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ABOLISHING THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY

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by Dr Nihal Jayawickrama

The message of the 2022 “Aragalaya”, which drove a President and a Prime Minister and other members of that political family out of office, expressed in clear and explicit terms, was a complete rejection of the authoritarian, patronage-based, corrupt system of governance introduced into this country by the 1978 Constitution and its 21 Amendments. A total of 45 years of autocratic presidential rule marked by massive loss of human life and unprecedented levels of corruption, have demonstrated the need to restore the system of government that this country enjoyed for 25, if not 30, years since 1947.

The Parliamentary Executive System

I am old enough to have lived through all three post-Independence Constitutions of this country, and especially the first. In my view, the 1946 Constitution served the country and its peoples best. If the purpose of a national constitution is to establish the essential framework of government by creating the principal institutions and defining their powers, that was precisely what it did. Drafted by one trained legal draftsman, based on the report of the Soulbury Commission and related documents, and endorsed by the four major communities represented in the State Council, that Constitution served us for 25 years without any significant amendments. Expressed in only 92 sections, it was, in my opinion, the model constitution. If it failed in some respects, it was due to the absence of a Bill of Rights.

Under that parliamentary executive system of government, the Head of State, who was also Head of the Executive, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, acted on the advice of the Prime Minister, while the Cabinet of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister and drawn from Parliament was charged with the direction and control of the Government and was collectively responsible to Parliament. That system facilitated regular democratic elections and periodic changes of government which enabled both right-wing and centrist or left-of-centre political parties to implement their respective economic and social policies without any hindrance.

The parliamentary executive system of governance it provided was flexible enough to deal effectively and expeditiously with the sudden death of the Prime Minister in 1951, an island-wide Hartal in 1953, the assassination of the Prime Minister in 1959, the attempted military Coup d’état in 1962, and the bloody JVP Insurgency in 1971. The independence of the Judiciary was protected, and so was that of the Public Service. As a Permanent Secretary under that Constitution during the first two years of my seven-year term, I had the freedom to supervise the departments assigned to the Ministry, subject only to policy directions from my Minister. On one occasion when I refused to comply with a specific non-policy direction, I was reported to the Prime Minister who, fortunately, had a clearer understanding of constitutional principles.

The Constitutional Head of State

For 30 years, the constitutional Head of State was the principal unifying figure in the country; the non-partisan, independent, symbol of the State. Opposition parties could approach the President in the knowledge that he was a neutral figure. When, in 1972, a conflict developed between the Constitutional Court and the National State Assembly, and the Judges refused to speak to the Speaker or the Ministers, it was at President’s House that each party sat on either side of the conference table, with the President at the head, to commence a dialogue to try to resolve their differences.

That exercise, however, failed. When, in 1976, following a long period of “cold war” between the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice, the Minister decided it was time to break the ice, and invited the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme Court to the Ministry to tea, it was to President’s House that they proceeded instead, to complain of the invitation, which they perceived to be an interference with the judiciary. Mr William Gopallawa was not a mere ceremonial president; he was not a mere cipher. I was summoned by him on several occasions when he disagreed or felt uncomfortable with advice tendered to him, either by a Minister or the Prime Minister. He did not hesitate to invite the Prime Minister, or the Minister concerned, to reconsider the advice.

The Presidential Executive System

That parliamentary executive system of government was replaced in 1978 by a presidential executive system of government, not because the former, which prevails to this day in democratic countries from Canada and the United Kingdom, through India, Singapore, and Malaysia, to Australia and New Zealand, had somehow failed the people of Sri Lanka. It was replaced not because the people of Sri Lanka cried out aloud nostalgically for a return to some form of monarchical rule.

It was replaced because that was the wish and desire of one senior political leader who probably sincerely believed that that was the best form of government for our country. However, from 1966, during the next seven years, Mr. J.R. Jayewardene failed to convince his party leader, Mr. Dudley Senanayake, of his strong belief that an Executive President chosen directly by the people, seated in power for a fixed number of years, and not subject to the whims and fancies of an elected legislature, was what the country required.

He also proposed an electoral system where there were no electorates; where each political party presented a list of candidates; where the voter voted for the party; and the legislators were chosen from that list, the number depending on the votes cast for each party. He predicted that that system would enable the best equipped men and women in the country to take part in our political life. Little did he know that 50 years later the “best equipped men and women” would include 90 parliamentarians who had not even attempted to sit the GCE “O” Levels. Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake did not support this proposal; nor did the UNP Working Committee.

At the general election of July 1977, when he led his party to an unprecedented five-sixth majority in the National State Assembly (NSA), Prime Minister Jayewardena was able to fulfil his dream project. In October of that year, a Bill to amend the Constitution, certified by his Cabinet as being “urgent in the national interest”, which sought to transfer all the executive powers of the Prime Minister to the President, and for the incumbent Prime Minister to be deemed the first nationally elected President, was passed by the NSA. On February 4, 1978, that constitutional amendment was brought into force, and Mr. Jayewardene was sworn-in on Galle Face Green as the first Executive President of Sri Lanka.

Meanwhile, a Select Committee of the NSA was established to consider the revision of the 1972 Constitution. At the concluding stages of that Committee, the Government tabled a wholly new draft constitution, the author of which was not disclosed. On August 31, 1978, with the TULF and the SLFP walking out, and with none voting against, the NSA enacted the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. On September 8, 1978, the new Constitution was brought into operation, and the 168 members of the NSA were deemed to have been elected as Members of the new Parliament that was established.

Parliamentary Majority Essential

The 1978 Constitution, under which the President was the source of all power and patronage and was beyond the reach of the law and the judiciary, was a Constitution of Mr Jayewardene, by Mr. Jayewardene, for Mr Jayewardene. Dr Colvin R. de Silva’s prescient plea that he should not bequeath it to his successors, was ignored. The success of his project, however, was entirely dependent on one essential factor – that the President elected by the people was supported by a clear majority in the Parliament elected by the people.

I attended a few meetings of the select committee as an adviser to Mrs Bandaranaike and Mr Maithripala Senanayake, since neither of them was a lawyer. At one of the meetings, I had occasion to ask Mr Jayewardene what the position would be if a political party opposed to the President secured a majority in Parliament. He thought that would be unlikely during his term of office, but if that were to happen, he said he would take a step back and be a constitutional Head of State. He, of course, ensured that that did not happen during his presidency by securing an extension of the life of Parliament for a further six-year term through an amendment of the Constitution, a rigged referendum, and through many other devices such as obtaining undated letters of resignation, maintaining secret files on the financial and other activities of his Ministers, and by imposing civic disabilities on his political opponents.

His successors, however, were either not so fortunate, or did not possess his political acumen. In August 1994, UNP President Wijetunge, faced with a Parliament in which the United Front had a majority, chose to take a step back to spend the last three months of his term as a constitutional Head of State. In 2001, President Kumaratunge, faced with a Parliament controlled by the UNP, chose “cohabitation” for a while, and then used her presidential powers to dissolve Parliament prematurely, having previously assured the Speaker that she would never do that while a political party other than her own commanded a working majority. In the next 10 years, both she and President Rajapaksa regularly lured Members of the Opposition to secure the majority which they required, using methods that should have alerted any self-respecting Bribery Commissioner and kept him awake at night.

One does not need to be reminded of the shambolic relationship that prevailed between the President and the Prime Minister in the “Yahapalana” government; nor of the inconceivable situation today where the President is compelled to function with a Cabinet of Ministers and a parliamentary majority politically opposed to him.

A Political Consensus Exists

For over 30 years, every major political party has pledged to restore the parliamentary executive form of government. For that purpose, every major political party has supported the election of the President by Parliament (or other representative body).

In 2000, President Chandrika Kumaratunge, as head of the SLFP government presented a draft Constitution which provided for the President and two Vice-Presidents (the latter drawn from ethnic communities different to that of the President) to be elected by Parliament.

In 2013, the Ranil Wickremesinghe-led UNP published the text of the principles upon which a new Constitution would be formulated after it forms a government. Among them was that the Executive Presidency would be abolished.

In 2015, President Sirisena stood before the casket bearing the remains of the late Rev. Maduluwawe Sobitha and, with his head bowed, swore an oath that he would ensure that all remnants of executive power would be removed from the office of the President of the Republic.

In 2018, a panel of experts appointed by the UNP/SLFP Yahapalana Government led by President Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe prepared and published a draft Constitution which required the President to be elected by Parliament and to exercise many of his/her powers on advice.

In 2018, the JVP headed by Anura Kumara Dissanayake, presented a Bill to amend the Constitution to enable the non-executive President to be elected by Parliament.

In 2021, the SJB led by Sajith Premadasa proposed an amendment to the Constitution to enable a non-executive President to be elected by Parliament.

A Referendum Is Not Required

The 1978 constitution introduced for the first time into the Sri Lankan constitutional process the concept of a referendum. In the tradition of the Greek city states, actual decision-making was being restored to the people. The articles of the constitution which Parliament may not amend without approval at a referendum are regarded as the fundamental elements of the State and are explicitly set out in Article 83. They are: its name (art. 1), its unitary character (art.2), the inalienability of the people’s sovereignty (art.3), its national flag (art.6), its national anthem (art.7), its national day (art.8), the foremost place accorded to Buddhism (art.9), the freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art.10), the prohibition of torture (art.11), any extension of the term of office of the President (art.30), and any extension of the life of Parliament (art.62).

The introduction of a referendum appears to have been intended as a means of ensuring that these fundamental elements would ordinarily remain unaltered. In that regard, the Constitution has distinguished the principle from its implementation. For example, while the life of Parliament or the term of office of the President cannot be extended without approval at a referendum, any reduction of the life or term can be achieved by an amendment passed in Parliament. Similarly, while the concept of the people’s sovereignty is unalterable (thus preventing its alienation to a monarch, a military officer or to a particular community), the manner of its exercise is left to be determined by Parliament. Thus, a requirement that the executive power of the people be exercised by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister is an amendment capable of being made by Parliament by a two-thirds majority without reference to a referendum, as was held by the Supreme Court in 2015.

Unfortunately, the decision of the Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Sripavan and Justices Ekanayake and Dep) on the 19th Amendment which enabled Parliament to amend the Constitution to require the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister in respect of several matters, has not been followed in subsequent determinations. For example, the proposal made in 2019 by the JVP that the impending election to the office of the then non-executive Presidency be by a majority vote in Parliament was rejected by the Supreme Court. Justice De Abrew held that that would violate Article 4, and that any amendment of Article 4 requires approval by the people at a referendum. Article 4 is not an entrenched provision specified in Article 83. He also ignored the fact that Article 40 of the Constitution already provided for Parliament to elect the President in certain circumstances.

Replacement of List-System with Constituencies

The election of members of parliament from 25 District lists, based on proportional representation, was introduced by Mr. J.R. Jayewardene as an integral element in the presidential executive system of governance. Since each District encompassed several former constituencies, the expenditure involved in campaigning in such a large extent of territory, and the need to raise money for that purpose from various sources, inevitably on a quid pro quo basis, has been identified as one of the principal factors leading to corruption. The return to the single-member/multi-member constituencies, combined with a system of proportional representation to ensure that unrepresented interests are adequately represented, ought to be an essential adjunct to a parliamentary executive system of governance.



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Features

From the missing to the missing truth and beyond

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A file photo of Foreign Minister Vijitha Heath addressing the UNHRC.

by Jehan Perera

The government is preparing to meet the challenge of the UN Human Rights Council next month. A Sri Lankan delegation led by Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath is expected to attend the 63rd session of the UNHRC in Geneva, where the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights will present a written update on Sri Lanka. The government has already submitted its response to the advance version of the report prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Foreign Minister, accompanied by officials from Colombo and Sri Lanka’s Permanent Mission in Geneva, is expected to explain the progress made on reconciliation, accountability and human rights. This is therefore an important moment for the government. It is an opportunity not merely to defend its record but to make new commitments.

The government has been criticised, as were its predecessors, for the manner in which it has dealt with past human rights violations, especially those connected with the thirty year war. The vexed issue of thousands of missing persons remains at the centre of this criticism. The government has sought to strengthen the Office on Missing Persons by providing it with additional staff and resources. It has also given support to the excavations at the Chemmani mass grave. Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara has told Parliament that the government has allocated Rs. 57 million for the excavations and related legal work, though that figure has not been set against the cost of comparable forensic operations elsewhere.

The government also took the significant step of holding a national event in Jaffna to mark the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Minister Harshana Nanayakkara attended the event together with the Chairman of the Office on Missing Persons (OMP), Mahesh Katulanda, and other senior officials and political representatives. Their presence was meant to demonstrate the government’s commitment to addressing the issue. But on the victims’ side there is continuing dissatisfaction. The commemoration in Jaffna was met by a protest outside the District Secretariat, organised by families of the disappeared, who demanded to know what happened to relatives who, according to their accounts, surrendered to or were taken away by the military and were never heard from again.

Jaffna Protests

The protests in Jaffna are a reminder of the gap that remains between what the government is trying to do and what the victims expect. For these families, compensation and death certificates are not substitutes for knowing what actually happened to those they lost. The protests, and the police action taken against some of those who demonstrated, were reported by the international and Tamil media and by international human rights organisations, and overshadowed much of what the government had hoped to showcase at the Jaffna event. The OMP’s mandate is to establish the fate and whereabouts of missing persons, clarify the circumstances in which they went missing, and provide redress and assistance to their families. Accordingly, it has sought to verify complaints, remove duplicate entries, encourage people who have not yet made complaints to come forward, and facilitate compensation and other forms of assistance. The families of victims expect the OMP to do more to clarify the circumstances in which their loved ones went missing. An example would be the disappearance of 158 displaced Tamil persons from the Eastern University campus in Vantharumoolai, Batticaloa District, who were rounded up and forcibly removed in front of thousands of other similarly displaced persons, including the officer in charge Prof T Jayasingam.

The government has also increased the support available to families of the missing, and says it is accelerating the OMP’s investigations. But the scale of what remains undone is stark. There are around 11,000 complaints remaining to be investigated, according to the Justice Minister, while the OMP has reported that final information has been established in only 31 cases, communicated privately to the families concerned. On the government’s own figures, that puts the clearance rate for establishing fate and whereabouts at well under one percent of the outstanding caseload. There is a limit to what the OMP can do even with more resources and time. Its mandate is primarily to establish the fate and whereabouts of individual missing persons. It was not intended to produce the comprehensive, public account of the past that victims and the country as a whole require.

In 2015, the government headed by President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe committed itself to establishing such a commission as part of a comprehensive approach to dealing with Sri Lanka’s past. Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1, which the government co-sponsored, specifically welcomed the proposed establishment of a “commission for truth, justice, reconciliation and non-recurrence”, together with an Office on Missing Persons and an Office for Reparations. However, the commitment to a truth-seeking mechanism was never fulfilled. The government should consider setting one up now. There is a growing feeling among Tamil people in the North and East that the government is failing to deliver on promises that are important to them. On issues important to them, they feel this is once again a Sinhala-dominated government like all the ones that came before.

Establish Truth

For the past two years the government has been concentrating on problems that it deems are important to the country as a whole such as the economy, development, poverty alleviation and corruption and criminality. However, the government needs to demonstrate that national unity means addressing the concerns of all communities, including those whose wounds from the war remain unhealed. Some of its own institutions have begun to act on this. The Office for National Unity and Reconciliation recently staged a drama entitled From Yakaweva to Nandikadal, depicting relationships between people that transcend the destruction caused by war. The drama portrayed the sufferings as well as the prejudices on both sides of the divide, from the Kebithigollewa bus bombing to the final days of the war around the Nandikadal lagoon. Its central message is that without forgiveness there cannot be reconciliation.

Particularly moving was the fact that the actors themselves came from families touched by the violence on both sides. The son of an LTTE Black Tiger leader and the daughter of an Army officer were among those who performed, alongside others who had experienced and survived some of the sites of carnage. The fact that a state institution is taking this message of reconciliation forward is itself a testament to the government’s openness to dealing with the past. A government institution can reach a population far larger than any civil society campaign could reach on its own, simply because the machinery of the state is so much more extensive. It is in this context that the government needs to give serious thought to setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the next step in the truth-seeking process. Special care will need to be taken to ensure that those who are appointed are not only politically non-partisan, but are acceptable to all the communities.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission cannot by itself resolve all the wounds of the past. Nor can it replace criminal investigations or judicial proceedings where these are necessary. But it can provide something that existing institutions cannot provide on their own. This would be a comprehensive national process through which victims can be heard and the truth can be established. The general population needs to understand what happened, so that the country can begin to acknowledge its past without passing it on indefinitely to future generations. The government has already taken several steps. It is supporting the search for the truth at Chemmani. It has begun reaching out to families of the disappeared. Its own institutions are producing messages of reconciliation. But these are still not delivering the results that the victims and their families want. The next step should be to bring these efforts together to begin the journey from the missing to the missing truth, and from there to comprehensive justice.

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The long road to educating Sri Lanka’s Bhikkhunis

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Bhikkunis: Image courtesy Buddhist Society of South Asia

A robe without recognition:

 

by Anushka Kahandagamage

Education is the right of every child. Yet somewhere between childhood and the robe, that right becomes precarious for many Buddhist women in Sri Lanka, threatening not only their social standing, but their fundamental access to learning and the institutional discrimination they face. This piece is not about Buddhist disciplinary rules, which discriminates women, rather about how the state’s refusal to fully recognise bhikkhunis as bhikkhunis quietly determines what they are, and are not, permitted to learn.

Unlike dasasil mathas, who occupy a distinct and unofficial category within Buddhist renunciation, bhikkhunis belong to a formally ordained order recognised within Buddhist monastic tradition itself. Dasa sil mata means ‘ten-precept mother.’ They are women who observe the ten precepts (rather than the fuller Vinaya) and live a renunciant, celibate life, often in robes, but formal ordination has not translated into formal recognition by the state. Even after a Supreme Court ruling affirmed their right to be identified as bhikkhunis on their National Identity Cards, many still do not hold one. This stems from the hesitation of the male-dominated Buddhist hierarchy to recognise these women as part of the Theravada tradition, specifically refusing to validate their higher ordination. The identity card lists her title as Dasa Sil Mata. The ruling exists on paper, but they are still waiting for their identity cards. This is not a small bureaucratic oversight. It is the first link in a longer chain, one that reaches, eventually, into the classroom.

A Name Withheld

In Sri Lanka, there are 827 pirivenas, traditional monastic colleges that have, for centuries, served as the primary institutions of Buddhist education. Of these, only 12 are dedicated to female renunciants at all, and of those 12, just five serve fully ordained nuns specifically. The imbalance is stark on its face: 827 institutions for monks, five for fully ordained nuns. But the discrimination here is not only a matter of numbers, but it is also written into the very language used to name these institutions. Monks’ schools are called pirivena, a term carrying centuries of institutional weight, historical continuity, and state recognition under Sri Lanka’s education laws. Bhikkhunis’ schools, by contrast, are not called pirivenas at all. They are designated Buddha Sravika Meheni Adhyapana Ayathanaya (Institute for the Education of Buddha’s Female Disciples), a separate, parallel term that, however similar in function, withholds from bhikkhuni institutions the same legal and institutional status that the word ‘pirivena’ confers. Since there are ten-precept mothers, the institutes have not given the same name as the pirivena and lack the official as well as social recognition they deserve.

A Pattern a Century in the Making

Following the decline of the Buddhist nun (bhikkhuni) order after the Polonnaruwa period, the first woman to be robed again was ordained in 1905 as a dasasil matha. Although dasasil mathas have long served important religious and societal roles, they have historically lacked access to formal education. Unfortunately, today also, this pattern continuous to exist. Education, in this context, is never just about literacy or dhamma study. It is the currency of religious authority. A bhikkhuni denied equivalent education or educated in an institution the state refuses to name a pirivena, is denied that religious authority. She may know the Tipitaka as well as any monk yet will lack the institutional stamp that would make a lay community trust her reading of it. It was not indifference from the public; it was the accumulated effect of a system that has spent centuries teaching devotees, implicitly, that a woman’s robe does not carry the same weight as a man.

The female renunciants, both dasasil mathas and bhikkunis, although they wear robes, have not been regarded as individuals capable of comprehending or preaching dhamma, simply because they are women. This is most visible in education, the pirivena system, developed historically to train bhikkhus, offered dasasil mathas and bhikkunis no equivalent institutional pathway, no comparable curriculum, certification, or state recognition. This exclusion is notable because it runs counter to Sri Lanka’s broader educational trends, where women have historically outnumbered men in general university enrolment, the gap here is specific to monastic/religious education rather than a reflection of wider societal restrictions on women’s schooling. The country’s National Education Commission Policy has a section on Pirivena education. However, it does not address the education of Buddhist nuns, nor does it mention nuns within the policy. I recently learned that the policy was being reviewed, with a committee appointed by the Ministry of Education, scheduled to begin the review on the 1st of September. This presents an important opportunity to raise the issue of nuns’ education and advocate for its inclusion in the revised policy.

The monks and nuns’ education institutes are funded by the government, which allocates only 5,000–6,000 LKR per student for the entire year. This sum is grossly inadequate to cover even basic institutional needs, accommodation, food, learning materials, and the maintenance of the physical premises, let alone to support any meaningful expansion of the curriculum. With this level of funding, these education institutes are struggling to sustain themselves, and many are forced to rely almost entirely on external support simply to remain operational. This is where the disparity becomes most visible. As female renunciants have historically not been taken seriously, regarded neither as authoritative teachers of dhamma nor as figures worthy of the same reverence extended to their male counterparts, their education centres receive far fewer lay offerings than those for male renunciants. The result is a widening resource gap that mirrors and reinforces the very discrimination that caused it. Underfunded institutions produce fewer well-trained female scholars, which in turn reinforces the perception that female renunciants are less capable, a perception that then justifies continued underinvestment. Without deliberate intervention, either through equitable government allocation or targeted lay support, this cycle is likely to persist rather than resolve on its own.

Sitting Alone at the Bo Tree

I was at Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura, where a few monks sat preaching in the shade of the Bo Tree, each surrounded by small clusters of lay devotees. Nearby, I noticed a few female Buddhist renunciants, though I could not immediately tell whether they were bhikkhunîs or dasasil mathas, since visually, in their robes and demeanour, they appeared indistinguishable to an outside observer. Most of them sat alone, without the small crowds of devotees gathered around the monks nearby. This, too, is not incidental. Because women cannot enter the sâsana through the same pathway to ordination, available to men, many Buddhist female renunciants remain dasasil mathas, a status that carries the appearance of monastic life without its legitamised spiritual standing. They observe the 10 precepts, wear robes, and live in renunciation, yet occupy a lower, unofficial rung in the religious hierarchy, one that grants them neither the ordination lineage nor the institutional recognition given to monks. However, in June last year, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka delivered a landmark majority ruling in SC/FR/218/2013, affirming that fully ordained Buddhist nuns have the fundamental right to use the title ‘Bhikkhuni’ on their National Identity Cards, legally recognising the de facto existence of the Bhikkhuni Sanga.

A Closed Loop

Social discrimination and educational discrimination feed each other in a closed loop. Because bhikkhunis have fewer, less recognised institutions, fewer are formally trained to a standard the public recognises. Because fewer are recognised as authoritative teachers, fewer devotees seek them out or support them. Because they attract fewer devotees, the education institutions of female renunciants remain under-resourced and easy to overlook in state budgets and in popular imagination alike. A dasasil matha or bhikkhuni without an active following also lacks the economic support that following brings, since in Sri Lanka’s monastic economy, devotees are patrons as much as students. The precarity is not only spiritual or bureaucratic; it is material, and it compounds across a lifetime spent in robes.

Until bhikkhunis’ education is named, funded, and recognised on the same terms as that of bhikkhus, this will remain a story not only about missing ID cards or under-resourced schools, but about an education system that continues to decide, quietly and continuously, which students are worth investing in. Education was supposed to be the one place where the women can speak for themselves, instead, for these women, it has become just another place where women have to ask permission to be heard.

(Anushka is a Sociologist who is working on contemporary Buddhist movements. She was formerly attached to the University of Colombo)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

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‘Memories of Milton – Live in Concert’ to enchant Dubai

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Seven Notes: Doing it in Dubai

Sri Lankan music knows no borders. Wherever our people go, our melodies follow — and our musicians make sure of it.

From Qatar’s Exit, to Melbourne’s EBONY, to Toronto’s Ceymphony, and Dubai’s Seven Notes, Sri Lankan bands abroad continue to keep the community connected to home, through song.

In July, Rajiv Sebastian set the Dubai stage alight with the band Seven Notes, creating an unforgettable night for Sri Lankans in the UAE. And the live-wire behind that magic? Niluk Uswaththa of Seven Notes.

Well, Niluk says he isn’t stopping there.

Now, Dubai is preparing for something truly special — ‘Memories of Milton – Live in Concert’, a grand musical tribute to one of Sri Lanka’s most beloved voices: Milton Mallawarachchi.

For more than a decade, Milton Mallawarachchi was a trending force in Sri Lankan music. With nearly 850 songs and over 35 albums to his name, he gave us melodies that became the soundtrack to our lives — songs of love, longing, and life itself.

On Saturday, 26th September 2026, from 8:00 PM to 3:00 AM, the Mercure Hotel, Al Barsha Heights, Dubai, will transform into a space of nostalgia.

Ranil Mallawarachchi; Carrying forward his father’s legacy / Yenuli Neriah

With the spotlight on Ranil Mallawarachchi — Milton’s eldest son, carrying forward his father’s legacy — along with Yenuli Neriah and Tharaka, the evening will certainly bring Milton’s timeless classics back to life … on one stage.

Seven Notes will do the needful, providing the live music that made Dubai dance before.

According to Niluk, this isn’t just a concert.

“It’s designed as a nostalgic musical journey — to bring cherished memories and beloved songs back to life,” he says.

And he promises: 26th September will be a night to remember.

In fact, Niluk Uswaththa has become a driving force for Sri Lankan entertainment in Dubai.

Through Seven Notes, he ensures the community always has something special to look forward to — especially when it comes to music that feels like home.

The success of these overseas shows naturally raises one big question back in Sri Lanka.

Yes, music lovers, in Sri Lanka, are keen to know whether the Seven Notes band will pop up in Colombo, sometime soon, for a live performance?

Music lovers, island-wide, will be watching … and waiting!

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