Features
When seabed goes dark: The Persian Gulf, cable sabotage, and race for space-based monopoly
“Former Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Navy and Vice Chancellor of Sir John Kotalawella Defence University.”
Undersea fiber optic cables constitute the backbone of global digital connectivity, carrying over 95% of international data traffic. The increasing geopolitical tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States elevate the risk of deliberate or collateral damage to submarine cable systems, particularly in the Persian Gulf, a critical global digital chokepoint. This article examines the strategic consequences of undersea cable sabotage in this region and its cascading effects across the Indian Ocean, with a focused analysis on Sri Lanka’s vulnerabilities and opportunities. It further argues that prolonged disruption could incentivize technologically advanced states and corporations to accelerate satellite-based global internet architectures, potentially reshaping control over global connectivity. The article concludes that Sri Lanka must urgently operationalize the National Submarine Cable Safety and Resilience Framework (NSCPRF) to safeguard national security while positioning itself within this evolving technological and geopolitical landscape.
Beneath the world’s oceans lies a largely invisible but indispensable network of submarine communication cables that form the backbone of the contemporary global order. These cables silently facilitate financial transactions, sustain military command and control, and power the digital economies that define modern life. Yet, in an era of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, this critical infrastructure has emerged as a strategic vulnerability and a prime target for hybrid warfare.
Current tensions among Iran, Israel, and the United States have introduced a new dimension of conflict: seabed contestation. The Persian Gulf, already a focal point for global energy security, has now become equally pivotal for digital connectivity. Any disruption to its dense network of submarine cables would not merely affect regional actors; the consequences would ripple across the global system, threatening financial stability, communications, and strategic operations worldwide. This evolving vulnerability underscores the urgent need to understand, protect, and adapt to the emerging risks facing undersea infrastructure in geopolitically sensitive regions.
Strategic importance of Persian Gulf cable network
The Persian Gulf serves as a critical digital chokepoint in global connectivity, functioning for data flows much like the Strait of Hormuz does for energy transport. A dense aggregation of undersea fiber optic cables traverses this narrow maritime corridor, linking Europe, the Middle East, and South and East Asia. The strategic centrality of the region arises not only from its role in facilitating global commerce and communications but also from its function as a redundancy hub for intercontinental digital traffic.
Several factors exacerbate the vulnerability of this network. First, the geographic concentration of cable routes in a limited corridor creates systemic risk: damage to even a few cables could severely disrupt connectivity. Second, the relatively shallow waters of the Gulf render cables physically accessible to divers, remotely operated underwater vehicles, and maritime operations that may inadvertently or deliberately cause damage. Third, the proximity of these routes to active conflict zones, territorial disputes, and naval operations further elevates the risk of intentional or collateral disruption.
A significant interruption in the Persian Gulf cable network would have far-reaching consequences, potentially impairing intercontinental data flows, destabilizing financial markets, degrading strategic communications, and undermining both commercial and military operations worldwide. This underscores the Persian Gulf’s dual role as a linchpin of global connectivity and a high-value target within contemporary hybrid warfare and geopolitical contestation.
Undersea cable sabotage as hybrid warfare
Undersea cables, due to their strategic importance and relative physical exposure, constitute high-value targets within contemporary hybrid warfare scenarios. Both state and non-state actors may seek to exploit these vulnerabilities through methods that are difficult to attribute, enabling deniable or covert operations while inflicting disproportionate disruption.
Potential attack vectors encompass a range of capabilities. Physical interference may be conducted by divers, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), or remotely operated submersibles, allowing direct manipulation or damage to cable infrastructure. Covert disruption may also occur through maritime activities, such as the unintentional or deliberate anchoring of commercial vessels, trawlers, or offshore operations in cable corridors. In parallel, cyberattacks targeting cable landing stations, associated terrestrial networks, or associated operational technology systems could degrade functionality without physical intervention.
Historical precedent underscores the plausibility of such scenarios. The 2008 Mediterranean submarine cable disruption, which caused widespread interruptions in internet connectivity across multiple regions, illustrates how failures, whether accidental or malicious can propagate globally. In the context of conflict involving high-stakes geopolitical actors, deliberate and coordinated sabotage could amplify these impacts, triggering cascading disruptions across financial systems, communications, and critical infrastructure worldwide.
Global consequences and systemic risks
A major disruption to undersea cable systems in the Persian Gulf would have far-reaching and cascading effects across the global digital and economic landscape. Financial systems, including banking networks, trading platforms, and digital payment infrastructures, could experience severe instability, potentially halting international transactions and market operations. Digital services reliant on continuous connectivity, such as cloud computing, data centers, and online platforms would face operational collapse, disrupting both commercial and governmental functions worldwide.
From a security perspective, military command, control, and communication systems could be degraded, compromising operational readiness and the ability to coordinate defense and strategic responses. Logistical networks, encompassing aviation, maritime shipping, and port operations, would similarly be affected, creating delays in supply chains and critical goods transportation.
The sudden rerouting of data traffic through alternative pathways, notably via the Indian Ocean region, would place immense strain on those networks, exacerbating congestion and increasing vulnerability to further disruption. In this context, Persian Gulf cable vulnerabilities are not merely regional concerns; they represent systemic risks capable of destabilizing global connectivity, commerce, and security simultaneously.
Spillover into the Indian Ocean region
The Indian Ocean functions as a strategically significant secondary corridor for global data traffic, linking the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. In the event of disruptions to submarine cables in the Persian Gulf, whether due to conflict, sabotage, or hybrid warfare traffic would inevitably be rerouted through Indian Ocean pathways, placing unprecedented strain on existing networks. This redirection could result in severe bandwidth congestion, degradation of service quality, and delays in critical communications for both commercial and military operations.
The increased reliance on the Indian Ocean network would also elevate the region’s vulnerability to further attacks, whether deliberate or opportunistic, as adversaries may seek to exploit the bottlenecked infrastructure. Moreover, the operational scope of any regional conflict could expand, effectively extending the theatre of digital contestation to the Indian Ocean and affecting the maritime security environment of surrounding nations.
Consequently, the Indian Ocean is not merely a passive conduit for rerouted data; it could emerge as an active domain of strategic competition, where control over undersea infrastructure and the ability to defend it becomes a critical determinant of regional and global digital resilience.
Sri Lanka’s strategic position and vulnerability
Situated at a pivotal maritime and digital crossroads in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka occupies a uniquely strategic position within global communication networks. The island serves as a critical node for multiple undersea fiber optic cable systems, including the SEA-ME-WE 3, 4, and 5 series, the Bay of Bengal Gateway (BBG), FALCON, as well as Chinese-led systems such as the Asia-Pacific Cable Network (APCN) and China-Asia-Pacific Network (CAPN). These networks not only connect Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, but also provide essential redundancy for global data traffic, rendering Sri Lanka an indispensable conduit for intercontinental digital flows.
Vulnerabilities
Sri Lanka’s strategic location, while advantageous, also exposes it to significant vulnerabilities. In the event of disruptions elsewhere in the network, traffic is often rerouted through the island, increasing the operational load on existing infrastructure and heightening the risk of congestion. Moreover, the island’s position as a critical redundancy node renders it a potential target for deliberate attacks or sabotage in scenarios of geopolitical tension. Currently, the absence of a fully operational legal and regulatory framework for submarine cable protection exacerbates these risks, leaving strategic infrastructure exposed. Limitations in seabed surveillance and rapid response capability further constrain the country’s ability to detect, deter, and mitigate threats effectively.
National implications
Disruptions to Sri Lanka’s undersea cable network could have profound national consequences. Financial and commercial systems reliant on uninterrupted digital connectivity would face operational instability, with potential cascading effects on banking, trading, and online services. Port operations and maritime logistics, which increasingly depend on real-time communication and data flows, would also be adversely affected, impacting the island’s role as a regional transshipment hub. From a national security perspective, interruptions could compromise command, control, and communication systems essential for defense and maritime governance. Finally, economic repercussions would extend to the digital and technology sectors, threatening both foreign investment and domestic industry reliant on high-speed connectivity.
In sum, Sri Lanka’s unique position at the intersection of major global and regional undersea cable systems provides both strategic leverage and significant exposure. Recognizing and addressing these vulnerabilities through a comprehensive protection and resilience framework is essential for national security, economic stability, and regional digital leadership.
Indian Ocean nexus: From seabed vulnerability to space-based control
A disruption originating in the Persian Gulf would cascade into the Indian Ocean, where dense maritime activity and limited surveillance heighten systemic risk. Reduced communication integrity and gaps in maritime awareness could mask further interference with submarine cables, compounding the crisis. Also, the Fragmented jurisdiction under frameworks such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and limitations in real-time monitoring create exploitable gaps.
Yet disruption also creates opportunity. Technologically advanced nations and corporations, already deploying Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, could rapidly step in as alternative providers of global connectivity. Systems led by SpaceX, Amazon, and OneWeb are capable of scaling quickly to offset cable outages, while China’s state-backed China Satellite Network Group (Guowang) and commercial initiatives such as Qianfan further reinforce this emerging space-based connectivity architecture. In such a context, the large-scale deployment of thousands of miniature satellites dedicated to global data connectivity by technologically advanced nations cannot be ruled out, further accelerating the shift toward space-based communication dominance.
Emerging risk: Space-based connectivity and strategic monopoly
A prolonged or large-scale disruption of undersea cable systems could catalyze a structural shift in global connectivity architecture. High-technology corporations and advanced states may exploit such a crisis to accelerate the deployment of satellite constellations, effectively bypassing vulnerable seabed infrastructure.
Sustained or large-scale disruption of undersea cable systems possesses the capacity to trigger a profound structural transformation in the global connectivity landscape. In such a scenario, technologically advanced states and private enterprises could exploit the crisis to accelerate the deployment of satellite constellations, effectively bypassing the vulnerabilities inherent in submarine cable infrastructure. This transition would fundamentally reshape the architecture of global communications, enabling rapid network deployment that surpasses the timelines required to repair damaged cables. It also carries the potential to centralize control over global connectivity within a narrow set of actors, undermining national data sovereignty and altering the distribution of geopolitical influence by establishing dominance over space-based communication systems. In effect, disruption at sea may act as a catalyst, accelerating a strategic shift from seabed-based to orbital-based control of global information flows, concentrating technological, informational, and strategic power in the hands of a limited cohort of state and corporate actors, and redefining the very nature of global digital governance.
Case for national submarine cable safety and resilience framework
Sri Lanka’s proposed National Submarine Cable Safety and Resilience Framework (NSCPRF) constitutes a proactive and strategically essential response to the evolving spectrum of threats to critical undersea communication infrastructure. Recognizing the vulnerabilities posed by both accidental and deliberate disruptions, the framework has been developed with technical guidance from the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) and operational support from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Importantly, it aligns with international obligations, including UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/73/124, thereby situating Sri Lanka’s initiative within the broader framework of global maritime security norms.
The NSCPRF is designed around four core objectives: first, to formally recognize submarine cables as Critical National Infrastructure, thereby elevating their status within national security and policy frameworks; second, to establish dedicated Cable Protection Zones within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to prevent inadvertent damage and deliberate interference; third, to integrate naval, coastguard, and civilian agencies into coordinated protection, monitoring, and enforcement efforts, ensuring a unified operational response; and fourth, to develop rapid repair and contingency mechanisms capable of restoring connectivity promptly in the event of disruption. Collectively, these measures aim to safeguard Sri Lanka’s strategic digital infrastructure, mitigate the risks associated with global cable vulnerabilities, and strengthen the country’s resilience in an increasingly contested maritime and technological domain.
Strategic recommendations
To enhance national resilience and strengthen Sri Lanka’s strategic positioning in the emerging landscape of maritime and digital security, a multi-dimensional approach is required. First and foremost, the NSCPRF should be enacted without delay, providing a formal legal and operational framework that recognizes submarine cables as critical national infrastructure and establishes robust protection protocols.
Second, Sri Lanka must significantly strengthen its Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities, with a particular emphasis on seabed surveillance and real-time monitoring of undersea cable routes. This would enable early detection of potential threats, ranging from accidental damage to deliberate sabotage, and allow for timely, coordinated responses.
Third, the development of specialized naval and coastguard capabilities dedicated to submarine cable protection is essential. These forces should be trained and equipped for rapid interdiction, repair support, and enforcement operations within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), ensuring both deterrence and resilience against emerging threats.
Fourth, infrastructure redundancy should be promoted through diversification of cable routes and integration with alternative regional networks. Redundant pathways would reduce the operational and economic impact of localized disruptions, ensuring continuity of digital communications under a variety of contingency scenarios.
Fifth, Sri Lanka should actively engage in international partnerships to facilitate coordinated protection, information sharing, and joint response mechanisms. Collaboration with regional actors, international organizations, and private cable operators would enhance collective security and resilience across the Indian Ocean Region.
Finally, as the risk of space-based connectivity monopolization grows, Sri Lanka should assess the integration of satellite systems as a complementary component of national digital infrastructure. This approach would safeguard against technological dependency on a limited number of external actors, while maintaining national control over critical communications.
Taken together, these recommendations provide a comprehensive roadmap for safeguarding Sri Lanka’s undersea cable infrastructure, reinforcing national security, and positioning the country as a regional leader in maritime and digital resilience.
Securing seabed, safeguarding the skies
Undersea cables are no longer merely commercial infrastructure; they are strategic assets at the heart of global stability. In a conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, disruption in the Persian Gulf could trigger a global digital crisis, with cascading effects across the Indian Ocean.
Simultaneously, such a disruption could open the door for technologically advanced actors to redefine global connectivity through satellite constellations, potentially establishing monopolistic control over digital networks.
The crisis envisioned in “When the Seabed Goes Dark” is not hypothetical, but it is structurally plausible. The convergence of dense cable networks, geopolitical rivalry, and weak maritime governance creates conditions where disruption is not only possible, but strategically attractive. What follows may be even more consequential: a shift in global connectivity from the ocean floor to orbital space where control is narrower, faster, and potentially monopolistic.
For nations like Sri Lanka and the broader Indian Ocean region, the challenge is clear: secure seabed infrastructure while preparing for the strategic realities of space-based connectivity.
For the broader Indo-Pacific region, the challenge is clear: to secure the seas without surrendering the skies. By operationalizing the NSCPRF and adopting a forward-looking posture, Sri Lanka can transform vulnerability into leadership in the emerging domain of integrated maritime and digital security.
In the future battle-space, dominance will depend not only on control of the seas , but on control of the data pathways beneath them and the satellites above them.
This article and its conceptual framework are based on the research and analysis of Rear Admiral JJ Ranasinghe (Retd), who holds a master’s degree in Maritime Policy from the University of Wollongong, reflecting his strategic insights into undersea cable vulnerabilities, Indo-Pacific maritime security, and emerging space-based connectivity risks.
by Rear Admiral Jagath Ranasinghe Retd)
VSV, USP, psc, MSc (DS) Mgt, MMaritimePol (Aus),
PG Dip in CPS, DIP in CR, FNI(Lond), Former Govt Fellow GCSP,
Features
So, who is going to tell the rest of the world?
Series: The greatest digital rethink, Part V of V – Series conclusion
Five instalments. Five levels of education. One recurring pattern: the countries that ran the experiment are retreating, the countries that watched them are still paying the entry price. This final column asks the question the international education community has been carefully avoiding: does anyone actually learn from anyone else, or do we just take turns making the same expensive mistakes?
What five parts told us
Let us briefly take stock. In Part I of this series, we traced the arc of three decades of digital enthusiasm in education, from the early computer labs of the 1990s through the tablet explosion of the 2010s, to the pandemic acceleration and the emerging backlash that defines the present moment. In Part II, we watched Sweden take tablets away from preschoolers who should never have been given them in the first place, and Finland legislate to return the pencil to its rightful place in the primary classroom. In Part III, we confronted the paradox at the heart of secondary school de-digitalisation: governments triumphantly banning the phone in the student’s pocket while quietly expanding the data systems that monitor their every digital interaction. In Part IV, we sat in the university exam hall, a room that had been pronounced redundant 20 years ago, and watched it fill up again with students writing with pens, because the large language models (LLM) like Chat GPT, had made every other form of assessment untrustworthy.
The inconvenient asymmetry
There is a concept in international education research, ‘asymmetric correction’, that describes this phenomenon with academic precision. It means, in plain language, that the systems with enough money, data and institutional capacity to discover that an experiment has gone wrong can afford to correct it. The systems without those resources cannot, and often do not even know the correction is needed until the damage is visible in their own classrooms and their own assessment results.
This is not merely an abstract inequity. It has a specific mechanism. The countries now de-digitalising, Finland, Sweden, Australia, France, the UK, have had 20 or 30 years of experience with school digitalisation. They have run multiple cycles of national assessments. They have PISA data going back decades. They have teacher unions vocal enough to flag classroom deterioration before it becomes a crisis. They have the research infrastructure to connect a policy change to an outcome measure and draw a conclusion. When their scores drop, they investigate. When the investigation points at screens, they act.
The evidence that was always there
One of the more unsettling conclusions of this series is that much of the evidence driving the current de-digitalisation wave was available considerably earlier than the policies it has inspired. The finding that handwritten notes produce better conceptual understanding than typed ones was published in 2014. The OECD’s analysis showing that more computers do not produce better learning outcomes appeared in 2015. UNESCO’s concerns about platform power and datafication in education have been articulated consistently for years. The distraction research, documenting that students with open laptops in lecture halls perform worse, and drag their neighbours down with them, has been accumulating for well over a decade.
None of this stopped the rollout. The tablets arrived in the Swedish preschools. The 1:1 device programmes expanded. The learning management systems embedded themselves. The AI proctoring tools were procured and deployed. Evidence that gave pause was routinely absorbed into a narrative about implementation, the problem was not the technology, it was how it was being used; give us better training, better platforms, better connectivity, and the results will follow. The results, in many cases, did not follow. But by the time that was clear, the infrastructure was in place, the contracts were running, and the political cost of admitting the bet had been wrong was prohibitive.
What changed was not the evidence, it was the political permission to act on it. PISA 2022 delivered declines dramatic enough to be impossible to attribute to anything other than something systemic. UNESCO issued what amounted to an institutional mea culpa. And a sufficient number of teachers, in a sufficient number of countries, were by then willing to say publicly what they had been saying in staffrooms for years: that the screens were not helping, and in many cases were actively in the way.
What a responsible global policy would look like
This series is not a manifesto against technology in education. It has never argued that. Screens are indispensable tools, for accessing information, for enabling collaboration across distance, for serving students whose accessibility needs require digital solutions, for supporting the administrative and logistical complexity of modern educational institutions. The argument is not against technology. It is against the thoughtless, evidence-free, vendor-driven acceleration of technology in contexts where it undermines the very foundations it is supposed to strengthen.
A responsible global education policy would, at minimum, do several things that the current system conspicuously fails to do. It would require that the evidence base for large-scale digital procurement be genuinely independent of the vendors supplying the technology. It would insist that the learning from early-adopter systems, including the learning about what went wrong, be actively communicated to late-adopter systems before, not after, they make the same investments. It would treat the question of appropriate technology use at different ages and in different pedagogical contexts as a matter of ongoing empirical inquiry, not a settled ideological commitment to ‘more is better.’ And it would hold to account the international organisations and development banks that have promoted digital solutions to educational problems without adequate attention to long-term cognitive and social outcomes.
None of this is technically difficult. The knowledge exists. The research is available. The lesson is sitting there in the PISA data, in the Swedish preschool curriculum reversal, in the UK university exam halls filling up with students holding pens. The question is purely one of political will, and of whether the global education community considers it acceptable to keep selling a model it is quietly dismantling at home.
Who decides what technology is for?
Beneath all the policy detail in this series lies a question that is fundamentally political rather than technical: who gets to decide what role technology plays in education, and in whose interest do those decisions get made? The answer, across the period this series has covered, has too often been: vendors, with governments following at a respectful distance and parents and teachers arriving to the conversation after the contract is signed.
De-digitalisation, for all its imperfections, its occasional moral panic, its selective use of evidence and its tendency to become a political signalling exercise, represents something important: a reassertion that educational technology is a means, not an end, and that the people who should determine how much of it to use are educators, researchers and communities, not quarterly earnings reports. The fact that Finland chose to legislate, that Sweden chose to buy books instead of tablets, that Queensland schools now require phones to be away for the day, often collected, or switched off, from the moment students arrive and found their playgrounds transformed, these are acts of pedagogical agency. They are an insistence that schools are for children, not for platforms.
A final word
There is nothing wrong with technology in education. There is something very wrong with the assumption that more technology is always better, and something worse with the global system that allows wealthy nations to learn that lesson expensively, correct it quietly, and then export the uncorrected version to everyone else.
The pencil did not disappear because it failed. It was sidelined because screens arrived with better marketing. It is coming back, in Finnish classrooms, in Swedish preschools, in Australian playgrounds, in university exam halls, not out of nostalgia, but because 30 years of evidence have converged on an uncomfortable truth: some things, it turns out, require your full attention, your physical hand, and the irreplaceable cognitive effort of a human being working without a shortcut.
That is not a retreat. That is a reckoning. And the only question left worth asking is whether the rest of the world will get to benefit from it before they have to discover it for themselves.
SERIES COMPLETE
Part I: From Ed-Tech Enthusiasm to De-Digitalisation | Part II: Phones, Pens & Early Literacy | Part III: Attention, Algorithms & Adolescents | Part IV: Universities, AI & the Handwritten Exam | Part V: Who Is Going to Tell the Rest of the World?
Features
New kid on the block – AI drug prescriber from the US
Artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare has come to stay and is a well-recognised development over the last decade or so. AI has now progressed on to even the ability to execute quite a few tasks and manoeuvres that were once the sole duties of doctors. Certain AI programmes are now designed to make tricky diagnoses, offer mental counselling, detect drug interactions, read and diagnose images, forecast results, and review scientific articles, to name a few amongst other capabilities. As the aptitudes of AI increase, the roles of doctors are likely to change. In the future, there is a real possibility that physicians would increasingly be placed in supervisory roles in semiautonomous systems, while retaining responsibility but with reduced independence.
Philosopher Walter Benjamin, in the 1930s, wrote that photography and cinema would have a telling effect on paintings and painters. It was argued that the introduction of visual images would render painting and painters quite obsolete. Many belittled the artistic value of photographs, just as today, many ask whether AI can truly understand illness or empathise with discomfort. The opponents of photography theorised that original works of art, such as paintings, had a so-called aura and that there was something special about an original artwork compared to a reproduction as a photo image, and that the painting echoed its singular history and unique trajectory through time, space, and social meaning.
Today’s doctors have something comparable. Their professional authority was grounded in their unique training, the practical wisdom that they had accrued, their face-to-face presence with patients, and their nuanced clinical judgment. Like an original painting, medical expertise appeared singular and inseparable from the clinician who exercised it rather than from the tools or institutions that supported the physician’s practice.
Now enters the latest AI initiative in healthcare. As documented in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) on the 13th of April 2026, it is the very first AI DRUG PRESCRIBER. It originated in the state of Utah of the United States of America, which is the 45th state admitted to the Union on the 4th of January 1896, and is well-known for its unique geography, including the Great Salt Lake and its “Mighty 5” national parks: Zion, Bryce Canyon, Arches, Capitol Reef, and Canyonlands.
In January 2026, the State of Utah publicised a first-of-its-kind partnership with an AI company to develop an AI-based programme to prescribe medications without physician involvement. The AI prescriber package sold by the company Doctronic is claimed to conduct a “comprehensive medical assessment” that “mirrors the clinical decision-making process a licensed physician would follow“. Originally, it was intended to focus on prescription renewals, and the software is designed to prescribe almost 200 drugs, including corticosteroids, statins, antidepressants, hormones, and anticoagulant agents. It has the potential to develop into an autonomous system that could even provide original prescriptions without the involvement of doctors.
There are perceived advantages to AI prescribing in a world facing shortages of primary care physicians, as well as certain specialists. The public health goal is to make sure that patients have access to safe, effective drugs and continue receiving them for as long as it is appropriate. There are documented scientific studies in Western countries on non-adherence, failure to take the drugs of a first prescription, and failure to get refill prescriptions. True enough, AI could reduce pervasive medication errors, enhance process efficiency, and free physicians to focus on complex diagnostic tasks or human-to-human interactions.
Yet for all that, technology-driven revolutions can also cause damage, create waste, and even destabilise the medical connection. They could reduce the patient-clinician encounters and substantially reduce the prospects for physicians to spot other problems and for patients to raise anxieties and ask questions. Doctors have to go through a rigorous process of training and demonstration of clinical fitness to be allowed to practice medicine. AI prescribers face no equivalent safety process. AI companies generally do not openly reveal the precise operational details of the software’s abilities to make medical decisions. In the Utah deal, generalisations were offered, including that the AI prescriber is “trained on established medical protocols,” and that its algorithm continues to progress through “feedback loops.” However, they are far from the absolute detailed guarantees that training of a physician offers.
In the American System of Governance, most states have long maintained foundational laws for dispensing medicines, positioning licensed physicians and pharmacists as essential caretakers and even as gatekeepers. Federal Law requires that any drug that “is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law” must be dispensed only “upon a written prescription of a practitioner licensed by law“. AI prescribers are not licensed “practitioners” of medicine, and here, Utah has waived state requirements. It has waived State Laws for businesses with novel ideas deemed potentially beneficial to consumers.
Under the main FDA statute, an AI prescriber comes under an “instrument, apparatus, implement, or machine clearly intended for use in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,” which makes it an FDA-regulated medical device. The 21st Century Cures Act of 2016 created exemptions for software involving administrative support, general wellness, or electronic record storage. For clinical software, the FDA has generally exercised enforcement discretion only for tools that aid physician decisions. By design, AI prescribers remove the physician, meaning that FDA oversight is required.
However, in the Utah deal, the company has apparently not attempted to approach the FDA about the technology, thereby working on the presumption that the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine. True enough, Federal Law and the FDA itself express that the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine. However, Federal Law also emphasises that medical devices and drugs must be legally sold and used within a legitimate patient-clinician relationship. Federal Law does not permit the replacement of physicians with unlicensed computers.
The scientific aspects of the conundrum imply that the current political administration appears to be disregarding some of the federal oversight. Since its 2025 inauguration, the executive branch of the current administration has rescinded previous AI governance orders, encouraged the removal of policies that might impair innovation, and issued an executive order aimed at reducing federal funds for states that strictly regulate AI. The USA Commissioner of Food and Drugs has clearly emphasised the need for AI innovation. Given this antiregulatory environment for AI, the prospect of federal intervention against initiatives like AI prescribers appears to be quite slim.
As federal and state regulators retreat, private parties have stepped in. The Joint Commission (TJC), a private, non-profit organisation that functions as the primary accrediting body for healthcare organisations, recently released non-binding guidance urging healthcare organisations to establish internal AI governance structures and rigorously measure outcomes. The success of AI prescribers will ultimately depend on the acceptance of health systems, which should demand robust evidence of safety and effectiveness, optimally in the form of clinical trials.
Tort law, a branch of civil law that deals with public wrongs such as situations where one person’s behaviour causes some form of harm or loss to another, remains a potential avenue for addressing patient harm because Utah’s agreement leaves such remedies intact. However, injured patients face significant hurdles. Courts will have to determine whether AI could be held to the same standard of care as a human physician. A product liability lawsuit would typically require a plaintiff to show that there was a reasonable alternative design, a challenge for AI black-box technologies. Furthermore, companies might argue that patients “assumed the risk” of using the AI prescriber. However, that is not a complete defence.
AI prescribing would be safest under concurrent state and federal oversight. Yet Utah has granted a state waiver, and FDA compliance has not been demonstrated. Other companies may take the lesson that they can bypass federal safety standards, and they may race into the market to ensure they are not left behind.
Some examples beg for caution. The FDA fell behind in regulating flavoured e-cigarettes, which are now ubiquitous and have contributed to a youth e-cigarette epidemic, which has even reached Sri Lanka. The sheer scale of the unauthorised market and the subsequent legal tactics used by tobacco companies turned premarket requirements into a mere technicality. If AI prescribing becomes the industry standard before safety and liability frameworks are established, the power problem may render future regulation infeasible.
Although AI offers the promise of increased efficiency and expanded access, the evasion of legal obligations by early movers raises profound concerns. The company that is marketing the AI Prescriber is operating in a unique legal “grey zone” that has sparked intense debate among regulators and medical associations.
Incorporating AI into modern health care must be evidence-based and responsible. Physicians and health systems should insist that AI technologies should not be allowed to bypass long-standing and proven legal guardrails governing medical products. That needs to be the axiom that should apply not only to the Western nations but to the whole wide world.
by Dr B. J. C. Perera
MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paediatrics), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL)
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
An Independent Freelance Correspondent.
Features
From the Handbook for Bad Political Appointments
The Geathiswaran Chapter:
Dr. Ganesanathan Geathiswaran, Sri Lanka’s Deputy High Commissioner in Chennai is in hot water, dragging in with him the Foreign Ministry as well as the Sri Lanka government into a worthless controversy. It stands as a classic example of a misplaced political appointment to a sensitive public position paid for by hapless Sri Lankan taxpayers. And that too by a government that came to power promising not to politicise appointments.
Why would a meeting between a Sri Lankan diplomat and a group of fishermen in South India in the last week of March 2026 be controversial? After all, illegal fishing in Sri Lankan waters by South Indian fishermen from the Tamil Nadu area, which negatively impacts the livelihoods of mostly Tamil-speaking Sri Lankan fishing communities, is a perennial problem that neither Sri Lankan nor Indian governments have been able to resolve. This is also a consistent political issue in Tamil Nadu politics. In this context, a Sri Lankan diplomat meeting local fishermen might well be within his job description. But the issue is how and where such a meeting should take place. The bottom line is that it should not be a public event.
Speaking to The Hindu on 5April 2026, Geathiswaran insisted his presence in the meeting was a “routine visit” and that the event was not organised by any political party. He also said, “I’m not here to do politics” and “I have nothing to do with politics.” He further insisted, “I did not take part in any political campaign. It was in an open area along the seashore. The meeting was not on a stage and in a public area.” These utterances show both Geathiswaran’s naivety, woeful lack of experience and understanding of the nature of politics in the region where he is our country’s chief diplomat.
Be that as it may, let us look at the optics and substance of the said event. According to information circulating in the media in both Sri Lanka and India, the Deputy High Commissioner attended a meeting with local fishermen in Puducherry. It was not a closed-door meeting. It appears, the Sri Lankan diplomat was invited to the event or it was coordinated by Jose Charles Martin, the leader of the newly formed political party, Latchiya Jananayaga Katchi (LJK). Though launched only in 2025, the LJK has been making inroads into Tamil Nadu politics mostly funded by the business interests and funds of Martin’s father, the well-known lottery tycoon, Santiago Martin. LJK joined the BJP-led NDA in the ongoing Puducherry Assembly Elections of 2026. Moreover, as indicated in the photographs in circulation, one can easily see the presence of several BJP politicians including V. P. Ramalingam, BJP’s Puducherry president and a candidate in the Raj Bhavan constituency.
Members of Martin’s family are craftily aligned with different Tamil Nadu political formations. Jose Charles Martin himself is contesting the Puducherry electoral area as a BJP ally, while his mother is contesting from the AIADMK, and his brother-in-law is contesting as a candidate of the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) party.
Therefore, Geathiswaran’s assertion that the event was not organised by a political party is blatantly false. Further, the event does not become non-political just because of the absence of a stage just as much as a stage does not provide political attributes merely because of its higher elevation. It is unacceptable that a diplomat hand-picked by the Sri Lankan President for the important station of Chennai, thereby depriving the appointment of a senior career diplomat with years of work experience and awareness of political nuance and optics, can be allowed to be this naïve.
It is in this context that Pawan Khera, a senior leader of the Indian National Congress, complained in an X post on 4 April tagging the Indian External Affairs Minister noting that Geathiswaran’s participation in the meeting was “a gross violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”, according to which “diplomats ‘have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.’” He also noted in his post that the diplomat was invited by the leader of the LJK and also referred to the presence of senior BJP politicians. Leaving aside the overemphasis of the Vienna Convention, which in this instance makes no sense, the issue at hand is the complete lack of common sense on the part of the Sri Lankan diplomat that allowed this controversy to arise in the first place. Despite his insistence on not engaging in politics, which in the case is likely true, this was very clearly a political event, politically conceived, perceived and packaged, organised by a political party, and conducted in the presence of allied politicians who were contesting in a local election. As a foreign diplomatic representative, Geathiswaran should have the cerebral wherewithal to make the distinction or at least seek guidance from his superiors at the Foreign Ministry in Colombo.
Diplomats need not shy away from controversy if it makes sense and benefits the nation. But the incident under reference is purely nonsensical from any perspective. This brings me back to Geathiswaran’s appointment as Sri Lanka’s Deputy High Commissioner in Chennai, itself. What unique experiences did he bring to the post? Of course, he is Tamil-speaking. So are hundreds of thousands of other citizens in the country including potentially competent, well-trained, intelligent and experienced career diplomats. I am not saying that political appointments are necessarily unfavourable, though not ideal unless they bring to the service expertise that the Foreign Service does not have. But what quality and qualification does Geathiswaran possess for the position that is lacking in a career foreign service officer?
Does he bring in access to the different segments of Tamil Nadu political landscape that no one else has? If so, should this controversy not have arisen in the first place, owing to the good connections to the entire political spectrum? In short, he brings absolutely nothing to his office and the country he represents. He also does not have any diplomatic or any other public or private sector experience that would have injected sense and nuance into the present posting. His only qualification is the close political connection to the NPP through family.
This fiasco brings to mind some ideas I presented in 2024 in the government’s own newspaper, the Observer two weeks before the NPP government was established and about one month after President Dissanayake assumed office. Since those conditions still remain valid and the present incident raises the same alarm I raised then, I think it is worth reflecting on them yet again:
“During the last three decades, particularly during the Rajapaksa administration, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Service saw a significant nosedive … In real terms what this means is, the Foreign Service has been encroached by individuals purely based on their political and nepotistic connections, with little or no regard for requisite qualifications, expertise or experience. This is observed not only at ambassadorial level, but also right down to the junior levels in our overseas missions … The main reason for the sorry state of the Sri Lanka Foreign Service is that it has been problematically and parochially politicised over a long period of time, without any pushback … Political appointments are a serious problem. Due to the appointment of completely unqualified individuals on political patronage, there are very few intelligent and well-trained personnel in our embassies in the major cities of the world who are able to proactively work in the country’s interest, when problems arise at the global level. Furthermore, it is also not apparent if there are officials in the Ministry who can advise their unenlightened political superiors without fear and stand their ground on principle. This situation has come about as a matter of simple personal survival and bread-and-butter purposes, owing to which both the larger interest of the Service and self-respect of officers have been clearly compromised.”
Is this not what the Chennai incident also indicates? Geathiswaran being a wrongful appointment is one matter. But it also appears that he did not even have the common sense to seek advice before the meeting in Puducherry or such advice was simply not forthcoming or heeded, as political appointees are generally considered a know-it-all bunch who have the ears of the political hierarchy, and therefore above the norms and regulations that apply to mere career officials.
For many of us the advent of the NPP to power signified the dismantling of the culture of political patronage in which diplomatic postings were rewards for loyalty and friendships. It took less time for the present government than others to go against its own repeatedly stated pre-election positions and to stuff the Foreign Service with incompetent individuals. The present fiasco authored by one of these appointees exemplifies the consequences of this continuing malpractice.
Let me leave readers and government apologists with the words of Tom Nichols, former professor at the U.S. Naval War College about Trumpian ambassadorial appointments, as this applies to our country too: “[With some of his ambassador choices], Trump has elevated diplomatic incompetence to an art.”
Sri Lanka just might outdo the mighty US President on this score.
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