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Amidst the Delta scare and Labour strife, will China become Sri Lanka’s new IMF?

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by Rajan Philips

The government, rather the country, is in the grip of three mutually aggravating crises – involving public health, people’s lives and the economy. And every one of them has gotten critical. Covid-19 has morphed or mutated into a dreadful Delta scare. Even the suddenly impressive vaccine rollout is being outrun by surges in infections and deaths. If vaccination is picking up four paces, Delta is overtaking by eight paces and more. That is the reality.

Last Thursday, two major hospitals, the Ratnapura General Hospital and the Karapitiya Teaching Hospital, “declared emergency,” apparently a rare occurrence in Sri Lanka’s medical history. The emergency situation is due to increases in Covid-19 patients, technically bordering on “a situation of Mass Casualty Incidents” and warranting emergency responses, according to the Deputy Director-general of Health Services, Dr. Hemantha Herath. Hospitals in the Western Province are also getting filled up even as they are running short of oxygen supply. For some time now, the Lady Ridgeway Hospital in Colombo has been struggling to cope with the influx of children infected by Covid-19.

The second crisis is the unrest among working people. This is more than a labour or trade union problem. The widespread unrest and ubiquitous protests are not part of the usual political muscle flexing. They are desperate signs of vast sections of people finding it impossible to get on with life. No one is suggesting that the government should creatively find ways to immediately restore normal economic life in the country. But everyone, except those who are close to the perks and fringes of power, is aghast that government leaders are pretending that they are in control of everything and that normality is just round the corner. Nothing can be more distant from the truth. And the truth is about the third crisis, which is the economic crisis. What the people are helplessly experiencing is the symptom of an economy that is in severe crisis. There is no point trying to hide it or to pretend otherwise.

Just like the crises, the government’s responses to them are also mutually aggravating. On the pandemic front, the President and the government have so failed to put together a permanent team of experts who will publicly tell the government and the people the unvarnished truth about the Covid-19 situation in Sri Lanka, and offer their advice on what everyone should be doing to control and contain the Delta spread as much as possible.

Friday’s news reports announced that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa convened a special meeting to discuss the current COVID-19 situation. Head of the COVID-19 task force Army Commander General Shavendra Silva, minsters, Director General of Health Services and several other experts reportedly took part in the meeting. Nothing much came out of it. The point is this is more political ad-hocism, and not a substitute for putting in charge a permanent body of experts.

The government after initially downplaying the severity of the pandemic crisis and prematurely celebrating victory over the virus, is now trying to use Covid-19 as reason to stop public protesting. At the same time, the government is ignoring universal medical opinion that has been pleading for the continuation of Covid-19 restrictions. People can see through when the government uses medical opinion as grounds for arresting protesters, but will not listen to medical opinion that calls for generally restrictive measures to contain the spread of Covid-19. People can also see that protesters are not flouting Covid-19 precautions and they are not ignoring social distance requirements.

People know that they are experiencing the same helplessness and frustrations that are driving protesters to picket lines. They expect empathy from the government. And they want the government to honestly engage with the protesters and establish a consensual framework for work and welfare in the middle of an out-of-control pandemic with no quick ending in sight.

The government’s economic management and messaging have been as bad as, or even worse than, its responses to the pandemic and to the people’s plights. The country is facing its worst economic crisis since independence in terms of self-inflicted revenue losses and diminishing foreign reserves, a falling rupee and mounting debt (domestic and foreign), and onerous debt repayment obligations. The people are going through the worst spell of severe hardships in living memory. In the midst of them all the government is stubbornly talking about some alternative way of economic management. What is being touted as the alternative way is not the outcome of any collective thought process and any co-ordinated implementation plan. Instead, it is a catch-all phrase to give context to knee jerk and uncoordinated responses to different problems as and when they arise.

Chinese alternative to IMF?

The abrupt switch from chemical to organic fertilizers in agriculture by presidential fiat is by far the most glaring case in point. A second, politically less dramatic but economically more consequential instance is the government’s stubborn reluctance to seek IMF help to tide over the current balance of payment (BOP) crisis. In vaccine parlance, this reluctance is a severe form of IMF hesitancy. No one knows if this hesitancy is backed up by any hope of getting a full BOP bailout from Beijing. Even less is known if the government has approached Beijing for a fully-fledged BOP help beyond periodical swaps. Known lesser still is what would be China’s response.

It would be rationally worthwhile for the government to at least consider Chinese help as an alternative to seeking IMF help. Although rational, it is not necessarily a prudent choice. The gossipy question is if there is any thinking at all within the government along these lines, assuming of course that thinking is going on in government circles. Equally, there has been no serious speculation among government critics that the government might be looking to China as a potential alternative to the IMF.

Ever since China started providing development assistance to emerging economies and developing countries, global watchers have become interested in China’s role as a counter to western hegemony over development assistance through the agencies of the World Bank (providing development assistance) and the IMF (securing financial stability and lending to tide over balance of payment difficulties). Although China’s development assistance (through the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank) is more comparable to the activities of the World Bank, in recent years there has been growing “journalistic interest” in viewing Beijing as an alternative source to the IMF for providing financial support to developing countries.

James Sundquist, a Yale University doctoral researcher, has summed up this interest in posing the question: “Does Chinese finance in the form of loans and currency swaps substitute for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), reducing that insti­tution’s influence and opening more ‘policy space’ for developing countries?” His study based on data for 104 countries between 2001 and 2017 would seem to suggest that mostly countries that are “able to compensate China in means other than cash” are likely to consider turning to China to avoid the IMF. Non-cash compensation can be “repayment-in-kind with natural resource exports and geo­political concessions.”

Sundquist selected four countries “for closer examination” to test his hypothesis. Sri Lanka is one of them. Angola, Zimbabwe and Mongolia are the other three. Angola is a resource rich country that received Chinese bailout and avoided the IMF. Zimbabwe, though nominally resource rich is practically resource poor because of its neglected and atrophied extraction infrastructure. China has not lent money to Zimbabwe because it is not credit worthy. Mongolia is resource-rich and China has been keen on offering assistance, but the Mongolian government opted to go along with IMF financial assistance and stabilization program. The apparent reason was to avoid too much bilateral reliance on China.

Sri Lanka is seen as a country that has received both development assistance and BOP assistance from China without possessing “resource guarantees,” because of its geopolitical assets. It would seem Sundquist’s research period preceded the Sri Lankan government’s current IMF hesitancy and did not quite assess the potential of Beijing becoming a total or the primary alternative to the IMF. But Sri Lanka’s current situation is more than a subject matter for research. It would be odd if looking to Beijing as an alternative to the IMF has not crossed the mind in the Rajapaksa government. The government speaks its mind on economic matters through half a dozen people. Everyone of them is dead set against the IMF. Six months ago, they were conventional IMF followers. But no one is mentioning Beijing as an alternative.

There are many factors at play. Until 20 years ago, there was no China and developing countries had only one place to go to, namely, the West and institutions dominated by the West. The entry of China has provided an alternative source and somewhat levelled the playing field. But only ‘somewhat.’ A part of that ‘levelling’ also includes the potential for ‘democratizing’ the operations of the World Bank and the IMF which are dominated by the US and its European allies. But China may not be all too keen about ‘democratizing’ anything anywhere. China’s development assistance and lending patterns are also totally driven by domestic reasons and for domestic purposes.

China’s external financial relations and operations are always “rooted in central government decisions” and are implemented only by “state-affiliated institutions.” China is not an incubator of private investors or a source of foreign direct investments. At the same time, China is not the inventor of financial diplomacy. The US and France, for example, have provided direct emergency financial assistance, bypassing the IMF, to countries in the Middle East and Africa, respectively.

Sundquist lists three key decisions taken at different times by the Chinese government, that apparently have influenced the ebb and flow of Chinese financial activities overseas. First, in 2006, came the decision to extend externally the hitherto domestic operations of the China Development Bank as a parallel to the World Bank. This decision was made “at a time of fractured political power in China,” according to Sundquist. The second was the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by President Xi Jinping even as he concentrated the powers of the state in the office of the President. The third key decision so far has been the roll back of the BRI initiative in 2018 to concentrate on the domestic economic situation in China.

Put another way, the rest of the world, especially countries that may want to look to China to avoid the west or the IMF, have no certainty whether or when China is going to keep its lending window open, and to what levels. There is also the concern over the lack transparency involving China’s assistance, that it ignores issues of domestic corruption and money laundering, and that it is more short-term oriented without long term sustainability.

Among Sundquist’s assertions based on his research are that “Chinese loans have indeed enabled some countries to avoid turning to the IMF and enabled others to negotiate deals with fewer attached conditions.” As his Zimbabwe case study has shown, “China has typically denied bailouts to countries without reliable sources of foreign exchange,” and has paid “attention to debt sustainability rather than trying to ensnare them in debt traps.” Overall, says Sundquist, “Borrowing governments will have to weigh the respective benefits of IMF and Chinese loans diligently. They will, however, be happy to have the choice.”

He further notes that “Since 2017, the pace of new loans has slowed, and China has begun to confront the problem of borrowers unable to meet their debt service obligations. It is entirely possible that as China’s position begins to resemble that of traditional Western creditors, it will begin to behave in a more similar manner to them and work more closely with the IMF.” Where does all this leave Sri Lanka? Is there a third way, that avoids both the IMF and China, to overcome the current balance of payment crisis? It is up to the government to clarify.



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Pakistan-Sri Lanka ‘eye diplomacy’ 

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The writer handing over a donation to restore the eyesight of injured military personnel

Reminiscences:

I was appointed Managing Director of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and Chairman of the Trincomalee Petroleum Terminals Ltd (TPTL – Indian Oil Company/ Petroleum Corporation of Sri Lanka joint venture), in February 2023, by President Ranil Wickremesinghe. I served as TPTL Chairman voluntarily. TPTL controls the world-renowned oil tank farm in Trincomalee, abandoned after World War II. Several programmes were launched to repair tanks and buildings there. I enjoyed travelling to Trincomalee, staying at Navy House and monitoring the progress of the projects. Trincomalee is a beautiful place where I spent most of my time during my naval career.

My main task as MD, CPC, was to ensure an uninterrupted supply of petroleum products to the public.

With the great initiative of the then CPC Chairman, young and energetic Uvis Mohammed, and equally capable CPC staff, we were able to do our job diligently, and all problems related to petroleum products were overcome.  My team and I were able to ensure that enough stocks were always available for any contingency.

The CPC made huge profits when we imported crude oil and processed it at our only refinery in Sapugaskanda, which could produce more than 50,000 barrels of refined fuel in one stream working day! (One barrel is equal to 210 litres). This huge facility encompassing about 65 acres has more than 1,200 employees and 65 storage tanks.

A huge loss the CPC was incurring due to wrong calculation of “out turn loss” when importing crude oil by ships and pumping it through Single Point Mooring Buoy (SPMB) at sea and transferring it through underwater fuel transfer lines to service tanks was detected and corrected immediately. That helped increase the CPC’s profits.

By August 2023, the CPC made a net profit of 74,000 million rupees (74 billion rupees)! The President was happy, the government was happy, the CPC Management was happy and the hard-working CPC staff were happy. I became a Managing Director of a very happy and successful State-Owned Enterprise (SOE). That was my first experience in working outside military/Foreign service.

I will be failing in my duty if I do not mention Sagala Rathnayake, then Chief of Staff to the President, for recommending me for the post of MD, CPC.

The only grievance they had was that we were not able to pay their 2023 Sinhala/Tamil New Year bonus due to a government circular.  After working at CPC for six months and steering it out of trouble, I was ready to move out of CPC.

   I was offered a new job as the Sri Lanka High Commissioner to Pakistan. I was delighted and my wife and son were happy. Our association with Pakistan, especially with the Pakistan Military, is very long. My son started schooling in Karachi in 1995, when I was doing the Naval War Course there. My wife Yamuna has many good friends in Pakistan. I am the first Military officer to graduate from the Karachi University in 1996 (BSc Honours in War Studies) and have a long association with the Pakistan Navy and their Special Forces. I was awarded the Nishan-e-Imtiaz  (Military) medal—the highest National award by the Pakistan Presidentm in 2019m when I was Chief of Defence Staff. I am the only Sri Lankan to have been awarded this prestigious medal so far.  I knew my son and myself would be able to play a quiet game of golf every morning at the picturesque Margalla Golf Club, owned by the Pakistan Navy, at the foot of Margalla hills, at Islamabad. The golf club is just a walking distance from the High Commissioner’s residence.

When I took over as Sri Lanka High Commissioner at Islamabad on 06 December 2023, I realised that a number of former Service Commanders had held that position earlier. The first Ceylonese High Commissioner to Pakistan, with a military background, was the first Army Commander General Anton Muthukumaru. He was concurrently Ambassador to Iran. Then distinguished Service Commanders, like General H W G Wijayakoon, General Gerry Silva, General Srilal Weerasooriya, Air Chief Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody, served as High Commissioners to Islamabad. I took over from Vice Admiral Mohan Wijewickrama (former Chief of Staff of Navy and Governor Eastern Province).

A photograph of Dr. Silva (second from right) in Brigadier
(Dr) Waquar Muzaffar’s album

One of the first visitors I received was Kawaja Hamza, a prominent Defence Correspondent in Islamabad. His request had nothing to do with Defence matters. He wanted to bring his 84-year-old father to see me; his father had his eyesight restored with corneas donated by a Sri Lankan in 1972! His eyesight is still good, but he did not know the Sri Lankan donor who gave him this most precious gift. He wanted to pay gratitude to the new Sri Lankan High Commissioner and to tell him that as a devoted Muslim, he prayed for the unknown donor every day! That reminded me of what my guru in Foreign Service, the late Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar told me when I was First Secretary/ Defence Advisor, Sri Lanka High Commission in New Delhi. That is “best diplomacy is people-to-people contacts.” This incident prompted me to research more into “Pakistan-Sri Lanka Eye Diplomacy” and what I learnt was fascinating!

Do you know the Sri Lanka Eye Donation Society has donated more than 26,000 corneas to Pakistan, since 1964 to date! That means more than 26,000 Pakistani people see the world with SRI LANKAN EYES! The Sri Lankan Eye Donation Society has provided 100,000 eye corneas to foreign countries FREE! To be exact 101,483 eye corneas during the last 65 years! More than one fourth of these donations was to one single country- Pakistan. Recent donations (in November 2024) were made to the Pakistan Military at Armed Forces Institute of Ophthalmology (AFIO), Rawalpindi, to restore the sight of Pakistan Army personnel who suffered eye injuries due to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) blasts. This donation was done on the 75th Anniversary of the Sri Lanka Army.

Deshabandu Dr. F. G. Hudson Silva, a distinguished old boy of Nalanda College, Colombo, started collecting eye corneas as a medical student in 1958. His first set of corneas were collected from a deceased person and were stored at his home refrigerator at Wijerama Mawatha, Colombo 7. With his wife Iranganie De Silva (nee Kularatne), he started the Sri Lanka Eye Donation Society in 1961. They persuaded Buddhists to donate their eyes upon death. This drive was hugely successful.

Their son (now in the US) was a contemporary of mine at Royal College. I pledged to donate (of course with my parents’ permission) my eyes upon my death when I was a student at Royal college in 1972 on a Poson Full Moon Poya Day. Thousands have done so.

On Vesak Full Moon Poya Day in 1964, the first eye corneas were carried in a thermos flask filled with Ice, to Singapore, by Dr Hudson Silva and his wife and a successful eye transplant surgery was performed. From that day, our eye corneas were sent to 62 different countries.

Pakistan Lions Clubs, which supported this noble gesture, built a beautiful Eye Hospital for humble people at Gulberg, Lahore, where eye surgeries are performed, and named it Dr Hudson Silva Lions Eye Hospital.

The good work has continued even after the demise of Dr Hudson Silva in 1999.

So many people have donated their eyes upon their death, including President J. R. Jayewardene, whose eye corneas were used to restore the eyesight of one Japanese and one Sri Lankan. Dr Hudson Silva became a great hero in Pakistan and he was treated with dignity and respect whenever he visited Pakistan. My friend, Brigadier (Dr) Waquar Muzaffar, the Commandant of AFIO, was able to dig into his old photographs and send me a precious photo taken in 1980, 46 years ago (when he was a medical student), with Dr Hudson Silva.

We will remember Dr and Mrs Hudson Silva with gratitude.

Bravo Zulu to Sri Lanka Eye Donation Society!

 

by Admiral Ravindra C Wijegunaratne
WV, RWP and Bar, RSP, VSV, USP, NI (M) (Pakistan), ndc, psn, Bsc
(Hons) (War Studies) (Karachi) MPhil (Madras)
Former Navy Commander and Former Chief of Defense Staff
Former Chairman, Trincomalee Petroleum Terminals Ltd
Former Managing Director Ceylon Petroleum Corporation
Former High Commissioner to Pakistan

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Lasting solutions require consensus

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Social Media training

Problems and solutions in plural societies like Sri Lanka’s which have deep rooted ethnic, religious and linguistic cleavages require a consciously inclusive approach. A major challenge for any government in Sri Lanka is to correctly identify the problems faced by different groups with strong identities and find solutions to them. The durability of democratic systems in divided societies depends less on electoral victories than on institutionalised inclusion, consultation, and negotiated compromise. When problems are defined only through the lens of a single political formation, even one that enjoys a large electoral mandate, such as obtained by the NPP government, the policy prescriptions derived from that diagnosis will likely overlook the experiences of communities that may remain outside the ruling party. The result could end up being resistance to those policies, uneven implementation and eventual political backlash.

A recent survey done by the National Peace Council (NPC), in Jaffna, in the North, at a focus group discussion for young people on citizen perception in the electoral process, revealed interesting developments. The results of the NPC micro survey support the findings of the national survey by Verite Research that found that government approval rating stood at 65 percent in early February 2026. A majority of the respondents in Jaffna affirm that they feel safer and more fairly treated than in the past. There is a clear improving trend to be seen in some areas, but not in all. This survey of predominantly young and educated respondents shows 78 percent saying livelihood has improved and an equal percentage feeling safe in daily life. 75 percent express satisfaction with the new government and 64 percent believe the state treats their language and culture fairly. These are not insignificant gains in a region that bore the brunt of three decades of war.

Yet the same survey reveals deep reservations that temper this optimism. Only 25 percent are satisfied with the handling of past issues. An equal percentage see no change in land and military related concerns. Most strikingly, almost 90 percent are worried about land being taken without consent for religious purposes. A significant number are uncertain whether the future will be better. These negative sentiments cannot be brushed aside as marginal. They point to unresolved structural questions relating to land rights, demilitarisation, accountability and the locus of political power. If these issues are not addressed sooner rather than later, the current stability may prove fragile. This suggests the need to build consensus with other parties to ensure long-term stability and legitimacy, and the need for partnership to address national issues.

NPP Absence

National or local level problems solving is unlikely to be successful in the longer term if it only proceeds from the thinking of one group of people even if they are the most enlightened. Problem solving requires the engagement of those from different ethno-religious, caste and political backgrounds to get a diversity of ideas and possible solutions. It does not mean getting corrupted or having to give up the good for the worse. It means testing ideas in the public sphere. Legitimacy flows not merely from winning elections but from the quality of public reasoning that precedes decision-making. The experience of successful post-conflict societies shows that long term peace and development are built through dialogue platforms where civil society organisations, political actors, business communities, and local representatives jointly define problems before negotiating policy responses.

As a civil society organisation, the National Peace Council engages in a variety of public activities that focus on awareness and relationship building across communities. Participants in those activities include community leaders, religious clergy, local level government officials and grassroots political party representatives. However, along with other civil society organisations, NPC has been finding it difficult to get the participation of members of the NPP at those events. The excuse given for the absence of ruling party members is that they are too busy as they are involved in a plenitude of activities. The question is whether the ruling party members have too much on their plate or whether it is due to a reluctance to work with others.

The general belief is that those from the ruling party need to get special permission from the party hierarchy for activities organised by groups not under their control. The reluctance of the ruling party to permit its members to join the activities of other organisations may be the concern that they will get ideas that are different from those held by the party leadership. The concern may be that these different ideas will either corrupt the ruling party members or cause dissent within the ranks of the ruling party. But lasting reform in a plural society requires precisely this exposure. If 90 percent of surveyed youth in Jaffna are worried about land issues, then engaging them, rather than shielding party representatives from uncomfortable conversations, is essential for accurate problem identification.

North Star

The Leader of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Prof Tissa Vitarana, who passed away last week, gave the example for national level problem solving. As a government minister he took on the challenge the protracted ethnic conflict that led to three decades of war. He set his mind on the solution and engaged with all but never veered from his conviction about what the solution would be. This was the North Star to him, said his son to me at his funeral, the direction to which the Compass (Malimawa) pointed at all times. Prof Vitarana held the view that in a diverse and plural society there was a need to devolve power and share power in a structured way between the majority community and minority communities. His example illustrates that engagement does not require ideological capitulation. It requires clarity of purpose combined with openness to dialogue.

The ethnic and religious peace that prevails today owes much to the efforts of people like Prof Vitarana and other like-minded persons and groups which, for many years, engaged as underdogs with those who were more powerful. The commitment to equality of citizenship, non-racism, non-extremism and non-discrimination, upheld by the present government, comes from this foundation. But the NPC survey suggests that symbolic recognition and improved daily safety are not enough. Respondents prioritise personal safety, truth regarding missing persons, return of land, language use and reduction of military involvement. They are also asking for jobs after graduation, local economic opportunity, protection of property rights, and tangible improvements that allow them to remain in Jaffna rather than migrate.

If solutions are to be lasting they cannot be unilaterally imposed by one party on the others. Lasting solutions cannot be unilateral solutions. They must emerge from a shared diagnosis of the country’s deepest problems and from a willingness to address the negative sentiments that persist beneath the surface of cautious optimism. Only then can progress be secured against reversal and anchored in the consent of the wider polity. Engaging with the opposition can help mitigate the hyper-confrontational and divisive political culture of the past. This means that the ruling party needs to consider not only how to protect its existing members by cloistering them from those who think differently but also expand its vision and membership by convincing others to join them in problem solving at multiple levels. This requires engagement and not avoidance or withdrawal.

 

by Jehan Perera

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Unpacking public responses to educational reforms

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A pro-government demonstration calling for the implementation of the education reforms. (A file photo)

As the debate on educational reforms rages, I find it useful to pay as much attention to the reactions they have excited as we do to the content of the reforms. Such reactions are a reflection of how education is understood in our society, and this understanding – along with the priorities it gives rise to – must necessarily be taken into account in education policy, including and especially reform. My aim in this piece, however, is to couple this public engagement with critical reflection on the historical-structural realities that structure our possibilities in the global market, and briefly discuss the role of academics in this endeavour.

Two broad reactions

The reactions to the proposed reforms can be broadly categorised into ‘pro’ and ‘anti’. I will discuss the latter first. Most of the backlash against the reforms seems to be directed at the issue of a gay dating site, accidentally being linked to the Grade 6 English module. While the importance of rigour cannot be overstated in such a process, the sheer volume of the energies concentrated on this is also indicative of how hopelessly homophobic our society is, especially its educators, including those in trade unions. These dispositions are a crucial part of the reason why educational reforms are needed in the first place. If only there was a fraction of the interest in ‘keeping up with the rest of the world’ in terms of IT, skills, and so on, in this area as well!

Then there is the opposition mounted by teachers’ trade unions and others about the process of the reforms not being very democratic, which I (and many others in higher education, as evidenced by a recent statement, available at https://island.lk/general-educational-reforms-to-what-purpose-a-statement-by-state-university-teachers/ ) fully agree with. But I earnestly hope the conversation is not usurped by those wanting to promote heteronormativity, further entrenching bigotry only education itself can save us from. With this important qualification, I, too, believe the government should open up the reform process to the public, rather than just ‘informing’ them of it.

It is unclear both as to why the process had to be behind closed doors, as well as why the government seems to be in a hurry to push the reforms through. Considering other recent developments, like the continued extension of emergency rule, tabling of the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), and proposing a new Authority for the protection of the Central Highlands (as is famously known, Authorities directly come under the Executive, and, therefore, further strengthen the Presidency; a reasonable question would be as to why the existing apparatus cannot be strengthened for this purpose), this appears especially suspect.

Further, according to the Secretary to the MOE Nalaka Kaluwewa: “The full framework for the [education] reforms was already in place [when the Dissanayake government took office]” (https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/08/12/wxua-a12.html, citing The Morning, July 29). Given the ideological inclinations of the former Wickremesinghe government and the IMF negotiations taking place at the time, the continuation of education reforms, initiated in such a context with very little modification, leaves little doubt as to their intent: to facilitate the churning out of cheap labour for the global market (with very little cushioning from external shocks and reproducing global inequalities), while raising enough revenue in the process to service debt.

This process privileges STEM subjects, which are “considered to contribute to higher levels of ‘employability’ among their graduates … With their emphasis on transferable skills and demonstrable competency levels, STEM subjects provide tools that are well suited for the abstraction of labour required by capitalism, particularly at the global level where comparability across a wide array of labour markets matters more than ever before” (my own previous piece in this column on 29 October 2024). Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS) subjects are deprioritised as a result. However, the wisdom of an education policy that is solely focused on responding to the global market has been questioned in this column and elsewhere, both because the global market has no reason to prioritise our needs as well as because such an orientation comes at the cost of a strategy for improving the conditions within Sri Lanka, in all sectors. This is why we need a more emancipatory vision for education geared towards building a fairer society domestically where the fruits of prosperity are enjoyed by all.

The second broad reaction to the reforms is to earnestly embrace them. The reasons behind this need to be taken seriously, although it echoes the mantra of the global market. According to one parent participating in a protest against the halting of the reform process: “The world is moving forward with new inventions and technology, but here in Sri Lanka, our children are still burdened with outdated methods. Opposition politicians send their children to international schools or abroad, while ours depend on free education. Stopping these reforms is the lowest act I’ve seen as a mother” (https://www.newsfirst.lk/2026/01/17/pro-educational-reforms-protests-spread-across-sri-lanka). While it is worth mentioning that it is not only the opposition, nor in fact only politicians, who send their children to international schools and abroad, the point holds. Updating the curriculum to reflect the changing needs of a society will invariably strengthen the case for free education. However, as mentioned before, if not combined with a vision for harnessing education’s emancipatory potential for the country, such a move would simply translate into one of integrating Sri Lanka to the world market to produce cheap labour for the colonial and neocolonial masters.

According to another parent in a similar protest: “Our children were excited about lighter schoolbags and a better future. Now they are left in despair” (https://www.newsfirst.lk/2026/01/17/pro-educational-reforms-protests-spread-across-sri-lanka). Again, a valid concern, but one that seems to be completely buying into the rhetoric of the government. As many pieces in this column have already shown, even though the structure of assessments will shift from exam-heavy to more interim forms of assessment (which is very welcome), the number of modules/subjects will actually increase, pushing a greater, not lesser, workload on students.

A file photo of a satyagraha against education reforms

What kind of education?

The ‘pro’ reactions outlined above stem from valid concerns, and, therefore, need to be taken seriously. Relatedly, we have to keep in mind that opening the process up to public engagement will not necessarily result in some of the outcomes, those particularly in the HSS academic community, would like to see, such as increasing the HSS component in the syllabus, changing weightages assigned to such subjects, reintroducing them to the basket of mandatory subjects, etc., because of the increasing traction of STEM subjects as a surer way to lock in a good future income.

Academics do have a role to play here, though: 1) actively engage with various groups of people to understand their rationales behind supporting or opposing the reforms; 2) reflect on how such preferences are constituted, and what they in turn contribute towards constituting (including the global and local patterns of accumulation and structures of oppression they perpetuate); 3) bring these reflections back into further conversations, enabling a mutually conditioning exchange; 4) collectively work out a plan for reforming education based on the above, preferably in an arrangement that directly informs policy. A reform process informed by such a dialectical exchange, and a system of education based on the results of these reflections, will have greater substantive value while also responding to the changing times.

Two important prerequisites for this kind of endeavour to succeed are that first, academics participate, irrespective of whether they publicly endorsed this government or not, and second, that the government responds with humility and accountability, without denial and shifting the blame on to individuals. While we cannot help the second, we can start with the first.

Conclusion

For a government that came into power riding the wave of ‘system change’, it is perhaps more important than for any other government that these reforms are done for the right reasons, not to mention following the right methods (of consultation and deliberation). For instance, developing soft skills or incorporating vocational education to the curriculum could be done either in a way that reproduces Sri Lanka’s marginality in the global economic order (which is ‘system preservation’), or lays the groundwork to develop a workforce first and foremost for the country, limited as this approach may be. An inextricable concern is what is denoted by ‘the country’ here: a few affluent groups, a majority ethno-religious category, or everyone living here? How we define ‘the country’ will centrally influence how education policy (among others) will be formulated, just as much as the quality of education influences how we – students, teachers, parents, policymakers, bureaucrats, ‘experts’ – think about such categories. That is precisely why more thought should go to education policymaking than perhaps any other sector.

(Hasini Lecamwasam is attached to the Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya).

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

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