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Midweek Review

Breaking the Cocoon: The Duality and Unity of a Dancer’s Body

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By Dr Saumya Liyanage

Dance is an elusive art form. It is elusive in the sense that any type of dance form uses the human body as its expressive tool, and the art and the artist are one and the same. Dance is in a way similar to the actor’s art because the dancer uses her body as the means of expression. The actor and the dancer share this common ground where their art and the artistic tool are nonetheless inseparable and tightly intertwined. In order to understand the meaning of dance, one may need to separate the dancer’s body from dance but as stated the inseparability of the dancer from dance poses ontological questions as to who the dancer is and what dance is. Therefore, marking a boundary between the body and the work of dance is always blurred.

It is difficult to explain why people dance and how dance is differentiated from non-dance. Celeste Snowber writes that whether we dance and move our bodies, or whether our bodies are static and still, we always dance. She further argues that ‘we are all dancing and as we are all living, whether it is walking or running, swimming or hopping, jumping or being still. There is a dance of blood and fluid circulating in our bodies, and the expressivity of gestures is a daily activity’ (Snowber cited in Leavy, 2018, p. 247). In this analysis, Snowber broadly defines and blurs the distinction between dance and non-dance challenging us to rethink the way we define dance in the contemporary context.

Yet, Sri Lankan dance scholarship is still practised and confined within a particular school of thought that favours dance as a refined, codified body of movement. The learning of dance needs assiduous practice and dedication under a specific training regimen. Moreover, the dancer’s body should be physically trained and aesthetically beautiful to be able to perform and bring meanings to spectators. Hence traditional dance training and performance is purely cultivated through guru-shishya parampara (Teacher-disciple model) where the repetition and execution of learnt scores are supremely important. Very little space is allowed for the novice to explore physical possibilities beyond the regimented body. However, I am not skeptical about the skills and capacities that a traditional dancer possesses. Yet, this long assiduous practice and the regimentation of bodies along with cosmic teaching pertaining to demons and deities would undoubtedly affect and discipline not only the learner’s physicality but their thought process as well. Therefore, these pedagogical systems do not allow the learner to explore various expressions or movement culture.

In this article, I am going to discuss about an emerging dancer and choreographer Kanchana Malshani and her recent work titled, Talking Silambu performed, at the Royal Taprobanian cultural hub in Navinna, Maharagama. In this piece of dance work, Kanchana raises several questions worthy of discussion through the current practice of dance pedagogy in Sri Lanka and ontological questions of what dance is, and who a dancer is. Further her work explores how dance can be a self-exploratory journey for those who seek alternative avenues through breaking their links to traditional forms and regimented bodies.

Kanchana

Kanchana Malshani has studied traditional Sri Lankan dance forms from various teachers since her childhood until she graduated from university. Kanchana is a graduate from Sripalee campus, University of Colombo and received a First Class honours degree. Being a student of traditional Sri Lankan dance forms such as Kandyan, Sabaragamuwa and Low country dance, Kanchana has developed her own style through her engagement with contemporary and experimental Sri Lankan dancers such as Venuri Perera and Umeshi Rajeendra. Learning and working with Venuri Perera and her influence on Kanchana’s reincarnation as a contemporary dancer is immense; in her ‘second life’ as a choreographer and dancer, she is being mentored by Venuri Perera. Her recent incarnation as a contemporary dancer signifies that she as a dancer needs a different life and expression within dance scholarship. Her recent work, Talking Silambu, shows a clear rebellious individuality that seeks to break the traditional codification and rebirth as a free bodied woman.

In 2017, Goethe Institute organised a Choreography Lab with dancer Venuri Perera, in Kalpitiya Sri Lanka. At this particular dance lab, Kanchana learnt contemporary dance from Yuko Kaseki, a Japanese Bhuto dancer, and Mahesh Umagiliya. Further, she learnt from Prof. Sandra Mathern-Smith, Professor of dance at Denison University, the USA, who has travelled several times to Sri Lanka as a Fulbright scholar. Her intervention in popularising and mentoring Sri Lankan dancers included a group of students at the University of the Visual and Performing Arts, Colombo, Sripalee campus, was also a turning point in her dance career. Dance teachers like Deepak Kurki Shivaswamy, Preethi Athreya, Maria Colusi have also helped Kanchana develop her skills. After receiving a half scholarship to visit a two-week-long dance camp at Sanskar Dance Festival India, she has been able to work with teachers such as Vittoria de Ferrari Sapetto and Roberto Olivan. Apart from her dance training, Kanchana has been working with one of the English Theatre companies, Stages Theatre, led by writer and director Ruwanthie De Chickera in Colombo. Kanchana may have undoubtedly learnt the value of being an artiste and professionalism in theatre through working in an actors’ ensemble at Stages Theatre.

Dance and Contemporaneity

The term ‘contemporary dance’ signifies specific meanings to dance specialists than non-specialists of dance. There are certain qualities that set contemporary dance apart from other genres. Contemporary dance can be distinguished from modern and other forms of dance because of its shift from the traditional narratology, dancer’s perspective, and breaking away from some of the dance prejudices to integrate text, words, digital and intermedial elements to it. One such difference is that contemporary dance work departs from traditional third person singular narrative to first person singular self-expression. This first person perspective allows the dancer to reflect her own auto-biographical material.

Yet, these auto-ethnographic or auto-biographical narratives finally gets transformed into a political idiom.

Further contemporary dance deconstructs the aesthetic body celebrated in traditional dance and questions and dissects the skin of the dancer by opening up the inner flesh of the body. André Lepecki further identifies the uniqueness of contemporary dance from other genres because of its ‘ephemerality, corporeality, precariousness, scoring, and performativity’ (Kwan, 2017, p. 39). Thus, contemporary dance does not stick to a particular form, style or a structure. Instead it integrates various techniques, styles, and influences even from traditional dance forms to use the body as a political tool and the self as the centre of expression.

 

Talking Silambu

In this dance work titled, Talking Silambu, a twenty minute long piece of choreography, Kanchana appears in a non-traditional lose attire while wearing two Silambu (Silambu is a type of anklet made out of brass which Kandyan dancers wear when they perform) In the first instance, we hear the sound of Silambu as Kanchana’s legs begin to move. Yet, her dance body starts movement towards the audience while mixing traditional Kandyan dance codification with free body movement. It is clear that she performs half Kandyan and half improvised body movements in the score. In other words, her body movements are choreographed through semi-Kandyan codification mixed with free style movements. When the dance intensifies, she removes her Silambu, holding them in her hands and begins to shake them with vigorous body movements while throwing her body in various directions. At this point, Kanchana uses a trans-like act depicting trans-performance inherited particularly in low country devil dance. In this work, it is clearly demonstrated that her body is struggling with Silambu and trying to remove its connection to the body. This struggle culminates in the final phase of the dance work by indicating she runs away from the codified body and becomes a free woman. In this work, Kanchana demonstrates her discontent with the previous life as a traditional dancer and her struggle to break her affinity to the codified structure and beautification of the body in Kandyan dance. In a short conversation I had with Kanchana, she mentioned as particular rebirth that occurred at a dance camp organised by the Goethe Institute Colombo:

“I have been trained as a traditional dancer since my childhood but for the first time, working with this Japanese Butoh dancer, Yuko Kaseki, I learnt how to speak from my body. For many years I was living in a cage-tradition where I was entrapped. Living in this cage, I have performed what others wanted me to do. But in this dance lab, I found myself speaking to my own body and speaking through the body. I don’t want my body to be beautiful and aesthetically refined. I don’t want to display precision and codification of my body. I want to show how ugly I am and how vulnerable my body is.” (Kanchana, M., Pers. Comm. Dec. 2020).

 

Against the grain

In the traditional dance pedagogy, the dancer’s body is understood as a vehicle via which the dancer’s symbolic meanings are conveyed. There is a clear division between the inner and outer faculties in the dance body, and the dancer’s role is to bring forth those inner feelings to the onlooker via her body movements. This conceptualisation of the dancer’s body as a split between inner and outer is a complex issue pertaining to dance. Knowingly or unknowingly the dancer divides her body into body and mind and this Cartesian division has influenced the dancer to theorise the body and her craft.

Living in an ocular centric world, the dancer’s outer body is a place where womanhood is exploited for commercial purposes. From state-sponsored national festivals to television advertisements selling instant noodles or carbonated drinks, the dancer’s outer skin is commodified. Writing about Sri Lankan neo-dance traditions, propagated and performed at high profile delegations, product launches and in TV commercials in the country, I have written elsewhere that ‘women’s bodies succumb to the surgical knife of the choreographer whose male sexual desires are displayed on those bodies. Hence, no difference can be made between a choreographer and a cosmetic surgeon, whose expertise on women’s bodies, especially breasts and buttocks, are surgically transplanted and enhanced by incisions, stitches and staples’ (Liyanage, 2016). Amidst this commodification of female bodies in Sri Lankan dance arena, Kanchana’s attempt is to break away from this commodified, sexualised, and mechanised body to establish a non-codified and unified body of self-expression.

Here it is important for contemporary dancers to understand the value of the ‘living body’ or the ‘lived’ body that is celebrated in the vast literature of phenomenology and dance theory in the contemporary dance literature. In the dominant dance cultures from stage performances to digital and visual representations, the dancer’s skin is the most valued and emphasised. Now, with the contemporary dance turn, the dancer’s living or lived experience has come forth. Kanchana as a dancer now understands that her body is not a place for others to communicate vague meanings but a living entity where her own selfhood is reflected and displayed. It is a challenge for a dancer like her because the dominant female body has already been already established by key dance authors of the country. These dance authors have created a symbolic and sexualised female body for live and digitised performances. This symbolic and sexualised female body consists of the idealised female body for the male viewer. Kanchana is challenging this idealised body that is dominant in the real and digital world.

 

Dancer and Danced

The key juncture where the lived body differs from the symbolic body is that the symbolic body that is propagated in the media and elsewhere is the body that is not presented as a place for knowledge. Let me explain this further. In the traditional dance pedagogy, the dancer’s body is a place where meanings are generated and shared. In other worlds, the codified body is a canvas or a display where the onlooker extricates meanings. This codified, symbolic body is not presented to us as a place for knowing or sensing. Kanchana’s work and the work of other contemporary dancers suggest that we should understand the body as a place of sensing and knowing. This marks an epistemological turn in dance making and its reception. Dance, or the dancer’s body, has not been considered a place for ‘knowing’ in Sri Lankan dance pedagogy. Most often, a dancer narrates someone’s story or represents a third person singular perspective of the dance.

What Kanchana and the contemporary dance body suggest is to make a shift from the third person singular narrative to a first person singular perspective. This ‘I’ or the first person perspective allows the dancer to narrate her own stories and engagement with the social, cultural and political terrains. Further, a dancer as the author of her own work marks the departure of the dancer as an employer for a particular author. What Kanchana does in Talking Silambu is that as a dancer she tries to incarnate herself and narrate a story of searching a breakthrough and liberation. In this performance, her body works as a site of struggle and seeks the unity of her body and soul.

Conclusion

Understanding the body as a sensing and perceiving entity is still an alien concept to dance pedagogies in universities and private schools. Furthermore, dance can be a self-expressive and auto-ethnographic inquiry and is also a far-reaching idea for our students. Hence, the mainstream dance pedagogy produces dancers who dance without self-motivation to satisfy the audience who come to see symbolic representation of the body. Yet a handful of dancers who are eagerly exploring other avenues for dance expressions are also facing complex issues that their artistic interventions are not fully accepted in the mainstream dance scholarship in the country. Moreover, dancers like Kanchana have chosen a non-popular pathway to pursue their future dance careers and already faced deadlocks, as their artistic practices are not being accepted or sustained by institutions or organisations. Yet Kanchana is determined to break her cocoon to be incarnated as a hybrid moth.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Himansi Dehigama and Sachini Senevirathe for their assistance in preparing this paper. Further the author’s gratitude goes to dancer Kanchana Malshani.

References

Kwan, S. (2017). When Is Contemporary Dance? Dance Research Journal, [online] 49(3), pp.38–52. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/dance-research-journal/article/when-is-contemporary-dance/8D44743A01A1ECC8100C5E65C1142DC2 [Accessed 4 Oct. 2019].

Leavy, P. (2019). Handbook of arts-based research. New York: The Guilford Press.



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Midweek Review

H’tota port’s strategic status remains focal point of geopolitical scrutiny

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Chinese scientific research vessel Yuan Wang 5 at the Hambantota International Port (HIP) in August 2022. The visit took place just weeks after the overthrowing of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. The second Chinese research vessel Shi Yan 6 arrived at the Colombo port in October, 2023. In the wake of the Chinese ship visits, the US and India forced Sri Lanka to impose a moratorium on such visits on January 1, 2024. Although the government announced it would be for one year, the moratorium remains.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Dual-use naval facilities are commercial ports, shipyards, or maritime hubs operationally designed and equipped to support military operations when required though they operate primarily for civilian trade in peacetime.

The issue at hand is whether the Hambantota International Port (HIP) operated as a public-private partnership between Sri Lanka and China is one such dual-use naval facility, as propagated by the US?

Sri Lanka handed over the Port to China on December 09, 2017, after the finalisation of the hotly disputed 99-year old lease for the strategic port on July 29, 2017. Having opposed Chinese projects in Sri Lanka in the run-up to the 2015 presidential election, the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe attended the handing over ceremony. China paid USD 1.2 bn for the Port.

In spite of repeated denials by successive governments over the years, the US still identifies HIP as a dual-use naval facility. India, too, subscribes to that view. There is no doubt that the Quad, a strategic partnership among the US. India, Japan and Australia considers HIP as such and its policy, vis-a-vis Sri Lanka, geared to meet that challenge. But, is HIP really a dual-use naval facility as alleged and Sri Lanka part of the overall Chinese strategy. The other issue is whether Sri Lanka is a willing partner of the Chinese strategy or caught up in that due to circumstances beyond its control.

The Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, published quarterly by the US Indo-Pacific Command, has regularly dealt with HIP. Its first issue this year went all out to emphasise HIP’s status as a dual-use naval facility. Sarosh Bana, Executive Editor of Business India magazine, in an article, titled ‘Indian Ocean Primacy,’ published in the first issue of the Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, referred to HIP as a dual-service naval facility.

In the article that dealt with the Indian move to establish a strategic naval base this year, in Andhra Pradesh, to neutralise China’s Longpo naval base on Hainan island, Bana categorised Bangladesh Navy base BNS Pekua and Kyaukphyu deep seaport being developed in Myanmar. Bana declared all above mentioned facilities as part of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure scheme. Since 2013, China has invested as much as USD 700 bn for OBOR projects covering over 150 countries across Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Indo-Pacific.

Specialist in political economy Dr. Alfred Oehlers, in an article, titled ‘Peace Through Economic Strength,’ also carried in the same edition of the Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, discussed the Hambantota Port, while another specialist in Chinese affairs Dr. Jinghao Zhou dealt with overall Chinese strategy at global level. Zhou’s article was titled ‘Countering OBOR’ and primarily argued how ports in Chinese hands could be used for military purposes.

Obviously the US and its partners are deeply concerned over the growing Chinese, influence both at regional and global level. Sri Lanka remains one of their key focus as HIP, located just 10 nm from major east – west shipping routes, continues to grow, quite rapidly and received significant international attention during the war between Israel-US against Iran (February-June, 2026).

US sub strike

HIP received global attention in the wake of a US torpedo attack on non-belligerent Iranian frigate IRIS Dena off Sri Lanka’s southern coast. The attack took place off Galle Port, within the country’s exclusive economic zone, in the first week of March, just days after the eruption of hostilities in West Asia. Sinking of IRIS Dena was the only attack that took place outside the war zone before Pakistan-Qatar mediated talks that brought about a fragile ceasefire that enabled the re-opening of Strait of Hormuz, albeit amidst many a violation.

In the immediate aftermath of the unprovoked attack on unnamed IRIS Dena returning home after participating in International Fleet Review (IFR) and Exercise Milan 2026 at Visakhapatnam (15-25 June), Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar declared Hambantota as a Chinese military facility. This happened in the presence of Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath at Raisina Dialogue 2026 (March 5 to 7) in New Delhi. Dr. Jaishankar said so as he responded to a pointed query regarding India’s much-touted position as the region’s net security provider. India was given a shocking jolt without even a warning, when the US struck in Delhi’s backyard, ignoring its status as the purported regional policeman.

Without mentioning that India, too, participated in US-led military exercises off Diego Garcia, Dr. Jaishankar referred to joint US-British base at Diego Garcia, Chinese military base at Djibouti in east Africa and Hambantota.

The US submarine strike also underscored that regardless of the climax of US-India relations during Narendra Modi’s third consecutive term as the Prime Minister, beginning in June 2024, the overall US strategy may disregard domestic and regional issues. India that backed the Israeli-US offensive against Iran by conveniently remaining silent on the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 28 February, 2026, after Modi visited Israel on the eve of the daring surprise attack on Iran, however had to protest US military action during the last phase of Pakistan-Qatar mediated talks to arrange a ceasefire. India bitterly complained when US targeted ships crewed by Indians in the Hormuz Strait.

In the second week of June, 2026, the US attacked three ships, namely The Marivex, a Palau-flagged oil tanker, merchant tanker Jalveer and merchant tanker Settebello in the Gulf of Oman. The attack on Settebello claimed the lives of three Indians. The US justified attacks on the basis that all three ships violated blockade imposed on Iranian ports. Can such unilateral actions be justified under any circumstances?

Indian and foreign news agencies quoted India’s Centre of Indian Trade Unions as having said in a statement: “When a foreign military kills Indian workers in international waters, the government of India must speak – loudly and firmly.” That statement even received the attention of CNN.

The US launched the blockade on 13 April, 2026, after failing to achieve its primary objectives though Iran endured significant damage. The US forces disabled eight vessels and redirected 134 others.

India insisted that “targeting of commercial shipping and civilian infrastructure in the region must end. But, India never condemned the sinking of an unarmed Iranian frigate returning home from Visakhapatnam.

The US allowed Sri Lanka and India to accommodate two other ships that were accompanying IRIS Dena at the time of its sinking off Galle-Hambantota stretch. The US had the opportunity to hit all three ships but refrained from doing so.

Expanded US role

While claiming Sri Lanka a part of OBOR strategy on the basis of HIP being a dual-use naval facility, the US and India stepped up military assistance to Sri Lanka. Since the transferring of a US Coast Guard vessel in 2004/2005 to Sri Lanka, the US provided a range of assistance with direct intelligence support during the 2006-2009 period leading to destruction of four LTTE floating warehouses in the high seas.

But with the US-India backed regime change operation achieving the desired result in 2022, the superpower and the regional power appeared to have advanced their strategy to a new level. The removal of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa had been of pivotal importance to their game plan but emergence of Ranil Wickremesinghe as Gotabaya’s successor undermined their strategy.

On behalf of the conspirators, the then Indian High Commissioner Gopal Baglay (2020 to 2023) went to the extent of urging Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over the presidency as an interim measure to thwart Wickremesinghe’s ascent to power for obvious reasons.

The US quietly dropped accountability issues that dominated bilateral issues since the successful conclusion of war in 2009 from its agenda while it stepped-up military assistance to cash-strapped Sri Lanka.

US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur, on 22 June, declared in Colombo the delivery of U.S. satellite communications technology to the Sri Lanka Navy, their self-proclaimed Indo-Pacific partner. The US Embassy, in a statement issued following the official announcement made on aboard SLNS Gajabahu at the Port of Colombo, quoted Kapur as having said: “This secure, real-time connection —representing a transformational upgrade for the Sri Lanka Navy— will be available aboard their entire fleet of offshore patrol vessels and ensures no communication gap at sea. It will allow our Sri Lanka partners to respond quickly to emergencies, protect the cargo ships that fuel our economy, and disrupt illegal activity across the Indian Ocean before it reaches our shores.”

On the following day, the US officially handed over 10 US-built TH-57 Sea Ranger (Bell 206) single engined helicopters to the Sri Lanka Air Force. The event, held at the Ratmalana air base, was attended by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Kapur and US Pacific Air Forces Commander General Kevin Schneide.

It would be pertinent to mention that the SLNS Gajabahu is one of the four former US Coast Guard vessels transferred since 2004/2005. But, the US refrained from transferring ships to Sri Lanka during the war and the second ex-Coast Guard vessel was made available in 2017, a decade after the end of the conflict. Of the four US Coast Guard vessels, Sri Lanka took delivery of the last one a couple of months ago and it arrived here in May.

The US-Sri Lanka relations had never been so strong though the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was signed in March 2007 during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s first term. The US and India seemed to be overtly happy with the ruling National People’s Power (NPP) approach.

The US-India accusations that HIP is a dual-use naval facility while simultaneously providing military assistance seems contradictory.

A forgotten move

Soon after the 2019 presidential election, Gotabaya Rajapaksa deeply antagonised China when he declared that the 99-year lease of the Hambantota Port was a mistake. President Rajapaksa revealed his decision to renegotiate the agreement.

In an hour-long exclusive interview, his first since becoming the President, aired on Nitin A Gokhle’s Strategic News International (SNI) web platform and on the defence website Barthshakthi, the newly elected President said: “We were never to give control of the Port [Hambantota] to China; that was a mistake.” Rajapaksa pointed out that the decision was made by the previous administration.

“The previous Government gave it on a 99-year lease, and even though China is a good friend of ours and we need their assistance for development, I am not afraid to say that was a mistake.”

But, the President retracted his statement soon after China warned that re-negotiations wouldn’t be possible under any circumstances. The President had no option but to call a special meeting with the Colombo-based journalists working for international news agencies to retract his statement to the Strategic News International (SNI) web platform and the defence website Barthshakthi. Who influenced President Rajapaksa to declare his intention to renegotiate the Hambantota Port deal? Did President Rajapaksa at least consult his elder brother Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa or the Cabinet of Ministers? Or did Gokhle, in some way, influenced the President.

The President couldn’t have been unaware of the possible angry Chinese reaction as Sri Lanka suffered due to the foolish Yahapalana decision to suspend the Colombo Port City project. In keeping with UNP leader Ranil Wickremeinghe’s promise to halt the Colombo Port City project, in the run-up to the presidential election, in January 2015, at his behest the Cabinet of Ministers suspended the project. Sri Lanka made the announcement on 5 March, 2015.

The utterly irresponsible Yahapalana leadership justified their idiotic decision on the failure on the part of China and Sri Lanka to follow proper procedures in launching the project. The Indian and US hand in the Colombo Port City work stoppage was transparent. But, at the end, China forced the Yahapalana government to lift the suspension to pave the way for the resumption of work.

The NPP hadn’t been formed at that time. The JVP formed the NPP ahead of the 2019 presidential poll and opposed both the Colombo Port City and the Hambantota Port, primarily over sovereignty concerns. But since winning the presidential and parliamentary polls in 2024, the JVP-led NPP seemed to be continuing with Chinese projects while creating extra space for the US and India. It wouldn’t be wrong to say that Sri Lanka is tilted towards the US-India combine. Regardless of the often repeated pledge to what some called strict commitment to non-alignment, Sri Lanka is now in that US-led camp. US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Kapur’s declaration onboard SLNS Gajabahu proved that.

Indo-Lanka relations

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence, on 5 April, 2025, in Colombo, immediately followed by India securing controlling shares of the security-related Colombo Dockyard Ltd., previously owned by Quad member Japan, marked an increasing loss of sovereignty to an overwhelming neighbour. Altogether, India and Sri Lanka signed seven MoUs. The presence of the Indian Premier at the signing ceremony underscored the importance of the occasion.

Both governments are of the view that all MoUs cannot be fully disclosed. They believe that there is no need or responsibility on the part of India and Sri Lanka to do so. However, none of the political parties represented in the current Parliament are not publicly opposed to the Indian approach. Over the years, India, China and the US have enhanced relations with political parties here as well as others, they are confident of pursuing their agendas.

While the local and global focus is on Hambantota Port, within 24 hours after Premier Modi concluded his visit to Colombo in the first week of April 2025, the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT), Lanka’s first fully automated container terminal with an $800 million investment, officially began operations.

The project, developed under a 35-year Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) agreement, is managed by a consortium of India’s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ), Sri Lankan conglomerate John Keells Holdings PLC, and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).

There are five container terminals at the Colombo port. They are Jaya Container Terminal (JCT), the oldest built during JRJ tenure; South Asia Gateway Terminals (SAGT), Colombo International Container Terminals (CICT), Unity Container Terminal (UCT), and the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT). China spearheads the CICT operation. China (China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited [CMPort]) owns 85% stake and the rest belongs to Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka Ports Authority).

Regardless of US and Indian interventions, China has sustained its operations here primarily focusing on Beijing’s major investments. China suffered a setback in 2024, when the US-India combine forced President Ranil Wickremesinghe to announce a one-year ban on foreign research ships visiting Sri Lanka. It was supposed to end on December 31, 2024. But, the NPP, in spite of publicly promising to state its stand on the ban that obviously targeted China, is yet to disclose its position. In fact, the writer raised this issue with Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath in January this year and he assured an announcement within two months.

Sri Lanka is in a deepening dilemma as the US and India relentlessly pressure the country on multiple issues. New Delhi is keen to upgrade the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and also connect the two countries through a land bridge in line with the overall enhancement of bilateral relations at every level. The seven MoUs finalised on 5 April, 2025, were meant to take the relations to the next level. The following are the MoUs (1) HVDC Interconnection (high-voltage direct current power link) for Import/Export of Power (2) Sharing Successful Digital Solutions Implemented at Population Scale for Digital Transformation (3) Development of Trincomalee as an Energy Hub (4) defence cooperation (5) grant assistance for the Eastern Province (6) cooperation in the fields of health and medicine and (7) Pharmacopoeial cooperation between the Indian Pharmacopoeia Commission.

With Sri Lanka in total political turmoil, foreign powers may find it easier to advance their agendas at different levels, simultaneously.

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Midweek Review

The Sacred Strains of W.D. Amaradewa

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The mellow, sacred strains of W.D. Amaradewa,

The master singer who plumbed the depths,

Of the ordinary people’s hearts and minds,

Wafting from the Dansala across the street,

Where devotees clad in immaculate white,

Gave themselves a much needed repast,

Helped give the venerated day just past,

Its special spiritual meaning and identity,

Putting the cardinal point beyond doubt,

Of content and medium being one in great art.

 

By Lynn Ockersz

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

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Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

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