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The Catastrophic Impact of Tropical Cyclone Ditwah on Sri Lanka:

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Nail heads are connected by beams. In between, vegetation introduced by hydroseeding. Soil nailing with shotcrete Facing, Improvement of surface drainage. Pictures adapted from internet.

A Comprehensive Examination of Human Loss, Environmental Devastation, and Governance Failure

Tropical Cyclone Ditwah, which blew its way across Sri Lanka between November 27 and November 30, 2025, has emerged as one of the lengthiest, destructive natural disasters in the country’s modern history. Although it did not surpass the human death toll of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, which claimed approximately 40,000 lives, its scale of destruction, economic cost, geographic spread, and the depth of infrastructural collapse have collectively positioned Ditwah as the most economically devastating catastrophe Sri Lanka has faced since independence.

The cyclone’s arrival exposed not only the vulnerability of the island’s terrain, especially its central hill country, but also the alarming weaknesses in governance, preparedness, and coordinated emergency response within the incumbent administration. For days, the cyclone battered the central highlands with relentless rainfall, triggering landslides, avalanches of mud, and sudden reservoir spillovers that swept through valleys, villages, and towns with little warning.

More than 550 millimetres of rain fell within twenty-four hours across several districts, overwhelming all natural and engineered waterways and turning mountain slopes into sheets of sliding earth. The regions of Badulla, Kandy, Matale, and Nuwara Eliya suffered the heaviest toll, with nearby communities in Kurunegala, the North, North Central, and Eastern provinces also sustaining widespread damage as rivers overflowed, irrigation systems collapsed, and entire settlements found themselves submerged or erased.

In the chaos that followed Ditwah’s landfall, the human cost became painfully apparent. By six o’clock in the evening on December 2, government estimates and independent assessments suggested that more than 1.5 million Sri Lankans had sought refuge in schools, temples, community halls, churches, and makeshift shelters while reported death tall is around 500+. Though the magnitude of the destruction clearly suggests a far higher death toll, with estimates likely exceeding 1,000.

Many arrived at these makeshift facilities barefoot, injured, drenched, and carrying nothing but the clothes they had been wearing when they fled. Homes had crumbled on top of families as hillsides collapsed. Water had risen unexpectedly in the dead of night. Tidal surges along rivers, exacerbated by sudden spill releases from large reservoirs, had torn homes from their foundations. More than 500,000 families were directly or indirectly affected; thousands of houses were utterly destroyed. In several districts, mudslides buried entire neighbourhoods, leaving only rooftops visible above the soil or nothing at all.

Some of the most harrowing stories came from Gampola, Minipe, Kotmale, and Walapane, where rescue teams reported scenes reminiscent of the worst tragedies Sri Lanka has ever endured. In more than one location, entire extended families had been wiped out, leaving not a single surviving relative. Such complete erasure of households had not been seen in this magnitude since the tsunami of 2004.

The question many Sri Lankans are now asking is whether the disaster had to be so severe. Local and international meteorological agencies issued repeated warnings days before Ditwah made landfall, but these warnings failed to translate into effective readiness or evacuation protocols. Despite the clearly predicted rainfall patterns and the heightened probability of landslides in the central hills, the government’s disaster management apparatus was sluggish, uncoordinated, and riddled with political interference.

Local authorities complained that they have not received coordinated instructions from political authorities within the government. District-level officers struggled to determine which chain of command to follow during financial disbursement for welfare and support: either presidential directions or newly implemented Anti-corruption Act. Reservoir management units did not synchronize their operations, and spill gates were opened abruptly in several major reservoirs, including Kotmale, Randenigala, Victoria, and Moragahakanda.

These sudden releases unleashed violent torrents downstream, catching residents off guard and amplifying both human and property losses. In many cases, villagers reported that they heard the roar of rushing water minutes before their homes were consumed. The failure to provide timely evacuation notices or spill warnings has become a major point of public anger, with many accusing the government of negligence, complacency, and a failure to act decisively in the face of impending catastrophe.

The chief custodian of the Sacred Tooth Relic in Kandy, Pradeep Nilanga Dela, together with the Buddhist clergy, was among the first to respond by providing food and essential support to affected communities despite shortcomings in the government’s disaster-management mechanism. The Sri Lanka Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police also extended tremendous assistance in evacuation efforts, although these operations were at times uncoordinated due to the scale of the crisis.

Local communities and youth groups, including well-known YouTubers such as Kelum Jayasumana, Waruna Rajapaksha, Sepal Amarasinghe, and Iraj Weeraratne, as well as Milinda Rajapaksha of Biththalksala, the ThreePosha group, and many other volunteer organizations, played a major role in providing food and relief to nearly 1.5 million displaced people across the country. Buddhist temples islandwide have been offering profound and continuous support to these humanitarian activities.

Hundreds of university students, especially those trapped in hostels at the severely affected University of Peradeniya, received meals and essential supplies predominantly from the Sri Dalada Maligawa, Kandy. At the time of writing, several evacuation sites and affected groups are still awaiting adequate welfare assistance. The Sabaragamuwa University community, electronic media giants such as Hiru, Derana along with many Old Boys’ Associations of prominent colleges, were also among the major responders. The Government Medical Officers’ Association (GMOA), in collaboration with medical students from universities that were not impacted, established medical camps and an online counseling service to support victims. Sri Lanka’s private tuition providers, including prominent educators such as Dinesh Muthugala, along with many other community support groups, also stepped forward to fill critical gaps left by the failures in the state disaster-response system.

The impact on the central highlands has been particularly severe, with the mountainous terrain amplifying the destructive potential of heavy rainfall. The steep slopes of Badulla, Matale, Kotmale, Gampola, Walapane, and Minipe turned into dangerous channels for mud and debris. Landslides were so extensive in some locations that rescue workers described entire landscapes as “unrecognizable.” Roads disappeared under several metres of mud. Tea plantations that had stood for generations were stripped bare. Estate line rooms were flattened, and in some cases, completely buried.

Hundreds are still missing in these areas, and officials warn that many bodies may never be recovered due to the unstable soil and the scale of the terrain collapse. Survivors who lost their families wander through temporary shelters in a state of shock, clinging to photographs, schoolbooks, or items pulled from the mud—often the last remaining evidence that their loved ones existed.

Yet, Ditwah’s significance extends beyond its immediate human tragedy. It struck at a time when the country’s economic and infrastructural landscape had evolved dramatically compared to 2004. When the tsunami hit, Sri Lanka had limited large-scale infrastructure, modest tourist development, and a smaller network of modern roads. Reconstruction, though painful, did not involve rebuilding the colossal national assets that today define the country’s economy.

In contrast, by 2025, Sri Lanka had spent more than a decade investing in large development projects, much of which occurred during the 2010–2015 period under President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Those years saw the construction of highways, expressways, expanded ports, new airports, modern bridges, and upgraded transport systems that reshaped the national economy and positioned Sri Lanka as a tourist and logistical hub in South Asia. This infrastructure was designed to endure decades. Yet Ditwah’s ferocity inflicted damage that experts believe may take years – and in some cases, perhaps a generation – to repair.

Ironically, it was the infrastructure of the Rajapaksa era that prevented the disaster from becoming even more deadly. As Ditwah knocked out nearly every A-class and B-class road in the central, northern, and eastern regions, the country’s expressway network remained largely operational. The Southern Expressway, the Katunayake Expressway, and the Outer Circular Expressway served as the only reliable land routes for emergency convoys, medical transfers, and military deployments.

Without these expressways, Sri Lanka’s most affected regions would have been completely isolated, making the delivery of relief and rescue assets far slower, more dangerous, and potentially impossible. Rescue workers, emergency physicians, and the armed forces relied heavily on these highways to access the worst-hit districts. Food, medicine, water, and fuel were transported almost exclusively through these corridors during the first 72 hours of the crisis. The fact that the expressway system withstood the cyclone has prompted both relief and reflection. While it stands as a testament to long-term infrastructure planning, it also underscores the fragility of the rest of the country’s transport network, which collapsed under the combined force of rainfall, flooding, and landslides.

The disruption to education has been severe. Schools across the island remain closed until December 16, while universities are shut until December 8 due to damaged buildings, inaccessible roads, and their repurposing as emergency shelters. The GCE Advanced Level examination, which was underway when the cyclone struck, has been canceled and postponed indefinitely, leaving hundreds of thousands of students in uncertainty.

The psychological toll on young people, especially those displaced with their families or who lost homes or relatives, will likely take months to properly assess. Many students interviewed at shelters said they felt as though their future had collapsed along with their homes. Some described leaving exam halls only to find rivers overflowing, walls cracking, and chaos erupting around them. The sudden halt of a national examination -a rare event – underscores the magnitude of Ditwah’s disruption of daily life.

Economically, Sri Lanka faces a long and arduous recovery. The destruction of tea estates in Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, and Kandy poses a significant blow to one of the country’s most valuable export sectors. Landslides have ruined slopes that have taken decades to cultivate. Vegetables, which the central highlands supply to much of the nation, have been lost in enormous quantities. The North Central and Eastern provinces, which function as key rice-producing regions, suffered severe flooding that destroyed large stretches of paddy fields.

Irrigation channels, small-scale tanks, and large reservoirs have been damaged, blocked, or filled with silt. Livestock losses across multiple districts add a further layer of agricultural disruption. Economists warn that food prices will rise sharply in the coming months, export earnings will fall, and supply shortages may persist well into 2026. Reconstruction of roads, bridges, culverts, water systems, and damaged power infrastructure is expected to consume vast resources at a time when Sri Lanka’s economy is still struggling with debt, inflation, and reduced fiscal capacity.

This disaster has also forced a critical public conversation about preparedness, governance, and the apparent failures of state institutions. Many citizens argue that while the cyclone itself was unstoppable, its deadliest consequences were not. The lack of coordinated communication, delayed evacuations, and sudden, poorly managed reservoir spillway releases have drawn intense scrutiny. Freelance investigations have already begun into whether certain reservoir operations violated established safety and warning protocols.

Some experts warn that political interference in technical decisions may have contributed to the chaos. Reports from district engineers suggest that requests for controlled, phased releases were ignored or overridden until the situation became unmanageable, forcing emergency gate openings that released thousands of cubic meters of water at once. Communities downstream -some of which had no history of flooding-were hit without warning. Survivors describe hearing what sounded like “a waterfall appearing from nowhere” before torrents engulfed their homes.

In the aftermath, the emotional weight of the disaster is overwhelming. Journalists and aid workers entering Gampola, Walapane, Minipe, and Kotmale have described scenes of profound grief and desolation. Parents sit silently beside the ruins of their homes, unsure whether their missing children are buried beneath the soil or carried away by floodwaters. Elderly survivors wander through shelters unable to locate relatives or neighbours. In some communities, mass graves have been dug for unidentified victims, echoing the darkest days of 2004. Funeral rites are performed in hurried, crowded shelters as survivors try to reconcile the magnitude of their loss. Entire generations of families have been wiped out in some hillside villages, leaving only distant relatives to grieve on their behalf.

Despite the overwhelming tragedy, stories of courage have also emerged. Volunteers, both local and international, have rushed into danger zones, pulling survivors from collapsed structures, carrying injured elders across flooded roads, and working around the clock to distribute food and clean water. Medical teams have set up mobile clinics along expressway exits and in remote rural schools. The armed forces have deployed helicopters to airlift trapped residents from landslide-prone ridges.

Yet even these remarkable efforts cannot mask the sobering reality: the scale of the disaster far exceeded the capacity of Sri Lanka’s emergency response systems. The country now stands at a crossroads, confronting questions that cannot be postponed. How can Sri Lanka adapt to a future in which extreme weather events are accelerating due to global climate change? Are existing disaster-response frameworks adequate for the new climate reality? What reforms are required to ensure that reservoir management, early warning systems, and evacuation protocols function with precision and authority? And most importantly, what political and administrative changes are necessary to prevent preventable loss of life during future crises?

Cyclone Ditwah will be remembered not only for the destruction it unleashed, but for the uncomfortable truths it revealed. It exposed the fragility of the nation’s governance structures, the consequences of political fragmentation, and the urgent need for professionalized disaster management. At the same time, it highlighted the enduring value of robust infrastructure, exemplified by the expressway network that served as a lifeline when the rest of the country was cut off.

While the human death toll, though painfully high, may remain below that of the 2004 tsunami, the economic damage is without precedent. Rebuilding will take years. Restoring agricultural productivity will take seasons. Reconstructing roads, bridges, schools, and reservoirs will require financial resources that Sri Lanka can scarcely afford. But the deepest scars will be carried by the families who have lost everything, by the children whose education has been shattered, and by the communities that now exist only as memories beneath landslides and floodwaters.

As Sri Lanka begins the long road to recovery, Ditwah stands as a stark reminder that natural disasters, when met with insufficient preparedness and fragmented governance, become national tragedies of far greater magnitude. Techniques such as soil nailing with a shotcrete facing, along with improved surface drainage systems-including the construction of basin drains at valley points to collect runoff and channel it into cascade drains-are essential methods that Sri Lanka must adopt to prevent landslides in the future (Figure 1 and Figure 2). The storm has passed, but its impact will shape the nation’s future for decades to come.

Sri Lanka now needs strong international support to recover from the massive losses caused by Ditwah. This recovery effort requires close collaboration with global partners, including India, the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan, and China, as well as both G8 and BRICS nations. Notably, India’s prompt response—along with the statements and commitments made by the Indian Finance Minister and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been especially appreciated. Their call to initiate a Sri Lanka Rebuilding Donor Conference could play a pivotal role in the country’s recovery and long-term reconstruction. It is essential that the Government of Sri Lanka begins this process immediately, without any delay.

About the Writer:

Writer is senior academic at Sabaragamuwa University of Sri Lanka, Fulbright scholar, Indian Science Research Fellow, Australian Endeavor fellow and also visiting Professor in University of Nebraska, Lincoln, USA. His international experience in various policy events and also experience in disaster and human and animal catastrophic management during 2019-2022 is significant, He served as Chairman National Livestock Development Board during 2019-2022 and also served as Dean- Faculty of Agriculture at Sabaragamuwa University of Sri Lanka.

E mail; . magamage@agri.sab.ac.lk.

By Prof. MPS Magamage
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences,
Sabaragamuwa University of Sri Lanka


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We handed every child a screen and called it progress. Now what?

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SERIES: THE GREAT DIGITAL RETHINK: PART I OF V

The Great Digital Bet

Cast your mind back to the late 1990s. Technology evangelists, in government, in schools, in Silicon Valley boardrooms, were making a very confident prediction: the classroom of the future would be digital, and that future was essentially already here. Wire the schools. Buy the computers. Train the teachers to press the right buttons. And stand back as a generation of turbo-charged, digitally-empowered learners leapfrogs every educational problem ever known to humanity.

It was, to be fair, an intoxicating idea. Who wouldn’t want to modernise education? Who could argue against progress? And so governments around the world, rich and poor, north and south, opened their wallets and signed their contracts. Phase One of the Great Digital Experiment had begun, and very few people were allowed to ask awkward questions.

From Computer Labs to Pocket Supercomputers

Through the 2000s, the experiment scaled up. We moved from shared computer labs to 1:1 device programmes, a laptop or tablet for every child, like some kind of annual prize-giving that never ended. Vendors introduced the irresistibly catchy notion of ‘digital natives,’ a generation supposedly born knowing how to swipe, and, therefore, desperately in need of classrooms that matched their wired-up lives. And, gradually, quietly, commercial platforms began mediating almost everything that happened between a teacher and a student.

The research, even then, was sending mixed signals. OECD data showed that more personal screen time was not automatically producing better learners. Students who used computers heavily in school were not streaking ahead in reading or maths. But these inconvenient findings were absorbed into a simple narrative: the problem was not the technology, it was how teachers were using it. More training. Better platforms. Upgraded hardware. The answer, invariably, was more.

‘The pen is mightier than the keyboard’,

a slogan that turned a psychology study into a revolution in educational policy.

Then the Pandemic Happened

And then came COVID-19, and suddenly every school in the world was forced to discover whether digital education actually worked when it had no analogue alternative. The answer, for most children, was: not very well. Schools closed, screens opened, and learning largely ground to a halt, not because the technology failed, but because education, it turned out, is stubbornly, irreducibly human. What worked was teachers who knew their students, relationships built over time, the unquantifiable texture of a real classroom. A Zoom rectangle, however crisp the resolution, is not a substitute.

The pandemic accelerated digitalisation to a degree nobody had planned for and exposed its limits simultaneously. UNESCO’s own global monitoring report, not exactly a hotbed of anti-technology radicalism, sounded the alarm in 2023, issuing what amounted to a polite institutional apology: technology in education must be a tool that serves learners, not an end in itself. Translation: we may have overdone it.

The Evidence Catches Up

The science, meanwhile, had been accumulating quietly. A widely cited study showed that students who take notes by hand retain and understand information better than those typing on laptops, not because handwriting is some mystical ancient craft, but because the physical slowness forces you to process, summarise and think, while typing tempts you into verbatim transcription. Your fingers race across the keyboard and your brain mostly stays home.

At the scale of entire school systems, OECD analysis of PISA 2022 results, which showed historic declines in reading and mathematics across member countries, drew a striking curve: moderate use of digital devices is associated with better outcomes, but heavy use, especially for leisure during school time, correlates with lower performance. Not a little lower. Substantially lower. And this held true even after accounting for students’ socioeconomic backgrounds. In other words, digital distraction is an equal-opportunity problem.

PISA 2022 also produced some of the most dismal reading and maths scores seen in decades across wealthy nations. Was technology entirely to blame? Almost certainly not. But policymakers looking for something tangible to point at, and something they could actually change before the next election, had found their answer.

The Revolt of the Sensible

Finland, long the world’s favourite education success story, passed legislation in 2025 restricting mobile phone use in schools. Phones are now generally prohibited during lessons unless a teacher grants specific permission. Sweden went further still, announcing a full national ban, phones collected at the start of the school day and returned at dismissal, to take effect in 2026. The Swedes had already begun quietly rolling back their earlier enthusiasm for digital devices in preschools, reintroducing books and handwriting after noticing that children’s reading comprehension was suffering. Australia’s Queensland state had already launched its ‘away for the day’ policy, extending the ban to break times as well as lessons. We do not yet know how other wealthy, technologically advanced countries will respond to this challenge, but they are undoubtedly watching the pioneers of de-digitalisation with close attention.

These are not technophobic, backwards-looking nations. Finland and Sweden sit at the very top of every global education ranking. They have the infrastructure, the teacher quality and the research capacity to make considered decisions. What they have decided, after three decades of enthusiastic investment in digital education, is that smartphones in the hands of children during school hours are doing more harm than good. That is a significant statement from people who know what they are talking about.

The Two-Speed World

Here is where things become genuinely uncomfortable for the international education community. While many rich countries like Finland, Sweden and Australia are scaling back, vast swathes of the world are still scaling up. Across parts of South Asia, Africa and Latin America, and in pockets of the Global North that never quite caught up, governments are signing major contracts for tablet programmes and AI tutoring tools. They are, in good faith, doing what wealthy countries told them to do 30 years ago: invest in technology and watch the learning happen.

The people selling them these systems are not pointing to the Nordic retreat.

The multilateral organisations and development banks financing their ed-tech purchases have been slow to update their models. And so the world is now running two parallel education experiments simultaneously:

some rich countries are de-digitalising, while everyone else is still trying to digitalise in the first place. The disparity is not merely ironic, it raises serious questions about who sets the agenda for global education reform, and whose children bear the cost of getting it wrong. While Finland retreats from the classroom screen, others are still signing the contracts that will fill theirs.

What This Series Is About

Over the next four articles, this column will trace this story across every level of education, from primary classrooms where six-year-olds are learning cursive again in Stockholm, to universities where academics are requiring handwritten examinations partly to outwit AI essay-generators. We will look at the evidence honestly, without either the breathless optimism that launched the digital revolution or the nostalgic panic now driving some of the backlash.

We will also ask the question that international education policy rarely pauses to ask: when the wealthy world discovers that an experiment has not gone quite as planned, who bears the cost of correction, and who is still being sold the original experiment at full price?

De-digitalisation is not a confession. It is, at best, a mid-course correction by systems with the luxury of one. The real question is what we owe the rest of the world, which hasn’t had that luxury yet.

SERIES ROADMAP

Part I: From Ed-Tech Enthusiasm to De-Digitalisation (this article) | Part II: Phones, Pens & Early Literacy in Primary Schools | Part III: Attention, Algorithms & Adolescents in Secondary Education | Part IV: Universities, AI & the Return of the Handwritten Exam | Part V: A Critical Theory of Educational De-Digitalisation

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)

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Relief without recovery

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A US airstrike on an Iranian oil storage facility

The escalating conflict in the Middle East is of such magnitude, with loss of life, destruction of cities, and global energy shortages, that it is diverting attention worldwide and in Sri Lanka, from other serious problems. Barely four months ago Sri Lanka experienced a cyclone of epic proportions that caused torrential rains, accompanied by floods and landslides. The immediate displacement exceeded one million people, though the number of deaths was about 640, with around 200 others reported missing. The visual images of entire towns and villages being inundated, with some swept away by floodwaters, evoked an overwhelming humanitarian response from the general population.

When the crisis of displacement was at its height there was a concerted public response. People set up emergency kitchens and volunteer clean up teams fanned out to make flooded homes inhabitable again. Religious institutions, civil society organisations and local communities worked together to assist the displaced. For a brief period the country witnessed a powerful demonstration of social solidarity. The scale of the devastation prompted the government to offer generous aid packages. These included assistance for the rebuilding of damaged houses, support for building new houses, grants for clean up operations and rent payments to displaced families. Welfare centres were also set up for those unable to find temporary housing.

The government also appointed a Presidential Task Force to lead post-cyclone rebuilding efforts. The mandate of the Task Force is to coordinate post-disaster response mechanisms, streamline institutional efforts and ensure the effective implementation of rebuilding programmes in the aftermath of the cyclone. The body comprises a high-level team, led by the Prime Minister, and including cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, provincial-level officials, senior public servants, representing key state institutions, and civil society representatives. It was envisaged that the Task Force would function as the central coordinating authority, working with government agencies and other stakeholders to accelerate recovery initiatives and restore essential services in affected regions.

Demotivated Service

However, four months later a visit to one of the worst of the cyclone affected areas to meet with affected families from five villages revealed that they remained stranded and in a state of limbo. Most of these people had suffered terribly from the cyclone. Some had lost their homes. A few had lost family members. Many had been informed that the land on which they lived had become unsafe and that they would need to relocate. Most of them had received the promised money for clean up and some had received rent payments for two months. However, little had happened beyond this. The longer term process of rebuilding houses, securing land and restoring livelihoods has barely begun. As a result, families who had already endured the trauma of disaster, now face prolonged uncertainty about their future. It seems that once again the promises made by the political leadership has not reached the ground.

A government officer explained that the public service was highly demotivated. According to him, many officials felt that they had too much work piled upon them with too little resources to do much about it. They also believed that they were underpaid for the work they were expected to carry out. In fact, there had even been a call by public officials specially assigned to cyclone relief work to go on strike due to complaints about their conditions of work. This government official appreciated the government leadership’s commitment to non corruption. But he noted the irony that this had also contributed to a demotivation of the public service. This was on the unjustifiable basis that approving and implementing projects more quickly requires an incentive system.

Whether or not this explanation fully captures the situation, it points to an issue that the government needs to address. Disaster recovery requires a proactive public administration. Officials need to reach out to affected communities, provide clear information and help them navigate the complex procedures required to access assistance. At the consultation with cyclone victims this was precisely the concern that people raised. They said that government officers were not proactive in reaching out to them. Many felt they had little engagement with the state and that the government officers did not come to them. This suggests that the government system at the community level could be supported by non-governmental organisations that have the capacity and experience of working with communities at the grassroots.

In situations such as this the government needs to think about ways of motivating public officials to do more rather than less. It needs to identify legitimate incentives that reward initiative and performance. These could include special allowances for those working in disaster affected areas, recognition and promotion for officers who successfully complete relief and reconstruction work, and the provision of additional staff and logistical support so that the workload is manageable. Clear targets and deadlines, with support from the non-governmental sector, can also encourage officials to act more proactively. When government officers feel supported and recognised for the extra effort required, they are more likely to engage actively with affected communities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most.

Political Solutions

Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the cyclone victims do not know what to do. The government needs to act on this without further delay. Government policy states that families can receive financial assistance of up to Rs 5 million to build new houses if they have identified the land on which they wish to build. But there is little freehold land available in many of the affected areas. As a result, people cannot show government officials the land they plan to buy and, therefore, cannot access the government’s promised funds. The government needs to address this issue by providing a list of available places for resettlement, both within and outside the area they live in. However, another finding at the meeting was that many cyclone victims whose lands have been declared unsafe do not wish to leave them. Even those who have been told that their land is unstable feel more comfortable remaining where they have lived for many years. Relocating to an unfamiliar area is not an easy decision.

Another problem the victims face is the difficulty of obtaining the documents necessary to receive compensation. Families with missing members cannot prove that their loved ones are no longer alive. Without official confirmation they cannot access property rights or benefits that would normally pass to surviving family members. These are problems that Sri Lanka has faced before in the context of the three decade long internal war. It has set up new legal mechanisms such as the provision of certificates of absence validated by the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in place of death certificates when individuals remain missing for long periods. The government also needs to be sensitive to the fact that people who are farmers cannot be settled anywhere. Farming is not possible in every location. Access to suitable land and water is essential if farmers are to rebuild their livelihoods. Relocation programmes that fail to take these realities into account risk creating new psychological and economic hardships.

The message from the consultation with cyclone victims is that the government needs to talk more and engage more directly with affected communities. At the same time the political leadership at the highest levels need to resolve the problems that government officers on the ground cannot solve. Issues relating to land availability, legal documentation and livelihood restoration require policy decisions at higher levels. The challenge to the government to address these issues in the context of the Iran war and possible global catastrophe will require a special commitment. Demonstrating that Sri Lanka is a society that considers the wellbeing of all its citizens to be a priority will require not only financial assistance but also a motivated public service and proactive political leadership that reaches out to those still waiting to rebuild their lives.

 

by Jehan Perera

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Supporting Victims: The missing link in combating ragging

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A recent panel discussion at the University of Peradeniya examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s judgement on ragging, in which the Court recognised that preventing ragging requires not only criminal penalties imposed after an incident occurs but also systems and processes within universities that enable victims to speak up and receive support. Bringing together perspectives from law, university administration, psychology and students, the discussion sought to understand why ragging continues to persist in Sri Lankan universities despite the existence of legal prohibitions. While the discussion covered legal and institutional dimensions, one theme emerged clearly: addressing ragging requires more than laws and disciplinary rules. It requires institutions that are capable of supporting victims.

Sri Lanka enacted the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Educational Institutions Act No. 20 of 1998 following several tragic incidents in universities, during the 1990s. Among the most widely remembered is the death of engineering student S. Varapragash at the University of Peradeniya in 1997. Incidents such as this shocked the country and revealed the consequences of allowing violent forms of student hierarchy to persist. The 1998 Act marked an important legal intervention by recognising ragging as a criminal offence. The law introduced severe penalties for individuals found guilty of engaging in ragging or other forms of violence in educational institutions, including fines and imprisonment.

Despite the existence of this law for nearly three decades, prosecutions under the Act have been extremely rare. Incidents continue to surface across universities although most are not reported. The incidents that do reach university administrations are dealt with internally through disciplinary procedures rather than through the criminal justice system. This suggests that the problem does not lie solely in the absence of legal provisions but also in the ability of victims to come forward and pursue complaints.

The tragic reminders; the cases of Varapragash and Pasindu Hirushan

Varapragash, a first-year engineering student at the University of Peradeniya, was forced by senior students to perform extreme physical exercises as part of ragging, resulting in severe internal injuries and acute renal failure that ultimately led to his death. In 2022, the courts upheld the conviction of one of the perpetrators for abduction and murder. The case illustrates not only the brutality of ragging but also how long and difficult the path to justice can be for victims and their families. Even when victims speak about their experiences, they may not always disclose the full extent of what they have endured. In the case of Varapragash, the judgement records that the victim told his father that he was asked to do dips and sit-ups. Varapragash’s father had testified that it appeared his son was not revealing the exact details of what he had to endure due to shame.

More than two decades after the death of Varapragash, the tragedy of ragging continues. The 2025 Supreme Court judgement arose from the case of Pasindu Hirushan, a 21-year-old student of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, who sustained devastating head injuries at a fresher’s party, in March 2020, after a tyre sent down the stairs by senior students struck him. He became immobile, was placed on life support, and returned home only months later. If the Varapragash case exposed the deadly consequences of ragging in the 1990s, the Pasindu Hirushan case demonstrates that universities are still failing to prevent serious violence, decades after the enactment of the 1998 Act. It was against this background of continuing institutional failure that the Supreme Court issued its Orders of Court in 2025. Among the key mechanisms emphasised by the judgement is the establishment of Victim Support Committees within universities.

Why do victims need support?

Ragging in universities can take many forms, including verbal humiliation, physical abuse, emotional intimidation and, in some instances, sexual harassment. While all forms of ragging can have serious consequences, incidents involving sexual harassment often present additional barriers for victims who wish to come forward. Victims may hesitate to complain due to weak institutional mechanisms, fear of retaliation, or uncertainty about whether their experiences will be taken seriously. In many cases, those who speak out are confronted with questions that shift attention away from the alleged misconduct and onto their own behaviour: why did s/he continue the conversation?; why did s/he not simply disengage, if the harassment occurred as claimed?; why did s/he remain in the environment?; or did his/her actions somehow encourage the accused’s behaviour? Such responses illustrate how easily victims can be subjected to a second layer of scrutiny when they attempt to report incidents. When individuals anticipate disbelief, minimisation or blame, silence may appear safer than disclosure. In such circumstances, the presence of a trusted institutional body, capable of providing guidance, protection and support, become critically important, highlighting the need for effective Victim Support Committees within universities.

What Victim Support Committees must do

As expected by the Supreme Court, an effective Victim Support Committee should function as a trusted institutional mechanism that places the safety and dignity of victims at the centre of its work. The committee must provide a safe and confidential point of contact through which victims can report incidents of ragging without fear of intimidation or retaliation. It should assist victims in understanding and pursuing available complaint procedures, while also ensuring their immediate protection where there is a risk of continued harassment. Recognising the psychological harm ragging may cause, the committee should facilitate access to counselling and emotional support services. At a practical level, it should also help victims document incidents, record statements, and preserve evidence that may be necessary for disciplinary or legal proceedings. The committee must coordinate with university authorities to ensure that complaints are addressed promptly and responsibly, while maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the identity and well-being of those who come forward. Beyond responding to individual cases, Victim Support Committees should also contribute to broader awareness and prevention efforts, within universities, helping to create an environment where ragging is actively discouraged and students feel safe to report incidents. Without such support, the process of pursuing justice can become overwhelming for individuals who are already dealing with the emotional impact of abuse.

Making Victim Support Committees work

According to the Orders of Court, these committees should include representatives from the academic and non-academic staff, a qualified counsellor and/or clinical psychologist, an independent person, from outside the institution, with experience in law enforcement, health, or social services, and not more than three final-year students, with unblemished academic and disciplinary records, appointed for fixed terms. Further, universities must ensure that committees consist of individuals who possess both expertise and genuine commitment in areas such as student welfare, psychology, gender studies, human rights and law enforcement, in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s directions, rather than consisting largely of ex officio positions. If treated as routine administrative positions, rather than responsibilities requiring specialised knowledge, sensitivity and empathy, these committees risk becoming symbolic rather than functional.

Greater transparency in the appointment process could strengthen the credibility of these committees. Universities could invite expressions of interest from individuals with relevant expertise and demonstrated commitment to supporting victims. Such an approach would help ensure that the committees benefit from the knowledge and dedication of those best equipped to fulfil this role.

The Supreme Court judgement also introduces an important safeguard by giving the University Grants Commission (UGC) the authority to appoint members to university-level Victim Support Committees. If exercised with integrity, this provision could help ensure that these committees operate with greater independence. It may also help address a challenge that sometimes arises within institutions, where individuals, with relevant expertise, or strong commitment to addressing issues, such as violence, harassment or student welfare, may not always be included in institutional mechanisms due to internal administrative preferences. External oversight by the UGC could, therefore, create opportunities for such individuals to contribute meaningfully to Victim Support Committees and strengthen their effectiveness.

Ultimately, the success of the recent judgement will depend not only on the directives it issued, the number of committees universities establish, or the number of meetings they convene, or other box-checking exercises, but on how sincerely those directives are implemented and the trust these committees inspire among students and staff. Laws can prohibit ragging, but they cannot by themselves create environments in which victims feel safe to speak. That responsibility lies with institutions. When universities create systems that listen to victims, support them and treat their experiences with seriousness, universities will become places where dignity and learning can coexist.

(Udari Abeyasinghe is attached to the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

by Udari Abeyasinghe

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