Features
Education reform or hidden agenda? Scrutinising proposed NEPF
by Nalaka Samaraweera
The new National Education Policy Framework (NEPF) was prepared by a Cabinet committee chaired by the President and assisted by a Cabinet-appointed committee of experts. Having been submitted to the Parliamentary Sectoral Oversight Committee (SOC) on Education, it is already in the implementation phase following the SOC’s recommendations. Unfortunately, public debate and dialogue generated regarding such an important and impactful set of policy proposals has been entirely inadequate. Therefore, this article is written with the intention to stimulate such discussion.
Before even considering the content of the new NEPF, several questions arise about its necessity, given the existence of a comprehensive National Education Policy Framework prepared by the National Education Commission (NEC) for 2020-2030. The new NEPF covers 2023-2033. Why was a new policy framework needed after just three years? This question remains unanswered, and the new NEPF does not have references the NEC report.
Based on the preface, one might speculate that the new conditions brought about by the Covid pandemic and economic downturn since 2020 necessitated the new framework. It would have been more practical and appropriate to ask the NEC to amend their report or create a new one rather than appointing entirely a new committee. The policy framework appears to be a highly misleading document, contradicting the rationale mentioned in the preface and further challenging the country’s Constitution.
The framers of the NEPF focused on three policy domains, namely Teaching, Learning and Credentialing; Governance; and Investments and Resources. This article presents a critique of policy proposals related to “Governance.” The NEPF defines “Governance” as:
“Governance
Actors and institutions with a stake in the Sector, both state and non-state, shall be identified and their roles and functions clearly defined allowing for autonomy based on the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring alignment with national standards to minimize top-down decision-making and avoid institutions acting in silos.”
The heavy lifting in this definition is done by the less publicly known term: The Principle of Subsidiarity. According to the author’s knowledge, one of the initial appearances of this principle in Sri Lanka’s Constitutional history is found in the Centre-Periphery Sub-Committee Report, prepared by a committee, chaired by D. Sithadthan, MP. It was submitted to the Constitutional assembly, which was established to draft a new Constitution by the then “Yahapalana” government. The report defines the principle of subsidiarity as follows:
“This suggestion was based on the principle of subsidiarity, i.e., whatever the lowest level of governing institution can handle should be left with that body or unit, and the rest should go to the next tier, and so on. This notion is contrary to the present model of transferring political power from the centre to sub-national units.” (
The emphasis is by the author). It goes without saying that the recommendation of this principle violates the current unitary structure of the country. The process of drafting a new Constitution had to be halted due to significant criticism and the lack of the support of the public on this matter. Years after this infamous attempt, how could such a principle that goes against the unitary structure of the country find its way into an education policy framework? The conclusion that the framers of this policy are fully aware of the implications of this principle and intend to weaken the central government is reinforced by the following policy proposals that appears in the NEPF:
7.4 Provincial Boards of Education shall be established in the each of the nine Provinces, with autonomy within national standards to ensure education policies and practices are tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of different provinces. The Provincial Boards of Education may establish new colleges and universities in accordance with national standards.
However, as made very clear under Appendix III Education (9) of the Constitution, Provincial Boards of Education are entrusted with the advisory functions. For the reader’s convenience, the section as it appears is quoted below.
9. Appointment of Provincial Boards of Education which will have the advisory functions, will be the responsibility of the Minister of Education. However, this will be done with the concurrence of the Chief Minister of the Provincial Authority.
The reader will agree that it is quite a serious matter when a “committee of experts” presumes to bestow powers exceeding those assigned Constitutionally upon the Provincial Boards of Education. It is important to remember that the central government’s establishment above all residual state structures is a fundamental character of a unitary state. The decentralization of self-governing powers is not authorized in any way by the Constitution of Sri Lanka.
Higher education and the establishment of higher education institutions are functions listed in the Concurrent List, as introduced by the 13th Amendment, of the Constitution, thereby delegating these powers to both the central and provincial governments. Strikingly, the proposed policy framework suggests removing these powers from the central government and transferring solely to the provincial governments. Furthermore, it proposes enacting laws to convert existing universities into provincial universities. This is mentioned in paragraph 7.8, as partially quoted below.
“Establishment of new universities shall be done under the Provincial Councils. Existing degree awarding institutes shall become Provincial Universities under a new law.“
The power to establish higher education institutions, defined as a concurrent task in the Constitution, be redefined as a responsibility solely for provincial councils? This, in popular political terms, goes beyond the provisions of the 13th amendment, suggesting “13+.” Below are the roles listed in the Concurrent List for Higher Education in the Constitution.
4. Higher Education –
4:1 The establishment and maintenance of new Universities.
4:2 The establishment of degree awarding institutions under the Universities (Amendment) Act, No. 07 of 1985 and other institutions for tertiary, technical and post-school education and training.
The Indian Constitution also included education as a concurrent function through the 42nd amendment. A key argument for moving education from the state list to the concurrent list is that education, particularly higher education, should be regarded as a matter of national importance. The intent is to ensure that regionalism does not become a primary factor. However, the new policy proposes to confine higher education to regionalism, which is a regressive step.
No less serious is the proposal given in 7.10.
7.10 All Education Providers shall have autonomy within the guidelines set by the national and Provincial Authorities, and School Boards where relevant, in administration, finance, human resource management and selection of students.
Why should education providers be granted autonomy? What exactly is meant by self-governing powers regarding student selection? This assertion poses a significant risk. There’s a danger of breaching the established procedure for university student recruitment, which has been upheld irrespective of ethnic, religious, and social status differences.
Now let us shift our attention to the establishment of the new National Higher Education Commission, proposed in paragraph 7.8. This fresh entity is to replace current University Grants Commission (UGC), and its role will be defined as follows:
7.8 National Higher Education Commission (NHEC) will replace the University Grants Commission and shall be responsible for the coordination of higher education adhering to national policies and maintenance of academic standards in all degree and degree equivalent credentials issued by Higher Educational Institutions, whether State, Non-State, National and Provincial.
We urge the entire university community, academics, administrators, and students, to closely examine this proposal, as several significant issues arise with this proposed replacement. Firstly, the purpose of the new institution needs clarification. If the problem is that the current UGC lacks adequate power or does not play a sufficient role, it could be easily remedied. Why does it needed to abolish the entire institution? The role of the existing UGC is broad. For example, the University Grants Commission has a crucial role to play in planning and coordinating university education, fixing the finances of higher education institutions and regulating the administration of these institutions, maintaining academic standards, and regulating the admission of students to higher education institutions. It appears that the new institution proposed to be established is focused only on maintaining standards in accordance with national policies.
Should this new institution be relieved of such extensive responsibilities, who will assume other tasks conducted by the UGC? Will they be entrusted to the local bodies proposed to receive autonomous powers mentioned earlier? Surely it will be disastrous for the universities. Consider, for instance, the allocation of funds to universities. As the new policy framework suggests, it will be the role of provincial governments to allocate money to universities. But it is a well-known fact that the local government bodies basically run their activities with the money they get from the central government. In such a situation, can it be ensured that sufficient funds will be allocated to the universities? What attitudes will different provincial councils have regarding universities? How much irregularity and inefficiency can occur in giving central government money indirectly to universities through provincial governments? How do the attitudes and priorities of provincial council politicians affect universities? In short, how do the academics deal with local political dynamics?
Acting as an intermediary buffer body between the Ministry of Education and the universities, the UGC has thus far upheld the honorable responsibility of safeguarding university independence from direct political interference. Our regional countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh also run institutions similar to the model of the UGC for this purpose.
Moreover, when studying the history of Sri Lankan universities, it appears that the establishment of the UGC by the University Act of 1978 was a progressive step that ensured the relative independence of the university compared to the previous body, National Council of Higher Education. Does this new policy framework propose to reverse the forward steps we took? Given the manner in which this proposal is presented, it is reasonable to entertain such suspicions.
What is surprising, or perhaps not, is the absence of any mention of university autonomy in this new policy framework. Instead, there are multiple references to granting autonomy to provincial institutions. Why have these policymakers treated this matter so lightly? National Education Commission’s Education Policy Framework (2020-2030) previously presented, adopted a very positive stance on university autonomy and proposed measures to strengthen it. How do we reconcile this framework’s complete disregard for that stance? Lastly, it must be emphasized that if this new policy framework is fully implemented, we will face grave consequences. Despite any progress we may have made in education thus far, there is a risk of regression. It is also disheartening to note the lack of professionalism exhibited by the compilers this new framework. We hope our readers grasp the true intentions behind this new policy framework.
(The writer is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Engineering, University of Moratuwa. Views expressed in the article are personal.)
Features
Coercive laws recipe for future misrule
by Jehan Perera
The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.
The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.
But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Proposed Laws
The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.
The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.
Civil Society
The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.
Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.
The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.
Features
Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA
By Ramya Kumar
According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.
An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.
The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.
Top-down check-box activities
The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.
There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).
1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….
2: And with pictures and all…
1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”
2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..
1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…
2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!
1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.
2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…
Auditing everything but power
QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.
The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.
A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.
This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.
External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.
Rethinking university QA
Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.
QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)
. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!
Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.
Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.
The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.
Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.
The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor
Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!
This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.
Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.
Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!
For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.
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