Features
Education reform or hidden agenda? Scrutinising proposed NEPF
by Nalaka Samaraweera
The new National Education Policy Framework (NEPF) was prepared by a Cabinet committee chaired by the President and assisted by a Cabinet-appointed committee of experts. Having been submitted to the Parliamentary Sectoral Oversight Committee (SOC) on Education, it is already in the implementation phase following the SOC’s recommendations. Unfortunately, public debate and dialogue generated regarding such an important and impactful set of policy proposals has been entirely inadequate. Therefore, this article is written with the intention to stimulate such discussion.
Before even considering the content of the new NEPF, several questions arise about its necessity, given the existence of a comprehensive National Education Policy Framework prepared by the National Education Commission (NEC) for 2020-2030. The new NEPF covers 2023-2033. Why was a new policy framework needed after just three years? This question remains unanswered, and the new NEPF does not have references the NEC report.
Based on the preface, one might speculate that the new conditions brought about by the Covid pandemic and economic downturn since 2020 necessitated the new framework. It would have been more practical and appropriate to ask the NEC to amend their report or create a new one rather than appointing entirely a new committee. The policy framework appears to be a highly misleading document, contradicting the rationale mentioned in the preface and further challenging the country’s Constitution.
The framers of the NEPF focused on three policy domains, namely Teaching, Learning and Credentialing; Governance; and Investments and Resources. This article presents a critique of policy proposals related to “Governance.” The NEPF defines “Governance” as:
“Governance
Actors and institutions with a stake in the Sector, both state and non-state, shall be identified and their roles and functions clearly defined allowing for autonomy based on the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring alignment with national standards to minimize top-down decision-making and avoid institutions acting in silos.”
The heavy lifting in this definition is done by the less publicly known term: The Principle of Subsidiarity. According to the author’s knowledge, one of the initial appearances of this principle in Sri Lanka’s Constitutional history is found in the Centre-Periphery Sub-Committee Report, prepared by a committee, chaired by D. Sithadthan, MP. It was submitted to the Constitutional assembly, which was established to draft a new Constitution by the then “Yahapalana” government. The report defines the principle of subsidiarity as follows:
“This suggestion was based on the principle of subsidiarity, i.e., whatever the lowest level of governing institution can handle should be left with that body or unit, and the rest should go to the next tier, and so on. This notion is contrary to the present model of transferring political power from the centre to sub-national units.” (
The emphasis is by the author). It goes without saying that the recommendation of this principle violates the current unitary structure of the country. The process of drafting a new Constitution had to be halted due to significant criticism and the lack of the support of the public on this matter. Years after this infamous attempt, how could such a principle that goes against the unitary structure of the country find its way into an education policy framework? The conclusion that the framers of this policy are fully aware of the implications of this principle and intend to weaken the central government is reinforced by the following policy proposals that appears in the NEPF:
7.4 Provincial Boards of Education shall be established in the each of the nine Provinces, with autonomy within national standards to ensure education policies and practices are tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of different provinces. The Provincial Boards of Education may establish new colleges and universities in accordance with national standards.
However, as made very clear under Appendix III Education (9) of the Constitution, Provincial Boards of Education are entrusted with the advisory functions. For the reader’s convenience, the section as it appears is quoted below.
9. Appointment of Provincial Boards of Education which will have the advisory functions, will be the responsibility of the Minister of Education. However, this will be done with the concurrence of the Chief Minister of the Provincial Authority.
The reader will agree that it is quite a serious matter when a “committee of experts” presumes to bestow powers exceeding those assigned Constitutionally upon the Provincial Boards of Education. It is important to remember that the central government’s establishment above all residual state structures is a fundamental character of a unitary state. The decentralization of self-governing powers is not authorized in any way by the Constitution of Sri Lanka.
Higher education and the establishment of higher education institutions are functions listed in the Concurrent List, as introduced by the 13th Amendment, of the Constitution, thereby delegating these powers to both the central and provincial governments. Strikingly, the proposed policy framework suggests removing these powers from the central government and transferring solely to the provincial governments. Furthermore, it proposes enacting laws to convert existing universities into provincial universities. This is mentioned in paragraph 7.8, as partially quoted below.
“Establishment of new universities shall be done under the Provincial Councils. Existing degree awarding institutes shall become Provincial Universities under a new law.“
The power to establish higher education institutions, defined as a concurrent task in the Constitution, be redefined as a responsibility solely for provincial councils? This, in popular political terms, goes beyond the provisions of the 13th amendment, suggesting “13+.” Below are the roles listed in the Concurrent List for Higher Education in the Constitution.
4. Higher Education –
4:1 The establishment and maintenance of new Universities.
4:2 The establishment of degree awarding institutions under the Universities (Amendment) Act, No. 07 of 1985 and other institutions for tertiary, technical and post-school education and training.
The Indian Constitution also included education as a concurrent function through the 42nd amendment. A key argument for moving education from the state list to the concurrent list is that education, particularly higher education, should be regarded as a matter of national importance. The intent is to ensure that regionalism does not become a primary factor. However, the new policy proposes to confine higher education to regionalism, which is a regressive step.
No less serious is the proposal given in 7.10.
7.10 All Education Providers shall have autonomy within the guidelines set by the national and Provincial Authorities, and School Boards where relevant, in administration, finance, human resource management and selection of students.
Why should education providers be granted autonomy? What exactly is meant by self-governing powers regarding student selection? This assertion poses a significant risk. There’s a danger of breaching the established procedure for university student recruitment, which has been upheld irrespective of ethnic, religious, and social status differences.
Now let us shift our attention to the establishment of the new National Higher Education Commission, proposed in paragraph 7.8. This fresh entity is to replace current University Grants Commission (UGC), and its role will be defined as follows:
7.8 National Higher Education Commission (NHEC) will replace the University Grants Commission and shall be responsible for the coordination of higher education adhering to national policies and maintenance of academic standards in all degree and degree equivalent credentials issued by Higher Educational Institutions, whether State, Non-State, National and Provincial.
We urge the entire university community, academics, administrators, and students, to closely examine this proposal, as several significant issues arise with this proposed replacement. Firstly, the purpose of the new institution needs clarification. If the problem is that the current UGC lacks adequate power or does not play a sufficient role, it could be easily remedied. Why does it needed to abolish the entire institution? The role of the existing UGC is broad. For example, the University Grants Commission has a crucial role to play in planning and coordinating university education, fixing the finances of higher education institutions and regulating the administration of these institutions, maintaining academic standards, and regulating the admission of students to higher education institutions. It appears that the new institution proposed to be established is focused only on maintaining standards in accordance with national policies.
Should this new institution be relieved of such extensive responsibilities, who will assume other tasks conducted by the UGC? Will they be entrusted to the local bodies proposed to receive autonomous powers mentioned earlier? Surely it will be disastrous for the universities. Consider, for instance, the allocation of funds to universities. As the new policy framework suggests, it will be the role of provincial governments to allocate money to universities. But it is a well-known fact that the local government bodies basically run their activities with the money they get from the central government. In such a situation, can it be ensured that sufficient funds will be allocated to the universities? What attitudes will different provincial councils have regarding universities? How much irregularity and inefficiency can occur in giving central government money indirectly to universities through provincial governments? How do the attitudes and priorities of provincial council politicians affect universities? In short, how do the academics deal with local political dynamics?
Acting as an intermediary buffer body between the Ministry of Education and the universities, the UGC has thus far upheld the honorable responsibility of safeguarding university independence from direct political interference. Our regional countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh also run institutions similar to the model of the UGC for this purpose.
Moreover, when studying the history of Sri Lankan universities, it appears that the establishment of the UGC by the University Act of 1978 was a progressive step that ensured the relative independence of the university compared to the previous body, National Council of Higher Education. Does this new policy framework propose to reverse the forward steps we took? Given the manner in which this proposal is presented, it is reasonable to entertain such suspicions.
What is surprising, or perhaps not, is the absence of any mention of university autonomy in this new policy framework. Instead, there are multiple references to granting autonomy to provincial institutions. Why have these policymakers treated this matter so lightly? National Education Commission’s Education Policy Framework (2020-2030) previously presented, adopted a very positive stance on university autonomy and proposed measures to strengthen it. How do we reconcile this framework’s complete disregard for that stance? Lastly, it must be emphasized that if this new policy framework is fully implemented, we will face grave consequences. Despite any progress we may have made in education thus far, there is a risk of regression. It is also disheartening to note the lack of professionalism exhibited by the compilers this new framework. We hope our readers grasp the true intentions behind this new policy framework.
(The writer is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Engineering, University of Moratuwa. Views expressed in the article are personal.)
Features
Regime change and the vacuum:Strategic lessons of Iraq and Libya
by Col. (R) Nalin Herath
There is a question that the international community must periodically ask itself: What happens to a State after its regime has been ousted?
The question is particularly relevant when examining Iraq and Libya. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were authoritarian rulers. Their governments were associated with political repression, human-rights violations and the suppression of political opposition. None of this should be ignored or excused. But recognising the failures of authoritarian rule does not prevent us from asking another, equally important strategic question:
Did the removal of these regimes adequately prepare for what came next?
The experience of Iraq and Libya suggests that removing a ruler is considerably easier than replacing the political, administrative and security architecture around that ruler.
Danger of confusing regime change with State reconstruction
A state is more than its leader. It consists of institutions, security forces, civil servants, courts, political structures, infrastructure, economic systems and, perhaps most importantly, an accepted monopoly over the legitimate use of force. When an authoritarian system has concentrated enormous power around one individual, removing that individual can expose weaknesses that were previously hidden. The strategic mistake is to assume that once the dictator has gone, a democratic and stable state will naturally emerge. History does not support such an assumption. The aftermath of Iraq demonstrates this particularly clearly. Following the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order No. 2, formally dissolving the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Army, among other security institutions. A US congressional report later documented the enormous consequences of this decision, including the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of military personnel from the institutional framework of the state. Whatever the intentions behind the decision, the strategic consequence was that an established security structure had to be rebuilt while the country was simultaneously experiencing political upheaval and growing violence. That is a dangerous combination.
Iraq: Removing the structure before building the replacement
Saddam Hussein’s government was unquestionably authoritarian. It also reflected a complicated sectarian and political structure in which members of the Sunni minority occupied disproportionate positions of power despite being a demographic minority. But the question for strategic planners should not simply be whether Saddam deserved to remain in power. The question should have been:
What institutional structure would replace the system once he was removed?
An army can be politically controlled without being politically representative. A bureaucracy can serve an authoritarian government while still providing essential state functions. A security institution can be reformed without necessarily being destroyed. The distinction between reforming institutions and eliminating institutions is therefore critical. The post-2003 experience demonstrated the consequences of institutional disruption. Security vacuums contributed to insurgency and instability, while the process of rebuilding Iraq’s security forces took place amid an increasingly deteriorating security environment. The lesson is not that authoritarian institutions should never be reformed. The lesson is that state capacity should not be casually destroyed without a credible replacement.
Libya: prosperity, authoritarianism and institutional fragility
Libya presents an even more complicated case. Gaddafi’s government was authoritarian and deeply personalised. Political freedom was severely restricted, and the security apparatus was deliberately structured around regime survival. Yet Libya, under Gaddafi, also used substantial oil revenues to fund education, healthcare, infrastructure and social services. World Bank data from around the end of the Gaddafi era show life expectancy reaching approximately 75 years by 2011, skilled attendance at birth at 100 percent and measles immunisation at 98 percent. This does not prove that Gaddafi’s system was politically legitimate. It demonstrates something different: economic and social outcomes can coexist with authoritarian political structures.
The Great Man-Made River illustrates the scale of Libya’s investment ambitions. The World Bank described the project as one of the world’s largest engineering schemes, involving thousands of kilometres of planned pipelines to transport water from deep desert aquifers toward the populated coastal belt. The original project was estimated at approximately US$ 25 billion over several phases. Again, this should not become nostalgia for dictatorship. It should become a lesson in state capacity.
What happened after Gaddafi?
The post-2011 experience is perhaps the clearest illustration of the vacuum problem. Libya did not simply move from dictatorship to a consolidated democratic state. Instead, competing armed groups, political factions and institutions emerged. A UN economic and social affairs analysis concluded that the fall of the Gaddafi regime exposed weak state institutions and that the post-Gaddafi period was characterised by the proliferation of armed militias and institutional fragmentation.
The World Bank has similarly described how the security vacuum allowed armed groups to expand, while attempts to integrate them into the formal security apparatus produced a hybrid system in which state institutions and powerful armed groups operated alongside one another. This is the heart of the lesson. The consequences of regime change were also evident in Libya. The 2012 Benghazi attack, later portrayed in 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, illustrated the security vacuum that emerged after Gaddafi’s fall. The collapse of central authority allowed militias and competing armed groups to fill the space left by weakened state institutions. The lesson is clear: removing a regime may achieve military victory, but without a credible plan to rebuild the state, victory can quickly become a security vacuum.
When the state withdraws, something else occupies the space. If the replacement is not a legitimate national institution, the vacuum can be filled by militias, tribes, ideological movements, criminal networks or competing political authorities. The vacuum does not remain empty.
Terrorism question
There is another uncomfortable issue. Authoritarian regimes frequently suppress political and armed movements through coercive security systems. When those systems disappear abruptly, previously contained organisations can find new operating space. This does not mean that dictatorship is an appropriate method of counterterrorism. It means that counterterrorism cannot be separated from State capacity. The international community therefore needs to distinguish between defeating a particular terrorist organisation and maintaining the institutional conditions that prevent multiple armed actors from competing for power. The destruction of one regime does not automatically eliminate the forces that created insecurity. Sometimes it creates an environment in which those forces multiply.
Strategic mistake: winning the war but losing the peace
Military intervention can have a clearly defined operational objective. State reconstruction does not. A military campaign may successfully remove a government in weeks or months. Building legitimate institutions can take decades.This creates a fundamental strategic asymmetry. The shorter the planning horizon for intervention, the greater the danger of a long-term vacuum. The international community therefore needs to think beyond the first question: How do we remove the regime?
It must ask: Who governs the country the next morning? Who controls the borders? Who controls the security forces? Who pays government employees? Who maintains electricity, water and hospitals? Who protects critical infrastructure? Who administers justice? Who prevents armed groups from becoming alternative governments? Who provides political legitimacy? And perhaps most importantly: Who possesses the authority to enforce the decisions of the new state? If there are no convincing answers, regime change is only the beginning of the problem.
The lesson should not be that the United States or its allies should never intervene. Nor should it be that Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi should be rehabilitated as models of governance. The lesson is more practical. Regime change must never be confused with state-building.
Before dismantling an established political order, external powers need a credible understanding of the institutions that will replace it. Security-sector reform should normally distinguish between individuals who must be removed and institutions that must be preserved. A national army may need reform. A ministry may need restructuring. A security service may need accountability and civilian oversight. But destroying institutional capacity without having an operational replacement can create consequences far beyond the original objective.
Wider geopolitical lesson
The consequences of Iraq and Libya did not remain within their borders. State fragmentation affects neighbouring countries, migration, organised crime, arms trafficking, terrorism, energy markets and regional power competition. In today’s interconnected world, a failed transition in one country can become a security problem for an entire region. That is why intervention planning should include not only military objectives but also political, economic, humanitarian and security-sector objectives. The most important planning document may therefore not be the operational plan for removing the regime. It may be the plan for Day One after the regime has disappeared.
History should not be written as a simple choice between dictatorship and democracy. The real strategic challenge is more complicated. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were dictators. Their governments committed serious abuses, and their populations had legitimate grievances. But the failures of authoritarian rule do not automatically justify the destruction of state institutions without a credible plan for rebuilding them. The experience of Iraq and Libya demonstrates a fundamental principle of international security: A political vacuum is not neutral space. Someone will fill it. If legitimate national institutions cannot fill that space, armed groups, sectarian interests, extremist organisations or foreign-backed factions may do so. The ultimate lesson for the United States, its allies and the wider international community is therefore straightforward:
Removing a regime may win the immediate battle. Building a legitimate, functioning and secure state determines whether the intervention succeeds in the long term. The world should learn to ask not only “How do we remove the dictator?”. It must also ask:
“What happens to the country when he is gone?”
That may be the most important strategic question of all.
(The writer is the Secretary General of the Ceylon Chamber of Shipping, former Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), and former Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue. His areas of expertise include international relations, geopolitics, maritime affairs, national security, economic policy, and strategic governance. He is a consultant at JITT Group and a member of World Pace Board.).
Features
‘Death at the Sign of the Rook’
Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 23
By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha
As I have noted with regard to the adventures of John Rebus, I am indebted to Dinali Fernando and her husband Steve for whole hosts of thrillers. The latter strongly recommended Kate Atkinson when I borrowed four books. I wondered about this, for I had not been too impressed with her debut novel, Behind the Scenes at the Museum, which was amongst the entries I had to judge for the Eurasian section of the Commonwealth Writing Prize. Two decades later, I had forgotten what it had been about.
But I am glad Steve persuaded me to read her. Kate Atkinson is distinctively British, and Death at the Sign of the Rook is set in a country house and the surrounding village, and seems a modern descendant of the laidback Agatha Christies I so much enjoy.
There are, however, many differences in that we have a policeman who can go rogue, like Rebus, with again a female sidekick who has a mind of her own, again like Rebus. But Jackson Brodie has retired and set up as a private investigator, while Reggie, a young lady, is still in the police.
There is a lesbian couple living in the converted dairy of the manor house, as has occurred in Agatha Christie too, in A Murder is Announced. But they are peripheral to the story, unlike Ben, the brother of one of them who left the army after losing a leg in Afghanistan. When he turns up at the Manor House to shelter from a snowstorm, along with its chatelaine, Lady Milton, he is asked to answer the door as various characters turn up, including Jackson and Reggie, who then starts fantasising about him.
The others who turn up are two couples, one from America, who have paid for a murder weekend at the hotel. The family is impoverished, and has sold lots of pictures to survive, but most recently a Turner had been stolen, almost certainly by Lady Milton’s housekeeper Sophie, who vanished one night along with the picture. Reggie had been involved in that investigation, but there had been no trace of either picture or young lady.
Jackson Brodie suspects a connection between that theft and the one he has been called in to investigate, which has not been reported to the police. The picture hung opposite the bed of an old woman whose carer vanished after she died, along with it. Her children, adopted twins, have asked Jackson to investigate and also try to trace the carer, though he suspects something strange in that they did not go to the police.
Brodie, in studying the stolen art, is also struck by the disappearance of a Rembrandt from a house in Scotland, along with a member of the cleaning staff. He thinks the three women might be the same one.
But Brodie’s assumption that the three women who vanished when valuable pictures did were identical would not have helped except that Beatrice, as she was also called, kept turning up, including to the funeral home where the old lady’s body was kept. And then that picture turned up, in the village church, and was found by the local vicar, Simon Cate, whose life story is also a prominent feature of the novel. He was an aspiring actor but then smitten by faith, and became a priest, but in time he lost his faith. His wife left him after the death of their son, and he is now in this backwater, where he feels he is of no use to anyone. But he has a great feel for living beings, and his most successful service has been one in which he blessed pets. And he was deeply concerned about the bees that Ben looks after for his sister and her wife.
He too staggers into the manor house in the midst of the storm, in which everyone concerned loses their way comprehensively. But amongst those Ben lets in is a man in a tracksuit with cuts and bruises, who then vanishes after he has been led to a bedroom, when Ben went in search of brandy. We soon work out that it is the escaped murderer about whom Reggie has been alerted.
Simon also turns up, through the back door, carrying the picture and also a gun, for he has found the dead body of one of his parishioners when he went to her house in search of his mobile phone. She had been shot and he had picked up the gun he found there. But he could not tell the police, for though he called he had lost his voice, and for the last few days had communicated only through writing.
This chaotic mix of characters at the manor house is further complicated by the group of players putting on the murder mystery play though some members have either cried off or died before reaching the venue. So, there is much doubling up and confusion over who is an actor and who is not.
The grand now largely empty rooms of the manor house, and its various odd passages and multiple doors, make it a splendid set for the lunacy that runs on and on. Reggie finds herself in a pantry Atkinsonwith a dead body, though this turns out to be the nanny who fell down the stairs and was put there by Lady Milton’s younger son. And there is high drama on the roof when the murderer nearly kills Ben, but he is saved by Reggie, and when he tries to kill Brody with an axe, he is shot by Beatrice, who has been the maid who served at the dinner before the murder mystery play, and explains to Brody how she has managed all her thefts.
And then in the melee, she vanishes on a motorbike, along with the daughter of the old lady’s adopted daughter, the only person who seemed to grieve at the funeral, and to whom the old lady had left her house in a codicil to
her will, which her children have not known about. She leaves the picture to the carer, but it is brought to Simon Cate as he lies in hospital, recovering from a heart attack which adds confusion to the play.
Wonderfully convoluted, but all very clear, despite the headlong pace of the book and its shifts from one scene to another, from one character to another (or rather combinations of them) and from one-time span to another. A writer and a detective well worth looking out for. e more books by her on Dinali’s shelves.
Features
Safety, security and teamwork in aviation
by Capt. (Ret.).G.A. Fernando, MBA
There are three essential components to a commercial airline operation: safety, security and teamwork.
Aviation and teamwork at the ‘sharp’ end of a commercial aircraft, i.e. the flight deck, is unique. Unlike many other teams, it may be quite literally the first and the last time a particular combination of small teams of two, three, or four individual airmen (or women) will fly together. Sometimes even in the same airline that employs them.
Therefore, to make conditions safe and practical, while understanding and trusting tech other, they have to rely on a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and ‘Normal’ and ‘Emergency’ checklists for every conceivable situation. That is, to be able to do the right things, and do things right. In fact, there is a saying in aviation to the effect that ‘if you make a mistake in aviation, be original and make a new one’.
To ensure that safety standards are constantly maintained, airline pilots’ proficiency is tested every six months, in simulators, under the supervision of examiners from the civil aviation regulator. In Sri Lanka that organisaton is the Civil Aviation Authority-Sri Lanka (CAASL). Three simulator checks are conducted every 12 months in keeping with the tenet that ‘practice makes perfect’. A pithy adage not confined to the world of aviation warns that ‘prior preparation prevents piss-poor performance’.
The simulator exercises include rejected takeoffs, including in cross-wind situations, landings, engine fires and/or engine failures from a variety of causes, cabin pressurisation failure, precision and non-precision approaches, and landings in bad visibility – amongst other conditions that could be expected in actual flight.
In addition, a flight in a real airplane, on a regular passenger service under the supervision of an examiner from the airline, is undertaken to ensure that the company’s standard practices and procedures are carried out and maintained as prescribed in the airline’s manuals. These publications are in turn approved by the national regulator.
Finally, flight crew members must take a written test annually, on emergency equipment locations and procedures, with 90% as the pass mark.
Since the mid-1980s it has been mandatory for airline pilots to undertake a Crew Resource Management (CRM) programme once every two years. This training essentially emphasises what to do and what not to do to, in a specific emergency situation, or even during normal operations, to make the team cohesive and effective. During the course, the CRM facilitators discuss recent incidents and accidents that have occurred. Results of those events are recorded and could be retrieved, when necessary, by the official aviation bodies.
Not unexpectedly, it is demanding on a pilot to fulfill these requirements on a regular basis throughout his/her career, along with presenting for a bi-annual medical examination, all with the objective of retaining one’s licence to operate an aircraft. It may not be understood, therefore, by persons outside the aviation industry, or even some working in other aspects of an airline organisation, that it is often the passion for flight that keeps many pilots doing what they do to earn a living.
Security
Another important factor is the challenge of maintaining security in all aspects of airline operations, not least in the cockpit. The challenges are many, with new ones surfacing almost every day. It is therefore essential to be always prepared for the activities and ‘methods’ of perpetrators seeking to wreak evil on an aircraft and its occupants. As it is impossible for any airline or national security organisation to cover all aspects, systematic management of risks to effect a safe outcome becomes imperative.
Flydubai Incident
In the recent Flydubai incident of 30 September, 2026, a first officer (co-pilot) attacked the captain of the flight with a crash axe to accomplish his sinister motives, into which investigations are continuing. For the time being, it prompts the questions: should the crash axe be easily accessible to the flight crew? Or even be there at all? I believe it is a case of assessing the greater risk.
With regard to that event, and the circumstances that led to it, other deterrents could have been applied more thoroughly. For example, more thorough screening of pilots’ and other crewpersons’ backgrounds, with emphasis on their mental health, ideological affiliations and previous employment history. Separately, during a time of conflict in the Middle East, should Flydubai have even been operating between Dubai and Tel Aviv? Notwithstanding that cost-cutting and profit maximisation are key aims of any business, an airline’s apparent failure to conduct adequate psychological profiling of flight crew members, while continuing to operate ‘profitable’ routes, regardless of potential danger, can only be regarded and condemned as greed and disregard for human lives.
( Captain. Fernando, RCyAF, SLAF, Air Ceylon, Air Lanka, Singapore Airlines (SIA), SriLankan Airlines, Former Chief Pilot, Air Lanka Boeing 737, Former Deputy Chief Pilot, Lockheed L 1011, Former Crew Resource Management (CRM) Facilitator, SIA, Former Deputy Director (Air Operations) CAASL, Former President, Aircraft Owners and Operators Association Sri Lanka (AOAOASL), President, The Colombo Flying Club, Representative for Aviation, Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA), Hony, and Member Sri Lanka Society of Transport and Logistics.)
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