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Women in Power

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The Revolutionary Lives and Careers of Siva, Doreen, Vivi and Sirima

By Kusum Wijetilleke

(kusumw@gmail.com) & Rienzie Wijetilleke (rienzietwij@gmail.com)

Women in Sri Lanka make up 52% of the population and 56% of registered voters, but a mere 5% of legislators. The Sri Lankan female voter, whilst having significant strength in numbers, has been unable to translate said the bers should make women’s issues front and centre for politicking but the reality is quite the opposite. The tax rate on sanitary napkin imports was just over 100% in 2018, until a reduction to 52%. There was controversy over the recent halving of maternity leave from 84 days to 42 days for trainee development officers in the public sector. Throughout the country we find reports of domestic abuse being ignored by authorities, of street harassment with the countrywide tradition of ‘cat-calling’ being “accepted” as part of a culture. Our politics indicate a level of flippancy with regards to women’s issues in general, with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs no longer worthy of a place in the Cabinet.

There were eight women elected to parliament at the 2020 General Elections, out of a total of 75 female candidates from the major political parties, making them a distinct minority in Sri Lanka’s 225-seat chamber. Around the world and in Sri Lanka, the debate around female representation in politics has been raging in social sciences for some time, with a variety of explanations proposed. Most pertinent might be the principle of “you cannot be what you cannot see”, asserted by Feminist Author Marie C. Wilson, President of the Ms Foundation for Women, established by Gloria Steinem. Ms Steinem remarked, “We’ll never solve the feminization of power until we solve the masculinity of wealth”. This is especially true for women that long to enter the very expensive business of politics. Another given and accepted reason is that the conservative and traditional family arrangements restrict most women’s career choices.

In Sri Lanka, the argument from traditional family restrictions on career choices certainly rings true, but with a few very notable and accomplished exceptions. In her most famous work; ‘Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World’ (1986), Sri Lanka’s definitive feminist academic and activist Kumari Jayawardena stated the importance of a political account on women’s struggles in the East as necessary for the women of these countries who may be “unaware of the role in liberation struggles of their ancestors and great-grandmothers”. She further discusses the limitations of women achieving liberation through education and entering the workforce, proposing that true liberation is only achieved through political as well as social and economic equality.

A cursory glance at Sri Lanka’s early history as a nation State shows that women did indeed hold some very important keys to power. These women were, as you might expect, from the upper classes and many with substantial financial clout and some did also have the full support of their families in political endeavours while others succeeded in spite of familial and cultural restrictions.

When Sri Lankans envision women in politics, we invariably fall back on the two most recent matriarchs, both from the same aristocratic family. ‘Sirima’ and ‘CBK’ certainly blazed their own trails in the world of politics. Whereas their political dynasty seems to have ended with CBK’s final term, the mixed fortunes of ‘Mrs. B’ and the times during which she ‘ruled’ are nonetheless fascinating. To begin with, Ms. Sirimavo Bandaranaike becoming the world’s first female Prime Minister may no longer be appreciated in the way that it should. When she was elected in 1960, six years ahead of Indira Gandhi, the London Evening News stated “… there will be need for a new word. Presumably, we shall have to call her a states-woman… This is the suffragette’s dream come true.”

If you define democracy as a system where all citizens of the state have an equally weighted right to vote, then Sri Lanka is the oldest democracy in Asia. Class, sex and ethnicity were all used to restrict the vote throughout history. Until 1918 in the UK, only property owning men over the age of 21 were allowed the vote. The 1965 Civil Rights act definitively lifted restrictions on Black Americans voting in many Southern States. Indigenous peoples in Canada achieved the right to vote in 1960 and those in Australia had to wait until 1967. Japanese women achieved suffrage in 1947 and Pakistani women in 1956. Yet Sri Lanka achieved universal suffrage in 1931 which is quite significant considering India only achieved the same parity in 1950. Thus the introduction of Universal Suffrage was by no means a simple evolution.

Sri Lankans will recall “Sirima” and her time in power with a shrug of dissatisfaction given the failures of her socialist economic policies. Following her husband’s assassination and her elevation as the leader of the SLFP and its candidate for PM, she would often cry during campaign speeches, which earned her a nick name; ‘the weeping widow’. Members of Parliament would speak disparagingly of her efforts to govern with references to the “kitchen cabinet”. Yet due to her strong intellectual and ideological positions, she eventually earned a sort of begrudging respect from the many men in that kitchen cabinet. Her time in power was characterized by food shortages, bread lines and rationing, but Ms. Bandaranaike is also remembered for her ruthless dismantling of the JVP insurrection in the early 70s, leading to a remark by a prominent politician that she was “the only man in her cabinet”.

The 1962 coup d’état attempted by high ranking military and police leaders is less recalled and worth revisiting. The aborted plan to detain Ms. Bandaranaike and her senior officials at the Army Headquarters was the result of a power struggle many decades in the making. Sri Lanka’s pre-independence elites were highly westernized, even Anglophilic, right wing and Christian and many had close ties to the UNP. The sudden and dramatic power shift post-independence, led to a political establishment that was staunchly Sinhala-Buddhist, left wing and ‘rural’, that is to say; non-westernized. Sri Lankans today are acutely aware of past ethnic divisions, but may not fully appreciate the class and religious divisions that were dominant during the colonial era.

The inevitable shift and consequent fissure, betrayed the nation’s ethno-religious divisions. The main protagonists of the attempted coup were all from the upper classes; property owning, well-educated and with right-wing ideologies. The coup was aborted at the last minute after an informant revealed the plans to the PM. All 24 individuals charged with the conspiracy were Christian: 12 Sinhalese, six Tamils and six Burghers. The coup was also an attempt to arrest the country’s economic decline that began with Ms. Bandaranaike’s nationalization of key industries including banking, foreign trade, insurance, transport and petroleum. Her policies further exacerbated the import-export imbalance and the country was $2 billion in debt, but the mantra she repeated defiantly through-out was “produce or perish”.

Whilst the faults of “Sirima” are widely accepted, her foreign policy and internationalism, which in many ways saved the Sri Lankan project, deserves more attention. With only two weeks’ worth of rice in stock, she negotiated an emergency shipment of 40,000 tons from China. These being the beginnings of the cold war, international diplomacy was fraught and required careful navigation, especially for a Socialist Republic having just achieved independence. Sri Lanka grew in stature internationally as a founder nation of the Non-Aligned Movement under the guidance of Ms. Bandaranaike and she made countless overtures for peace between the major Western Powers and the Soviet Union. In 1963, following several state visits to “western” nations, understanding the need to balance both sides, she became the first Sri Lankan Prime Minister to visit the Soviet Union and returned with an agreement for large quantities of discounted petroleum from the Soviets. The nationalization of the oil industry and the resulting distress to British and American corporate interests led to the US cutting aid to Sri Lanka. Egyptian President Abdel Nasser sent oil tankers to Sri Lanka and in 1975 Ms. Bandaranaike negotiated a supply arrangement for 250,000 tons of oil on a deferred payment scheme after direct negotiations with the then Vice President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein.

 



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India at 75

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By Gwynne Dyer

Last Tuesday, on the 75th anniversary of Indian independence, Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised to turn India into a developed country, within the next 25 years. If all goes well, that could actually come to pass, but it would have to go very well indeed.The demographic and economic signs are positive. The country’s population has grown fourfold, since independence in 1947, but population growth has now dropped to ‘replacement level’: 2.1 children per completed family.

The current youngest generation is so large that the population will keep growing, until 2060, when it will have reached 1.7 billion. The upside of this is that India will continue to have a rapidly growing young workforce for another generation, while its only rival, China, will have a rapidly ageing and dwindling population (1.2 billion and still falling in 2060)

India’s GDP per capita has been growing at about 5% for years, and if that continues for the next 25 years, it will have grown to $7,500 per person. That’s certainly within the lower ranks of developed countries (like Mexico, South Africa or China today). Given the size of India’s population, the economy would certainly rank in the world’s top five.

So, Modi’s prediction was certainly within the realm of possibility, but there are two big wild cards. One is climate: although only half of India, technically, falls within the tropics, all of it, except the very far north, suffers long, very hot summers.This summer has been the hottest ever, with many of the largest cities experiencing temperatures, above 45°C, for days at a time. Whatever we do about climate in the future, it can only go on getting worse for India, for the next 25 years.

That will bring the country into the zone where it literally becomes unsafe for people to do manual work outside, at the height of summer; death rates will go up, and food production will go down. Nobody knows exactly how bad it will get, but it will certainly get much worse that it is now.

The other wild card is war. Since the Indian and Pakistani tests of nuclear weapons, in 1999, the subcontinent has lived under the threat of a ‘local’ nuclear war that would devastate both countries (and also cause global food shortages lasting for at least four or five years).An Indo-Pak nuclear war is not inevitable, but, unlike the major nuclear powers, these two countries have fought real wars against each other – three in the past 75 years. The likelihood of such a catastrophe actually happening is certainly a lot higher than zero.

Each country now has about 160 nukes, and although both are now working to move beyond the dangerously unstable ‘use them or lose them’ phase where a a surprise attack might disarm the other side, there is no real stability to be found when the adversaries are so close and the hostility is so intense.So there is no harm in considering whether it might have been better to keep the entire Indian subcontinent, first united by the British empire, in one piece, at independence, rather than splitting it into two countries (and eventually three, counting Bangladesh).

The split was by no means inevitable. Both Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the two main Hindu leaders of the independence movement, wanted an inclusive, non-sectarian republic, including all of British India, although they failed to offer Muslims sufficient guarantees to ensure their support.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the main Muslim leader in 1947, did want to carve a Muslim-majority Pakistan out of the country, but there was no obligation for the British government to satisfy his demand. He got his way because the United Kingdom was virtually broke after the Second World War and in a great hurry to dump its responsibilities in India.

Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a British lawyer who had never been east of Paris, had five weeks to draw the dividing line between the two new countries. Around 15 million people, who found themselves on the wrong side of that line, became refugees, mutual massacres followed, and within weeks India and Pakistan had their first war. But it could have been different.

The undivided ‘big India’ would have 1.8 billion people today, about one-third Muslim and two-thirds Hindu. That would virtually guarantee that both groups would be represented in every government and in most political parties.

Lots of countries, elsewhere in the world, manage to be both democratic and prosperous with comparable religious and/or ethnic differences. The ‘big India’ would not have wasted 75 years’ worth of high defence spending, and there would be no risk of nuclear war.All those energies would have been devoted instead to civilian priorities, and that united India might already rank as a developed country. Might-have-beens.

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Ukraine War: Mother May I?

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By Gwynne Dyer

“This obviously does not happen because of a thrown butt,” said British Defense Minister Ben Wallace. But the Russian Ministry of Defence insisted that the explosions that destroyed at least eight warplanes at Saki Air Base in Russian-occupied Crimea on 9 August were due to “a violation of fire safety requirements.”

The implication is that some careless Russian smoker tossed away his cigarette butt and caused a fire that set off explosions. That’s hardly a testimonial to the discipline of the Russian air force’s ground crews, but it’s better than admitting that Ukrainian missiles have reached 225 km behind Russian lines to destroy a whole squadron of Russian fighters.Moscow also claimed that no Russian aircraft had been damaged by the explosions in Crimea, although the wreckage of the destroyed fighters was clearly visible on the ‘overheads’ from satellite observations.

The Russian Defence Ministry played the same silly game in April when Ukrainian cruise missiles sank the ‘Moskva.’, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. It claimed that a fire had caused munitions to explode, and that the ship then sank while under tow due to “stormy seas” (although the sea was actually flat calm at the time).And what caused that fire? Careless smokers again, presumably, because even the most damning statements about the indiscipline and incompetence of Russian sailors and airmen are preferable to an admission that the Ukrainians are really hurting Russia.

Ukraine’s Defence Ministry is having fun with this, reporting that it “cannot establish the cause of the fire [at the Russian airfield], but once again reminds of fire safety rules and a ban on smoking in unauthorized places.”

Taking responsibility for these strikes deep in Russian-controlled territory is not in Ukraine’s interest, so it’s happy for Russia to take the blame. Various anonymous defence officials in Kyiv further muddied the waters by suggesting that Ukrainian partisans were responsible, or Ukrainian special forces already operating far behind Russian front lines.

But why is it not in Ukraine’s interest to take ownership of these small but symbolically important victories?

It’s because the really decisive front in this war is how fast American and other NATO weapons systems are sent to Ukraine, and that is determined by a process that seems to be derived largely from the old children’s game of ‘Mother May I’ (also known as ‘Giant Steps’).The opening move is quite straightforward: Kyiv asks Washington for a hundred HIMARS multiple-launch rocket systems so that it can counter Russia’s huge superiority in older artillery and rocket systems and drive Moscow’s forces from Ukrainian soil.

Washington replies that it can take two giant steps and a frog hop. No, wait a minute, it replies that Ukraine can have four HIMARS systems now. Once the crews have been trained and have demonstrated their proficiency in using the weapons, Kyiv can start the next round of the game by asking for more. This takes four weeks.

Getting into the spirit of the game, Ukraine then asks for only twenty more HIMARs, leaving the rest for later. Washington replies that it can take four baby steps and a pirouette – or rather, four more HIMARs now, but with the range still restricted to 70 km. and no thermobaric ammunition (fuel-air explosives). And so on.We are now in the fourth round of this game, with sixteen HIMARs promised of which Ukraine has already deployed between eight and twelve on the battlefield. At this rate, Ukraine will have the hundred HIMARs it needs to expel the Russians around April of 2024.

Similar games are being played with other badly needed weapons from NATO stockpiles like Western-made combat aircraft, modern anti-air defence systems, and longer-range missiles for attacks like the one on Saki Air Base. This is all driven by an excess of caution about such ‘escalation’ at the White House and in the National Security Council.

Washington is right to be concerned about Russia’s reactions, but it is prone to see the Russians as dangerously excitable children. They are not. They are poker players (NOT chess-players) who bet over-confidently, and are now trying to bluff their way out of trouble. The Russian ruling elite, or at least most of it, remains rational.

The Ukrainians, however, have to take American anxieties into account even when they use their own weapons, some of which have been modified for extended range, on distant Russian targets. The simplest way is just to pretend it wasn’t their weapons that did the damage.The same policy applies to the numerous acts of sabotage carried out in Russia by Ukrainian agents – and by a happy accident the Russians are willing to collaborate in this fiction. They’d rather blame the clumsiness, ignorance and incompetence of their own troops than give the credit to the Ukrainians.

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Book Review : An incisive exploration of Sri Lanka’s religiosity

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Title: ‘Multi-Religiosity in Contemporary Sri Lanka’ – Innovation, shared spaces, contestation

Editors – Mark P. Whitaker, Darini Rajasingham- Senanayake and Pathmanesan Sanmugeswaran

A Routledge South Asian Religion Series publication

Exclusively distributed in Sri Lanka by Vijitha Yapa Publications, Colombo 5. (e-mail: vijiyapa@gmail.com)

Reviewed by Lynn Ockersz

This timely publication could be described as a revelation of the fascinating nature of Sri Lanka’s religiosity. It is almost customary to refer to Sri Lanka as a ‘religious country’ but it is not often that one comes across scholarly discussions on the subject locally. ‘Multi-Religiosity in Contemporary Sri Lanka..’, a collection of research papers put together in book form, fills this void most adequately.

Although not necessarily synonymous with spiritual development, religiosity in Sri Lanka essentially refers to the widespread prevalence of organized or institutionalized religion in the lives of the majority of Sri Lankans. What qualifies the country to be seen as religiously plural is the presence in it of numerous religions, though mainly in their institutionalized forms.

What ought to pique the interest of the specialist and that of the inquiring layman alike is the fact that though falling short of the highest standards of spirituality most of the time, religion is used innovatively and creatively by its adherents to meet some of their worldly and otherworldly needs. That is, religion is a dynamic and adaptable force in the lives of Sri Lanka’s people. ‘Multi-Religiosity in Contemporary Sri Lanka..’ explores these characteristics of religion in depth and underscores the vitality of religion in the consciousness of its diverse practitioners. A chief strength of the publication is the featuring of almost all the main religions of Sri Lanka, from the viewpoint of their innovative and adaptable use by devotees.

The research papers in question, numbering 16, were presented at an Open University of Sri Lanka forum held in mid-July in 2017. The editors of the volume have done well to bring these papers together and present them in book form to enable the wider public in Sri Lanka and abroad to drink deep of the vital insights contained in them, considering that religiosity has gained increasingly in importance in post-war Sri Lanka. Fittingly, ‘Multi-Religiosity in Contemporary Sri Lanka..’, is dedicated to the memory of well-known Sri Lankan social scientist Malathi de Alwis who, unfortunately, is no longer with us, but had contributed a paper at the relevant forum prior to her passing away. Her paper too is contained in the collection.

The thematic substance of the volume could be said to have been set out in some detail by co- editor Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake in her introductory essay titled, ‘Spaces of Protection, healing and liberation…’ She writes: ‘Religiosity appears as a means of coping with life’s transitions, celebrations, disappointments, diseases, conflicts and violence; and events such as birth and death, illness, exams, marriage, divorce, the sense of the sacred, the auspicious, and inauspicious (Sumangali-Amangali). Fundamentally, beyond the political, (multi-)religiosity provides an individual’s coping strategy and/or a social performance for negotiating with the perceived power, energies and structures that are greater than oneself, particularly the supernatural and transnational.’

When seen from the above perspective, the ability of many Sri Lankans to comfortably worship at multiple religious institutions and shrines, for example, while claiming adherence in the main to this or that religious belief makes considerable sense, because the average Lankan devotee is of a pragmatic bent and not a religious purist. Depending on her needs she would worship at a major Buddhist or Hindu temple, for example, and also supplicate her cause at a prominent Catholic church. Such practices speak volumes for the flexibility and innovativeness of the devotee. They also testify to her broad religious sympathies and her ability to share her religious spaces with others of different religious persuasions. A few places of religious significance in Sri Lanka that thus draw adherents of multiple religions are Adam’s Peak, Kataragama, Madhu Church and St. Anthony’s Church in Kochchikade, Colombo.

At these places of reverence the usually restricted adherence to a single religious belief or faith is easily transcended by worshippers as apparently part of a personal or collective coping strategy to deal with multiple personal and societal pressures. ‘Kataragama Pada Yatra – Pilgrimaging with ethnic “others” ‘ by Anton Piyaratne and ‘Religious innovation in the pilgrimage industry – Hindu bodhisattva worship and Tamil Buddhistness’ by Alexander McKinley are just two papers in the collection that deal insightfully with this aspect of worshippers’ abilities to comfortably manage multiple religious identities and spaces. These habits of the average Sri Lankan devotee highlight the potentiality of religiosity, among other things, to be a bridge-builder among communities.

For instance, Mckinley sets out in his exposition: ‘Religious innovation at shared sacred sites can thus blur or sharpen the dominant ethno-religious divisions of ‘Sinhala Buddhist’ and ‘Tamil Hindu’ in Sri Lanka. Saman devotion can simultaneously be interpreted as a sincere form of highland Hindu religiosity, a strategic innovation by Tamil workers to appease Sinhala pilgrims, as well as an opening for Sinhalas to either convert Tamils into Buddhists, or to cooperate with them towards common goals, such as environmental conservation’.

A conspicuous and continuing theme of the collection is the wide-ranging and often damaging impact of the Sri Lankan government’s 30-year anti-LTTE war. Quite a number of the researchers, thus, deal with its adverse impact on women, and quite rightly, because the war revealed as perhaps never before the marked vulnerabilities of Sri Lankan women in conflict situations. ‘Of Meditation, Militarization and Grease Yakas’ by Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake and ‘Vijaya and Kuweni retold’ by Neena Mahadev deal quite elaborately on this subject and throw valuable light on the multi-dimensional impact the Northern war has had on women, besides focusing on the resourceful ways in which religion is used by women to cope with social and political issues.

‘Emerging innovative religiosities and what they signify’ by Selvy Thiruchandran continues with the focus on women and religiosity but introduces a wider societal dimension by bringing into the discourse the phenomenon of New Religious Movements (NRM). The researcher points to the immense popularity among mainly middle class women of two of these movements, the Satya Sai Baba cult and the growing interest in Brahma Kumaris Yoga centres, and elaborates on the roles they play in enabling women to deal with personal and societal pressures.

However, Thruchandran arrives at the thought-provoking conclusion at the end of her wide-ranging research that, ‘The old religion and the new so-called innovation that is sought in the new religions can be summarized in a well-known cliché – old wine in new bottles.’ That is, these New Religions are mainly forms of escapism. We have here a fresh perspective on issues relating to the liberation of women that calls for deep consideration. Moreover, these New Religious Movements do not help in any substantive way to change the fundamental and perennial reality of male domination over women; for, we are given to understand that some men actively discourage their wives from joining the Brahma Kumaris movement.

The role of Sri Lanka’s Christian Left in giving religion a progressive and socially emancipatory orientation in recent decades is the subject of Harini Amarasuriya’s paper titled, ‘Beards, cloth bags, and sandals – Reflections on the Christian left in Sri Lanka’. The researcher’s prime focus is on an institution of mainly Left political activism established by a Christian clergyman, Sevaka Yohan, in Ibbagamuwa, Kurunegala in the seventies decade by the name Devasaranaramaya. Besides committing itself to robust Left political activism, the latter centre possessed an indigenous cultural ethos and sought to unite the country’s cultures and religions. In other words, the institution aimed at being a shared space where religions comingled on the basis of shared values.

Accordingly, the publication of ‘Multi-Religiosity in Contemporary Sri Lanka…’, is a welcome development. The book sheds invaluable light on the subject of local religiosity, which is a relatively unexplored but vital area of knowledge that has important implications for nation-building in Sri Lanka. Besides the papers discussed above, there are numerous other learned and insightful research papers on religiosity in this collection that call for urgent reading. Collectively the papers constitute a treasury of knowledge that those pursuing Sri Lankan Studies could ill-afford to by-pass.

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