By Chandre Dharmawardana
chandre.dharma@yahoo.ca)

(Continued from 22 Sept. 2026)
Other well-recognised fault lines

In discussing Sri Lanka’s political trajectory since 1948, many writers relish a narrative where its current impasse and its ethnic conflict are traced back to the “curse of partisan politics” (e.g., This curse of partisan politics in Sri Lanka, Island 2026/09/4, by Brig. Ranjan de Silva [10]). A more sophisticated narrative is based on the negative impact of Sinhala Only nationalist policies introduced by SWRD Bandaranaike after defeating the pro-business UNP in 1956. In fact, many social scientists (e.g., H. L. Seneviratne [11]) have analysed Sri Lanka’s post-Independence trajectory in dystopian terms within this paradigm equated to the negative impact of a majoritarian “Sinhala-Buddhist-dominance” politics.

H. L. Seneviratne explicitly positions the 1956 election of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and the subsequent “Sinhala Only” Act as the foundational missteps that set Sri Lanka on a tragic path. He argues that this political turn institutionalised majoritarian chauvinism to secure electoral victories. Seneviratne analyses the post-1956 era in stark, structural terms. He argues that by allowing Buddhist monks (the Sangha) to morph from spiritual renunciates into a highly politicised, corporate pressure group, the state birthed a toxic political culture. In his evaluation, this “New Buddhism” fostered ethnic polarisation, institutionalised corruption, and ultimately laid the structural groundwork for the devastating Sri Lankan Civil War.

These authors have claimed that the increasingly jingoistic policies of many politicians of the majority community, as well as the ultra-nationalist politics of the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) established in 1949 dictated an irrevocable path to armed conflict that sapped Sri Lanka for over three decades. Majoritarian “Sinhala-Buddhist domination” is frequently cited by Tamil opinion writers as a major cause hindering Sri Lanka. In contrast, Sinhalese opinion writers point to the “excessive” set of demands of the 12% Tamil minority that began with their rejection of the Donoughmore constitution and the Eelamist demands for an exclusive Tamil homeland that grew out of the political platform of the ITAK.

The 1972 republican constitution of the SLFP-LSSP government became a pivotal juncture when the Tamil youth, inflamed by the violent propaganda, e.g., the poetry of Kasi Anathan, firmly embraced militant separatism. This was finally ratified by the Vaddukkodai resolution of 1976 crafted by the Tamil United liberation Front (TULF). Kasi Anandan had called for physical elimination of “thurogi” (traitors) who sought federalism or any form of power sharing with the majority. By then, several of the moderate Tamil leaders who had been named by Kasi Anandan had been assassinated. The TULF leaders were themselves assassinated and Tamil politics was hijacked by violent youth groups. The LTTE emerged out of the blood bath within the Tamil community to confront the Sri Lankan state militarily until the LTTE’s demise in 2009.

Historians, like K. M. de Silva, have characterised the Tamils as a minority who behave like a majority, while the Sinhalese are a majority who have behaved like a minority always fearful that the Tamil minority and Tamil-Nadu Tamils would act together and prevail against them.

However, both inter-Ethnic violence as well as intra-ethnic violence are fueled by the availability of discontented youth populations. Currently, Sri Lanka’s youth population has probably fallen below threshold for driving social upheavals, as Sri Lanka is now in demographic contraction. However, given the widening rich-poor gap, the residual youth populations still have the potential to spawn urban terrorist cells that can have an impact far beyond their numerical strengths.

Malaysia provides a strong counterexample to the type of social analysis presented by H. L. Seneviratne and others who argue that demotion of English and majoritarian jingoist politics were the key factors that have weighed in on Sri Lanka’s post-independence performance.

Malaysia emerged from British Malaya and by 1970 adopted Malay as the only official language. It demoted English completely, and made no room for the use of Chinese, the language of the 30% minority. Furthermore, Malaysia openly and unabashedly adopted a policy of discriminating in favour of Malay ethnics (60% of the population) who were named “Bhumiputra” (sons of the soil) with special rights and privileges in an Islamic hegemonic society. Unlike in Sri Lanka (where the leaders at least affirmed equality for all, or the wish to create just societies), Malaysia adopted an unapologetically chauvinist political programme.

In strong contrast to the political programme launched by elite leaders of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Chinese minority, basing on its previous experience of violence faced by them, followed a non-violent approach, ostensibly cooperating with the Malays, but concentrating on achieving hegemony in the mercantile and professional sectors.

Another factor that worked in favour of Malaysia was the absence of a significant Marxist political movement that could have deterred foreign investment or spawned nationalisation of successful private assets. Massive tax breaks and guarantees of labour stability enabled Malaysia to attract industrial giants such as Mitsubishi, Intel, HP, Texas Instruments etc., into its free-trade zones in the 1970s. At that time Sri Lanka was busy nationalising its tea plantations, driving out experienced managers to other countries such as South Africa and looking at foreign investors with a Marxist lens. Meanwhile, in Malaysia, majority and minority ethnic groups worked together in spite of political and linguistic discrimination, and today the average income of a Malaysian citizen is approximately five times that of a citizen of Sri Lanka.

A fragile facade

The Central Bank’s upbeat figures and the upgrade to middle-income status provide a vital psychological boost, but they reflect a temporary stabilisation rather than permanent structural health. A country cannot genuinely move into “safe waters” when its corporate elite is exporting capital, its professional class is fleeing overseas, and its remaining domestic population is rapidly aging.

Without aggressive structural reforms aimed at curbing trade mis-invoicing, incentivising talent retention, and preparing the economy for an aging workforce, the current economic growth will remain a fragile facade. If these three dystopian factors are left unaddressed, they will inevitably intersect, trigger a collapse in productivity, and rapidly destabilise Sri Lanka’s hard-won recovery. The leaders of the country, as well as the populace, irrespective of their political hue, have not appreciated the overarching importance of the three fault lines that we have described. They are enjoying the theatre of political arrests, jingoist exchanges and conspiracy theories even while their very firmament is trembling. The two ethnic groups that have fought each other will find that their communities face extinction because their TFR has dropped way below the 2.1 children per female that is needed to sustain their populations.

References & citations

[1] Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL). (2026). Macroeconomic Developments and Estimates for First/Second Quarters 2026. Colombo: CBSL; and Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL). (2026). Special Probes Report on Telegraphic Transfers and Fictitious Capital Outflows. Colombo: Financial Intelligence Unit.

[2] Global Financial Integrity (GFI). (2024). Trade Misinvoicing and Illicit Financial Flows in Developing Nations: A Focus on South Asia. Washington, D.C.: GFI; Global Financial Integrity (GFI). (2026). Trade-Related Illicit Financial Flows in Developing Asia (2013–2022). Washington, D.C.: GFI.

[3] National Chamber of Exporters of Sri Lanka (NCE). (2025). Annual Review on Export Sector Diversification and Off-Shoring Capacity. Colombo: NCE.

[4] Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE). (2025). Statistical Handbook on Migration Trends and Professional Brain Drain. Colombo: SLBFE.

[5] Hasini Lecamwasam, “The emptying university: why are academics leaving? (Island, 15th September 2026)

[6] Prof. Amarasiri de Silva, Sri Lanka’s university crisis: Brain drain and union action demand urgent reform (Island, 14th September 2026)

[7] World Bank. (2025). Sri Lanka Development Update: Navigating the Demographic Transition and Economic Recovery. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

[8] De Silva, R., The Demography of Transition in South Asia: Emerging Trends (Colombo University Press, Colombo, 2025).

[9] Haldane, J. B. S., Daedalus; Science and the Future (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1924).

[10] Brig. Ranjan de Silva, This curse of partisan politics in Sri Lanka, Island 2026/09/4

[11] H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka, University of Chicago Press (1999/2000).

by Sasanka Perera
(The writer is on X as @sasmester)

The ongoing controversy surrounding the internal disciplinary proceedings against Reverend Kekirawe Sudassana conducted by senior monks of the ecclesiastical order he belongs to–Sri Lanka Ramanna Nikaya–offers an opportunity to reflect upon dissent and discourse within Sri Lankan Buddhism. The inquiry is the result of a series of complaints made against Reverend Sudassana focused on his public discourses which have been widely shared in social media and other online portals.

As usual, this case too has polarised Buddhists in the public domain. Those in support of Reverend Sudassana see absolutely nothing wrong in what he has done and said. Similarly, those against him in the public domain, see nothing but wrong in all his public utterances and want him taken to task. Between these two extremes, the core meaning of the Buddha’s notion of ehipassiko, which literally means ‘come and see for yourself’, is completely lost.

I have followed some of the public statements and discourses of Reverend Sudassana for a while as part of my interest in popular religion. Much of what he has to say goes against long held beliefs and traditions in Sri Lankan Buddhism. I find his ideas shift between rationalism and noisy rhetoric, both not unusual in different manifestations of Sri Lankan Buddhism. For instance, the much-respected Anagarika Dharmapala was essentially a rationalist who wanted to focus on the dhamma and not on Buddhism’s rituals or even on gods. But this does not mean that Reverend Sudassana can be judged in the same way as Anagarika Dharmapala given the vast variation in historical epochs the two operated in and their different approaches to public discourse.

Reverend Sudassana has often critiqued what he sees as mythology and ritualism in Buddhism. For him, many long-held rituals and beliefs embedded in popular Sri Lankan Buddhist practices are irrational and therefore not acceptable. While to any rational thinking being, there is no contention here, one must concede that it is mythology and rituals that hold any core set of philosophical ideas such as the dhamma together as a religion. It is through these practices that religion as a matter of faith emerges from abstract ideas. This is common to any religion. It is through these practices that Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism or Islam become religion as opposed to other philosophical ideas such as Plato’s and Socrates’ discourses or more recent trends in post-modern thinking, which do not constitute religion.

So, when Reverend Sudassana critiques and dismisses something so central to religion as belief and ritual as irrational, he needs to offer an alternative that would hold religion’s core ideas together. That, in my view, cannot be done by philosophy, the dhamma in the abstract sense or rationality as it is commonly understood today.

But when Reverend Sudassana argues against the over-commercialised merit-making practices, such as elaborate and very expensive pujas and certain customs that divert lay people from the Buddha’s pragmatic, core philosophical teachings, then, we have to pay serious attention to what he has to say. It is this kind of merit-making that I wrote about in 1995 with the use of the concept ‘grandiose religiosity’ that I coined to refer to expensive rituals and offering of alms.

Reverend Sudassana also stepped into the social minefield when he questioned the ordination of children at a very young age, inviting society to reflect on whether a child is mature enough to make a lifelong commitment to monasticism. He is not the first one to ask this question. Earlier critics include Gananath Obeyesekere and many others. This is an extremely important area that deserves the serious attention of citizens. Related to the same issue, Reverend Sudassana has also openly spoken out against child abuse within monastic environments, a topic that has traditionally been treated with strict institutional silence even through this has gained more traction as a public topic recently, at least in social media

Reverend Sudassana, through online commentaries has frequently targeted contemporary preaching styles of many Buddhist monks, explicitly calling out senior and popular monks who in his opinion perform ‘entertainment-driven’ or emotionally manipulative sermons (such as weeping while preaching) rather than focusing on true dhamma. Given the advent of what we may call ‘tele-monk’s or ‘online monks’, Reverend Sudassana’s criticism cannot be faulted if the comparison is only with the traditional preaching style of Buddhist monks. However, if this is the point of departure, then, Reverend Sudassana’s often combative style of discourse can also be critiqued in the same way. The issue in public discourse should be based on what preachers actually say and to what extent they take listeners closer to the dhamma or not. But often, such a reflective examination of dhamma content does not take place.

In certain ways, Reverend Sudassana has attempted to introduce a more rational interpretation of the Buddha as a historical figure and subsequent Buddhist history. From a historiographical point of view, this makes sense. The problem is, there is a vast variation between history as a formal academic discourse and belief in the past in terms of both perceived history and the past lives of well-known people. In the latter, there is not much space for rational reflection. That is why it is part of faith and not historiography. However, by trying to do this and attempting to separate what he views as historical fact from ‘literary or cultural interpretation’, Reverend Sudassana has drawn fierce opposition from orthodox factions of institutional Buddhism as well as many ordinary people who view his arguments as an attack on sacred text and tradition. What does all this mean? It is in answering this question that we need to reflect on the ancient Pali term, ehipassiko –‘come and see for yourself.’ In discursive terms, it is thought to be an open invitation by the Buddha himself to explore what he has preached rather than a demand for blind faith. The idea represented by ehipassiko is one of the six core qualities of dhamma in so far as the Theravada practice is concerned. the other five qualities include, svākkhāto (well-expounded by the Buddha), sandiṭṭhiko (directly visible or apparent right now), akāliko (timeless conditions, the results of which will be apparent when one practices), opaneyyiko (leading onwards to be applied within oneself) and paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhī (to be personally known and realised by the wise).

Of these, ehipassiko is the most open invitation for reflection, which in my opinion goes very well with the Kalama Sutra or the Buddha’s charter of free inquiry. If Reverend Sudassana was motivated by ehipassiko and Kalama Sutra in his public discourses, he may have come closer to Buddhist ideals when it comes to Buddhism’s sympathies with freedom of inquiry. But at the same time, he has also moved considerably away from common sense dictating what is possible and what is not possible within the context in which he operates. First, complete rationalisation of Buddhist practice within an idiom of post-Enlightenment sense of rationalism is both not possible and dangerous. This applies to all religions. If this is done, then, faith will have to become mere philosophical reflection, thereby undermining what religion over time everywhere has done for humanity.

Second, what is actually possible to critique within the structures he is operating from (including his nikaya affiliations) needs to be clearly understood. What I can say as a scholar based on my research and reflection, are things a monk cannot say beyond a point as long as he is a monk. This common sense needs to be clearly understood if one is interested in reforming institutionalised Buddhism. It is in this area that many of the formal complaints against Reverend Sudassana have been made in the ongoing inquiry. There are numerous seriously problematic areas in his commentaries. These include claiming that the idea of karma is a myth and that rebirth is false. These are such core beliefs in Buddhism. One cannot critique them without disrupting the overall structure of the faith. But one can remain an unbeliever by virtue of personal choice but not make such opinions matters of public discourse. He has also claimed that specific powers such as the ability to read others’ minds, attributed to the Buddha are fictional. Again, beyond matters of rationality and within a discourse of faith, these things cannot be questioned in Buddhism in the same way they also cannot be in any other structure of belief. Reverend Sudassana has also been accused of providing problematic interpretations to long held positions espoused in the sutras and for claiming that that the Mahayana abhidhamma is superior to the Theravada version and so on. While the latter may be open to interpretation, Reverend Sudassana so far has not established that his grasp of the dhamma is adequate to offer such critical reinterpretations.

Third, endless combativeness is counterproductive if the aim is reform. It is much better to pick one’s battles on a rational basis rather than having a noisy opinion on everything under the sun. For instance, if Reverend Sudassana has issues with some of the less rational aspects of Buddhism like the Jataka stories, rebirth, specific rituals and so on, the better option is to underemphasise them in his sermons and public statements and replace them with life experiences of contemporary or historical times so that people understand the specifics of the dhamma being explained.

As for his more violent detractors on social media, my suggestion is to let the logic of ehipassiko come into play the way it was intended. Verbal violence, threats or ill-will have no space in Buddhism or in any decent society. If Reverend Sudassana’s discourses have negatively impacted disciplinary positions of his nikaya, I hope, they will be resolved through the kind of inquiry that is ongoing and even more importantly through broader reflection. But the senior monks in Sri Lanka Ramanna Nikaya must also reflect on why a discursive disagreement has generated this much internal reflection and interest leading to a formal inquiry at a time when very serious and continuous disciplinary and ethical violations by many monks, which are also now part of the public discourse, have not received the same attention.

By Lynn Ockersz

Educated youngsters without work –

This is a most explosive mix,

That’s having the South in its grip,

And the fabled ‘Pearl Isle, we are told,

Is on top of this list of the Angst-hit;

All signs that the curtain could be lifting,

On the Isle’s own Cockroach-style rage.