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Foreigners Can Drive TukTuks in Sri Lanka — That’s the Law

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Sri Lanka faces a defining choice: remain trapped on the hamster wheel of mass tourism — short-stop itineraries, overcrowded attractions, and wealth funneled to mega-resorts — or rise as a sustainable, high-value destination rivaling Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. What blocks that transformation isn’t economy, safety, policy, or politics, its deliberate disregard of the law and of the international human rights principles that underpin it. As a nation built on socialist values of equality and shared prosperity, Sri Lanka has a moral duty to ensure its tourism model uplifts communities rather than concentrates wealth.

The global experiential travel market – built on authentic, independent exploration – was valued at USD 138 billion in 2024 and is projected to surge to USD 372.93 billion by 2034. For Sri Lanka, the humble tuktuk, an icon of its vibrant streets, is a bridge to unlocking a large share of this booming market. When travellers venture beyond short-stop itineraries and into rural towns, their spending has a multiplier effect. It doesn’t end with hotels or tour operators; it flows directly to mechanics, roadside stalls, homestays, and family-run shops. The self-drive model turns tourists into mobile micro-investors, circulating income deep into communities that mass tourism overlooks. It is grassroots economics on three wheels.

The average tourist itinerary in Sri Lanka lasts just eight days (SLTDA), but self-drive travellers stay between 12 to 16 days and spend significantly more. On average, they contribute USD 1,281 per person, compared to USD 851 for a mid-range visitor. The benefits of self-drive tuktuks extend deep into local communities. In Weligama, P.G. Nissanka earns over LKR 60,000 a month by leasing his tuktuk for self-drive rentals netting a return exceeding 25%, higher than many blue-chip firms on the Colombo Stock Exchange. Others, like Naveen, a 22-year-old flower seller from Wellimada, profit from this ripple effect — selling blooms to visiting travellers and colouring both their holidays and his own livelihood.

The self-drive revolution isn’t just spreading wealth — it’s reshaping who comes to Sri Lanka. Tourists from Europe, North America, and Australia lead arrivals in the market, bringing new revenue, storytelling, and global exposure that go far beyond the traditional high volume arrivals from China, India, and Russia. Few travel experiences have captured the world’s imagination like Sri Lanka’s self-drive tuktuk. With over 17 million+ impressions on social media, a spot on The Amazing Race Australia, and glowing features in BBC, The Guardian, Lonely Planet, and Nat Geo Traveller, it’s become a global phenomenon — even drawing stars like Jonty Rhodes to take the driver’s seat.

According to the Ministry of Transport, Highways and Urban Development, safety concerns surrounding tuktuks simply don’t hold up to evidence. DMT data shows that road fatalities comprised 33.2% motorcycles, 31.1% pedestrians, 8.5% bicyclists, 7.3% motor cars and dual-purpose vehicles, 7.3% rear riders, 4.7% lorries, 4.2% three-wheelers, 3.5% buses, and 0.2% other. With around 1.18 million registered three-wheelers compared to 900,000 cars, Sri Lanka has more three-wheelers on the road yet they account for a smaller share of fatalities.

Despite the overwhelming global exposure, proven economic benefits, and data disproving safety concerns, misinformation persists. Opposition from parts of the informal travel sector continues to sow doubt among locals — often for political or protectionist gain. The lingering question remains: is it legal for a foreign visitor to drive a tuktuk in Sri Lanka? Yes, and here’s why.

The International Convention on Road Traffic: 1949 Geneva

The law is clear. Sri Lanka ratified the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic on 26 July 1951, joining more than 100 nations that recognise the International Driving Permit (IDP). This commitment was formally enacted into national law through Gazette Extraordinary No. 11,603 of 28 November 1958, giving full domestic legal force to the treaty’s recognition of international driving rights. As a signatory, and under its own Motor Traffic statute, Sri Lanka is bound to uphold the Convention’s core principle: that once a driver is deemed competent by one sovereign nation, that competence must be respected by all others.

Sri Lanka remains a party to the 1949 Convention, which continues to be the legal foundation upon which its missions abroad advise foreign nationals. Under Article 32, any state may withdraw by giving one year’s notice to the UN Secretary-General — a notice Sri Lanka has never given — meaning the Convention remains fully in force and domestically binding. This international framework also benefits Sri Lankans travelling overseas, who can obtain an IDP through the Automobile Association of Ceylon (AAC) and drive legally in other member countries without sitting any further tests.

The International Convention on Road Traffic: 1968 Vienna

While Sri Lanka remains bound primarily by the 1949 Geneva Convention, its Motor Traffic (Amendment) Act No. 8 of 2009 incorporated key provisions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic. Through Sections 132A and 132B of the amended Motor Traffic Act, Sri Lanka formally recognises International Driving Permits (IDPs) issued under the 1968 Convention — ensuring that tourists holding either a 1949- or 1968-based IDP can legally drive in the country. This alignment reinforces Sri Lanka’s standing in the international motoring framework and simplifies cross-border travel for both visitors and Sri Lankans abroad.

Do you need to complete additional driving testing in Sri Lanka?

Under Article 24 of the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic, any visitor holding a valid International Driving Permit (IDP) issued by another contracting state must be permitted to drive “without further examination or test”. The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic reaffirms this same principle under Article 41(2), obliging all contracting countries to recognise the competence of foreign drivers who hold a valid national licence and an IDP, without imposing any additional testing or licensing requirements. Together, these conventions make it unequivocally clear: once a tourist is certified as a competent driver by their home country, Sri Lanka as a party to the 1949 Convention and a domestic recogniser of the 1968 framework is legally bound to honour that qualification in full

Sri Lankan Repeal Process

Sri Lanka is a dualist nation (similar to 65% of nations like India, UK, Australia), yet it has never repealed its ratification of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Under Article 75 and 168(1) of the Constitution, read with Sections 22 and 23 of the Interpretation Ordinance (Cap. 12), any repeal or amendment of an existing Gazette must be expressly published in writing in the Government Gazette. Given the absence of such publication, the original 1958 Gazette implementing the 1949 Convention continues to remain in full legal force. Article 32 of the Convention also prescribes that withdrawal requires one year’s formal notice to the UN Secretary-General — no such notice has ever been given by Sri Lanka, confirming its continued legal obligation.

Tourists Driving Competence

Tourists arriving in Sri Lanka with a valid driving license (and by association, IDP) have already undergone rigorous licensing procedures in their home countries. Nations like the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia have some of the most demanding driving tests in the world, often requiring over 200 hours of supervised practice hours, hazard perception tests, and stringent theory exams. To suggest that a driver licensed in such a system is inherently unqualified is to disregard international standards that Sri Lanka itself benefits from when its citizens drive abroad.

Excerpts from Gazette Extraordinary No. 11,603 of 28 November 1958

Deconstructing the Motor Tricycle Myth: Vehicle Categories vs. Competence

After convincing a critic it’s safe and legal for a foreigner to drive a tuktuk, they deflect the issue from driver competence to vehicle type, insisting that because tuktuks don’t exist in every country, tourists’ IDPs can’t cover them. But that’s false — tuktuks do exist and do operate legally in the UK, the Netherlands, Australia, and elsewhere. It’s a technical distraction, not a legal truth, and it falls apart under scrutiny.

The International Driving Permit (IDP) is not a licence in itself; it is an internationally recognised translation and validation of a driver’s national licence, issued under global conventions established by the United Nations. Its purpose is to ensure that a traveller’s driving competence is understood and accepted across borders. The authority to define what an IDP covers does not rest with local agencies like the DMT — if it did, the entire purpose of the treaty system would collapse. The Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), recognised by the UN as the global authority on international motoring standards, oversees this framework to ensure uniformity among contracting states. When a valid IDP is presented, its recognition is not optional — it is a legal obligation under international law.

Under both international conventions, the tuktuk (motor tricycle) is unambiguously covered by the International Driving Permit (IDP) with either Category A or B stamp.

Under the 1949 Geneva Convention, the foundation of Sri Lanka’s current legal framework, the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) defines tuktuks as falling within both:

= Category A: vehicles with two or three wheels and an unladen weight not exceeding 400 kg; or

= Category B: light motor vehicles designed for carrying passengers.

Accordingly, any IDP endorsed with Category A or B is legally sufficient to operate a tuktuk in Sri Lanka.

The 1968 Vienna Convention, which Sri Lanka recognises through the 2009 Motor Traffic (Amendment) Act, retained the same classifications until 2011, when the United Nations updated Article 41 to introduce subcategories such as B1. Because Sri Lanka’s 2009 amendment predates this 2011 revision, domestic law still reflects the pre-2011 structure — recognising only A, B, C, and D categories.

This distinction, however, has no impact on legality. Under both the 1949 and pre-2011 Vienna frameworks, a tourist holding an IDP endorsed with A or B fully meets the competence requirement to drive a tuktuk in Sri Lanka.

Image of an IDP and its specified vehicle categories, any IDP endorsed with Category A or B is legally sufficient to operate a tuktuk in Sri Lanka.

The Role of the Automobile Association of Ceylon

The Automobile Association of Ceylon (AAC) was established in 1904 and is affiliated with the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), the United Nations–recognised authority on global motoring standards is Sri Lanka’s officially recognised motoring body. Unlike the Department of Motor Traffic (DMT), which regulates local licences, the AAC is responsible for validating and recognising foreign driving permits and International Driving Permits (IDPs) under international law. For visiting tourists, it issues a “covering permit” — a brief administrative process that confirms an IDP’s validity in Sri Lanka without any re-testing. This endorsement acts as the domestic bridge between Sri Lanka’s Motor Traffic Act and the international treaty framework that guarantees cross-border driving rights.

The Two Legal Pathways to Drive a tuktuk in Sri Lanka

International law grants the right to drive; domestic administration simply provides the mechanism to validate it.

In Sri Lanka, there are two distinct legal avenues available to foreign drivers:

(1) International Driving Permit + Covering Permit (under the 1949 Convention & 1958 Gazette No. 11,603)

= The visitor holds a valid national licence and IDP (1949 or 1968 format).

= A Covering Permit is issued by either the Automobile Association of Ceylon (AAC) or the Commissioner of Motor Traffic (DMT), as expressly empowered in the Gazette: “under the hand and seal of the Commissioner or of the prescribed association”.

= No new exam or medical is required because competence is already recognised by treaty.

(2) Temporary Sri Lankan Driving Licence (under Section 132 Motor Traffic Act)

= For visitors with long-stay visas or residency of at least one year.

= Requires a medical certificate and practical driving test per DMT Circular 2022/14E.

These two systems are legally independent and serve different groups. Tourists visiting for short periods should rely on the IDP and Covering Permit route, while long-term residents can apply for a temporary domestic licence through the DMT.

The Vested Interest Smokescreen: Why Legality is Still Questioned

If the law is so clear, why does the myth of ‘illegal’ driving persist, and why are tourists sometimes subjected to harassment?

Much of the confusion originates from internal DMT circulars such as Circular No. 2022/14E which outline medical and testing requirements for the conversion of foreign licences. These provisions apply only to foreigners seeking to obtain a local Sri Lankan licence, not to visitors driving under the 1949 Geneva Convention with a valid IDP and AAC Covering Permit. Conflating these distinct regimes has led to unnecessary enforcement errors and tourist uncertainty, undermining confidence in the system.

This confusion has not arisen by accident. It is deliberately sustained by a lobby that fears economic decentralisation. Opposition to the self-drive model is less about safety or legality and more about protecting entrenched revenue streams threatened by a transparent, community-driven alternative. The “dangerous tourist driver” narrative is, in truth, a weaponised excuse — a rhetorical smokescreen used to resist change.

The myths sustaining this opposition have already been dismantled through two key analyses in our series:

= Economic Empowerment (Article 2 Beyond the Wheel: the tuktuk as a tool for social empowerment and passive income): The self-drive model gives the tourist economic freedom, bypassing commission-based tours and pre-arranged transport. This model provides a reliable source of passive income for local families – a grassroots success story for people like P.G. Nissanka in Weligama who rents his tuktuk for over 25% return.

= Safety Truths (Article 3 -Tuktuk Tourism truths: cutting through the lies with honest replies ): The opponents’ claims collapse under the weight of data. Tuktuks are legally capped at 40 km/h and account for only a small fraction of road fatalities, while motorcycles are involved in over 50% of all deaths on Sri Lankan roads. To oppose a rigorously licensed, legally compliant, and comparatively safer form of tourism — while permitting far more hazardous alternatives — is not a matter of safety or law, but of protectionism and economic fear.

The persistent pushback, therefore, is not a reflection of a flaw in the law, but a reflection of a deep-seated fear of progress and economic change among those who want profits concentrated in a few hands.

The Legal Verdict and the Call for Consistent Courage

The law is clear, and the path forward is irrefutable. The legal framework for selfdrive tuktuk tourism is no grey area, it is the robust product of international law, proudly ratified and domestically enshrined. In a nation founded on socialist principles of equality and opportunity, denying the legal right of a competent foreign driver would contradict both our international obligations and our national values. The integrity of our tourism industry, and its ability to deliver true grassroots prosperity, requires consistent enforcement and communication of this legal truth.

When the law is applied with clarity and confidence, the result is transformative. A seamless visitor experience generates an outpouring of organic, global marketing — millions of authentic stories, posts, and films that project Sri Lanka as open, safe, and inspiring. Every satisfied traveller becomes an ambassador for the nation. Yet when legality is misrepresented, and visitors who follow every rule — obtaining their IDP and AAC permit — face arbitrary obstacles, it fractures trust and undermines our promise of hospitality. The choice for Sri Lanka’s tourism leaders could not be clearer: build ambassadors or breed critics.

It is time for policymakers and law enforcement to cut through misinformation, stand by the legal certainty, and make consistent application the standard, not the exception. Sri Lanka stands on the brink of global leadership in experiential travel. By embracing this legal certainty, we can empower local vehicle owners, fuel rural economies, and declare to the world — with confidence and integrity — that Sri Lanka is a modern, law-abiding, and genuinely welcoming destination.

The law stands guard. The world is ready to explore; our institutions must ensure we are legally ready to let them.

By Calistas Wijesooriya ✍️



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The NPP Government is more than a JVP offspring:

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Rohana Wijeweera

It is also different from all past governments as it faces new and different challenges

No one knows whether the already broken ceasefire between the US and Iran, with Israel as a reluctant adjunct, will last the full 10 days, or what will come thereafter. The world’s economic woes are not over and the markets are yo-yoing in response to Trump’s twitches and Iran’s gate keeping at the Strait of Hormuz. The gloomy expert foretelling is that full economic normalcy will not return until the year is over even if the war were to end with the ceasefire. That means continuing challenges for Sri Lanka and more of the tough learning in the art of governing for the NPP.

The NPP government has been doing what most governments in Asia have been doing to cope with the current global crisis, which is also an Asian crisis insofar as oil supplies and other supply chains are concerned. What the government can and must do additionally is to be totally candid with the people and keep them informed of everything that it is doing – from monitoring import prices to the timely arranging of supplies, all the details of tender, the tracking of arrivals, and keeping the distribution flow through the market without bottlenecks. That way the government can eliminate upstream tender rackets and downstream hoarding swindles. People do not expect miracles from their government, only honest, sincere and serious effort in difficult circumstances. Backed up by clear communication and constant public engagement.

But nothing is going to stop the flow of criticisms against the NPP government. That is a fact of Sri Lankan politics. Even though the opposition forces are weak and have little traction and even less credibility, there has not been any drought in the criticisms levelled against the still fledgling government. These criticisms can be categorized as ideological, institutional and oppositional criticisms, with each category having its own constituency and/or commentators. The three categories invariably overlap and there are instances of criticisms that excite only the pundits but have no political resonance.

April 5 anniversary nostalgia

There is also a new line of criticism that might be inspired by the April 5 anniversary nostalgia for the 1971 JVP insurrection. This new line traces the NPP government to the distant roots of the JVP – its April 1965 founding “in a working-class home in Akmeemana, Galle” by a 22-year old Rohana Wijeweera and seven others; the short lived 1971 insurrection that was easily defeated; and the much longer and more devastating second (1987 to 1989) insurrection that led to the elimination of the JVP’s frontline leaders including Wijeweera, and brought about a change in the JVP’s political direction with commitment to parliamentary democracy. So far, so good, as history goes.

But where the nostalgic narrative starts to bend is in attempting a straight line connection from the 1965 Akmeemana origins of the JVP to the national electoral victories of the NPP in 2024. And the bend gets broken in trying to bridge the gap between the “founding anti-imperialist economics” of the JVP and the practical imperatives of the NPP government in “governing a debt-laden small open economy.” Yet this line of criticism differs from the other lines of criticism that I have alluded to, but more so for its moral purpose than for its analytical clarity. The search for clarity could begin with question – why is the NPP government more than a JVP offspring? The answer is not so simple, but it is also not too complicated.

For starters, the JVP was a political response to the national and global conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, piggybacking socialism on the bandwagon of ethno-nationalism in a bi-polar world that was ideologically split between status quo capitalism and the alternative of socialism. The NPP government, on the other hand, is not only a response to, but is also a product of the conditions of the 2010s and 2020s. The twain cannot be more different. Nothing is the same between then and now, locally and globally.

A pragmatic way to look at the differences between the origins of the JVP and the circumstances of the NPP government is to look at the very range of criticisms that are levelled against the NPP government. What I categorize as ideological criticisms include criticisms of the government’s pro-IMF and allegedly neo-liberal economic policies, as well as the government’s foreign policy stances – on Israel, on the current US-Israel war against Iran, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, and the apparent closeness to the Modi government in India. These criticisms emanate from the non-JVP left and Sinhala Buddhist nationalists.

Strands of nationalism

To digress briefly, there are several strands in the overall bundle of Sri Lankan nationalism. There is the liberal inclusive strand, the left-progressive strand, the exclusive Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist (SBN) strand, and the defensive strands of minority nationalisms. Given Sri Lanka’s historical political formations and alliances, much overlapping goes on between the different strands. The overlapping gets selective on an issue by issue basis, which in itself is not unwelcome insofar as it promotes plurality in place of exclusivity.

Historically as well, and certainly after 1956, the SBN strand has been the dominant strand of nationalism in Sri Lanka and has had the most influential say in every government until now. Past versions of the JVP frequently straddled the dominant SBN space. Currently, however, the dominant SBN strand is in one of its more dormant phases and the NPP government could be a reason for the current dormancy. This is an obvious difference between the old JVP and the new NPP.

A second set of criticisms, or institutional criticisms, emanate from political liberals and human rights activists and these are about the NPP government’s actions or non-actions in regard to constitutional changes, the future of the elected executive presidency, the status of provincial devolution and the timing of provincial council elections, progress on human rights issues, the resolution of unfinished postwar businesses including the amnesia over mass graves. These criticisms and the issues they represent are also in varying ways the primary concerns of the island’s Tamils, Muslims and the Malaiyaka (planntationn) Tamils. As with the overlapping between the left and the non-minority nationalists, there is also overlapping between the liberal activists and minority representatives.

A third category includes what might be called oppositional criticisms and they counterpose the JVP’s past against the NPP’s present, call into question the JVP’s commitment to multi-party democracy and raise alarms about a creeping constitutional dictatorship. This category also includes criticisms of the NPP government’s lack of governmental experience and competence; alleged instances of abuse of power, mismanagement and even corruption; alleged harassment of past politicians; and the failure to find the alleged mastermind behind the 2019 Easter bombings. At a policy and implementational level, there have been criticisms of the government’s educational reforms and electricity reforms, the responses to cyclone Ditwah, and the current global oil and economic crises. The purveyors of oppositional criticisms are drawn from the general political class which includes political parties, current and past parliamentarians, as well as media pundits.

Criticisms as expectations

What is common to all three categories of criticisms is that they collectively represent what were understood to be promises by the NPP before the elections, and have become expectations of the NPP government after the elections. It is the range and nature of these criticisms and the corresponding expectations that make the NPP government a lot more than a mere JVP offspring, and significantly differentiate it from every previous government.

The deliverables that are expected of the NPP government were never a part of the vocabulary of the original JVP platform and programs. The very mode of parliamentary politics was ideologically anathema to the JVP of Akmeemana. And there was no mention of or concern for minority rights, or constitutional reforms. On foreign policy, it was all India phobia without Anglo mania – a halfway variation of Sri Lanka’s mainstream foreign policy of Anglo mania and India phobia. For a party of the rural proletariat, the JVP was virulently opposed to the plantation proletariat. The JVP’s version of anti-imperialist economics would hardly have excited the Sri Lankan electorate at any time, and certainly not at the present time.

At the same time, the NPP government is also the only government that has genealogical antecedents to a political movement or organization like the JVP. That in itself makes the NPP government unique among Sri Lanka’s other governments. The formation of the NPP is the culmination of the evolution of the JVP that began after the second insurrection with the shedding of political violence, acceptance of political plurality and commitment to electoral democracy.

But the evolution was not entirely a process of internal transformation. It was also a response to a rapidly and radically changing circumstances both within Sri Lanka and beyond. This evolution has not been a rejection of the founding socialist purposes of the JVP in 1968, but their adaptation in the endless political search, under constantly changing conditions, for a non-violent, socialist and democratic framework that would facilitate the full development of the human potential of all Sri Lankans.

The burden of expectations is unmistakable, but what is also remarkable is their comprehensiveness and the NPP’s formal commitment to all of them at the same time. No previous government shouldered such an extensive burden or showed such a willing commitment to each and every one of the expectations. In the brewing global economic crisis, the criticisms, expectations and the priorities of the government will invariably be focussed on keeping the economy alive and alleviating the day-to-day difficulties of millions of Sri Lankan families. While what the NPP government can and must do may not differ much from what other Asian governments – from Pakistan to Vietnam – are doing, it could and should do better than what any and all past Sri Lankan governments did when facing economic challenges.

by Rajan Philips

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A Fragile Ceasefire: Pakistan’s Glory and Israel’s Sabotage

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Smokes over Beirut: Israel’s Ceasefire Attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon

After threatening to annihilate one of the planet’s oldest civilizations, TACO* Trump chickened out again by grasping the ceasefire lifeline that Pakistan had assiduously prepared. Trump needed the ceasefire badly to stem the mounting opposition to the war in America. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted the war to continue because he needed it badly for his political survival. So, he contrived a fiction and convinced Trump that Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire. Trump as usual may not have noticed that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Shariff had clearly indicated Lebanon’s inclusion in his announcement of the ceasefire at 7:50 PM, Tuesday, on X. Ten minutes before Donald Trump’s fake deadline.

True to form on Wednesday, Israel unleashed the heaviest assault by far on Lebanon, reportedly killing over 300 people, the highest single-day death toll in the current war. Iran responded by re-closing the Strait of Hormuz and questioning the need for talks in Islamabad over the weekend. There were other incidents as well, with an oil refinery attacked in Iran, and Iranian drones and missiles slamming oil and gas infrastructure in UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.

The US tried to insist that Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire, with the argumentative US Vice President JD Vance, who was in Budapest, Hungary, campaigning for Viktor Orban, calling the whole thing a matter of “bad faith negotiation” as well as “legitimate misunderstanding” on the part of Iran, and warning Iran that “it would be dumb to jeopardise its ceasefire with Washington over Israel’s attacks in Lebanon.”

But as the attack in Lebanon drew international condemnation – from Pope Leo to UN Secretary General António Guterres, and several world leaders, and amidst fears of Lebanon becoming another Gaza with 1,500 people including 130 children killed and more than a million people displaced, Washington got Israel to stop its “lawn mowing” in southern Lebanon.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to “open direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible,”. Lebanese President Joeseph Aoun has also called for “a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, followed by direct negotiations between them.” Israel’s involvement in Lebanon remains a wild card that threatens the ceasefire and could scuttle the talks between the US and Iran scheduled for Saturday in Islamabad.

Losers and Winners

After the ceasefire, both the Trump Administration and Iran have claimed total victories while the Israeli government wants the war to continue. The truth is that after more than a month into nonstop bombing of Iran, America and Israel have won nothing. Only Iran has won something it did not have when Trump and Netanyahu started their war. Iran now has not only a say over but control of the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire acknowledges this. Both Trump and Netanyahu are under fire in their respective countries and have no allies in the world except one another.

The real diplomatic winner is Pakistan. Salman Rushdie’s palimpsest-country has emerged as a key player in global politics and an influential mediator in a volatile region. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Field Marshal Asim Munir have both been praised by President Trump and credited for achieving the current ceasefire. The Iranian regime has also been effusive in its praise of Pakistan’s efforts.

It is Pakistan that persisted with the effort after initial attempts at backdoor diplomacy by Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye started floundering. Sharing a 900 km border and deep cultural history with Iran, and having a skirmish of its own on the eastern front with Afghanistan, Pakistan has all the reason to contain and potentially resolve the current conflict in Iran. Although a majority Sunni Muslim country, Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia Muslim population after Iran, and is the easterly terminus of the Shia Arc that stretches from Lebanon. The country also has a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia that includes Pakistan’s nuclear cover for the Kingdom. An open conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have put Pakistan in a dangerously awkward position.

It is now known and Trump has acknowledged that China had a hand in helping Iran get to the diplomatic table. Pakistan used its connections well to get Chinese diplomatic reinforcement. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar flew to Beijing to brief his Chinese counterpart and secured China’s public support for the diplomatic efforts. The visit produced a Five-Point Plan that became a sequel to America’s 15-point proposal and the eventual ten-point offer by Iran.

There is no consensus between parties as to which points are where and who is agreeing to what. The chaos is par for the course the way Donald Trumps conducts global affairs. So, all kudos to Pakistan for quietly persisting with old school toing and froing and producing a semblance of an agreement on a tweet without a parchment.

It is also noteworthy that Israel has been excluded from all the diplomatic efforts so far. And it is remarkable, but should not be surprising, the way Trump has sidelined Isreal from the talks. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been enjoying overwhelming support of Israelis for starting the war of his life against Iran and getting the US to spearhead it. But now the country is getting confused and is exposed to Iranian missiles and drones far more than ever before. The Israeli opposition is finally coming alive realizing what little has Netanyahu’s wars have achieved and at what cost. Israel has alienated a majority of Americans and has no ally anywhere else.

It will be a busy Saturday in Islamabad, where the US and Iranian delegations are set to meet. Iran would seem to have insisted and secured the assurance that the US delegation will be led by Vice President Vance, while including Trump’s personal diplomats – Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner. Iran has not announced its team but it is expected to be led, for protocol parity, by Iran’s Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and will likely include its suave Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Vice President Vance’s attendance will be the most senior US engagement with Iran since Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal under President Obama.

The physical arrangements for the talks are still not public although Islamabad has been turned into a security fortress given the stakes and risks involved. The talks are expected to be ‘indirect’, with the two delegations in separate rooms and Pakistani officials shuttling between them. The status of Iran’s enriched uranium and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will be the major points of contention. After Netanyahu’s overreach on Wednesday, Lebanon is also on the short list

The 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan) took months of negotiations and involved multiple parties besides the US and Iran, including China, France, Germany, UK, Russia and the EU. That served the cause of regional and world peace well until Trump tore up the deal to spite Obama. It would be too much to expect anything similar after a weekend encounter in Islamabad. But if the talks could lead to at least a permanent ceasefire and the return to diplomacy that would be a huge achievement.

(*As of 2025–2026, Donald Trump is nicknamed “TACO Trump” by Wall Street traders and investors as an acronym for “”. This term highlights a perceived pattern of him making strong tariff threats that cause market panic, only to later retreat or weaken them, causing a rebound.)

by Rajan Philips

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CIA’s hidden weapon in Iran

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We are passing through the ten-day interregnum called a ceasefire over the War on Iran. The world may breathe briefly, but this pause is not reassurance—it is a deliberate interlude, a vacuum in which every actor positions for the next escalation. Iran is far from secure. Behind the veneer of calm, external powers and local forces are preparing, arming, and coordinating. The United States is unlikely to deploy conventional ground troops; the next moves will be executed through proxies whose behaviour will defy expectation. These insurgents are shaped, guided, and amplified by intelligence and technology, capable of moving silently, striking precisely, and vanishing before retaliation. The ceasefire is not peace—it is the prelude to disruption.

The Kurds, historically instruments of Tehran against Baghdad, are now vectors for the next insurgency inside Iran. This movement is neither organic nor local. It is externally orchestrated, with the CIA as the principal architect. History provides the blueprint: under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurdish uprisings were manipulated, never supported out of sympathy. They were instruments of leverage against Iraq, a way to weaken a rival while projecting influence beyond Iran’s borders. Colonel Isa Pejman, Iranian military intelligence officer who played a role in Kurdish affairs, recalled proposing support for a military insurgency in Iraq, only for the Shah to respond coldly: “[Mustafa] Barzani killed my Army soldiers… please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely transformed.” The Kurds were pawns, but pawns with strategic weight. Pejman later noted: “When the Shah wrote on the back of the letter ‘Accepted’ to General Pakravan, I felt I was the true leader of the Kurdish movement.” The seeds planted then are now being activated under new, technologically empowered auspices.

Iran’s geographic vulnerabilities make this possible. The Shah understood the trap: a vast territory with porous borders, squeezed by Soviet pressure from the north and radical Arab states from the west. “We are in a really terrible situation since Moscow’s twin pincers coming down through Kabul and Baghdad surround us,” he warned Asadollah Alam. From Soviet support for the Mahabad Republic to Barzani’s dream of a unified Kurdistan, Tehran knew an autonomous Kurdish bloc could destabilize both Iraq and Iran. “Since the formation of the Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic, the Shah had been considerably worried about the Kurdish threat,” a US assessment concluded.

Today, the Kurds’ significance is operational, not symbolic. The CIA’s recent rescue of a downed F-15 airman using Ghost Murmur, a quantum magnetometry system, demonstrated the reach of technology in intelligence operations. The airman survived two days on Iranian soil before extraction. This was not a simple rescue; it was proof that highly mobile, technologically augmented operations can penetrate Iranian territory with surgical precision. The same logic applies to insurgency preparation: when individuals can be tracked through electromagnetic signatures, AI-enhanced surveillance, and drones, proxy forces can be armed, guided, and coordinated with unprecedented efficiency. The Kurds are no longer pawns—they are a living network capable of fracturing Iranian cohesion while providing deniability to foreign powers.

Iran’s engagement with Iraqi Kurds was always containment, not empowerment. The Shah’s goal was never Kurdish independence. “We do not approve an independent [Iraqi] Kurdistan,” he stated explicitly. Yet their utility as instruments of regional strategy was undeniable. The CIA’s revival of these networks continues a long-standing pattern: insurgent groups integrated into the wider calculus of international power. Israel, Iran, and the Kurds formed a triangular strategic relationship that terrified Baghdad. “For Baghdad, an Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish triangular alliance was an existential threat,” contemporary reports noted. This is the template for modern manipulation: a networked insurgency, externally supported, capable of destabilizing regimes from within while giving foreign powers plausible deniability.

Iran today faces fragility. Years of sanctions, repression, and targeted strikes have weakened educational and scientific hubs; Sharif University in Tehran, one of the country’s leading scientific centres, was bombed. Leaders, scholars, and innovators have been eliminated. Military readiness is compromised. Generations-long setbacks leave Iran exposed. Against this backdrop, a Kurdish insurgency armed with drones, AI-supported surveillance, and precision munitions could do more than disrupt—it could fracture the state internally. The current ten-day ceasefire is a mirage; the next wave of revolt is already being orchestrated.

CIA involvement is deliberate. Operations are coordinated with allied intelligence agencies, leveraging Kurdish grievances, mobility, and ethnolinguistic networks. The Kurds’ spread across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria provides operational depth—allowing insurgents to strike, vanish, and regroup with impunity. Barzani understood leverage decades ago: “We could be useful to the United States… Look at our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East.” Today, the calculation is inverted: Kurds are no longer instruments against Baghdad; they are potential disruptors inside Tehran itself.

Technology is central. Ghost Murmur’s ability to detect a single heartbeat remotely exemplifies how intelligence can underpin insurgent networks. Drones, satellite communications, AI predictive modeling, and battlefield sensors create an infrastructure that can transform a dispersed Kurdish insurgency into a high-precision operation. Iran can no longer rely on fortifications or loyalty alone; the external environment has been recalibrated by technology.

History provides the roadmap. The Shah’s betrayal of Barzani after the 1975 Algiers Agreement demonstrated that external actors can manipulate both Iranian ambitions and Kurdish loyalties. “The Shah sold out the Kurds,” Yitzhak Rabin told Kissinger. “We could not station our troops there and keep fighting forever,” the Shah explained to Alam. The Kurds are a pivot, not a cause. Networks once acting under Tehran’s influence are now being repurposed against it.

The insurgency exploits societal fissures. Kurdish discontent in Iran, suppressed for decades, provides fertile ground. Historical betrayal fuels modern narratives: “Barzani claimed that ‘Isa Pejman sold us out to the Shah and the Shah sold us out to the US.’” Intelligence agencies weaponize these grievances, pairing them with training, technological augmentation, and covert support.

Geopolitically, the stakes are immense. The Shah’s defensive-offensive doctrine projected Iranian influence outward to neutralize threats. Today, the logic is inverted: the same networks used to contain Iraq are being readied to contain Iran. A technologically augmented Kurdish insurgency, covertly backed, could achieve in months what decades of sanctions, diplomacy, or repression have failed to accomplish.

The operation will be asymmetric, high-tech, and dispersed. UAVs, quantum-enhanced surveillance, encrypted communications, and AI-directed logistics will dominate. Conventional Iranian forces are vulnerable to this type of warfare. As Pejman reflected decades ago, “Our Army was fighting there, rather than the Kurds who were harshly defeated… How could we keep such a place?” Today, the challenge is magnified by intelligence superiority on the insurgents’ side.

This is not a temporary flare-up. The CIA and its allies are constructing a generational network of influence. Experience from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon proves these networks endure once operationalised. The Shah recognized this: “Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign left a lasting legacy for the post-Revolution era.” Today, those instruments are being remade as vectors of foreign influence inside Iran.

The future is stark. Iran faces not simply external threats, but a carefully engineered insurgency exploiting historical grievances, technological superiority, and precise intelligence. The Kurds are central. History, technology, and geopolitical calculation converge to create a transformative threat. Tehran’s miscalculations, betrayals, and suppressed grievances now form the lattice for this insurgency. The Kurds are positioned not just as an ethnic minority, but as a vector of international strategy—Tehran may be powerless to stop it.

Iran’s containment strategies have been weaponized, fused with technology, and inverted against it. The ghosts of Barzani’s Peshmerga, the shadows of Algiers, and the Shah’s strategic vision now converge with Ghost Murmur, drones, and AI. Tehran faces a paradox: the instruments it once controlled are now calibrated to undermine its authority. The next Kurdish revolt will not only fight in the mountains but in the electromagnetic shadows where intelligence operates, consequences are lethal, and visibility is scarce.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa

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