Features
Coping with geopolitical challenges facing Sri Lanka

“… we find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities…. (and) in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved”.
by Neville Ladduwahetty
The most recent challenge that Sri Lanka has had to face was associated with UNHRC Resolution A/HRC/46/L.Rev.1. This Resolution was primarily based on the Report of the UN appointed Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite the objections raised the Sri Lankan government on grounds that the Report of the Commissioner violates the mandate granted by General Assembly Resolution 48/141 and that the Resolution itself violates the UN Charter and lacks “impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity”, the Resolution was adopted by the Human Rights Council on March 23, 2021.
The compulsion to go to such extremes and adopt a Resolution violating due process established by the UN, is driven by internal politics within countries that initiated the Resolution and by geopolitical interests of major powers.
Internal political compulsions are driven by the priorities of the Tamil minority concentrations resident in defined electorates in countries such as U.K., Canada, Germany and other European countries. When prospective Members of Parliament in these countries, regardless of which political party they represent, campaign for the votes of the Tamil minorities, they when elected, become the torchbearers for the priorities of the Tamil minorities, because it is their vote that decided whether they are elected or not. Consequently, since accountability for issues arising from the non-international armed conflict in Sri Lanka is the single-minded focus of the Tamil minorities, accountability has become a government policy for elected governments in these countries.
On the other hand, geopolitical compulsions are driven by a coalition of democracies forging security alliances such as the Quad, headed by the U.S. to contain China’s global expansion in the South China Sea founded on the Chinese claim of nine-dash line and its inroads into the Indian Ocean Rim countries in pursuit of their Belt and Road Initiative. These developments have energized the U.S. to adopt the policy of “Pivot to Asia” through the stated policy of forging a new Indo-Pacific Maritime Order.; a policy that is being relentlessly pursued by the U.S. in the form of forging alliances. the latest being the Maldives and the consequent isolation of Sri Lanka in this part of the Indian Ocean.
ADDRESSING INTERNAL COMPULSIONS
Internal compulsions are driven by the call to address accountability arising from issues relating to the non-international armed conflict within the time frame of signing the Ceasefire Agreement on February 22, 2002 and May 19, 2009 when the conflict ended. Having established the time frame, the next step is to establish the context in which to address accountability. In this regard, a context that would be acceptability to all concerned should be those established by the Panel of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and by the Appeal Court of the International Tribunal of former Yugoslavia.
The UN appointed Panel of Experts in their report stated: “There is no doubt that an internal armed conflict was being waged in Sri Lanka with the requisite intensity during the period that the Panel examined. As a result, international humanitarian law is the law against which to measure the conduct of both government and the LTTE”.
The Report of Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Sri Lanka (OISL) states: “Paragraph 182 of The OHCHR report states: “Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions relating to conflict not of an international character is applicable to the situation in Sri Lanka”.
Paragraph 183 goes on to state: “In addition, the Government and armed groups that are parties to the conflict are bound alike by relevant rules of customary international law applicable to non-international armed conflict”.
FURTHERMORE,
Defining what constitutes an armed conflict, the Appeals Court of the International Tribunal on former Yugoslavia (1995) in the case of Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadic stated: “… we find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities…. (and) in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved”.
Thus, it could justifiably be concluded that the context in which accountability issues should be addressed is International Humanitarian Law since the conflict in Sri Lanka was a Non-International Armed Conflict and the applicable law is International Humanitarian Law that acknowledges the derogation of Human Rights Law except for a defined few defined as the “hard core” of Human Rights during an officially declared emergency. Since these laws are codified in Additional Protocol II of 1977, issues relating to accountability should be addressed within the context of Additional Protocol II of 1077 that is acknowledged by the community of nations as a part of customary law.
Therefore, the task at hand is to evaluate any and all evidence of any violations of International Humanitarian Law as stated in the OISL Report, in the context of provisions in Additional Protocol II of 1977, subject to derogation of International Human Rights Law that is recognized by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and by Article 15 (7) and (8) of the Constitution during a declared emergency. In this regard, Paragraph 175 of the OISL Report states: “OISL notes that Sri Lanka has submitted a Declaration of a State of emergency dated 30 My 2000, derogating from articles 9 (2), 9 (3), 12 (1), 12 (2), 14 (3), 17 (1), 19 (2), 21 and 22 of the ICCPR. Measures taken pursuant to derogation are lawful to the extent they comply with the conditions set out in international human rights law…”.
In explaining the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the International Court of Justice has stated: “…. the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law” (Applicable International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Framework – UN).
Considering the material presented above, it is recommended that a document should be prepared on the basis of principles of Distinction, Proportionality and Military Necessity on which is founded International Humanitarian Law an embodied in Additional Protocol II of 1977 that addresses any alleged violations stated in the OISL Report by a group nominated by the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Such a document should include material proposed by the international experts appointed by the Paranagama Commission together with material from Lord Naseby, as well as any other related material for distribution to all countries, in order to convey to them a perspective that thus far has not being presented at repeated sessions of the UN Human Rights Council and other International forums.
The mandate of the three Member Commission of Inquiry appointed by the President as part of the Domestic Mechanism to address accountability states: (a) “Find out whether preceding Commissions of Inquiry and Committees which have been appointed to investigate into human rights violations, have revealed any human rights violations, serious violations of the international humanitarian law and other such offences”. Since the mandate does not specify the criteria and the time frame that should be used to distinguish human rights violations from humanitarian law violations, it would be up to Commission to decide how to distinguish between the two types of violations bearing in mind that the two types of law are applicable over different time frames.
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
The UNHRC 46/1 Resolution calls for the Office of the High Commissioner “to collect, consolidate, analyse and preserve information and evidence…to advocate for victims and survivors, and to support relevant judicial and other proceedings, including in Member States, with competent jurisdiction” (Paragraph 6). In short the evidence is gathered at a cost of US $ 2.8 Million to facilitate Member States to exercise universal jurisdiction. Thus far, universal jurisdiction has been exercised in regard to violations that come within the framework of a “Grave Breaches” regime that have occurred during certain internal conflicts that were governed by International Human Rights Law. However, in the case of Sri Lanka the conflict is categorized as a non-international armed conflict that is governed by International Humanitarian Law. Therefore, while the international community has accepted universal jurisdiction in the case of international armed conflicts along with Protocol I, the jury is still out as to whether it applies to non-international conflicts as in Sri Lanka as expressed by the ICRC comment cited below made to the General Assembly.
A document that addresses accountability from a Sri Lankan perspective would stand in good stead in the event a country or countries attempt to exercise universal jurisdiction relating to issues arising from the armed conflict. However, since the conflict in Sri Lanka was a non-international armed conflict the application of universal jurisdiction is fraught with fundamental issues as is evidenced by the statement of the ICRC to the UN General Assembly at its 71st session Sixth Committee, when it stated: “The updated commentaries also address other fundamental issues, such as the time frame for fulfilling the obligation to investigate alleged grave breaches and either prosecute or extradite those responsible; the challenges encountered by States when implementing universal jurisdiction; the state of international law today with regard to the potential immunities from jurisdiction and prosecution for alleged perpetrators of serious violations of IHL; and the possible applicability of the grave breaches regime to serious violations of IHL in non-international armed conflict” (emphasis added).
ADDRESSING GEOPOLITICAL COMPULSIONS
The strategic position of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean has been increasingly coming into focus with the conclusion of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. This, together with China’s policy to pursue its expansion founded on its Belt and Road Initiative has increased the focus on Sri Lanka. The need for the U.S. to contain China’s expansion in the South China Sea and in the Indian Ocean Rim countries has prompted the U.S. and its allies to build alliances such as the Quad that include India, Japan and Australia. India’s inclusion in the Quad was a recent development and an even more recent development was the Maldives entering into security related agreements with the U.S. and India.
This has isolated Sri Lanka. With the Quad attempting to extend its influence to countries East of the Malacca Straits, Sri Lanka’s isolation would be even greater. However, Sri Lanka would not be facing such isolation had it succumbed to U.S. pressures and signed the MCC Compact and SOFA after having signed ACSA. Although Sri Lanka managed to emerge ostensibly unscathed by not caving into U.S. pressure, its repercussions were experienced in Geneva. However, for all intents and purposes, the perceived isolation of Sri Lanka in the current context is bound to be taken advantage of by China to build even stronger bonds than those existing today. This is inevitable since China’s foot print is already well established in the Colombo Port City, the Colombo International Container Terminal and the harbour at Hambantota for the next 35 to 99 years.
It is most likely that the U.S., India and the rest of the Quad are going to extract a heavy price for the presence of China to the extent it has. This compels Sri Lanka to make hard choices similar to the ones that countries East of the Malacca Straits would have to face in the coming years. As for Sri Lanka, it cannot afford to offer planned infrastructure projects such as the West Container Terminal to India/Japan in the hope of appeasing one or more members to the Quad to balance the influence of China. This would amount dividing national projects between the Quad and China.
The way out for Sri Lanka to prepare the tender documents and call for open international bids in a transparent manner, and award the contract to the successful bidder regardless of geopolitical considerations. For instance, the solar power project in the three islands off the Jaffna peninsula should be awarded to China because China was chosen by the ADB as the successful bidder after addressing the security concerns of India, but Sri Lanka certainly need not abandon the project because of India’s concerns.
Since Sri Lanka’s stated Foreign Policy is Neutrality; and Non-Alignment, entertaining unsolicited bids for projects would amount to violating that policy. How Sri Lanka could live up to the promise of its stated policy and engage with all countries is to be open and transparent in the manner it implements its planned developments.
CONCLUSION
The challenges facing Sri Lanka, apart from the effects of COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the economy and the livelihood of the people are primarily from two sources. One is from internal pressures from the Tamil concentrations in defined electorates in countries such as U.K., Canada, Germany and other European countries that determine who gets elected to their respective Parliaments. Consequently, to these politicians the cause of their Tamil concentrations relating to accountability has become a policy for these governments. The second challenge is from geopolitical rivalries between major powers and others aspiring to be major powers attempting to control the Indo-Pacific Oceans. It was the role of the Oceans in maintaining the super power status of the U.S. that made US Navy Admiral Mahan to recommend to President Roosevelt the importance of oceans, especially the Pacific, to the U.S. The Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004 is based on this U. S. concept (Khan, May 23, 2010). The rivalry arose when China’s claims in the South China Seas and the concept of Belt and Road Initiative announced in 2013 were superimposed on the U.S. formulations.
The impact of these developments was the emergence of the Quad security alliance headed by the U.S. involving Japan and Australia and recently India, and even more recently the Maldives. The Quad started out as a humanitarian exercise to address the disaster following the 2004 tsunami. The transformation into a security alliance was to be expected in the wake of China’s claims. However, the impact of all these developments is to isolate Sri Lanka. What is recommended is a strategy for Sri Lanka to meet the challenges arising from the geopolitical rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.
The two recommendations presented above to overcome these challenges are: 1. To prepare a comprehensive document as suggested above that addresses the Internationally recognized Humanitarian Law violations as alleged by the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the OISL Report, in the context of Additional protocol II of 1977, and circulate and canvass through Sri Lanka’s Missions, all the Member States of the UN, in order to convey Sri Lanka’s perspective that hitherto has not been presented to the Human Rights Council or to any other international forum. 2. In keeping with Sri Lanka’s declared Foreign Policy of Neutrality and Non-Alignment, follow due process in the award of contracts relating to infrastructure projects by not entertaining unsolicited proposals from any quarter and call for international bids based on tender documents prepared in Sri Lanka independently or with external collaboration when necessary, without assigning them to designated entities based on geopolitical compulsions; an example being the West Container Terminal.
These recommendations are presented with a view to ensuring that Sri Lanka retains its independence, its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and develop as a free Nation State.
Features
RIDDHI-MA:

A new Era of Dance in Sri Lanka
Kapila Palihawadana, an internationally renowned dancer and choreographer staged his new dance production, Riddhi-Ma, on 28 March 2025 at the Elphinstone theatre, which was filled with Sri Lankan theatregoers, foreign diplomats and students of dance. Kapila appeared on stage with his charismatic persona signifying the performance to be unravelled on stage. I was anxiously waiting to see nATANDA dancers. He briefly introduced the narrative and the thematic background to the production to be witnessed. According to him, Kapila has been inspired by the Sri Lankan southern traditional dance (Low Country) and the mythologies related to Riddhi Yâgaya (Riddi Ritual) and the black magic to produce a ‘contemporary ballet’.
Riddhi Yâgaya also known as Rata Yakuma is one of the elaborative exorcism rituals performed in the southern dance tradition in Sri Lanka. It is particularly performed in Matara and Bentara areas where this ritual is performed in order to curb the barrenness and the expectation of fertility for young women (Fargnoli & Seneviratne 2021). Kapila’s contemporary ballet production had intermingled both character, Riddi Bisaw (Princes Riddhi) and the story of Kalu Kumaraya (Black Prince), who possesses young women and caught in the evil gaze (yaksa disti) while cursing upon them to be ill (De Munck, 1990).
Kapila weaves a tapestry of ritual dance elements with the ballet movements to create visually stunning images on stage. Over one and a half hours of duration, Kapila’s dancers mesmerized the audience through their virtuosic bodily competencies in Western ballet, Sri Lankan dance, especially the symbolic elements of low country dance and the spontaneity of movements. It is human bodily virtuosity and the rhythmic structures, which galvanised our senses throughout the performance. From very low phases of bodily movements to high speed acceleration, Kapila managed to visualise the human body as an elevated sublimity.
Contemporary Ballet

Figure 2 – (L) Umesha Kapilarathna performs en pointe, and (R) Narmada Nekethani performs with Jeewaka Randeepa, Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, Maradana, 28th March 2025. Source:
Malshan Witharana
The dance production Riddhi-Ma was choreographed in several segments accompanied by a flow of various music arrangements and sound elements within which the dance narrative was laid through. In other words, Kapila as a choreographer, overcomes the modernist deadlock in his contemporary dance work that the majority of Sri Lankan dance choreographers have very often succumbed to. These images of bodies of female dancers commensurate the narrative of women’s fate and her vulnerability in being possessed by the Black Demon and how she overcomes and emancipates from the oppression. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have showcased their ability to use the bodies not much as an object which is trained to perform a particular tradition but to present bodily fluidity which can be transformed into any form. Kapila’s performers possess formlessness, fluid fragility through which they break and overcome their bodily regimentations.
It was such a highly sophisticated ‘contemporary ballet’ performed at a Sri Lankan theatre with utmost rigour and precision. Bodies of all male and female dancers were highly trained and refined through classical ballet and contemporary dance. In addition, they demonstrated their abilities in performing other forms of dance. Their bodies were trained to achieve skilful execution of complex ballet movements, especially key elements of traditional ballet namely, improvisation, partnering, interpretation and off-balance and the local dance repertoires. Yet, these key ballet elements are not necessarily a part of contemporary ballet training (Marttinen, 2016). However, it is important for the dance students to learn these key elements of traditional ballet and use them in the contemporary dance settings. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have achieved such vigour and somatic precision through assiduous practice of the body to create the magic on stage.
Pas de deux
Among others, a particular dance sequence attracted my attention the most. In the traditional ballet lexicon, it is a ‘pas de deux’ which is performed by the ‘same race male and female dancers,’ which can be called ‘a duet’. As Lutts argues, ‘Many contemporary choreographers are challenging social structures and norms within ballet by messing with the structure of the pas de deux (Lutts, 2019). Pas de Deux is a dance typically done by male and female dancers. In this case, Kapila has selected a male and a female dancer whose gender hierarchies appeared to be diminished through the choreographic work. In the traditional pas de deux, the male appears as the backdrop of the female dancer or the main anchorage of the female body, where the female body is presented with the support of the male body. Kapila has consciously been able to change this hierarchical division between the traditional ballet and the contemporary dance by presenting the female dominance in the act of dance.
The sequence was choreographed around a powerful depiction of the possession of the Gara Yakâ over a young woman, whose vulnerability and the powerful resurrection from the possession was performed by two young dancers. The female dancer, a ballerina, was in a leotard and a tight while wearing a pair of pointe shoes (toe shoes). Pointe shoes help the dancers to swirl on one spot (fouettés), on the pointed toes of one leg, which is the indication of the ballet dancer’s ability to perform en pointe (The Kennedy Centre 2020).
The stunning imagery was created throughout this sequence by the female and the male dancers intertwining their flexible bodies upon each other, throwing their bodies vertically and horizontally while maintaining balance and imbalance together. The ballerina’s right leg is bent and her toes are directed towards the floor while performing the en pointe with her ankle. Throughout the sequence she holds the Gara Yakâ mask while performing with the partner.
The male dancer behind the ballerina maintains a posture while depicting low country hand gestures combining and blurring the boundaries between Sri Lankan dance and the Western ballet (see figure 3). In this sequence, the male dancer maintains the balance of the body while lifting the female dancer’s body in the air signifying some classical elements of ballet.
Haptic sense

Figure 3: Narmada Nekathani performs with the Gara Yaka mask while indicating her right leg as en pointe. Male dancer, Jeewaka Randeepa’s hand gestures signify the low country pose. Riddhi-Ma, Dance Theatre at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025. Source: Malshan Witharana.
One significant element of this contemporary ballet production is the costume design. The selection of colour palette, containing black, red and while combining with other corresponding colours and also the costumes which break the traditional rules and norms are compelling. I have discussed in a recent publication how clothes connect with the performer’s body and operate as an embodied haptic perception to connect with the spectators (Liyanage, 2025). In this production, the costumes operate in two different ways: First it signifies sculpted bodies creating an embodied, empathic experience.
Secondly, designs of costumes work as a mode of three dimensional haptic sense. Kapila gives his dancers fully covered clothing, while they generate classical ballet and Sinhalese ritual dance movements. The covered bodies create another dimension to clothing over bodies. In doing so, Kapila attempts to create sculpted bodies on stage by blurring the boundaries of gender oriented clothing and its usage in Sri Lankan dance.
Sri Lankan female body on stage, particularly in dance has been presented as an object of male desire. I have elsewhere cited that the lâsya or the feminine gestures of the dance repertoire has been the marker of the quality of dance against the tândava tradition (Liyanage, 2025). The theatregoers visit the theatre to appreciate the lâsya bodies of female dancers and if the dancer meets this threshold, then she becomes the versatile dancer. Kandyan dancers such as Vajira and Chithrasena’s dance works are explored and analysed with this lâsya and tândava criteria. Vajira for instance becomes the icon of the lâsya in the Kandyan tradition. It is not my intention here to further discuss the discourse of lâsya and tândava here.
But Kapila’s contemporary ballet overcomes this duality of male-female aesthetic categorization of lâsya and tândava which has been a historical categorization of dance bodies in Sri Lanka (Sanjeewa 2021).

Figure 4: Riddhi-Ma’s costumes creates sculpted bodies combining the performer and the audience through empathic projection. Dancers, Sithija Sithimina and Senuri Nimsara appear in Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025, Source, Malshan Witharana.
Conclusion
Dance imagination in the Sri Lankan creative industry exploits the female body as an object. The colonial mind set of the dance body as a histrionic, gendered, exotic and aesthetic object is still embedded in the majority of dance productions produced in the current cultural industry. Moreover, dance is still understood as a ‘language’ similar to music where the narratives are shared in symbolic movements. Yet, Kapila has shown us that dance exists beyond language or lingual structures where it creates humans to experience alternative existence and expression. In this sense, dance is intrinsically a mode of ‘being’, a kinaesthetic connection where its phenomenality operates beyond the rationality of our daily life.
At this juncture, Kapila and his dance ensemble have marked a significant milestone by eradicating the archetypical and stereotypes in Sri Lankan dance. Kapila’s intervention with Riddi Ma is way ahead of our contemporary reality of Sri Lankan dance which will undoubtedly lead to a new era of dance theatre in Sri Lanka.
References
De Munck, V. C. (1990). Choosing metaphor. A case study of Sri Lankan exorcism. Anthropos, 317-328. Fargnoli, A., & Seneviratne, D. (2021). Exploring Rata Yakuma: Weaving dance/movement therapy and a
Sri Lankan healing ritual. Creative Arts in Education and Therapy (CAET), 230-244.
Liyanage, S. 2025. “Arts and Culture in the Post-War Sri Lanka: Body as Protest in Post-Political Aragalaya (Porattam).” In Reflections on the Continuing Crises of Post-War Sri Lanka, edited by Gamini Keerawella and Amal Jayawardane, 245–78. Colombo: Institute for International Studies (IIS) Sri Lanka.
Lutts, A. (2019). Storytelling in Contemporary Ballet.
Samarasinghe, S. G. (1977). A Methodology for the Collection of the Sinhala Ritual. Asian Folklore Studies, 105-130.
Sanjeewa, W. (2021). Historical Perspective of Gender Typed Participation in the Performing Arts in Sri Lanka During the Pre-Colonial, The Colonial Era, and the Post-Colonial Eras. International Journal of Social Science And Human Research, 4(5), 989-997.
The Kennedy Centre. 2020. “Pointe Shoes Dancing on the Tips of the Toes.” Kennedy-Center.org. 2020 https://www.kennedy-center.org/education/resources-for-educators/classroom-resources/media- and-interactives/media/dance/pointe-shoes/..
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Himansi Dehigama for proofreading this article.
About the author:
Saumya Liyanage (PhD) is a film and theatre actor and professor in drama and theatre, currently working at the Department of Theatre Ballet and Modern Dance, Faculty of Dance and Drama, University of the Visual and Performing Arts (UVPA), Colombo. He is the former Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and is currently holding the director position of the Social Reconciliation Centre, UVPA Colombo.
Features
Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part II

Chinese Naval Entry and End of Post-War Unipolarity
The ascendancy of China as an emerging superpower is one of the most striking shifts in the global distribution of economic and political power in the 21st century. With its strategic rise, China has assumed a more proactive diplomatic and economic role in the Indian Ocean, signalling its emergence as a global superpower. This new leadership role is exemplified by initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The Economist noted that “China’s decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform” (The Economist, 11 November 2014). Thus far, China’s ascent to global superpower status has been largely peaceful.
In 2025, in terms of Navy fleet strength, China became the world’s largest Navy, with a fleet of 754 ships, thanks to its ambitious naval modernisation programme. In May 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) further strengthened its capabilities by commissioning the Fujian, its latest aircraft carrier. Equipped with an advanced electromagnetic catapult system, the Fujian can launch larger and heavier aircraft, marking a significant upgrade over its predecessors.
Driven by export-led growth, China sought to reinvest its trade surplus, redefining the Indian Ocean region not just as a market but as a key hub for infrastructure investment. Notably, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf transit to the Straits of Malacca before reaching its industrial centres. These factors underscore the Indian Ocean’s critical role in China’s economic and naval strategic trajectories.
China’s port construction projects along the Indian Ocean littoral, often associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exemplify its deepening geopolitical and economic engagement in the region. These initiatives encompass multipurpose berth development, deep-sea port construction, and supporting infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing maritime connectivity and trade. Key projects include the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan, a strategic asset for China’s access to the Arabian Sea; Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, which became a focal point of debt diplomacy concerns; the Payra deep-sea port in Bangladesh; as well as port and road infrastructure development in Myanmar’s Yunnan and Kyaukphyu regions and Cambodia’s Koh Kong.
While these projects were promoted as avenues for economic growth and regional connectivity, they also triggered geopolitical tensions and domestic opposition in several host countries. Concerns over excessive debt burdens, lack of transparency, and potential dual-use (civilian and military) implications of port facilities led to scrutiny from both local and external stakeholders, including India and Western powers. As a result, some projects faced significant pushback, delays, and, in certain cases, suspension or cancellation. This opposition underscores the complex interplay between economic cooperation, strategic interests, and sovereignty concerns in China’s Indian Ocean engagements.
China’s expanding economic, diplomatic, and naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has fundamentally altered the region’s strategic landscape, signalling the end of early post-Cold War unipolarity. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiatives, China has entrenched itself economically, financing. Diplomatically, Beijing has deepened its engagement with littoral states through bilateral agreements, security partnerships, and regional forums, challenging traditional Western and Indian influence.
China’s expanding naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, including its military base in Djibouti, and growing security cooperation with regional states, mark the end of unchallenged US dominance in the region. The Indian Ocean is now a contested space, where China’s presence compels strategic recalibrations by India, the United States, and other regional actors. The evolving security landscape in the Indian Ocean—marked by intensifying competition, shifting alliances, and the rise of a multipolar order—has significant implications for Sri Lanka’s geopolitical future.
India views China’s growing economic, political, and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region as a key strategic challenge. In response, India has pursued a range of strategic, political, and economic measures to counterbalance Chinese influence, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka through infrastructure investment, defense partnerships, and diplomatic engagements.
Other Extra-Regional powers
Japan and Australia have emerged as significant players in the post-Cold War strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean. During the early phases of the Cold War, Australia played a crucial role in Western ‘Collective Security Alliances’ (ANZUS and (SEATO). However, its direct engagement in Indian Ocean security remained limited, primarily supporting the British Royal Navy under Commonwealth obligations. Japan, meanwhile, refrained from deploying naval forces in the region after World War II, adhering to its pacifist constitution and post-war security policies. In recent decades, shifting strategic conditions have prompted both Japan and Australia to reassess their roles in the Indian Ocean, leading to greater defence cooperation and a more proactive regional presence.
In the post-Cold War era, Australia has progressively expanded its naval engagements in the Indian Ocean, driven by concerns over maritime security, protection of trade routes, and China’s growing influence. Through initiatives, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and deeper defence partnerships with India and the United States, Australia has bolstered its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Recalibration of Japan’s approach
Japan, too, has recalibrated its approach to Indian Ocean security in response to geopolitical shifts. Recognising the Indian Ocean’s critical importance for its energy security and trade, Japan has strengthened its naval presence through port visits, joint exercises, and maritime security cooperation. The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) has taken on a more active role in anti-piracy operations, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and strategic partnerships with Indian Ocean littoral states. This shift aligns with Japan’s broader strategy of contributing to regional stability while balancing its constitutional constraints on military force projection.
Japan’s proactive role in the Indian Ocean region is evident in its diplomatic and defence engagements. In January 2019, Japan sent its Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, and Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Katsutoshi Kawano, to the Raisina Dialogue, a high-profile geopolitical conference in India. Japan’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, identifies China’s growing assertiveness as its greatest strategic challenge and underscores the need to deepen bilateral ties and multilateral defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It also emphasises the importance of securing stable access to sea-lanes, through which more than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass. In recent years, Japan has expanded its port investment portfolio across the Indian Ocean, with major projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In 2021, Japan participated for the first time in CARAT-Sri Lanka (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), a bilateral naval exercise. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force returned for the exercise in January 2023, held at Trincomalee Port and Mullikulam Base.
Japan’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean have been most evident in its involvement in port infrastructure development projects. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are key countries where early Chinese-led port construction faced setbacks. Unlike India, which carries historical and political complexities in its relations with these countries, Japan is better positioned to compete with China. In December 2021, a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility in Trincomalee, complementing the already well-established Tokyo Cement factory. When the Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans in mid-2022 to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port—inviting expressions of interest from investors to utilise port facilities and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land—Trincomalee regained strategic attention.
The Colombo Dockyard, in collaboration with Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, has established a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee, marking a significant development in Japan’s engagement with Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure. This initiative aligns with Japan’s broader strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal, a region of critical economic and security importance. A key Japanese concern appears to be limiting China’s ability to establish a permanent presence in Trincomalee. This initiative underscores the broader strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Trincomalee, with its deep-water harbour, has long been regarded as a critical maritime asset. Japan’s involvement reflects its efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement with Sri Lanka amid growing regional competition. The challenge before Sri Lanka is how to navigate this strategic contest while maximising its national interests.
Other Regional Powers
In analyzing the evolving naval security architecture of the post-Cold War Indian Ocean, particular attention should be given to the naval developments of regional powers such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In 2012, Pakistan established the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) to strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). The creation of the NSFC suggests a shift toward sea-based deterrence, complementing Pakistan’s broader military strategy. In December 2012, Pakistan conducted a series of cruise missile tests from naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. Given India’s expanding maritime capabilities, which Pakistan views as a significant threat, the Pakistan Navy may consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships as part of its evolving deterrence strategy. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy cannot overlook this development.
Indonesia also emerged as a significant player in the evolving naval security landscape of the Indian Ocean. In 2010, it launched a military modernisation programme aimed at achieving a ‘Minimum Essential Force’ (MEF) by 2024. As part of this initiative, Indonesia sought to build a modern Navy with 247 surface vessels and 12 submarines. One of the primary challenges faced by the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is piracy. To enhance maritime security, Indonesia and Singapore signed the SURPIC Cooperation Arrangement in Bantam in May 2005, enabling real-time sea surveillance in the Singapore Strait for more effective naval patrols. In 2017, Indonesia introduced the Indonesian Ocean Policy (IOP) and subsequently incorporated blue economy strategies into its national development agenda, reinforcing its maritime vision. According to projections from the Global Firepower Index, published in 2025, the Indonesian Navy is ranked fourth in global ranking and second in Asia in terms of Navy fleet strength (Global Firepower, 2025).
In October 2012, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) announced plans to build a second Scorpène simulator training facility at its base in Kota Kinabalu, in addition to submarine base in Sepanggar, Sabah, constructed in 2002. To enhance its naval capabilities, the RMN planned to procure 18 Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) for maritime surveillance and six Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) between 2019 and 2023. Malaysia and China finalised their first major defence deal during Prime Minister Najib Razak’s visit to Beijing in November 2016. During this visit, Malaysia’s Defence Ministry signed a contract to procure LMS from China, as reported by The Guardian. Despite this agreement, Malaysia continues to maintain amicable relations with both China and India, as does Indonesia.
The increasing presence of major naval powers, the rise of regional stakeholders, and the growing significance of trade routes and maritime security have transformed the Indian Ocean into a central pivot of both regional and global politics, with Sri Lanka positioned at its heart. (To be Continued)
by Gamini Keerawella
Features
More excitement for Andrea Marr…

Sri Lankan Andrea Marr, now based in Australia, is in the spotlight again. She says she has teamed up with a fantastic bunch of Sri Lankan musicians, in Melbourne, and the band is called IntoGroove.
“The band has been going strong for many years and I have been a fan of this outfit for quite a few years; just love these guys, authentic R&B and funk.”
Although Andrea has her original blues band, The McNaMarr Project, and they do have a busy schedule, she went on to say that “when the opportunity came up to join these guys, I simply couldn’t refuse … they are too good.”
IntoGroove is Jude Nicholas (lead vocals), Peter Menezes (bass), Keith Pereira (drums), Blaise De Silva (keyboards) and and Steve Wright (guitar).

Andrea Marr: Powerhouse of the blues
“These guys are a fantastic band and I really want everyone to hear them.”
Andrea is a very talented artiste with many achievements to her credit, and a vocal coach, as well.
In fact, she did her second vocal coaching session at Australian Songwriters Conference early this year.
Her first student showcase for this year took place last Sunday, in Melbourne, and it brought into the spotlight the wonderful acts she has moulded, as teacher and mentor.
What makes Andrea extra special is that she has years of teaching experience and is able to do group vocal coaching for all styles, levels and genres.
In January, this year, she performed at the exclusive ‘Women In Blues’ showcase at Alfred’s On Beale Street (rock venue with live entertainment), in Memphis, in the USA, during the International Blues Challenge when bands from all over the world converge on Memphis for the ‘Olympics of the Blues.’

The McNaMarr Project with Andrea and Lindsay Marr in the
vocal spotlight
This was her fourth performance in the home of the blues; she has represented Australian Blues three times and, on this occasion, she went as ambassador for Blues Music Victoria, and The Melbourne Blues Appreciation Society’s ‘Women In Blues’ Coordinator.
Andrea was inducted into the Blues Music Victoria Hall of Fame in 2022 and released her 10th album which hit #1 on the Australian Blues Charts.
Known as ‘the pint-sized powerhouse of the blues’ for her high energy, soulful, original music, Andrea is also a huge fan of the late Elvis Presley and has checked out Graceland, in Memphis, Tennessee, USA, many times.
In Melbourne, the singer also plays a major role in helping Animal Rescue organisations find homes for abandoned cats.
Andrea Marr’s wish, at the moment, is that the Lankan audience, in Melbourne, would get behind this band, IntoGroove. They are world class, she added.
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