Features
Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part III
Global Strategic Transformations
Since the 16th century, global power has largely been concentrated in the West, driven by European colonial expansion, industrialisation, and later, US dominance. However, in the 21st century, this balance is gradually, yet profoundly, shifting. This global power shift is evident in four key trends that have shaped the post-Cold War era: the relative decline of the United States, a renewed Cold War-style rivalry between China and the US, Asia’s resurgence, and the US policy shift—its pivot to Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy must navigate these structural shifts, which carry significant implications for economic partnerships, security alliances, and geopolitical positioning.
Relative Decline of the United States
The relative economic and political decline of the United States, in the new millennium, marked a pivotal turning point in global power dynamics. The US leadership interpreted the end of the Cold War as an ideological victory for liberal democracy. The Cold War did not end through a violent military confrontation, but rather as a result of the voluntary dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the immediate aftermath, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower, the undisputed leader of the global order. However, over time, the US began to face mounting challenges from both internal and external factors. The 2008 financial crisis, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and increasing domestic political polarization all contributed to a decline in US global influence.
The decline of US power, as a global leader, is not sudden. As early as 1973, President Richard Nixon acknowledged that the post-war era in international relations had ended. He observed that the United States had shifted from a nuclear monopoly in the mid-1940s to nuclear superiority in the 1950s and, by the 1960s, to rough strategic parity with the Soviet Union. The Nixon-Kissinger leadership predicted that more complex multi-polar power relations were emerging, replacing the simple bi-polar alignments that characterised the post-World War II era. He also noted that the changing mood of the American people signalled the end of the postwar international order. At the beginning of the Cold War, the US public strongly supported a global leadership role. However, Nixon observed that “after almost three decades, our enthusiasm was waning and the results of our generosity were being questioned. Our policies need change, not only to match new realities in the world but also to meet a new mood in America” (Nixon, Shaping a Durable Peace, 1973: 3). Nixon’s observations on the shifting US global role became particularly relevant in the post-Cold War era, three decades later. The rise of nationalist and inward-looking policies, epitomised by President Donald Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ démarche, reflected a renewed skepticism toward US global commitments. His policies, along with his return to the political stage, underscored the tensions between America’s global leadership roles and growing concerns about its relative US economic and political decline.
The transformation of US policy in the Indian Ocean reflects the relative decline of American hegemony in the region. While the US initially relied on military dominance—anchored by Diego Garcia as a critical logistics hub—shifts in global power dynamics have forced a strategic recalibration. The growing influence of China, the rise of regional naval powers, like India, and increasing challenges to unilateral US military presence, have made it difficult to sustain the same level of dominance. As a result, US policy has evolved from a posture of overwhelming military superiority to a more nuanced, cooperative, and regionally integrated approach, signalling a shift in its ability to unilaterally dictate security dynamics in the Indian Ocean. The Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (1991) successfully expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait but entangled the US in prolonged Middle Eastern conflicts. Similarly, Operation Enduring Freedom (2001) swiftly removed the Taliban from power in Kabul, yet the economic and human costs of maintaining a long-term presence in Afghanistan underscored the limitations of US military interventions in the post-Cold War historical context.
China’s Rise and Evolving
‘New Cold War’
China has taken on an increasingly proactive role in global diplomacy and economics, solidifying its position as a 21st-century superpower. This growing leadership is evident in major initiatives, like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both of which expand China’s influence on the world stage. The Economist noted that “China’s decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform” (The Economist, 11 November 2014). Thus far, China’s ascent to global superpower status has been largely peaceful.
China’s influence is evident in its extensive investments in port infrastructure, maritime trade routes, and strategic partnerships under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The United States sees this growing presence as a direct challenge to its global dominance, particularly as China deepens its economic entrenchment and modernises its military. US officials worry that dual-use facilities, an expanding naval footprint, and greater regional influence could undermine power projection, disrupt open sea lanes, and weaken allied security. In response, the US has intensified alliances, expanded security cooperation, and bolstered its military presence to counteract what it perceives as an erosion of its global primacy. As a result, the intensifying rivalry between China and the United States appears to be shaping the global strategic landscape in the 21st century.
The current Sino-US rivalry differs from the US-Soviet Cold War in several key aspects. Unlike the Soviet Union, which primarily contested US dominance in military and strategic spheres, China’s challenge to US hegemony is largely economic. This competition intensified during the Trump administration, particularly through the US-China trade war. Given the deep interdependence of global economic activities, US tariffs on Chinese goods have had repercussions for both countries, affecting Americans as much as Chinese producers and consumers.
Indian Ocean small states, such as Sri Lanka, do not necessarily perceive Chinese economic initiatives through a power-political lens. Instead, they assess these initiatives based on their own economic interests and the benefits they offer. Consequently, the US strategy used to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War is unlikely to be effective in addressing the current challenge posed by China.
China’s progress in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) adds another dimension to US-China rivalry in trade and technology, digital geopolitics. In 2015, China initiated its ‘Made in China 2025’ plan, aimed at advancing high-tech manufacturing capabilities.The worldwide challenge of the dominance of US IT giants, including Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft by Chinese IT giants, such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent of came forefront in digital geopolitics. The competition to develop 5G infrastructures, viewed by both powers as pivotal for enabling the next generation of digital application, has added a new dimension to their rivalry.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is another critical frontier in UU-China competition. In March 2016, Google advanced machine-learning technology by integrating algorithms and reinforcement learning to process big data and enhance predictive capabilities. A year later, in July 2017, President Xi Jinping unveiled China’s ‘New Generation AI Development Plan,’ aiming to position China as the global leader in AI by 2030. The plan underscores the strategic advantage of exclusive technological control, allowing a nation to establish dominance before rivals can catch up (Pecotic, 2019). As Sri Lanka embarks on acquiring Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), it must navigate the intensifying digital geopolitical rivalry among global tech giants. Countries like Sri Lanka, which have only recently begun acquiring Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), must navigate carefully in the face of digital geopolitical rivalry among global powers such as China, India, and the United States.
Resurgence of Asia and the Asian Century
Another crucial development that signifies the global shift of power is the resurgence of Asia, driven by the strategic rise of China and India, along with the sustained economic growth of other key Asian economies, often referred to as the ‘Asian Tigers.’ This transformation has led to the widespread characterisation of the 21st century as the ‘Asian Century.’ The region’s rapid economic expansion, technological advancements, and growing geopolitical influence have reshaped global power dynamics, positioning Asia at the heart of international affairs. In 2019, the World Economic Forum declared, “We’ve entered the Asian Century, and there is no turning back” (World Economic Forum, 2019). This assertion reflects Asia’s role as the primary driver of global economic growth, trade, and innovation. With China and India leading the way, alongside the economic resilience of nations like Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN bloc, Asia is not merely rising—it is redefining the global order.
In the Asian Century, the Indian Ocean has emerged as a pivotal geopolitical arena where the global balance of power is increasingly contested and reshaped. As major economic and military powers vie for influence in this strategically vital region, Sri Lanka’s geostrategic significance has grown exponentially. Positioned at the crossroads of key maritime trade routes connecting East and West, Sri Lanka occupies a central role in global politics, attracting the attention of global and regional powers alike.
Sri Lanka’s enhanced strategic relevance presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it allows the country to leverage its geographic advantage for economic development, foreign investment, and diplomatic engagement. On the other hand, it requires careful navigation of complex geopolitical dynamics to maintain strategic autonomy while balancing the competing interests of global powers. In this evolving landscape, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy choices will be instrumental in shaping not only its national trajectory but also broader regional stability in the Indian Ocean.
Pivot to Asia and Indo-Pacific Concept
The emergence of the Indo-Pacific strategic concept reflects the shifting global balance of power towards the Indian Ocean. In response to Asia’s rise, the US recalibrated its approach through the ‘Pivot to Asia’ and ‘Strategic Rebalancing’ under the Obama Administration. While Obama championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a signature initiative, the Trump administration abandoned it in favour of the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy. The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of the US Department of Defence (2019) asserts: “The United States is a Pacific nation. Our ties to the Indo-Pacific are forged by history, and our future is inextricably linked… The past, present, and future of the United States are interwoven with the Indo-Pacific.” To align with this policy slant, the US Pacific Command (PACOM) renamed itself as the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in May 2018.
In addition to the United States, India, Australia, and Japan are in the forefront in promoting the concept of Indo-Pacific. Since 2010, Indian political leaders and the strategic community have actively promoted the Indo-Pacific framework. It reinforces the strategic rationale behind India’s Look East, Act East policy and expands its maneuverability beyond the Indian Ocean, aligning with its aspirations as an emerging global power. Under the Indo-Pacific strategic framework, US-India defence relations have reached a new stage, with the INDUS-X, launched on June 20, 2023, to bring together US and Indian stakeholders, including research and academic institutions, industry leaders, startups, and investors, to accelerate and scale up commercial technologies with military applications.
Southeast Asia emerges as the centre of the strategic theatre in the Indo-Pacific strategic construct, while South Asia appears to be positioned further west. At first glance, this shift may suggest a reduced strategic focus on other small states in South Asia like Sri Lanka. In fact, the connectivity of the Pacific and Indian Oceans reinforces the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, too. Rather than being sidelined, small South Asian states are positioned to benefit from the economic dynamism of Southeast and East Asia through the Indo-Pacific framework.
Sri Lanka remains strategically relevant despite a growing regional focus on Southeast Asia. Its central location ensures continued engagement from major regional and global powers. Sri Lanka’s engagement in Indo-Pacific security discourse, economic frameworks, and infrastructure initiatives will shape its ability to benefit from regional growth while balancing competing strategic interests. Strengthening regional connectivity, trade partnerships, and infrastructure development could unlock new economic opportunities. However, success will depend on Sri Lanka’s ability to navigate regional power dynamics while maintaining strategic autonomy. This highlights the critical role of foreign policy in securing the country’s interests. (To be continued)
by Gamini Keerawella
Features
Civilizational dialogue proving a remote possibility as realpolitik rages
Looking back over the years since the 9/11 catastrophe, it could be said that barring former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami no world political leader of note has made an earnest effort to change the nature of global political discourse for the better. Khatami won world acclaim for his pronouncement that the time is right to launch and sustain a ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’.
This was in marked contrast to US political scientist Samuel P. Huntingdon’s epochal theses, formulated in the wake of 9/11 and other global political tumults that the Post Cold War era is essentially one of conflicts among civilizations. That is, people’s identity markers, such as culture and religion, are the prime shaping forces of international conflicts.
From a Political Realism standpoint, Huntingdon’s theory may seem to have gained in credibility over the years but it is Khatami’s pronouncement that has evoked an empathetic response in the hearts and minds of publics world wide. So much so, 2001 was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly as the ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilizations’.
It could be said that the latter proclamation was an endeavour to give back to humans their essential identity of peace-makers. It was an eschewing of the position that war and conflict are central to the human condition and amounted to upholding constructive dialogue among peoples and civilizations as a path to peace.
That things have not worked out in the world in keeping with the expectations of peace makers does not in any way invalidate the thesis that peace is the essential propensity of humans.
If peace-making is seemingly ineffective it is primarily because the path to peace is narrow, tortuous and time-consuming. On the other hand, violence usually misleadingly recommends itself to the human as the more expedient, cost-effective way out of a conflictual situation. However, the ultimate cost of the latter approach is prohibitive because it brutalizes the human beyond recognition.
Some of the evidence is before our eyes. The Trump administration, for example, has, minus much forethought, unleashed what may be described as a ‘quick-fix’ war against Iran but is now finding that it is in a veritable military quagmire in West Asia. The priority for the administration now seems to be a face-saving escape strategy. Such are the costs of the war option.
However, there is no denying that much remains to be done by the world community to bring peoples and cultures together with a view to enabling them to work as one for the cause of a less dangerous world.
Meanwhile, the broad divisions in international politics continue and past political polarities are lingering to the detriment of enhanced international understanding. The East and the West and the South and the North, for instance, are continuing to work in separate collectives, more or less, and no notable efforts are being made by the international community to bring these sides together for the purpose of united constructive action that could usher greater international well being.
The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, 2026, held in Kyrgyztan was a replication of the above broad trends but there were some statements at the forum by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that deserve special scrutiny and comment.
Modi was quoted saying among other things: ‘The land of Gandhi and the land of Buddha share a single message: the path to peace!..We must move away from endless war towards an end to the war. This is essentially for the well being of humanity. A peaceful resolution to all issues at the earliest is the call of humanity, and this is India’s message.’
The above is the language of international peace and unity. It is such language that will help in building bridges among civilizations and advance the cause of world peace. Besides, it will help bring a measure of understanding between North and South.
In this regard, the Trump administration could take a leaf or more from the Modi government. Unless it makes a ‘U turn’, as it were, in the direction of peace and reconciliation it is very unlikely that the US and the world would experience any stability worth speaking of.
Right now the US is savaging the sovereignty of Venezuela. It is a question of the ‘Empire striking back’ but Venezuela is a far cry from Iran. Iran has outsmarted the US on the battle field and is in a position to influence broad trends in the world economy since it still has control over the Hormuz Straits. That is, Iran could exercise a determining influence over world oil, gas and energy prices. In short, the US consumer’s future peace of mind is very much in the hands of Iran.
Given the above backdrop it should have dawned on the US political leadership that working towards cordial relations with Iran is the most advisable option. The US, simply, has too much to lose otherwise.
Likewise, Russia too needs to take a leaf from India. It is plain to see that its invasion of Ukraine is proving totally ineffective. It has not brought any measure of peace for the Russian people. Russia is right now experiencing a rerun of its military misadventure in Afghanistan. On the other hand, sections of the peoples concerned have been victimized and even brutalized.
Accordingly, there needs to be a coming together of democratic opinion worldwide for a fresh consideration of the options facing humanity. There is a dire need for value-based politics to take the place of Realpolitik. Besides, the language of peace and humanity needs to replace current divisive discourse with its stress on polarities and antagonisms.
International organizations of the stature of the UN need to take the lead in spearheading the above initiatives. Right now the UN gives the impression of being a spent force. This columnist hopes that he would be proved wrong on this score because the UN remains the only hope of the poor and victimized. It will be in the interests of all peoples for the UN to rejuvenate itself and dedicate itself increasingly enthusiastically to the cause of international peace.
Whether it be the South or North, dynamic, visionary political leadership and direction emerges as essential. The need is for voices that would espouse peace and accord across boundaries and divisions. For South Asia, India and Pakistan have the potential to fill this lacuna.
Features
Sri Lanka’s constitutional test: Judicial independence beyond immediate political moment
by Shelton Dharmaratne
Sri Lanka has reached an important constitutional moment.
The proposed 22nd Amendment has moved beyond political debate and into the constitutional process through which its validity will be examined. That development should change the character of the national discussion.
That is understandable in a politically contested environment. But Sri Lanka should now resist reducing a question of constitutional design to a contest over political positions.
The deeper issue concerns the relationship between constitutional reform, judicial independence and public confidence in the institutions of the State.
The Supreme Court will determine the constitutional questions before it. Public commentators should therefore exercise restraint in predicting, interpreting or seeking to influence that determination. But restraint does not require silence. It requires a more rigorous discussion of the institutional principles at stake.
A narrower constitutional question than the political debate suggests
The proposed amendment principally concerns the retirement ages of judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, together with an increase in the maximum number of judges permitted on the Court of Appeal.
Under the proposal, the retirement age of Supreme Court judges would rise from 65 to 67 and that of Court of Appeal judges from 63 to 65. The maximum number of Court of Appeal judges would also increase from 19 to 24.
Other proposed changes concerning the retirement ages of judges in the lower courts arise under separate legislation. This distinction matters because the public debate has sometimes treated the wider package of judicial reform as though it formed a single constitutional proposal.
Nor should the central issue be reduced to whether retaining experienced judges is inherently good or inherently dangerous. Both propositions are too simplistic.
Sri Lanka faces a substantial burden of pending litigation, and delays in the administration of justice impose significant costs on citizens, businesses and the State. Experienced judges represent an institutional resource. Continuity, accumulated knowledge and familiarity with complex areas of law cannot always be replaced immediately.
Those are legitimate policy considerations.
But the opposing concern is equally important: judicial tenure is not merely an employment condition. It is a structural component of judicial independence.
The real question is institutional
The critical question is not whether an individual judge is capable of acting impartially. It is whether the constitutional structure provides adequate protection against circumstances in which judicial tenure could become connected, directly or indirectly, with political authority.
That is an institutional question, not an accusation against individual judges.
A judge may be entirely conscientious and independent while the institutional arrangements surrounding the judiciary nevertheless create public doubts about independence. Constitutional democracies therefore cannot depend solely on the personal integrity of office-holders. They must construct institutions capable of preserving independence even when governments, individuals and political circumstances change.
This is particularly relevant when constitutional reform concerns the tenure of serving members of the superior judiciary.
The institutional sensitivity of such a proposal should neither be exaggerated into an allegation of improper motive nor dismissed as irrelevant. The appropriate response is transparency, procedural fairness and confidence in constitutional safeguards.
Legitimate objectives do not settle constitutional questions
The government has stated that its objectives include strengthening the administration of justice, addressing delays, retaining judicial experience and increasing institutional capacity.
Those objectives deserve serious consideration. Sri Lanka needs judicial reform. Citizens waiting years for their cases to be concluded experience the justice system very differently from those discussing it in Parliament, courtrooms or universities.
A government is therefore entitled to propose reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency.
But legitimate objectives do not automatically resolve constitutional objections. The relevant question is whether the means chosen are compatible with the constitutional structure and whether sufficient safeguards exist against unintended institutional consequences.
That is precisely why constitutional scrutiny matters.
The concerns of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) should likewise be examined without political labelling. Opposition to the proposed changes should not automatically be characterised as opposition to judicial reform or an attempt to obstruct the government. At the same time, invoking judicial independence does not place any argument beyond scrutiny.
The appropriate questions are straightforward:
Does extending judicial tenure strengthen the administration of justice?
What risks, if any, could it create for judicial independence?
Are adequate institutional safeguards in place?
Does the proposal operate prospectively, or does it affect judges already serving?
Could the same objectives be achieved by filling vacancies, increasing judicial capacity, improving court administration and strengthening case management?
These questions can be examined rationally without attributing improper motives to either side.
Judicial vacancies and institutional confidence
Recent concerns raised by the BASL regarding judicial vacancies add another dimension to the debate. The BASL has argued that vacancies in the Supreme Court contributed to the retirement of a senior Court of Appeal judge without promotion to the Supreme Court, despite vacancies having existed. It has also raised concerns regarding forthcoming judicial retirements and the need for timely consideration of appointments.
Such matters should not be treated as evidence of the motives behind the proposed amendment. They do, however, illustrate a broader principle.
Judicial independence is shaped not only by the retirement age written into the Constitution. It is also influenced by how vacancies are filled, how promotions are determined, how seniority and merit are assessed, and whether judicial officers and the public believe that institutional decisions are made according to transparent and defensible criteria.
The government has an opportunity to address these concerns constructively.
Prompt appointments based on publicly defensible principles would strengthen confidence in the judiciary irrespective of the eventual outcome of the constitutional debate.
Seniority, merit and transparent criteria
The controversy also exposes a longstanding question concerning judicial appointments.
Seniority has traditionally carried considerable weight in judicial advancement. Yet seniority alone need not be the sole measure of merit. Conversely, replacing established practices with undefined assessments of “merit” could create another institutional problem.
If governments or appointing authorities can determine which judges are sufficiently meritorious without clear and objective criteria, uncertainty itself may become a source of institutional anxiety.
Sri Lanka would therefore benefit from clearer, objective and defensible standards governing judicial appointments and promotions.
Such standards would protect judges as well as appointing authorities. They would reduce opportunities for favouritism, strengthen institutional confidence and make it harder for political actors to portray every appointment as politically motivated.
Institutional rules are stronger safeguards than assurances of good intentions.
The State is larger than any government
One principle deserves particular emphasis: a government is not the State.
Governments are temporary. The constitutional State is continuing. Political parties change, parliamentary majorities change and political priorities change. The judiciary, however, must continue to function independently of whoever occupies the government benches.
The judiciary is neither a government institution in the political sense nor an Opposition institution. It is an institution of the State whose legitimacy depends upon its independence from both.
For that reason, governments should exercise particular caution when proposing constitutional changes affecting the judiciary, even where the policy objectives are legitimate.
The stronger a government is politically, the greater its responsibility to demonstrate institutional restraint.
That is not political weakness. It is constitutional maturity.
Public confidence is a constitutional asset
The most consequential issue may ultimately be neither retirement age nor judicial capacity, but public confidence.
Courts do not possess political power in the conventional sense. Their authority rests substantially on the acceptance of their decisions as legitimate.
Citizens will sometimes disagree with judicial decisions. But where the judiciary is perceived as independent, even unpopular decisions can command respect. If judicial institutions are perceived as being shaped by political convenience, even legally sound decisions may become vulnerable to suspicion.
Constitutional reform affecting judicial tenure must therefore be evaluated not only by its immediate administrative benefits but also by its effect on institutional credibility.
A reform that produces short-term efficiency while weakening confidence in judicial independence could impose a greater long-term cost. Conversely, reform that improves efficiency while preserving independence can strengthen both justice and public trust.
The challenge is not to choose between judicial efficiency and judicial independence. It is to achieve both.
If a referendum arises …
If the constitutional process ultimately requires approval by the people at a referendum, the debate should rise above the conventional government versus Opposition contest.
The electorate should be given a clear constitutional question and sufficient information to assess it.
Citizens should understand what problem the amendment seeks to address, why the proposed mechanism is considered necessary, what institutional risks have been identified, what safeguards exist and whether alternative measures could achieve the same objectives.
A constitutional referendum deserves a higher standard of public discussion than an ordinary election campaign.
The people would not merely be choosing a political side. They would be deciding the institutional framework within which political power and judicial authority operate.
Beyond who wins
The most important question arising from the proposed Twenty-Second Amendment is therefore not simply whether the government succeeds or whether the Opposition and BASL prevail.
Nor is it ultimately whether judicial retirement ages become 67 and 65 or remain unchanged.
Those are immediate constitutional questions. The deeper issue is what Sri Lanka learns from the controversy.
If the government seeks to modernise and strengthen the justice system, that objective deserves serious consideration. If the BASL and others warn that particular reforms may affect judicial independence, those concerns deserve equally serious examination.
Neither side strengthens the country by assuming that the other is acting in bad faith.
The constitutional system is strongest when legitimate disagreements are resolved through institutions rather than political pressure.
Whatever the eventual constitutional outcome, Sri Lanka will still face the underlying challenges of judicial vacancies, case delays, institutional capacity, judicial appointments and public confidence. Those problems will not disappear with a judicial determination, nor should the national conversation end there.
Sri Lanka should instead seek a broader consensus around a fundamental proposition:
Judicial reform and judicial independence are not competing objectives.
The real challenge is to pursue reform in a manner that strengthens the judiciary without placing its independence under suspicion.
That requires sound legislation, transparent appointments, adequate resources, efficient court administration, responsible political conduct and safeguards capable of surviving changes of government.
The present controversy will eventually pass. Political arguments surrounding it will fade.
But constitutional arrangements can endure for decades.
That is why Sri Lanka must look beyond the immediate political contest.
The ultimate test is not who wins today’s constitutional argument. It is whether, when the political moment has passed, Sri Lanka has a judiciary that is more efficient, more accessible and more trusted—while remaining sufficiently independent to hold every government, including future governments, within the boundaries of the Constitution.
Features
Farewell to a Fashion Icon
Sri Lanka’s fashion world lost one of its brightest stars Monday morning – veteran model, actress, and elite pageant trainer Chulpadmendra “Chula” Kumarapathirana.
Her sudden demise has certainly come as a shock to many.
Chula had just completed a major event on Sunday (30th August), and was no more in the land of the living the following day (31st August).
Born in Colombo, she was an old girl of Buddhist Ladies’ College and later studied at the National Institute of Business Management, and has many awesome achievements to her credit.
In 2006, she won the “Miss Tourism Model of the World Press Award” in Tanzania.
She entered the entertainment industry, as an actress, and gained popularity through the teledrama “Wahinna Muthu Wessak.”
Chulpadmendra has been on TV, and many Sri Lankan hip-hop music videos, including “Hanthane” and “Heena Hirimal”, and has had several other minor acting jobs since then.
She hosted the Derana Miss Sri Lanka for Miss World 2008 and even participated in the reality TV show Sirasa Dancing Star.
For over 25 years Chula was active in local and international fashion and founded the Chulpadmendra Catwalk Studio to train young newcomers
She trained hundreds of models for runway, photoshoots, auditions, and international pageants.
She was known as a fierce mentor who believed in “not just learning to walk, but learning to command the runway”.
Many young models called graduating from her studio their “happiest moment.”

Chulpadmendra “Chula” Kumarapathirana: Many young models called graduating
from her studio their “happiest moment.” (L)/ Won the “Miss Tourism Model of the World Press Award” in Tanzania (R)
Chula was very fond of The Island newspaper and kept in touch with us on a regular basis.
Her last message to The Island was a ‘thank you’ note for the article ‘New benchmark in pageant industry’:
“Thank you, Ivan, for writing such a beautiful article about me. Your unwavering support, encouragement, and belief in me throughout my career mean more than words can express. I am truly grateful for your kindness and generosity.
“My heartfelt thanks also go to The Island newspaper for featuring the article. It is a great honour, and I sincerely appreciate the recognition and support.
“Thank you once again.”
In fact, just a couple weeks ago, she sent a photo of herself for our Glam Scene and that picture I publish today, as part of this story.
May she rest in peace. Our deepest condolences to her family, students, and all who loved her.
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