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Inside the Shadows of China: My Talk with Jasper Becker

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Jasper Becker

That was one of the most concealed nightmares humanity was forced to endure. “In one village a mother was discovered boiling her two-year-old to eat its flesh. In another case, a father was charged with strangling his two sons to consume them; his defence was that they were already dead,” Jasper recounted in his book Hungry Ghosts. The famine of Mao’s era, though China had long been known as a land prone to scarcity, was of an unprecedented magnitude; this man-made calamity claimed at least 30 million lives.

I spoke to Jasper this week, and our hours-long discussion unearthed his profound insights on China—its history, economy, and the deep, often invisible mechanisms that have shaped its trajectory. “I was not an academic,” he told me, “and most of the academic books written in American universities and British universities got the whole picture of China completely wrong.” It was this outsider’s perspective, unencumbered by institutional loyalty, that allowed him to travel freely across rural China and speak directly with peasants, capturing truths that the state sought to conceal.

Jasper Becker is a British journalist, historian, and author whose career has spanned several decades across Asia, with a particular focus on China. Fluent in Chinese, French, and German, Jasper began his career reporting for the Associated Press in Geneva and Frankfurt, before joining The Guardian, where he covered pivotal events across East Asia, including the pro-democracy movements in South Korea and Taiwan, the first pro-independence riots in Lhasa, and developments in North Korea.

From 1995 to 2002, he served as Beijing Bureau Chief for Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, later becoming China correspondent for The Independent. Jasper has authored nine books on Asia, most notably Hungry Ghosts, the first comprehensive account of China’s Great Leap Forward famine, and Rogue Regime, a study of Kim Jong Il’s North Korea, along with numerous privately published family histories.

Jasper explained that the systemic failures leading to the Great Famine were not merely historical accidents but predictable consequences of authoritarian centralisation and obfuscation. “Because one of the things about China is that it’s very secretive, it’s very authoritarian, and the statistics are unreliable,” he said. During Mao’s era, reporting lines were constructed on fear: “People were given targets. And if you didn’t meet the targets, you were punished. So people told lies to the people above them in the hierarchy, and they then doubled those lies. So you got these inflated reports, which went to the centre.”

This compounding of falsehoods created the terrifying conditions in which policy, divorced from reality, resulted in catastrophe. As Jasper noted, “Eventually then everybody starved, because you couldn’t eat these lies, and you had to import food from abroad. Nobody dared tell the great leader Mao that actually all this was lies and his policies didn’t work. And people who tried to do it were then severely punished.”

China’s long history of famine contextualises the Great Famine within a recurring pattern of environmental stress, social upheaval, and bureaucratic failure. Jasper elaborated on the historical mechanisms: “China was known as the land of famine… the responsibility of the state in Chinese history had been to collect grain in surplus years, hold that in storage, and release it during famine years. That system worked quite well.”

Yet environmental pressures, population expansion, and infrastructure challenges often disrupted these mechanisms. “The geography of China makes it very difficult to move grain around in large quantities, so what China did was they built a grand canal to bring food from the centre of China—from the Yangtze Valley—up to the north on barges.” The north, perpetually threatened by horse-riding invaders, relied on this logistical system to protect both population and state. However, Jasper stressed that, over centuries, human intervention exacerbated vulnerabilities: “People began to move out of the valleys into the mountains and cut down the trees, and that silted up the rivers, and when the rivers silted up there were more and more floods. So there were a succession of rebellions because there wasn’t enough food; the food wasn’t keeping up with the population growth.”

The twentieth century layered additional calamities atop these historical vulnerabilities. Civil wars between the Communists and the Nationalists, Japanese invasion, and regional conflicts created a persistent cycle of destruction. Jasper explained, “Despite the fact that the Chinese were benefiting from all these Western inventions and better crops and better transport, that was negated by all these people moving armies across the country and fighting each other.”

These repeated disruptions meant that, by the time the Great Famine struck under Mao, China’s population was extraordinarily vulnerable. Yet, while the famine itself was catastrophic, Jasper noted that the Communist Party later claimed to have eradicated extreme poverty—a claim he views through a critical lens: “The claim doesn’t really make any sense to me because people were poor when the Chinese Communist Party took over, because the Chinese Party had waged a civil war in order to impose a communist system, which made people worse off.”

The political economy that underpinned the famine and subsequent reforms is complex and, Jasper argued, distinct from other socialist experiments. In the early years of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, the challenge was to transition from a militarized, state-controlled economy to a consumer-driven one. “When I went there, everybody was dressed in military uniforms… and the military ran everything… So people moved things out of the military into the civilian consumer market.” Jasper emphasized the incremental, step-by-step liberalisation as central to understanding China’s economic evolution.

“Communist countries had a choice between freeing all the prices and privatizing everything in one go, which is what a country like Poland did. Or they could do what China did, which was to do this one commodity at a time.” The initial price liberalizations led to rampant inflation and social frustration, culminating in the student protests of 1989: “Even though living standards were going up, the people wanted to get rid of the Communist Party, because they believed, well, if we’re going to go into a market economy, why do we need a Communist Party?”

Jasper recounted his own experiences reporting during those turbulent times. “I was in Tiananmen, and in Beijing when they sent the army in to suppress the student protest.” The episode revealed the Party’s prioritization of political control over economic reform, a principle that continued to define China’s subsequent trajectory. Upon returning to China in the mid-1990s, Jasper observed the divergence from the Soviet experience: “In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party had been banned. But the Chinese said, well, we’re staying in power. Our children, the children of the revolutionary leaders, are going to stay in control. We are not going to sell off the state factories… But we are going to get foreign investment in.” This hybrid model, combining controlled liberalization with political continuity, underpinned China’s rapid industrial ascent.

Yet Jasper stressed that the extraordinary industrial expansion carries its own contradictions. “China has done everything to excess… which leads to actually a lot of damage.” Overcapacity in housing, steel, and emerging sectors like electric vehicles exemplifies this pattern. “You get a car and the speed limit should be 50 miles an hour. And you say, ‘Oh no, we’re the Chinese Communist Party. We can do things faster.’ And then you drive the car at 100 miles an hour. And then you crash the car. That’s kind of what they do.” This metaphor captures the structural tensions within China’s economic model: rapid production without the corrective mechanisms provided by a truly functioning market.

The modern manifestation of this over-investment is striking. China’s steel production now exceeds one billion tonnes annually, eclipsing the combined output of the next ten countries. Jasper explained, “China produces more than India, Japan, Korea, America, Europe all put together. And now they’re flooding the world with cheap steel. So steel companies all over the world are going bankrupt, because they can’t match the steel prices.”

Similarly, overbuilt housing and infrastructure, while creating employment and stimulating local economies, represent sunk costs unlikely to yield sustainable returns. “You built all this housing, but way too much housing—nobody wants this housing. And so that means the banks, which kind of own the housing because they lend people mortgages, are essentially bankrupt. And lots of industries are like that.”

The structural opacity of the Chinese system exacerbates these issues. Jasper highlighted that “even to this day, the Chinese currency, the renminbi, is not a convertible currency. We don’t know what it’s worth. And they were very fortunate that a lot of foreign companies came into China… but people in the leadership also don’t know the true data.” The reliance on falsified statistics and controlled information channels creates persistent uncertainty in both domestic and global economic planning. “Most of the data coming out of China is fraudulent… the problem we still have today is that most of the data coming out of China is fraudulent; it’s inflated and doesn’t give you a true picture because the political system is still the same.”

This combination of over-centralization, state-directed investment, and opaque governance presents distinct challenges for contemporary analysts and journalists. Jasper lamented the shrinking space for independent reporting: “There are almost no foreign journalists there now… and the Chinese journalists obviously can’t do anything because everything is censored.” Digital technologies, once presumed to guarantee transparency, have been co-opted into mechanisms of control. “You can’t even use a VPN safely in China… that technology story didn’t pan out at all.”

In our discussions, Jasper repeatedly emphasized that the patterns observed historically continue to shape China’s present. The “stimulus programmes” of 2008 and subsequent over-investment, the lack of a convertible currency, and state-directed malinvestment reflect enduring features of a highly centralized system. “One steel mill is a good idea, but ten steel mills is a bad idea… you basically have to write that off.”

Similarly, the economic and demographic legacies of the Great Famine reverberate in persistent rural–urban inequalities. The Hukou system, controlling mobility and access to services, reproduces centuries-old hierarchies: “If you are from a rural area you have no right to live in the city and therefore enjoy better schools or better health care… the difference between the status of an urban resident and a rural resident didn’t change.”

Jasper also offered trenchant observations on China’s geopolitical posture and trade strategies. Overcapacity and export-led industrial growth create structural pressures on other nations, inducing trade tensions. “European and American countries are now moving to basically putting up barriers to Chinese products… because if you’re dumping all this stuff on the market, other people can’t develop their own factories and industries.” He detailed the complex interplay of tariffs, smuggling, and regional industrial relocation: “China has been using countries in Southeast Asia to move factories out of China and try and get round these tariff barriers, and to smuggle these advanced chips through third countries.”

Throughout our conversations, Jasper returned consistently to the historical continuities linking famine, war, and economic mismanagement. Centralized decision-making, secrecy, and excessive intervention created vulnerabilities in the past and continue to shape the present. “Over-centralization is a mistake, having fixed exchange rates is a mistake, having too many subsidies and too much government-directed investment is a mistake, and you’re better relying on market signals than government central planning… They promised everyone they were going to abolish money, abolish markets and abolish private property and they all starved to death.”

His reflections also extended to China’s military–industrial nexus. “It’s certainly building up its military because that’s a way of using up all this steel and all these people… it becomes really difficult to compete.” The intersection of industrial overcapacity, strategic posturing, and centralized planning illustrates how historical patterns of overreach persist into contemporary policy making. Similarly, tensions regarding Taiwan exemplify the political uncertainties that permeate the upper echelons of the Party. “Ever since I’ve been dealing with China, people have been talking about this… I don’t think it’s physically possible for China to invade Taiwan; they would suffer a huge defeat.”

Jasper offered a sobering assessment of the prospects for journalism and historical research in the digital age. The capacity to collect reliable information has been severely curtailed, creating significant blind spots in global understanding: “We certainly know less about China than we used to do… because what China does affects everybody’s economy now, whereas what China did in those days mostly just affected China.” He warned that the combination of over-investment, opaque governance, and restricted information channels will continue to produce systemic challenges, echoing lessons from history.

Reflecting on the entirety of our hours-long dialogue, it becomes evident that the Great Famine, China’s economic trajectory, and its current global positioning are inseparable from the patterns Jasper elucidates. From man-made famine to overcapacity in steel, to censored information and over-centralized planning, the through-line is a system that amplifies both achievement and risk. “Although you get these incredible achievements,” he noted, “you also actually bankrupt yourself doing this… You make lots of electric vehicles, but you lose money when you make them.”

China’s trajectory, as Jasper portrays it, is one of extraordinary paradox: immense industrial and technological prowess coexists with structural fragility; economic growth is accompanied by unsustainable debts and overproduction; centralization ensures both speed and opacity; and censorship preserves the Party’s narrative while masking underlying dysfunctions. In his words, “The manufacturing is real, but underneath things are not very healthy at all… that reversal will be very painful… a lot of the investment will go bad.”

As Jasper reminded me repeatedly, “This is the characteristic of the Chinese system… they do everything to excess, incredibly organized and good at organizing large numbers of people, and getting them to do something very, very quickly, because nobody can oppose it. But this leads to actually a lot of damage.” The tragedy of the famine was not merely the deaths themselves, but the fact that they were preventable. The tragedy of modern China, as Jasper sees it, may lie not in dramatic collapse but in an extended period of stagnation, tension, and dislocation—a slow grinding down of dynamism under the weight of centralized control. The past is not repeating; it is rhyming in ways that are easy to overlook and dangerous to ignore.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa  ✍️



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NASA’s Epic Flight, Trump’s Epic Fumble and Asian Dilemmas

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Epic Crew (L-R): Jeremy Hansen, Victor Glover, Reid Wiseman Christina and Christina Koch

Three hours after the spectacular Artemis II flight launch in Florida, US President Donald Trump delivered a forlorn speech from Washington. Thirty three days after starting the war against Iran as Epic Fury, the President demonstrated on national and global televisions the Epic Fumble he has made out of his Middle East ‘excursion’. It was an April Fool’s Day speech, 20 minutes of incoherent rambling with the President looking bored, confused, disengaged and dispirited. He left no one wiser about what will come next, let alone what he might do next.

There was more to April Fool’s Day this year in that it brought out the nation’s good, bad and the ugly, all in a day’s swoop. The good was the Artemis II flight carrying astronauts farther from the Earth’s orbit and closer to the moon for the first time in over 50 years. The mission is a precursor for future flights and will test the performance of a new spacecraft, gather new understanding of human conditioning, and extend the boundaries of lunar science. It is a testament to humankind being able to make steady progress in science and technology at one end of a hopelessly uneven world, while poverty, bigotry and belligerence simmer violently at the other end.

Terrible Trump

The four Artemis II astronauts, three Americans, Reid Wiseman, Victor Glover, and Christina Koch, and one Canadian, Jeremy Hansen, are also symptomatic of the endurance of America’s inclusive goodness in spite of efforts by the Trump Administration to snuff the nation’s fledgling DEI (Diversity, Equity and Inclusion) ethos. To wit, of the four astronauts, Victor Glover, a Caribbean American, is the first person of colour, Christina Koch the first woman, and Jeremy Hansen of Canada the first non-American – to fly this far beyond the earth’s orbit. All in spite of Trump’s watch.

Yet Trump managed to showcase his commitment to America’s ugliness, on the same day, by presenting himself at the Supreme Court hearing on the constitutionality of his most abominable Executive Order – to stop the American tradition of birthright citizenship. He keeps posting that America is Stupid in being the only country in the world that grants citizenship at birth to everyone born in America, regardless of the status of their parents, except the children of foreign diplomats or members of an occupying enemy force. In fact, there are 32 other countries in the world that grant birthright citizenship, a majority of them in the Americas indicating the continent’s history as a magnet for migrants ever since Christopher Columbus discovered it for the rest of the world.

And birthright citizenship in the US is enshrined in the constitution by the 14th Amendment, supplemented by subsequent legislation and reinforced by a century and a half of case law. Trump wants to reverse that. Thus far and no further was the message from the court at the hearing. A decision is expected in June and the legal betting is whether it would be a 7-2 or 8-1 rebuke for Trump. In a telling exchange during the hearing, when the government’s Solicitor General John Sauer quite sillily dramatized that “we’re in new world now … where eight billion people are one plane ride way from having a child who’s a US citizen,” Chief Justice John Roberts quietly dismissed him: “Well, it’s a new world. It’s the same Constitution!”

Trump’s terrible ‘bad’ is of course the war that he started in the Middle East and doesn’t know how to end it. Margaret MacMillan, acclaimed World War I historian and a great grand daughter of World War I British Prime Minister Lloyd George from Wales, has compared Trump’s current war to the origins of the First World War. Just as in 1914, small Serbia had pulled the bigger Russia into a war that was not in Russia’s interest, so too have Netanyahu and Israel have pulled Trump and America into the current war against Iran. World War I that started in August, 2014 was expected to be over before Christmas, but it went on till November, 2018. Weak leaders start wars, says MacMillan, but “they don’t have a clear idea of how they are going to end.”

There are also geopolitical and national-political differences between the 1910s and 2020s. America’s traditional allies have steadfastly refused to join Trump’s war. And Trump is under immense pressure at home not to extend the war. This is one American war that has been unpopular from day one. The cost of military operations at as high as two billion dollars a day is anathema to the people who are aggravated by rising prices directly because of the war. Trump’s own mental acuity and the abilities of his cabinet Secretaries are openly under question. There are swirling allegations of military contract profiteering and selective defense investments – one involving Secretary of War Pete Hegseth.

Trump’s Administration is coming apart with sharp internal divisions over the war and government paralysis on domestic matters. There are growing signs of disarray – with Trump firing his Attorney General for not being effective prosecuting his political enemies and Secretary Hegseth ordering early retirement for Army Chief of Staff Randy George. In America’s non-parliamentary presidential system, Trump is allowed to run his own forum where he lies daily without instant challenger or contradiction, and it is impossible to get rid of his government by that simple device called no confidence motion.

Asian Dilemmas

Howsoever the current will last or end, what is clear is that its economic consequences are not going to disappear soon. Iran’s choke on the Strait of Hormuz has affected not only the supply and prices of oil and natural gas but a family of other products from fertilizers to medicines to semiconductors. The barrel price of oil has risen from $70 before the war to over $100 now. After Trump’s speech on April 1, oil prices rose and stock prices fell. The higher prices have come to stay and even if they start going down they are not likely to go down to prewar levels.

There are warnings that with high prices, low growth and unemployment, the global economy is believed to be in for a stagflation shock like in the 1970s. Even if the war were to end sooner than a lot later, the economic setbacks will not be reversed easily or quickly. Supplies alone will take time to get back into routine, and it will even take longer time for production in the Gulf countries to get back to speed. Not only imports, but even export trading and exports to Middle East countries will be impacted. The future of South Asians employed in the Middle East is also at stake.

In 1980, President Carter floated the Carter Doctrine that the US would use military force to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Trump is now upending that doctrine – first by misusing America’s military force against Iran and provoking the strait’s closure, and then claiming that keeping the strait open is not America’s business. Ever selfish and transactional, Trump’s argument is that America is now a net exporter of oil and is no longer dependent on Middle East oil.

To fill in the void, and perhaps responding to Trump’s call to “build up some delayed courage,” UK has hosted a virtual meeting of about 40 countries to discuss modalities for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. US was not one of them. While Downing Street has not released a full list of attendees, European countries, some Gulf countries, Canada, Australia, Japan and India reportedly attended the meeting. Which other Asian countries attended the meeting is not known.

British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper has blamed Iran for “hijacking” an international shipping route to “hold the global economy hostage,” while insisting that the British initiative is “not based on any other country’s priority or anything in terms of the US or other countries”. French President Emmanuel Macron now visiting South Korea has emphasized any resolution “can only be done in concert with Iran. So, first and foremost, there must be a ceasefire and a resumption of negotiations.”

Prior to the British initiative focussed on the Strait of Hormuz, Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye have been playing a backdoor intermediary role to facilitate communications between the US and Iran. Trump as usual magnified this backroom channel as serious talks initiated by Iran’s ‘new regime’, and Trump’s claims were promptly rejected by Iran. There were speculations that Pakistan would host a direct meeting between US Vice President JD Vance and an Iranian representative in Islamabad. So far, only the foreign ministers of Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have met in Islamabad, and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar flew to Beijing to brief his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, of Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts.

The Beijing visit produced a five-point initiative calling for a ceasefire, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and diplomacy instead of escalation. The five-point pathway seems a follow up to the 15-point demand that the US sent to Iran through the three Samaritan intermediaries which Iran rejected as they did not include any of Iran’s priorities. The state of these mediating efforts are now unclear after President Trump’s April Fool’s Day rambling. In fairness, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced that his country intends to keep ‘nudging’ the US and Iran towards resuming negotiations and ending the war.

While these efforts are welcome and deserve everyone’s best wishes, they have also led to what BBC has called the “chatter in Delhi” – “is India being sidelined” by Pakistan’s intermediary efforts? Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s rather undiplomatic characterization of Pakistan’s role as “dalali” (brokerage) provoked immediate denunciation in Islamabad, while Indian opposition parties are blaming the Modi Government’s foreign policy stances as an “embarrassment” to India’s stature.

The larger view is that while it is Asia that is most impacted by the closure of Hormuz, with Singapore’s Foreign Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan calling it an “Asian crisis”, Asia has no leverage in the matter and Asian countries have to make special arrangements with Iran to let their ships navigate through the Strait of Hormuz. There is no pathway for co-ordinated action. China is still significant but not consequentially effective. India’s all-alignment foreign policy has made it less significant and more vulnerable in the current crisis. And Pakistan has opened a third dimension to Asia’s dilemmas.

In the circumstances, it is fair to say that Sri Lanka is the most politically stable country among its South Asian neighbours. Put another way, Sri Lanka has a remarkably consensual and uncontentious government in comparison to the old governments in India and Pakistan, and even the new government in Bangladesh. But that may not be saying much unless the NPP government proves itself to be sufficiently competent, and uses the political stability and the general goodwill it is still enjoying, to put the country’s economic department in order. More on that later.

by Rajan Philips

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Ranjith Siyambalapitiya turns custodian of a rare living collection

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Siyambalapitiya’s ancsetral house built on 1923 at Vendala

From Parliament to Fruit Grove:

After more than two decades in politics, rising to the positions of Cabinet Minister and Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ranjith Siyambalapitiya has turned his attention to a markedly different arena — one far removed from parliamentary debate and political intrigue.

Today, Siyambalapitiya spends much of his time tending to a sprawling 15-acre home garden at Vendala in Karawanella, near Ruwanwella, nurturing what has gradually evolved into one of the most remarkable private fruit collections in the country.

Situated in Sri Lanka’s Wet Zone Low Country agro-ecological region (WL2), Ruwanwella lies at an elevation of roughly 100–200 metres above sea level. Deep red-yellow podzolic soils, annual rainfall exceeding 2,500 millimetres, and a warm humid tropical climate combine to create conditions that make the region one of the richest areas in the island for fruit tree diversity.

Within this favourable ecological setting, Siyambalapitiya has become what may best be described as a custodian of a living collection—a fruit grove that now contains around 554 fruit trees and vines, many of them rare or seldom seen in contemporary agriculture.

Of these, 448 varieties have already been properly identified and documented with the assistance of agriculturist Dr. Suba Heenkenda, a retired expert of the Department of Agriculture. Together they have undertaken the painstaking task of cataloguing the plants by their botanical names, common Sinhala names, and the names used in ancient Ayurvedic and indigenous medical texts, assigning each species a unique identification number.

According to Siyambalapitiya, the Vendala estate is possibly the only single location in Sri Lanka where such a large number of fruit varieties—particularly rare and underutilized species—are maintained within one property.

“This garden came down to me through my grandfather, grandmother, mother and father,” he says. “It is a place shaped by three generations.”

The estate, he explains, began as a traditional home garden where crops such as tea, coconut and rubber were cultivated alongside fruit trees planted by family members over decades. Over time, however, it evolved into something much larger: a carefully nurtured grove preserving both common and obscure fruit species.

Siyambalapitiya recalls with affection one of the oldest trees in the garden—a honey-jack tree known locally as “Lokumänike’s Rata Kos Gaha.”

The story behind it has become part of family lore. According to village elders, his grandmother had brought home the sapling after visiting the Colombo Grand Exhibition in 1952 many decades ago and planted it near the house.

The tree soon gained fame in the village. Its tender jackfruit proved ideal for curry and mallum, while the ripe fruit was renowned for its sweetness.

“Ripe jackfruit from this tree tastes like honey itself,” Siyambalapitiya says. “Even the seeds are full of flour and can be eaten throughout the year.”

Yet age has not spared the venerable tree. It now shows signs of disease, and Siyambalapitiya and his staff have had to treat old wounds and monitor unusual bark damage.

“Once lightning struck it,” he recalls. “The largest branch began to die. Saving the tree required what I would call a kind of surgical operation.”

Such care, he says, reflects the deep attachment he feels toward the collection.

His fascination with fruit trees began in childhood. While attending Royal College in Colombo and living in a boarding house he disliked, Siyambalapitiya would insist that the family procure new fruit saplings for him to plant during his weekend visits home.

“That was the only ‘price’ I demanded for going to school,” he laughs.

Over the years the collection expanded steadily as he encountered new plants in forests, nurseries, and rural landscapes across the island.

The result today is a grove that includes traditional Sri Lankan fruit species, underutilized native varieties, forest fruits, and plants introduced from overseas.

Some species originate in Arabian deserts, while others thrive naturally in cooler climates such as Europe. Certain plants require greenhouse-like conditions, while others are hardy forest trees.

Managing such diversity is no easy task.

“One plant asks for rain, another asks for cold, and yet another prefers heat,” Siyambalapitiya explains. “Too much rain makes some sick, too much sun troubles others. The older trees overshadow the younger ones. You cannot feed or medicate them all in the same way.”

He compares the task to caring for a household filled with people from many nations and ages—each with different needs.

Despite the challenges, he believes the effort is worthwhile, particularly because many of the trees are native species that have become increasingly rare.

“If things continue as they are, some of these plants may disappear from our lives,” he warns.

To preserve knowledge about them, Siyambalapitiya is preparing to launch a book titled “Mage Vendala Palathuru Arana” (My Vendala Fruit Grove), which serves as an introductory guide to the collection.

The book, scheduled for release on April 18 at the Vendala estate, will be attended by Ven. Dr. Kirinde Assaji Thera, Chief Incumbent of Gangaramaya Temple,

Uruwarige Wannila Aththo, the leader of the Indigenous Vedda Community,

a long-serving former employee who helped maintain the plantation, and Sunday Dhamma school students from the region, who will participate as guests of honour.

The publication will also mark Siyambalapitiya’s eighth book. Previously he authored seven works and wrote more than 500 weekly newspaper columns offering commentary on politics and current affairs.

While working on the fruit catalogue, he is simultaneously writing another volume reflecting on his 25-year political career, including his tenure as Deputy Finance Minister during Sri Lanka’s most severe economic crisis.

For Siyambalapitiya, however, the fruit grove represents more than a hobby or academic exercise.

“The fruit we enjoy is the result of a tree’s effort to reproduce,” he says. “Nature has given fruits their taste, fragrance and colour to attract us. All the tree asks in return is that its seeds be carried to new places.”

That simple cycle of life, he believes, has continued for tens of thousands of years.

“And those who love trees,” he adds, “are guardians of the world’s survival.”

by Saman Indrajith

Pix by Tharanga Ratnaweera

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Smoke Free Sweden calls out to WHO not to suggest nicotine alternatives

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It has been reported by the international advocacy initiative, ‘Smoke Free Sweden’ (‘SFS’) that many International health experts have begun criticizing the World Health Organization (WHO) for presenting safer nicotine alternatives rather than recognizing its role in accelerating decline in smoking.

As the world’s premier technical health agency, the WHO is empowered to support strategies that reduce morbidity and mortality even if they do not eliminate the underlying behaviour. Furthermore, it should base its guidance on evolving scientific knowledge, which includes comparative-risk assessments. Equating smoke-free nicotine alternatives with combustible cigarettes, is essentially putting lives at risk, according to the health experts contacted by SFS.

The warning follows recent WHO comments suggesting that vaping and other non-combustible nicotine products are driving tobacco use in Europe. This narrative ignores real-world evidence from countries like Sweden where access to safer alternatives has coincided with record low smoking rates.

A “Smoke-Free” status is defined as an adult daily smoking prevalence below 5% and Sweden is on the brink of officially achieving this milestone. This is clear proof that pragmatic harm-reduction policies work. Sweden’s success has been driven by adult smokers switching to lower-risk alternatives such as oral tobacco pouches (Snus), oral nicotine pouches and other non-combustible products.

“Vapes and pouches are helping to reduce risk, and Sweden’s smoke-free transition proves this,” said Dr Delon Human, leader of Smoke Free Sweden. “We should be celebrating policies that help smokers quit combustible tobacco, not spreading fear about the very tools that are accelerating the decline of cigarettes.”

It is further reported by health experts that conflating cigarettes with non-combustible alternatives risks deterring smokers from switching and could slow progress toward reducing tobacco-related disease.

Dr Human emphasized that youth protection and harm reduction are not mutually exclusive.

“It is critically important to safeguard against underage use, but this should be done by targeted, risk-proportionate regulation and proper enforcement, not by sacrificing the right of adults to access products that might save their lives,” he said.

Smoke Free Sweden is calling on global health authorities to adopt evidence-based policies that distinguish clearly between combustible tobacco – the primary cause of tobacco-related death – and lower-risk nicotine alternatives.

“Public health policy must be grounded in science and real-world outcomes,” Dr Human added. “Sweden’s experience shows that when adult smokers are given legal access to safer nicotine alternatives, smoking rates fall faster than almost anywhere else in the world.”

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