Midweek Review

A Special Forces officer’s narrative

Published

2 years ago

2024/04/24

Gajaba Regiment Headquarters, Saliyapura, bids farewell to Maj. Gen. Dhammi Hewage in 2022 (pic courtesy Army)

‘Deperamunaka Satan’ dealt with several issues that hadn’t been addressed by ex-military men who shared their experiences before Maj. Gen. Dhammi Hewage launched his controversial memoirs seven months ago. The chapter on wartime recruitment underscored the importance of sustained process and the readiness on the part of the Army to inspire youth and the unprecedented impact made by entrepreneur Dilith Jayaweera, one of the presidential aspirants now, to help the armed forces to recruit required personnel. Jayaweera, who had been a classmate of Hewage at St Aloysius, Galle, in fact for the first time met the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa with the intervention of late Bandula Jayasekera, the then Editor of the Daily News. That meeting led to a massive Triad-led advertising campaign that achieved the unthinkable. Hewage’s narrative is a must read for those interested in the Eelam conflict.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Fighting was raging in the Vanni in 2008. The 57 Division, tasked to regain Kilinochchi, was facing stiff resistance, while Task Force 1 (TF1) battled the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) units at a higher pace, on a wider front, also in the Vanni west, particularly in the formidable Madhu jungle terrain, which prompted some armchair experts in Colombo to predict that the Army would not come out of it in one piece.

One sarcastic scribe from another newspaper even went to the extent of claiming that the Army would be swallowed up by the LTTE in those jungles.

When Rohan Abeywardena, now with The Island, on behalf of The Sunday Times, raised that possibility, with the Task Force 1 that was still based in the Mannar Rice Bowl region, Major Harendra Ranasinghe of the Special Forces, at his makeshift field office, declared they had prepared well for jungle warfare and were ready as never before. Despite so many naysayers in Colombo they truly proved their mettle in next to no time. Ranasinghe later retired as a Major General without any fanfare.

The Army faced severe shortage of officers and men as fighting Divisions slowly but steadily advanced towards enemy strongholds along numerous thrusts as never before.

The LTTE gradually retreated towards Vanni east but posed quite a formidable threat. Both Pooneryn and Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi section of the Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road remained under its control.

Regardless of stepped-up recruitment, the Army lacked sufficient troops to hold areas that were brought back under government control. Growing casualties further increased the pressure on the fighting Divisions.

Then Major Dhammi Hewage, stationed at Volunteer Force headquarters, Battaramulla, having received an order from Army headquarters, reported to Vanni Security Forces headquarters where he was directed to 611 Brigade. Major Hewage was given the unenviable task of protecting the 15 km Main Supply Route (MSR) from Kalmadu junction to Kirisuddan.

In the absence of fighting troops, the bold officer was assigned medically downgraded personnel. There hadn’t been a single combat ready soldier under Major Hewage’s command and of them approximately 80 percent openly dissented and challenged the Army headquarters’ move.

But the then Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s Army was not inclined to tolerate dissent. Having served the Army for just over 35 years, Hewage retired as a Major General in August 2022 in the wake of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster. At the inception of the then Second Lieutenant Hewage’s somewhat controversial military career, he had first served under the then Lieutenant Colonel Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who functioned as the Military Coordinating Officer, Matale district (May 1989-January 1990).

Hewage launched his memoirs ‘Deperamunaka Satan’ (Battles on Two Fronts) in September last year, a couple of months before Gotabaya Rajapaksa published ‘The Conspiracy to Oust Me from Presidency’, the latter however was far more blunt and dealt with the failure on the part of the military and police to protect their constitutionally elected government.

‘Deperamunaka Satan’

is certainly an immensely readable and hugely stimulating memoir of an officer, who had served the elite Special Forces after being moved from the celebrated Gajaba Regiment to the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The author quite easily captured the attention of the reader as he described his meeting with then Lieutenant Shavendra Silva at Saliyapura, Anuradhapura, where he was told of an opportunity to join the RDF.

Having passed out as a Second Lieutenant, in late June 1989, Hewage had been in command of a platoon of the first battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (IGR) deployed on a hill top near Ovilikanda.

On a specific directive of Lt. Col. Rajapaksa, the then Commanding Officer of 1GR, Hewage’s platoon comprising 25 personnel had been deployed there to provide protection to workers of a private firm hired to build four new power pylons to replace those destroyed by the then proscribed Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna (JVP).

It would be pertinent to mention that President Ranasinghe Premadasa, having entered into a clandestine deal with the LTTE, provided arms, ammunition and funds to the group. The LTTE caused quite significant losses on the Indian Peace Keeping Force no sooner they were deployed here under the controversial Indo-Lanka Accord that was forced on us by New Delhi, during the July 1987 and March 1990 period. The Premadasa-Prabhakaran ‘honeymoon,’ however, only lasted for about 14 months, when the LTTE turned its guns against the Premadasa government that nurtured it unwisely hoping that the Tigers would change with proper incentives. The LTTE resumed the war in June 1990, after India withdrew its Army in March 1990 at the request of President Premadasa.

If not for my colleague Harischandra Gunaratne’s offer of ‘Deperamunaka Satan’, the writer could have missed it though Captain Wasantha Jayaweera, also of the Special Forces, alerted me to the launch of the retired Maj. General’s work late last year. Incidentally, Jayaweera, had been quoted in the heart-breaking chapter that dealt with the catastrophic heli-borne landing, death of Special Forces pioneer Colonel Aslam Fazly Laphir and the humiliating fall of the isolated Mullaithivu Army Camp in July 1996 during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President. Mullaithivu had been the home to the Army’s 25 Brigade. That loss sent shock waves through the defence establishment but, four years later, the LTTE delivered a massive blow to the Army when a Division plus troops couldn’t thwart the LTTE offensive directed at Elephant Pass.

An unprecedented ‘hit’

One of the most intriguing episodes dealt with Maj. Hewage led an attack on an LTTE group positioned in the jungles off Pompemadu without knowing their identity.

In the absence of a suitable contingent of troops for immediate deployment, Hewage had led a group of disabled men through the jungles to take on the LTTE after another patrol consisting of medically downgraded men spotted the enemy but refrained from engaging them.

Why did Hewage risk his life and the precious lives of medically condemned (categorized) men under his command? What did he really expect to achieve in such circumstances? Or was he trying to prove a point to some of his seniors or just acted recklessly on the spur-of-the-moment?

At one point they stopped firing fearing the group under fire by them were either Special Forces or Commandos. But, a shouted question and response in Tamil prompted them to fire everything they had until the group was eliminated.

The ragtag group of soldiers, led by Hewage, after the successful firefight, found four Tiger bodies along with a whole lot of equipment, including a satellite phone and two Global Positioning Systems, that led the Division Commander, then Brigadier Piyal Wickremaratne, to declare that the vanquished enemy unit were members of the LTTE Long Range Patrol.

Hewage’s response to Brig. Wickremaratne’s heartless query as to why bodies of LTTE LRP hadn’t been brought to his base and the circumstances Division Commander’s directive to recover them was not carried out, captured the imagination of the readers.

Interception of enemy communications, within 24 hours after the ‘hit’ off Pompemadu, revealed that the ‘neutralized’ LRP had been tasked with moving some Black Tiger suicide cadres, suicide jackets and other equipment from Puthukudirippu to Anuradhapura, having crossed the Kandy-Jaffna road. The Army ascertained that the LRP had been on its way back to Puthukudirippu after having safely moved a Black Tiger group to Anuradhapura.

There couldn’t have been a similar ‘hit’ during the entire war. Unfortunately, for want of follow up action to highlight the success of his men under trying circumstances, on the part of Hewage, the disabled men were denied an opportunity to receive at least the distinguished RWP (Ranawickrema Padakkama) award.

Hewage’s perspective is important. His narrative is not ordinary or simply a case of blowing his own trumpet, but a genuine bid to present an untold story that may not be to the liking of some of his seniors or of those on the same level.

But, Hewage’s is an inspiring story, especially at a time the military earned severe criticism of some due to shortcomings of a few in higher places. The social media onslaught on selected officers, both serving and retired, has worsened the situation. The devastating allegations by former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, himself an ex-frontline combat veteran, that the Army failed in its responsibility to protect the elected President made an already bad situation far worse and intolerable.

From Maduru Oya to Kalawanchikudi

Having undergone, perhaps, the toughest training available at that time for elite fighting men at Maduru Oya where Counter Revolutionary Warfare Wing (CRW Wing) is situated, Hewage had been one of the 16 officers to pass out without a parade. All 16 officers who had been there, at the beginning of the training, were fortunate to pass out after the grueling course, though of 483 other rankers, who underwent training at the same time, only 181 were able to complete it.

Of Hewage’s Gajaba contingent (1 officer/30 other rankers) that had been sent for the training, only he and three others, including Lance Corporal Chandrapala, lasted the training period that comprised basic and advance training.

There had been peace in the Northern and Eastern Provinces at that time as President Premadasa played pandu with the LTTE. The group that included Hewage passed out from Maduru Oya during peace time and perhaps seemed to have been unaware of the resumption of the Eelam War with far bolder Tigers ranged against them after having given a bloody nose to the IPKF. However, the then Major Jayavi Fernando, who had been a senior instructor at Maduru Oya, warned those undergoing training there the war was coming. One of the key Special Forces pioneers, Fernando issued the warning at the commencement of the training and at the end of it when he declared let us go to hell. That warning was followed up by a serving of tea.

Having joined The Island in early June 1987 as a trainee reporter, this correspondent had an opportunity to cover the conflict in the North and East as well as the second southern savage uprising, perpetrated by the JVP, and an equally or more violent campaign by the forces to put it down. The time Hewage passed out from Maduru Oya had been dicey as President Premadasa, obviously duped by the LTTE, bent backwards to appease them.

On the orders of the President, the then Army Commander Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe (1988-1991) cooperated with the LTTE. The President went to the extent of releasing money to the LTTE, even after the Eelam War II erupted with the disgraceful betrayal of the police and the Army. Fortunately, the Army disregarded the President’s directive. President Premadasa released as much as Rs 125 mn during the 1989/1990 period through the then Treasury Secretary R. Paskaralingham as he remained supremely confident the LTTE could be won over through such strategies. The LTTE proved the President wrong and the consequences, as all of us know, were devastating.

Author Hewage made reference to the formation of the Tamil National Army (TNA) by the Indian government. Although Hewage didn’t touch the issue in detail, that reference should be appreciated as the formation of the TNA should be considered taking into consideration the overall Indian strategy at that time as New Delhi sought to somehow sustain Vartharaja Perumal’s EPRLF-led administration.

Two incidents that would attract the readers were an injury suffered by Hewage while undergoing training at Maduru Oya, where he faced the threat of expulsion, and the death of Second Lieutenant Priyantha Gunawardena, on Nov 17th, 1989, at Kalmunai, during clashes between government forces and the IPKF. The death of Gunawardena caused an immense impact on Hewage, and the colleagues of the dead junior officer, of the 28th Intake, wanted two days leave to attend the funeral. When they sought approval from Maj. Jayavi Fernando, the officer’s no nonsense response must have been received as a warning.

Hewage quoted Fernando, known for his efficient, direct and quite blunt approach whatever the circumstances were, as having told them that the Kalmunai incident was only the beginning. The real war hadn’t even started yet. Gunawardena was the first batch-mate of yours to die. Many more people would die. It would be far more important to complete the course and be ready for the Eelam War II. Once you complete the training you may visit the home of the late colleague. Maj. Jayavi Fernando retired on Oct 31, 1998 during the disastrous Operation ‘Jayasikuru’ (Victory Assured) that was meant to restore Overland MSR from Vavuniya to Elephant Pass. Fernando’s shock retirement caused a severe loss of morale to the Army at a time it was under tremendous pressure not only in the Vanni but in all other theatres as well.

Hewage dealt with the killing of Second Lieutenant Deshapariya also of the Special Forces and his buddy (an assistant assigned to an officer from the time he passes out from the Military Academy) at Galagama where their bodies were set ablaze by the JVP, their deployment at the Engineers’ detachment at Tissamaharama and the sudden appearance of Maj. Laphir of the same detachment on June 13, 1990.

Within 24 hours, they were on their way to Weerwawila where officers, including Maj Laphir, joined the flight to Uhana whereas administrative troops accompanied supplies and other equipment were dispatched overland.

Hewage lovingly recalled how ordinary people waved lion flags to show their support to security forces as they travelled overland from Uhana airport to Ampara against the backdrop of punitive measures taken by the Army against JVP terrorists.

By the time the Army started building up strength the LTTE had massacred several hundred police personnel who had surrendered to them on another foolish directive issued by President Premadasa. Having named the senior officers who had arrived in Ampara to neutralize the LTTE threat, Hewage described the pressure on then Ampara Coordinating Officer then Brig.Rohan de S. Daluwatte was under as he struggled to cope up with the developing scenario.

Hewage gave an extremely good description of the fighting and incidents which involved his unit at a time the Army lacked actual combat experience as there hadn’t been any operations since India compelled Sri Lanka to halt ‘Operation Liberation’ in June 1987 that was meant to clear the Vadamatchchy region in the Jaffna peninsula, which included Velvettiturai, the home town of LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

The Army was suddenly forced to resume both defensive and offensive operations in the aftermath of the massacre of the surrendered police personnel in the East. By the end of 1990, the Army lost control of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road and remained under LTTE control till Dec 2008/January 2009 when Brigadier Shavendra Silva’s celebrated Task Force 1, subsequently named 58 Division, cleared the Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi south stretch and met Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias’s 57 Division at Kilinochchi.

Hewage called the infamous instructions issued from Colombo during Ranasinghe Premadasa’s tenure as the President to all military installations to surrender to the LTTE pending negotiations. In spite of some police stations accepting the directive, other bases refused point blank. Hewage mentioned with pride how the Commanding Officer at Kalawanchikudy detachment Captain Sarath Ambawa defied those instructions and asked personnel at the neighbouring police station not to surrender but to seek protection at his base. A section of the police surrendered to the LTTE against the Captain’s wishes and were executed but 11 policemen ran across open space to reach the Kalawanchikudy Army detachment. One of them, Constable Ukku Banda succumbed to injuries he suffered as a result of LTTE fire.

Negotiations between Maj. Laphir and a local LTTE leader on the partially damaged Kokkadhicholai bridge in a bid to cross it while the then Foreign Minister A.C.S. Hameed was in Jaffna to work out a last minute ceasefire and the first Sia Marchetti attack (witnessed by Hewage) a little distance away from the bridge and later crossing the river under threat of enemy fire make interesting reading.

Trouble within

Hewage shared his first-hand experience in the 1990 Mullaithivu battle, followed by rescuing of troops trapped in Jaffna Fort also in the same year, various smaller operations in the Eastern theatre and an incident in mid-1994 at Maduru Oya where at the conclusion of risky bunker busting drill he caused an injury to private Rajapaksa, unintentionally resulting in severe repercussions.

Hewage discussed how his seniors exploited that incident to harass him though five years later Corporal Rajapakse served as his buddy during his stint in Jaffna as the Commanding Officer of Combat Rider Team.

Regardless of consequences, Hewage had been courageous and reckless to take decisions on his own on the battlefield and his description of wife of a senior officer based at Maduru Oya over her requirement to secure the services of a civilian cook with the Army is hilarious but later the difficulties the author experienced at his new appointment at the Special Forces Regimental Centre, Seeduwa, and the death of Special Forces man in the hands of Military Police investigating the disappearance of two Browning pistols and two Beretta semi-automatic pistols at their Naula camp explained the turmoil within.

Hewage had been harsh on some of his seniors, including Maj. Gen. Gamini Hettiarachchi, widely considered the Father of Special Forces and Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka whom he accused of depriving him of an opportunity to command 10 GR at that time headquartered at Akkarayankulam.

Hewage quoted the then Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka as having told the then Gajaba Regimental Commander Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias he (Hewage) created a problem at Volunteer Force headquarters.

Don’t even make him Grade 1. Declaring that he realized he wouldn’t receive a command appointment as long as the war-winning Army Chief remained in office, Hewage said that he finally took over 9 GR on Sept 09, 2011 when Fonseka was under the custody of the Navy.

Hewage hadn’t minced his words as he boldly presented a controversial narrative, regardless of consequences.

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Related Topics:Gajaba Regiment Headquarters Saliyapura Maj. Gen. Dhammi Hewage

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Midweek Review

2019 Easter Sunday carnage in retrospect

Published

3 days ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

November 21, 2019: President Gotabaya Rajapaksa meets Archbishop of Colombo, His Eminence Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith at the Bishop House where he requested the Church to nominate a representative for the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) probing the Easter Sunday carnage.

Coordinated suicide attacks targeted three churches—St. Anthony’s in Colombo, St. Sebastian’s at Katuwapitiya and Zion Church in Batticaloa—along with popular tourist hotels Shangri-La, Kingsbury, and Cinnamon Grand. No less a person than His Eminence Archbishop of Colombo Rt. Rev. Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith is on record as having said that the carnage could have been averted if the Yahapalana government shared the available Indian intelligence warning with him. Yahapalana Minister Harin Fernando publicly admitted that his family was aware of the impending attack and the warning issued to senior police officers in charge of VVIP/VIP security is evidence that all those who represented Parliament at the time knew of the mass murder plot. Against the backdrop of Indian intelligence warning and our collective failure to act on it, it would be pertinent to ask the Indians whether they knew the Easter Sunday operation was to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the 2019 presidential poll. Perhaps, a key to the Easter Sunday conspiracy is enigma Sara Jasmin (Tamil girl from Batticaloa converted to Islam) whose husband Atchchi Muhammadu Hasthun carried out the attack on St. Sebastian’s Church, Katuwapitiya

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) leader Udaya Gammanpila’s Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema (Searching for the mastermind behind the Easter Sunday attacks) inquired into the 2019 April 21 Easter Sunday carnage. The former Minister and Attorney-at-Law quite confidently argued that the mastermind of the only major post-war attack was Zahran Hashim, one of the two suicide bombers who targeted Shangri-la, Colombo.

Gammanpila launched his painstaking work recently at the Sambuddhathva Jayanthi Mandiraya at Thummulla, with the participation of former Presidents Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had been accused of being the beneficiary of the Easter Sunday carnage at the November 2019 presidential election, and Maithripala Sirisena faulted by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) that probed the heinous crime. Rajapaksa and Sirisena sat next to each other, in the first row, and were among those who received copies of the controversial book.

PCoI, appointed by Sirisena in September, 2019, in the run-up to the presidential election, in its report submitted to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in February, 2020, declared that Sirisena’s failure as the President to act on ‘actionable intelligence’ exceeded mere civil negligence. Having declared criminal liability on the part of Sirisena, the PCoI recommended that the Attorney General consider criminal proceedings against former President Sirisena under any suitable provision in the Penal Code.

PCoI’s Chairman Supreme Court Judge Janak de Silva handed over the final report to President Rajapaksa on February 1, 2021 at the Presidential Secretariat. Gotabaya Rajapaksa received the first and second interim reports on 20 December and on 2 March, 2020, respectively.

The Commission consists of the following commissioners: Justice Janak De Silva (Judge of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Commission), Justice Nissanka Bandula Karunarathna (Judge of the Court of Appeal), Justice Nihal Sunil Rajapakse (Retired Judge of the Court of Appeal), Bandula Kumara Atapattu (Retired Judge of the High Court) and Ms W.M.M.R. Adikari (Retired Ministry Secretary).

H.M.P. Buwaneka Herath functioned as the Secretary to the PCoI.

It would be pertinent to mention that the Archbishop of Colombo Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, declined an opportunity offered by President Rajapaksa to nominate a person for the PCoI. The Church leader asserted such a move would be misconstrued by various interested parties. Both the former President and Archbishop of Colombo confirmed that development soon after the presidential election.

Having declared its faith in the PCoI and received assurance of the new government’s intention to implement its recommendations, the Church was taken aback when the government announced the appointment of a six-member committee, chaired by Minister Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the PCoI and recommend how to proceed. That Committee included Ministers Johnston Fernando, Udaya Gammanpila, Ramesh Pathirana, Prasanna Ranatunga and Rohitha Abeygunawardena.

The Church cannot deny that their position in respect of the Yahapalana government’s pathetic failure to thwart the Easter Sunday carnage greatly influenced the electorate, and the SLPP presidential candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa directly benefited. Alleging that the Archbishop of Colombo played politics with the Easter Sunday carnage, SJB parliamentarian Harin Fernando, in June 2020, didn’t mince his words when he accused the Church of influencing a decisive 5% of voters to back Gotabaya Rajapaksa. At the time that accusation was made about nine months before the PCoI handed over its report, President Rajapaksa and the Archbishop of Colombo enjoyed a close relationship.

The Church raised the failure on the part of the government to implement the PCoI’s recommendations six months after President Rajapaksa received the final report.

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Eastern Sunday Attack Victims, in a lengthy letter dated 12 July 2021, demanded the government deal with the following persons for their failure to thwart the attacks. The Committee warned that unless the President addressed their concerns alternative measures would be taken. The government ignored the warning. Instead, the SLPP adopted delaying tactics much to their disappointment and the irate Church finally declared unconditional support for the US-India backed regime change project.

Sirisena and others

On the basis of the 19th Chapter, titled ‘Accountability’ of the final report, the Committee drew President Rajapaksa’s attention to the following persons as listed by the PCoI: (1) President Maithripala Sirisena (2) PM Ranil Wickremesinghe (3) Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando (4) Chief of National Intelligence Sisira Mendis (5) Director State Intelligence Service Nilantha Jayawardena.

The 20th Chapter, titled ‘Failures on the part of law enforcement authorities’ in the Final report (First Volume), identified the following culprits ,namely IGP Pujith Jayasundera, SDIG Nandana Munasinghe (WP), Deshabandu Tennakoon (DIG, Colombo, North), SP Sanjeewa Bandara (Colombo North), SSP Chandana Atukorale, B.E.I. Prasanna (SP, Director, Western province, Intelligence), ASP Sisira Kumara, Chief Inspector R.M. Sarath Kumarasinghe (Acting OIC, Fort), Chief Inspector Sagara Wilegoda Liyanage (OIC, Fort)., Chaminda Nawaratne (OIC, Katana), State Counsel Malik Azeez and Deputy Solicitor General Azad Navaavi.

The PCoI named former Minister and leader of All Ceylon Makkal Congress Rishad Bathiudeen, his brother Riyaj, Dr Muhamad Zulyan Muhamad Zafras and Ahamad Lukman Thalib as persons who facilitated the Easter Sunday conspiracy, while former Minister M.L.A.M. Hisbullah was faulted for spreading extremism in Kattankudy.

Major General (retd) Suresh Sallay, who is now in remand custody, under the CID, for a period of 90 days, in terms of the prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) ,was not among those named by the PCoI. Sallay, who served as the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI/from 2012 to 2016) was taken into custody on 25 February and named as the third suspect in the high profile investigation. (Interested parties propagated that Sallay was apprehended on the basis of UK’s Channel 4 claim that the officer got in touch with would-be Easter Sunday bombers, including Zahran Hashim, with the help of Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pilleyan. However, Pilleyan who had been arrested in early April 2025 under PTA was recently remanded by the Mount Lavinia Magistrate’s Court, pending the Attorney General’s recommendations in connection with investigations into the disappearance of a Vice Chancellor in the Eastern Province in 2006. There was absolutely no reference to the Easter Sunday case)

The Church also emphasised the need to investigate the then Attorney General Dappula de Livera’s declaration of a ‘grand conspiracy’ behind the Easter Sunday carnage. The Church sought answers from President Rajapaksa as to the nature of the grand conspiracy claimed by the then AG on the eve of his retirement.

Sallay was taken into custody six years after the PCoI handed over its recommendations to President Rajapaksa and the appointment of a six-member parliamentary committee that examined the recommendations. The author of Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema, Gammanpila, the only lawyer in the six-member PCoI, should be able to reveal the circumstances that committee came into being.

Against the backdrop of the PCoI making specific recommendations in respect of the disgraced politicians, civilian officials and law enforcement authorities over accountability and security failures, the SLPP owed an explanation regarding the appointment of a six-member committee of SLPPers. Actually, the SLPP owed an explanation to Sallay whose arrest under the PTA eight years after Easter Sunday carnage has to be discussed taking into consideration the failure to implement the recommendations.

Let me briefly mention PCoI’s recommendations pertaining to two senior police officers. PCoI recommended that the AG consider criminal proceedings against SDIG Nandana Munasinghe under any suitable provision in the Penal Code or Section 82 of the Police Ordinance (Final report, Vol 1, page 312). The PCoI recommended a disciplinary inquiry in respect of DIG Deshabandu Tennakoon. The SLPP simply sat on the PCoI recommendations.

Following the overthrow of President Rajapaksa by a well-organised Aragalaya mob in July 2022, the SLPP and President Ranil Wickremesinghe paved the way for Deshabandu Tennakoon to become the Acting IGP in November 2023. Wickremesinghe went out of his way to secure the Constitutional Council’s approval to confirm the controversial police officer Tennakoon’s status as the IGP.

Some have misconstrued the Supreme Court ruling, given in January 2023, as action taken by the State against those named in the PCoI report. It was not the case. The SC bench, comprising seven judges, ordered Sirisena to pay Rs 100 mn into a compensation fund in response to 12 fundamental rights cases filed by families of the Easter Sunday victims, Catholic clergy and the Bar Association of Sri Lanka. The SC also ordered ex-IGP Pujith Jayasundara and former SIS head Nilantha Jayawardene to pay Rs. 75m rupees each, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando Rs. 50 million and former CNI Sisira Mendis Rs. 10 million from their personal money. All of them have been named in the PCoI report. As previously mentioned, Maj. Gen. Sallay, who headed the SIS at the time of the SC ruling that created the largest ever single compensation fund, was not among those faulted by the sitting and former justices.

Initial assertion

The Archbishop of Colombo, in mid-May 2019, declared the Easter Sunday carnage was caused by local youth at the behest of a foreign group. The leader of the Catholic Church said so in response to a query raised by the writer regarding a controversial statement made by TNA MP M. A. Sumanthiran. The Archbishop was joined by Most Ven Ittapane Dhammalankara Nayaka Thera of Kotte Sri Kalyani Samagri Dharma Maha Sangha Sabha of Siyam Maha Nikaya. They responded to media queries at the Bishop’s House, Borella.

The Archbishop contradicted Sumanthiran’s claim that the failure on the part of successive governments to address the grievances of minorities over the past several decades led to the 2019 Easter Sunday massacre.

Sumanthiran made the unsubstantiated claim at an event organised to celebrate the first anniversary of the Sinhala political weekly ‘Annidda,’ edited by Attorney-at-Law K.W. Janaranjana at the BMICH.

The Archbishop alleged that a foreign group used misguided loyal youth to mount the Easter Sunday attacks (‘Cardinal rejects TNA’s interpretation’, with strap line ‘foreign group used misguided local youth’, The Island, May 15, 2019 edition).

Interested parties interpreted the Easter Sunday carnage in line with their thinking. The writer was present at a special media briefing called by President Sirisena on 30 April, 2019 at the President’s House where the then Northern Province Governor Dr. Suren Raghavan called for direct talks with those responsible for the Easter Sunday massacre. One-time Director of the President’s Media Division (PMD) Dr. Raghavan emphasised that direct dialogue was necessary in the absence of an acceptable mechanism to deal with such a situation. Don’t forget Sisisena had no qualms in leaving the country a few days before the attacks and was away in Singapore when extremists struck. Sirisena arrived in Singapore from India.

The NP Governor made the declaration though none of the journalists present sought his views on the post-Easter Sunday developments.

During that briefing, in response to another query raised by the writer, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake disclosed that the CNI refrained from sharing intelligence alerts received by the CNI with the DMI. Brigadier Chula Kodituwakku, who served as Director, DMI, had been present at Sirisena’s briefing and was the first to brief the media with regard to the extremist build-up leading to the Easter Sunday attacks.

The collapse of the Yahapalana arrangement caused a security nightmare. Frequent feuds between Yahapalana partners, the UNP and the SLFP, facilitated the extremists’ project. The top UNP leadership feared to step in, even after Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapaksha issued a warning in Parliament, in late 2016, regarding extremist activities and some Muslim families securing refuge in countries dominated by ISIS. Instead of taking tangible measures to address the growing threat, a section of the UNP parliamentary group pounced on the Minister.

The UNP felt that police/military action against extremists may undermine their voter base. The UNP remained passive even after extremists made an abortive bid to kill Thasleem, Coordinating Secretary to Minister Kabir Hashim, on 8 March 2019. Thasleem earned the wrath of the extremists as he accompanied the CID team that raided the extremists’ facility at Wanathawilluwa. The 16 January 2019 raid indicated the deadly intentions of the extremists but PM Wickremesinghe was unmoved, while President Sirisena appeared clueless as to what was going on.

Let me reproduce the PCoI assessment of PM Wickremesinghe in the run-up to the Easter Sunday massacre. “Upon consideration of evidence, it is the view of the PCoI that the lax approach of Mr. Wickremesinghe towards Islamic extremists as the Prime Minister was one of the primary reasons for the failure on the part of the then government to take proactive steps towards tackling growing extremism. This facilitated the build-up of Islam extremists to the point of the Easter Sunday attack.” (Final report, Vol 1, pages 276 and 277).

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Easter Sunday Attack Victims, in its letter dated 12 July, 2021, addressed to President Rajapaksa, questioned the failure on the part of the PCoI to make any specific recommendations as regards Wickremesinghe. Accusing Wickremesinghe of a serious act of irresponsibility and neglect of duty, the Church emphasised that there should have been further investigations regarding the UNP leader’s conduct.

SLPP’s shocking failure

The SLPP never made a serious bid to examine all available information as part of an overall effort to counter accusations. If widely propagated lie that the Easter Sunday massacre had been engineered by Sallay to help Gotabaya Rajapaksa win the 2019 presidential poll is accepted, then not only Sirisena and Wickremesinghe but all law enforcement officers and others mentioned in the PCoI must have contributed to that despicable strategy. It would be interesting to see how the conspirators convinced a group of Muslims to sacrifice their lives to help Sinhala Buddhist hardliner Gotabaya Rajapaksa to become the President.

Amidst claims, counter claims and unsubstantiated propaganda all forgotten that a senior member of the JVP/NPP government, in February 2021, when he was in the Opposition directly claimed Indian involvement. The accusation seems unfair as all know that India alerted Sri Lanka on 4 April , 2019, regarding the conspiracy. However, Asanga Abeygoonasekera, in his latest work ‘Winds of Change’ questioned the conduct of the top Indian defence delegation that was in Colombo exactly two weeks before the Easter Sunday carnage. Abeygoonasekera, who had been a member of the Sri Lanka delegation, expressed suspicions over the visiting delegation’s failure to make reference to the warning given on 4 April 2019 regarding the plot.

The SLPP never had or developed a strategy to counter stepped up attacks. The party was overwhelmed by a spate of accusations meant to undermine them, both in and outside Parliament. The JVP/NPP, in spite of accommodating Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim, father of two Easter Sunday suicide bombers Ilham Ahmed Ibrahim (Shangila-la) and Imsath Ahmed Ibrahim (Cinnamon Grand), in its 2015 National List was never really targeted by the SLPP. The SLPP never effectively raised the possibility of the wealthy spice trader funding the JVP to receive a National List slot.

The Catholic Church, too, was strangely silent on this particular issue. The issue is whether Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been aware of the conspiracy that involved his sons. Another fact that cannot be ignored is Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah who had been arrested in April 2020 in connection with the Easter Sunday carnage but granted bail in February 2022 had been the Ibrahim family lawyer.

Hejaaz Hizbullah’s arrest received international attention and various interested parties raised the issue.

The father of the two brothers, who detonated suicide bombs, was granted bail in May 2022.

Eric Solheim, who had been involved in the Norwegian-led disastrous peace process here, commented on the Easter Sunday attacks. In spite of the international media naming the suicide bombers responsible for the worst such atrocity Solheim tweeted: “When we watch the horrific pictures from Sri Lanka, it is important to remember that Muslims and Christians are small minorities. Muslims historically were moderate and peaceful. They have been victims of violence in Sri Lanka, not orchestrating it.”

That ill-conceived tweet exposed the mindset of a man who unashamedly pursued a despicable agenda that threatened the country’s unitary status with the connivance of the UNP. Had they succeeded, the LTTE would have emerged as the dominant political-military power in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and a direct threat to the rest of the country.

Midweek Review

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – I

Published

3 days ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

At present, the world stands in the midst of a transitional and turbulent phase, characterised by heightened uncertainty and systemic flux, reflecting an ongoing transformation of the modern global order. The existing global order, rooted in the US hegemony, shows unmistakable signs of decay, while a new and uncertain global system struggles to be born. In such moments of profound transformation, as Antonio Gramsci observed, morbid symptoms proliferate across the body politic. From a geopolitical perspective, the intensifying coordinated aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran is not merely a regional crisis, but an acceleration of a deeper structural transformation in the international order. In this context, the conduct of Donald Trump appears less as an aberration and more as a morbid symptom of a declining US-led global order. As Amitav Acharya argues in The Once and Future World Order (2025), the emerging global order may well move beyond Western dominance. However, the pathway to that future is proving anything but orderly, shaped instead by disruption, unilateralism, and the unsettling symptoms of a system in transition.

Origins of the Conflict

To begin with, the origins and objectives of the parties to the present armed confrontation require unpacking. In a sense, the current Persian Gulf crisis reflects a convergence of long-standing geopolitical rivalries and evolving security dynamics in the Middle East. The roots of tension between the West and the Middle East can be traced back to earlier historical encounters, from the Persian Wars of classical antiquity to the Crusades of the medieval period. A new phase in the region’s political trajectory commenced in 1948 with the establishment of Israel—widely perceived as a Western enclave within the Arab world—and the concurrent displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians from their homeland. Since then, Israel has steadily consolidated and expanded its territory, a process that has remained a persistent source of regional instability. The Iranian Revolution introduced a further layer of complexity, fundamentally reshaping regional alignments and ideological contestations. In recent years, tensions between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other have steadily intensified. The current phase of the conflict, however, was directly triggered by coordinated U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on both civilian and military targets on 28 February 2026, which, as noted in a 2 April 2026 statement by 100 international law experts from leading U.S. universities, constituted a clear violation of the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Objectives and Strategic Aims

Israel’s strategic objective appears to be directed toward the systematic and total destruction of Iran’s military, nuclear, and economic capabilities, driven by the perception that Iran remains the principal obstacle to its security and its pursuit of regional primacy. Israel was aware that Iran did not possess a nuclear weapon at the time; however, its nuclear programme remained a subject of international contention, with competing assessments regarding its ultimate intent and potential for weaponisation.

The United States, for its part, appears to be pursuing more targeted political and strategic objectives, including eventual transformation of Iran’s current political regime. Washington has long regarded the Iranian leadership as fundamentally antagonistic to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In this context, the United States may seek to enhance its strategic leverage over Iran, including in relation to its substantial oil and gas resources, a point underscored in recent statements by Donald Trump. It must be noted, however, successive U.S. administrations since 1979 have avoided direct large-scale military confrontation with Iran, preferring instead a combination of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and indirect military engagement.

The positions of other Arab states in the Persian Gulf are shaped by a combination of security calculations, sectarian considerations, and broader geopolitical alignments. While several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, notably Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, have expressed tacit support for measures that counter Iranian regional influence, their involvement remains calibrated to avoid direct military confrontation. Their position is informed by the belief that Iran provides backing to militant non-state actors, including Hezbollahs in the West Bank and the Houthis in Southern Yemen, which they view as destabilising forces in the region. These states are balancing competing priorities: the desire to curb Iran’s power projection, maintain strong security and economic ties with the United States, and preserve domestic stability. At the same time, countries such as Oman and Qatar have adopted more neutral or mediating stances, emphasizing diplomatic engagement and conflict de-escalation.

Militarily, Iran is not positioned to match the combined military capabilities of U.S.–Israeli forces. Nevertheless, it retains significant asymmetric leverage, particularly through its capacity to influence global energy flows. Control over critical maritime chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Hormuz, provides Tehran with a potent strategic instrument to disrupt global oil supply. Iranian leadership appears to view this leverage as a key pressure point, designed to compel global economic actors to push Washington and Tel Aviv toward a cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement. In this context, attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, shipping routes, and supply lines constitute central components of Iran’s survival strategy. As long as the conflict persists and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain disrupted, the resulting instability is likely to generate severe repercussions across the global economy, increasing pressure on the United States to halt military operations against Iran.

Now entering its fifth week, the conflict continues to flare intensely, characterised by sustained and intensive aerial operations. Joint U.S.–Israeli strikes have reportedly destroyed substantial elements of Iran’s air and naval capabilities, as well as critical military and economic infrastructure. Nevertheless, Iran has retained the capacity to conduct guided missile strikes within Israel and against selected U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military assets across the Middle East, including reported long-range attacks on the U.S. facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, approximately 4,000 kilometers from Iranian territory. Initial U.S. and Israeli strategic calculations—anticipating that a decisive initial strike and the targeted killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would precipitate regime collapse and popular uprising—have not materialized. On the contrary, the destruction of civilian facilities has strengthened anti-American sentiment and reinforced domestic support for the Iranian leadership. While Iran faced initial setbacks on the battlefield, it has achieved notable success in the international media front, effectively shaping global perceptions and advancing its propaganda objectives. By the fifth week, Tehran’s asymmetric strategy has yielded tangible results, including the downing of two U.S. military aircraft, F15E Strike Eagle fighter jet and A10 Thunderbolt II (“Warthog”) ground-attack aircraft , signaling the resilience and operational efficacy of Iran’s military power.

The Military Industrial Complexes and ProIsrael Lobby

Why did the United States initiate military action against Iran at this particular juncture? Joe Kent, who resigned in protest over the war, stated that available intelligence did not indicate an imminent Iranian capability to produce a nuclear weapon or pose an immediate threat to the United States. This assessment raises important questions about the stated objective of dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme, suggesting that it may have served to obscure broader strategic and economic considerations underpinning the intervention. To understand the timing and rationale of the U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, it is therefore necessary to examine the influence of two powerful domestic pressure groups: the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby.

The influence of the U.S. military–industrial complex on American foreign policy is most clearly manifested through the institutionalized “revolving door” between defense corporations and senior positions within the U.S. administration. Over the past two decades, key figures such as Lloyd Austin (Secretary of Defence, 2021–2025), a former board member of Raytheon Technologies, Mark Esper (Secretary of Defence 2019–2020), who previously served as a senior executive at the same firm, and Patrick Shanahan (2019) from Boeing exemplify the direct movement of personnel from industry into the highest levels of strategic decision-making. This circulation is complemented by influential policy actors such as Michèle Flournoy (Under Secretary of Defence Under President Obama) and Antony Blinken (Secretary of State 2021 to 2025, Deputy Secretary of State 2015 to 2017), whose engagement with consultancies like WestExec Advisors further blurs the boundary between public policy and private defense interests. This pattern appears to persist under the present Trump administration, where the interplay between defense industry interests and strategic policymaking continues to shape procurement priorities and threat perceptions. Consequently, the military–industrial complex operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an internalized component of the policy process, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that align strategic objectives with the structural and commercial interests of the defense sector. Armed conflicts may also generate substantial commercial opportunities, as increased military spending often translates into expanded profits for defense contractors.

The influence of the pro-Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy is best understood as a dense network of advocacy organisations, donors, policy institutes, and political actors that shape both elite consensus and decision-making within successive administrations. At the center of this network is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, widely regarded as one of the most effective lobbying organisations in Washington, which works alongside a broader constellation of groups and donors to sustain bipartisan support for Israel. This influence is reinforced through the presence of senior policymakers and advisors with strong ideological or institutional affinities toward Israel, including Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, whose close political alignment has translated into consistent diplomatic and strategic backing. Policy decisions—ranging from the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital to continued military assistance—reflect not only geopolitical calculations but also the domestic political salience of pro-Israel advocacy within the United States. Consequently, the pro-Israel lobby operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an embedded force within the policy ecosystem, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that sustain a strong and often unconditional commitment to Israeli security and strategic interests. A fuller explanation of U.S. policy toward Iran emerges when the influence of both the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby is considered together. These two forces, while distinct in composition and motivation, converge in reinforcing a strategic outlook that prioritises the identification of Iran as a central threat and legitimizes the use of coercive military instruments.

Global Economic Fallout

After five weeks of sustained conflict, the trajectory of the war suggests that Iran’s strategy of resilience and asymmetric resistance is yielding tangible effects. While the United States, alongside Israel, has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s economic and military infrastructure, it has not succeeded in eroding Tehran’s capacity—or resolve—to continue the conflict through unconventional means. At the same time, Washington appears to be encountering increasing difficulty in bringing the war to a decisive conclusion, even as signs of strain emerge in its relations with key European allies. Most importantly, the repercussions of the conflict are no longer confined to the battlefield: the unfolding crisis has generated a widening economic shock that is reverberating across global markets and supply chains. It is this broader international economic impact of the war that now warrants closer examination.

The Persian Gulf conflict is rapidly sending shockwaves through the global economy. At the forefront is the energy sector: even partial disruptions to oil and gas exports from the region are driving prices sharply higher, placing severe pressure on energy-importing economies in Europe and Asia and fueling inflation worldwide. Maritime trade is also under strain, as heightened risk prompts longer shipping routes, increased freight rates, and rising war-risk premiums. These disruptions ripple through global supply chains, pushing up the cost of goods far beyond the energy sector.

Insurance costs for shipping and aviation are soaring as large zones are designated high-risk or even excluded from coverage, further elevating transport costs and pricing out smaller operators. Together, these pressures constitute a systemic economic shock: industrial production costs rise, supply chains fragment, and trade volumes contract, stressing manufacturing, logistics, and consumption simultaneously.

The cumulative effect is already slowing global growth. Major economies such as the EU, China, and India face slower expansion, while import-dependent states risk recession. Trade-driven sectors are contracting, reinforcing a scenario of high inflation and stagnating growth. Air travel is also impacted, with restricted airspace, higher fuel prices, and elevated insurance premiums driving up ticket costs and lengthening travel routes. Rising energy prices, logistics bottlenecks, and increased production costs are pushing up food prices and cost-of-living pressures, potentially forcing central banks into tighter monetary policy and slowing growth further.

Finally, global manufacturing—from chemicals and plastics to agriculture—is experiencing ripple effects as supply chain disruptions intensify shortages and price increases. The conflict in the Persian Gulf is thus not only a regional security crisis but also a catalyst for broad, interconnected economic disruptions that are reverberating across markets, trade networks, and everyday life worldwide.

(To be continued)