with the clear understanding stated in the Agree-sent nor with the peremptory norms of international law.
Features
The invisible crisis: How tour guide failures bleed value from every tourist
(Article 04 of the 04-part series on Sri Lanka’s tourism stagnation)
If you want to understand why Sri Lanka keeps leaking value even when arrivals hit “record” numbers, stop staring at SLTDA dashboards and start talking to the people who face tourists every day: the tour guides.
They are the “unofficial ambassadors” of Sri Lankan tourism, and they are the weakest, most neglected, most dysfunctional link in a value chain we pretend is functional. Nearly 60% of tourists use guides. Of those guides, 57% are unlicensed, untrained, and invisible to the very institutions claiming to regulate quality. This is not a marginal problem. It is a systemic failure to bleed value from every visitor.
The Invisible Workforce
The May 2024 “Comprehensive Study of the Sri Lankan Tour Guides” is the first serious attempt, in decades, to map this profession. Its findings should be front-page news. They are not, because acknowledging them would require admitting how fundamentally broken the system is. The official count (April 2024): SLTDA had 4,887 licensed guides in its books:
* 1,892 National Guides (39%)
* 1,552 Chauffeur Guides (32%)
* 1,339 Area Guides (27%)
* 104 Site Guides (2%)
The actual workforce: Survey data reveals these licensed categories represent only about 75% of people actually guiding tourists. About 23% identify as “other”; a polite euphemism for unlicensed operators: three-wheeler drivers, “surf boys,” informal city guides, and touts. Adjusted for informal operators, the true guide population is approximately 6,347; 32% National, 25% Chauffeur, 16% Area, 4% Site, and 23% unlicensed.
But even this understates reality. Industry practitioners interviewed in the study believe the informal universe is larger still, with unlicensed guides dominating certain tourist hotspots and price-sensitive segments. Using both top-down (tourist arrivals × share using guides) and bottom-up (guides × trips × party size) estimates, the study calculates that approximately 700,000 tourists used guides in 2023-24, roughly one-third of arrivals. Of those 700,000 tourists, 57% were handled by unlicensed guides.
Read that again. Most tourists interacting with guides are served by people with no formal training, no regulatory oversight, no quality standards, and no accountability. These are the “ambassadors” shaping visitor perceptions, driving purchasing decisions, and determining whether tourists extend stays, return, or recommend Sri Lanka. And they are invisible to SLTDA.
The Anatomy of Workforce Failure
The guide crisis is not accidental. It is the predictable outcome of decades of policy neglect, regulatory abdication, and institutional indifference.
1. Training Collapse and Barrier to Entry Failure
Becoming a licensed National Guide theoretically requires:
* Completion of formal training programmes
* Demonstrated language proficiency
* Knowledge of history, culture, geography
* Passing competency exams
In practice, these barriers have eroded. The study reveals:
* Training infrastructure is inadequate and geographically concentrated
* Language requirements are inconsistently enforced
* Knowledge assessments are outdated and poorly calibrated
* Continuous professional development is non-existent
The result: even licensed guides often lack the depth of knowledge, language skills, or service standards that high-yield tourists expect. Unlicensed guides have no standards at all. Compare this to competitors. In Mauritius, tour guides undergo rigorous government-certified training with mandatory refresher courses. The Maldives’ resort model embeds guide functions within integrated hospitality operations with strict quality controls. Thailand has well-developed private-sector training ecosystems feeding into licensed guide pools.
2. Economic Precarity and Income Volatility
Tour guiding in Sri Lanka is economically unstable:
* Seasonal income volatility: High earnings in peak months (December-March), near-zero in low season (April-June, September)
* No fixed salaries: Most guides work freelance or commission-based
* Age and experience don’t guarantee income: 60% of guides are over 40, but earnings decline with age due to physical demands and market preference for younger, language-proficient guides
* Commission dependency: Guides often earn more from commissions on shopping, gem purchases, and restaurant referrals than from guiding fees
The commission-driven model pushes guides to prioritise high-commission shops over meaningful experiences, leaving tourists feeling manipulated. With low earnings and poor incentives, skilled guides exist in the profession while few new entrants join. The result is a shrinking pool of struggling licensed guides and rising numbers of opportunistic unlicensed operators.
3. Regulatory Abdication and Unlicensed Proliferation
Unlicensed guides thrive because enforcement is absent, economic incentives favour avoiding fees and taxes, and tourists cannot distinguish licensed professionals from informal operators. With SLTDA’s limited capacity reducing oversight, unregistered activity expands. Guiding becomes the frontline where regulatory failure most visibly harms tourist experience and sector revenues in Sri Lanka.
4. Male-Dominated, Ageing, Geographically Uneven Workforce
The guide workforce is:
* Heavily male-dominated: Fewer than 10% are women
* Ageing: 60% are over 40; many in their 50s and 60s
* Geographically concentrated: Clustered in Colombo, Galle, Kandy, Cultural Triangle—minimal presence in emerging destinations
This creates multiple problems:
* Gender imbalance: Limits appeal to female solo travellers and certain market segments (wellness tourism, family travel with mothers)
* Physical limitations: Older guides struggle with demanding itineraries (hiking, adventure tourism)
* Knowledge ossification: Ageing workforce with no continuous learning rehashes outdated narratives, lacks digital literacy, cannot engage younger tourist demographics
* Regional gaps: Emerging destinations (Eastern Province, Northern heritage sites) lack trained guide capacity
1. Experience Degradation Lower Spending
Unlicensed guides lack knowledge, language skills, and service training. Tourist experience degrades. When tourists feel they are being shuttled to commission shops rather than authentic experiences, they:
* Cut trips short
* Skip additional paid activities
* Leave negative reviews
* Do not return or recommend
The yield impact is direct: degraded experiences reduce spending, return rates, and word-of-mouth premium.

2. Commission Steering → Value Leakage
Guides earning more from commissions than guiding fees optimise for merchant revenue, not tourist satisfaction.
This creates leakage: tourism spending flows to merchants paying highest commissions (often with foreign ownership or imported inventory), not to highest-quality experiences.
The economic distortion is visible: gems, souvenirs, and low-quality restaurants generate guide commissions while high-quality cultural sites, local artisan cooperatives, and authentic restaurants do not. Spending flows to low-value, high-leakage channels.
3. Safety and Security Risks → Reputation Damage
Unlicensed guides have no insurance, no accountability, no emergency training. When tourists encounter problems, accidents, harassment, scams, there is no recourse. Incidents generate negative publicity, travel advisories, reputation damage. The 2024-2025 reports of tourists being attacked by wildlife at major sites (Sigiriya) with inadequate safety protocols are symptomatic. Trained, licensed guides would have emergency protocols. Unlicensed operators improvise.
4. Market Segmentation Failure → Yield Optimisation Impossible
High-yield tourists (luxury, cultural immersion, adventure) require specialised guide-deep knowledge, language proficiency, cultural sensitivity. Sri Lanka cannot reliably deliver these guides at scale because:
* Training does not produce specialists (wildlife experts, heritage scholars, wellness practitioners)
* Economic precarity drives talent out
* Unlicensed operators dominate price-sensitive segments, leaving limited licensed capacity for premium segments
We cannot move upmarket because we lack the workforce to serve premium segments. We are locked into volume-chasing low-yield markets because that is what our guide workforce can provide.
The way forward
Fixing Sri Lanka’s guide crisis demands structural reform, not symbolic gestures. A full workforce census and licensing audit must map the real guide population, identify gaps, and set an enforcement baseline. Licensing must be mandatory, timebound, and backed by inspections and penalties. Economic incentives should reward professionalism through fair wages, transparent fees, and verified registries. Training must expand nationwide with specialisations, language standards, and continuous development. Gender and age imbalances require targeted recruitment, mentorship, and diversified roles. Finally, guides must be integrated into the tourism value chain through mandatory verification, accountability measures, and performancelinked feedback.
The Uncomfortable Truth
Can Sri Lanka achieve high-value tourism with a low-quality, largely unlicensed guide workforce? The answer is NO. Unambiguously, definitively, NO. Sri Lanka’s guides shape tourist perceptions, spending, and satisfaction, yet the system treats them as expendable; poorly trained, economically insecure, and largely unregulated. With 57% of tourists relying on unlicensed guides, experience quality becomes unpredictable and revenue leaks into commission-driven channels.
High-yield markets avoid destinations with weak service standards, leaving Sri Lanka stuck in low-value, volume tourism. This is not a training problem but a structural failure requiring regulatory enforcement, viable career pathways, and a complete overhaul of incentives. Without professionalising guides, high-value tourism is unattainable. Fixing the guide crisis is the foundation for genuine sector transformation.
The choice is ours. The workforce is waiting.
This concludes the 04-part series on Sri Lanka’s tourism stagnation. The diagnosis is complete. The question now is whether policymakers have the courage to act.
For any concerns/comments contact the author at saliya.ca@gmail.com
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Recruiting academics to state universities – beset by archaic selection processes?
Time has, by and large, stood still in the business of academic staff recruitment to state universities. Qualifications have proliferated and evolved to be more interdisciplinary, but our selection processes and evaluation criteria are unchanged since at least the late 1990s. But before I delve into the problems, I will describe the existing processes and schemes of recruitment. The discussion is limited to UGC-governed state universities (and does not include recruitment to medical and engineering sectors) though the problems may be relevant to other higher education institutions (HEIs).
How recruitment happens currently in SL state universities
Academic ranks in Sri Lankan state universities can be divided into three tiers (subdivisions are not discussed).
* Lecturer (Probationary)
– recruited with a four-year undergraduate degree. A tiny step higher is the Lecturer (Unconfirmed), recruited with a postgraduate degree but no teaching experience.
* A Senior Lecturer can be recruited with certain postgraduate qualifications and some number of years of teaching and research.
* Above this is the professor (of four types), which can be left out of this discussion since only one of those (Chair Professor) is by application.
State universities cannot hire permanent academic staff as and when they wish. Prior to advertising a vacancy, approval to recruit is obtained through a mind-numbing and time-consuming process (months!) ending at the Department of Management Services. The call for applications must list all ranks up to Senior Lecturer. All eligible candidates for Probationary to Senior Lecturer are interviewed, e.g., if a Department wants someone with a doctoral degree, they must still advertise for and interview candidates for all ranks, not only candidates with a doctoral degree. In the evaluation criteria, the first degree is more important than the doctoral degree (more on this strange phenomenon later). All of this is only possible when universities are not under a ‘hiring freeze’, which governments declare regularly and generally lasts several years.
Problem type 1
– Archaic processes and evaluation criteria
Twenty-five years ago, as a probationary lecturer with a first degree, I was a typical hire. We would be recruited, work some years and obtain postgraduate degrees (ideally using the privilege of paid study leave to attend a reputed university in the first world). State universities are primarily undergraduate teaching spaces, and when doctoral degrees were scarce, hiring probationary lecturers may have been a practical solution. The path to a higher degree was through the academic job. Now, due to availability of candidates with postgraduate qualifications and the problems of retaining academics who find foreign postgraduate opportunities, preference for candidates applying with a postgraduate qualification is growing. The evaluation scheme, however, prioritises the first degree over the candidate’s postgraduate education. Were I to apply to a Faculty of Education, despite a PhD on language teaching and research in education, I may not even be interviewed since my undergraduate degree is not in education. The ‘first degree first’ phenomenon shows that universities essentially ignore the intellectual development of a person beyond their early twenties. It also ignores the breadth of disciplines and their overlap with other fields.
This can be helped (not solved) by a simple fix, which can also reduce brain drain: give precedence to the doctoral degree in the required field, regardless of the candidate’s first degree, effected by a UGC circular. The suggestion is not fool-proof. It is a first step, and offered with the understanding that any selection process, however well the evaluation criteria are articulated, will be beset by multiple issues, including that of bias. Like other Sri Lankan institutions, universities, too, have tribal tendencies, surfacing in the form of a preference for one’s own alumni. Nevertheless, there are other problems that are, arguably, more pressing as I discuss next. In relation to the evaluation criteria, a problem is the narrow interpretation of any regulation, e.g., deciding the degree’s suitability based on the title rather than considering courses in the transcript. Despite rhetoric promoting internationalising and inter-disciplinarity, decision-making administrative and academic bodies have very literal expectations of candidates’ qualifications, e.g., a candidate with knowledge of digital literacy should show this through the title of the degree!
Problem type 2 – The mess of badly regulated higher education
A direct consequence of the contemporary expansion of higher education is a large number of applicants with myriad qualifications. The diversity of degree programmes cited makes the responsibility of selecting a suitable candidate for the job a challenging but very important one. After all, the job is for life – it is very difficult to fire a permanent employer in the state sector.
Widely varying undergraduate degree programmes.
At present, Sri Lankan undergraduates bring qualifications (at times more than one) from multiple types of higher education institutions: a degree from a UGC-affiliated state university, a state university external to the UGC, a state institution that is not a university, a foreign university, or a private HEI aka ‘private university’. It could be a degree received by attending on-site, in Sri Lanka or abroad. It could be from a private HEI’s affiliated foreign university or an external degree from a state university or an online only degree from a private HEI that is ‘UGC-approved’ or ‘Ministry of Education approved’, i.e., never studied in a university setting. Needless to say, the diversity (and their differences in quality) are dizzying. Unfortunately, under the evaluation scheme all degrees ‘recognised’ by the UGC are assigned the same marks. The same goes for the candidates’ merits or distinctions, first classes, etc., regardless of how difficult or easy the degree programme may be and even when capabilities, exposure, input, etc are obviously different.
Similar issues are faced when we consider postgraduate qualifications, though to a lesser degree. In my discipline(s), at least, a postgraduate degree obtained on-site from a first-world university is preferable to one from a local university (which usually have weekend or evening classes similar to part-time study) or online from a foreign university. Elitist this may be, but even the best local postgraduate degrees cannot provide the experience and intellectual growth gained by being in a university that gives you access to six million books and teaching and supervision by internationally-recognised scholars. Unfortunately, in the evaluation schemes for recruitment, the worst postgraduate qualification you know of will receive the same marks as one from NUS, Harvard or Leiden.
The problem is clear but what about a solution?
Recruitment to state universities needs to change to meet contemporary needs. We need evaluation criteria that allows us to get rid of the dross as well as a more sophisticated institutional understanding of using them. Recruitment is key if we want our institutions (and our country) to progress. I reiterate here the recommendations proposed in ‘Considerations for Higher Education Reform’ circulated previously by Kuppi Collective:
* Change bond regulations to be more just, in order to retain better qualified academics.
* Update the schemes of recruitment to reflect present-day realities of inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary training in order to recruit suitably qualified candidates.
* Ensure recruitment processes are made transparent by university administrations.
Kaushalya Perera is a senior lecturer at the University of Colombo.
(Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.)
Features
Talento … oozing with talent
This week, too, the spotlight is on an outfit that has gained popularity, mainly through social media.
Last week we had MISTER Band in our scene, and on 10th February, Yellow Beatz – both social media favourites.
Talento is a seven-piece band that plays all types of music, from the ‘60s to the modern tracks of today.
The band has reached many heights, since its inception in 2012, and has gained recognition as a leading wedding and dance band in the scene here.
The members that makeup the outfit have a solid musical background, which comes through years of hard work and dedication
Their portfolio of music contains a mix of both western and eastern songs and are carefully selected, they say, to match the requirements of the intended audience, occasion, or event.
Although the baila is a specialty, which is inherent to this group, that originates from Moratuwa, their repertoire is made up of a vast collection of love, classic, oldies and modern-day hits.
The musicians, who make up Talento, are:
Prabuddha Geetharuchi:
(Vocalist/ Frontman). He is an avid music enthusiast and was mentored by a lot of famous musicians, and trainers, since he was a child. Growing up with them influenced him to take on western songs, as well as other music styles. A Peterite, he is the main man behind the band Talento and is a versatile singer/entertainer who never fails to get the crowd going.
Geilee Fonseka (Vocals):
A dynamic and charismatic vocalist whose vibrant stage presence, and powerful voice, bring a fresh spark to every performance. Young, energetic, and musically refined, she is an artiste who effortlessly blends passion with precision – captivating audiences from the very first note. Blessed with an immense vocal range, Geilee is a truly versatile singer, confidently delivering Western and Eastern music across multiple languages and genres.
Chandana Perera (Drummer):
His expertise and exceptional skills have earned him recognition as one of the finest acoustic drummers in Sri Lanka. With over 40 tours under his belt, Chandana has demonstrated his dedication and passion for music, embodying the essential role of a drummer as the heartbeat of any band.
Harsha Soysa:
(Bassist/Vocalist). He a chorister of the western choir of St. Sebastian’s College, Moratuwa, who began his musical education under famous voice trainers, as well as bass guitar trainers in Sri Lanka. He has also performed at events overseas. He acts as the second singer of the band
Udara Jayakody:
(Keyboardist). He is also a qualified pianist, adding technical flavour to Talento’s music. His singing and harmonising skills are an extra asset to the band. From his childhood he has been a part of a number of orchestras as a pianist. He has also previously performed with several famous western bands.
Aruna Madushanka:
(Saxophonist). His proficiciency in playing various instruments, including the saxophone, soprano saxophone, and western flute, showcases his versatility as a musician, and his musical repertoire is further enhanced by his remarkable singing ability.
Prashan Pramuditha:
(Lead guitar). He has the ability to play different styles, both oriental and western music, and he also creates unique tones and patterns with the guitar..
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