Midweek Review

War against separatist terrorism: Gen. Daya Rathnayake’s narrative

Published

9 months ago

2025/06/4

General (retd) Daya Rathnayake presents a copy of ‘Sri Lankawe Bedumwadi Thrasthawadaya 1975-2009’ to Army Commander Lieutenant General Lasantha Rodrigo at the SLF recently.

‘Sri Lankawe Bedumwadi Thrasthawadaya 1975-2009’

(Separatist Terrorism in Sri Lanka 1975 to 2009) made reference to major military operations conducted against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). A very interesting point made was the absence of major military operations after the disastrous Agni Keela (Anvil of Fire) offensive launched on April 24, 2001, in the Jaffna peninsula. That offensive had been aimed at regaining Elephant Pass that was abandoned in April 2000. The Agni Keela debacle stunned the military. That was the last major action undertaken by the military before the People’s Alliance defeat at the 2001 general election leading to the signing of the Norwegian arranged one-sided Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) advantageous to the LTTE. The military remained passive until the LTTE initiated offensive action in the second week of August 2006. The 2001-2006 period saw massive expansion of the LTTE as the southern political leadership pulled in different directions, thereby giving the LTTE a sense of certain victory. Resumption of large scale hostilities, simultaneously in both eastern and northern theaters in August 2006, underscored the level of the LTTE preparedness.

The war against separatist terrorism could have been brought to a successful conclusion much earlier if not for utterly irresponsible, foolish, politically motivated and treacherous actions of successive governments.

President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s handling of the war (January 1989-May 1993) is a glaring case in point. Premadasa’s ill-conceived political strategies that had caused so much destruction at the onset of Eelam War IV, in June 1990, demoralised the armed forces and resulted in debilitating setbacks. Premadasa prolonged the war that lasted two decades (From Eelam War II to IV/ 1990 to 2009).

Former Army Commander General Daya Rathnayake, in his recently launched memoirs ‘Sri Lankawe Bedumwadi Thrasthawadaya 1975-2009’ (Separatist Terrorism in Sri Lanka 1975 to 2009) briefly dealt with Premadasa’s handling of the war, after becoming the President on January 02, 1989. Perhaps, Rathnayake should have elaborated on Premadasa’s period, as the LTTE underwent a drastic transformation during Premadasa’s time. Premadasa not only directed the military to fully cooperate with the LTTE, the group was also provided with both arms, ammunition and finance, at the taxpayers’ expense.

Rathnayake, nor the previous ex-military officers who authored books on the conflict, never really bothered to examine this aspect. Premadasa ordered the disbursement of funds to the LTTE, just months after he took office as the President. There is irrefutable evidence that Premadasa had the then Finance Secretary, R. Paskaralingam, release to the Tigers Rs 5 mn each time, on August 09, September 15, 27, November 11, 30, and December 13, 1989. In the following year, again Rs 5 mn each were released to the LTTE on January 08, 30, February 20, March 02, 21, April 19, 20, and June 06 and 08. Premadasa’s decision to release Rs 50 mn on November 05, 1990, is a mystery as, by then, the LTTE had taken the upper hand in the Eelam War II. Why did Premadasa release Rs 50 mn about five months after the resumption of fighting and the strategic loss of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, north of Vavuniya? That foolish action had never been explained and no one in authority bothered to examine Premadasa’s action.

The 21st Commander of the Army Rathnayake (August 1, 2013, to February 21, 2015) succeeded General Jagath Jayasuriya (July 15, 2009, to July 31, 2013), the man who earned the wrath of war-winning Army commander, General Sarath Fonseka, for obvious reasons. President Mahinda Rajapaksa brought in Jayasuriya as Fonseka’s successor, amidst developing turmoil over his decision to replace Fonseka.

Dispute between the Rajapaksas and Fonseka

The unprecedented dispute between the Rajapaksas and Fonseka, over the latter’s entry into politics, seeking the highest office in 2010, threw the country into political turmoil as never before. That undermined the post-war defence of armed forces in the face of war crimes accusations, propagated by Western powers. The election of Maithripala Sirisena as President, in January 2015, paved the way for Fonseka to receive the coveted Field Marshal’s appointment in May 2015. In Oct ober, the same year, just two months after the parliamentary polls, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government treacherously co-sponsored an accountability resolution against its own war-winning armed forces. Rathnayake relinquished command a couple of weeks before Fonseka’s appointment as Field Marshal.

One-time Rajapaksa loyalist Rathnayake teamed-up with experienced writer Major Sarath Jayawardena to author a highly readable book that explained the conflict lucidly. The book launch took place amidst the ongoing controversy over the National People’s Power (NPP) government’s handling of the 16th Anniversary of the crushing defeat rendered to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the battlefield. Rathnayake received appointment as Secretary to the Ministry of Industries in July 2021. Previously he served as Chairman of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA,) but quit amidst controversy. In the run-up to the last presidential election, Rathnayake pledged his support to presidential candidate Sajith Premadasa.

People found fault with the government over President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s decision not to attend the May 19 event. But, the President, who is also the Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces ,at the last moment, fortunately, changed his mind, thereby averting a major blunder.

Let me get back to the work of the two authors.

They dealt with the beginning on a low intensity conflict, the gradual development of hostilities, to a full scale conventional war, the Indian military deployment here (August 1987 to March 1990), resumption of war between the government and the LTTE, in June 1990, on and off peace negotiations, and the collapse of the Norwegian peace initiative, finally leading to the destruction of the group whose military prowess surprised the world. But, as the authors pointed out, Sri Lanka, too, contributed to the enemy’s battlefield success. Rathnayake explained one major blunder caused by Premadasa at the onset of Eelam War II.

The then Major Rathnayake had been at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH), Colombo, when fighting raged in the East, in the second week of June 1990. The senior author had been the duty officer at the JOH. Rathnayake is, perhaps, one of the few military personnel to observe the then State Defence Minister, the late Ranjan Wijeratne, Defence Secretary the late General Cyril Ranatunga, and then IGP the late Ernest Perera, issuing orders for the armed forces, and police, to surrender to the LTTE.

Rathnayake names the then Lt. Colonel Hiran Halangoda, the Commanding Officer of the first battalion of Gemunu Watch (1GW), as the one who refused to heed the treacherous directive issued by the JOH. Sri Lanka never bothered to examine the conduct of political and military leadership during the conflict. Even 17 years after the conclusion of the war, no government took tangible measures to conduct a thorough examination of the conflict.

Although several senior retired officers had written about the conflict, in addition to wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who himself served the celebrated Gajaba Regiment, the armed forces hadn’t made a collective effort to record the conflict. Co-author Maj. Jayawardena, in his brief but quite useful narrative, explained the overall shortcomings in the armed forces’ efforts. Jayawardena pointed out how Mahavamsa, too, failed to receive the confidence of all.

In spite of the discrepancy in the number of police deaths, as a result of the treacherous directive issued by the UNP government, the Police Department, according to Rathnayake and Jayawardena, definitely lost more than 600 officers and men.

Pooneryn debacle

Rathnayake and Jayawardena discussed the Pooneryn debacle and the subsequent pullout from the area. The losses suffered by the Army as a result of the multi-pronged attack on the Pooneryn-Nagathevanthurai naval detachment, in early November 1993, underscored the failure on the part of the command structure.

The writer was surprised the authors failed to mention the then Army Commander Cecil Waidyaratne acceptance of responsibility for the Pooneryn debacle and resigned on December 31, 1993. During the 30-year conflict, Waidyaratne was the only service chief to relinquish command following a debacle. The authors also depend on the memoirs of Sivakamy Sivasubramaniyam, alias Thamilini, the LTTE’s Women’s Wing leader whose memoirs were launched after the conclusion of the conflict and attracted much public attention. Thamilini’s THIYUNU ASIPATHAKA SEWANA YATA received appreciation from many, though some of those who still cannot stomach the LTTE’s defeat found fault with her for obvious reasons.

Thamilini died of cancer in October 2015, seven years after she surrendered to the Army on the Vanni east front.

The latest book from an ex-Army commander can influence the Sinhala readers, especially at a time when a concentrated attempt was being made to downplay the bloody conflict, ignoring innumerable sacrifices made by the armed forces to preserve the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Regardless of the strategic political-military blunders and battlefield miscalculations, the armed forces ultimately brought the war to a successful conclusion.

Rathnayake explained the loss of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road at the onset of the Eelam War II, on June 11, 1990, soon after the LTTE broke the14-month honeymoon with Premadasa. That stretch of road, north of Vavuniya, remained under LTTE control till the armed forces regained the area in the first week of January 2009.

The authors referred to memoirs of several retired officers, including the late Maj. General Sarath Munasinghe, the late Maj. Gen. Cyril Ranatunga (he was one of those shortsighted persons who, at the behest of Premadasa, ordered the police and the military to surrender), Maj General Wasantha Perera, General Gerry de Silva, General Kamal Gunaratne and Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda. However, the authors should have paid attention to Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka’s memoirs ‘The Army Commander’s Promise to the Nation’, as well as Special Forces veteran Dhammi Hewage ‘Fighting on Two Fronts’ and armourd corps veteran Ranjan Wijedasa’s ‘Unburied Man.’

Rathnayake and his co-author also left out wartime Defence Secretary Lt. Colonel Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s autobiography ‘Gota’s War.’ Authored by political analyst and Sri Lanka’s former Permanent Representative in Geneva C.A. Chandraprema. ‘Gota’s War’, whatever the criticism directed at its author, is the most comprehensive post-war work on the conflict.

Post-war failure

All those who authored books on the conflict, so far, failed pathetically to build a strong defence of war-winning armed forces against wild war crimes allegations, especially emanating from the West. Sri Lanka’s failure to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations propagated by interested parties, including those represented in Parliament, is a mystery. Seventeen years after the successful conclusion of the conflict, the country is in a deepening political-economic-social crisis. The absence of long queues for essentials, as in 2022, does not mean we are out of the woods. In spite of national elections that paved the way for the NPP to secure both the presidency and 2/3 majority in Parliament, the country is certainly not out of the woods yet.

The current armed forces leadership, in consultation with the NPP government, should at least now establish an expert team, consisting of wartime GoCs of the fighting Divisions and Task Forces, or their senior representatives, and other key officers, now retired, to formulate a strategy that would go beyond memoirs of any particular officer. The inclusion of Gajaba Regiment veteran Chagi Gallage, who played a significant role in military operations that cleared the Eastern theatre of operations (2006-2007), and then contributed immensely to the success in the Vanni theatre (2007-2009). Gallage, who had been the then Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s original choice to command Task Force 1, subsequently named 58 Division, the celebrated formation that figured prominently in the destruction of the LTTE. General Shavendra Silva, who retired on January 01, 2025, gave unparalleled leadership to that division after Chagi Gallage suffered a sudden heart attack, is credited with causing massive losses on the enemy, both in terms of territory, men and material.

Sri Lanka’s failure to counter unsubstantiated war crimes accusations, even 17 years after the emphatic defeat of the LTTE, cannot be discussed without taking into consideration Sarath Fonseka switching allegiance to the UNP in 2009. Fonseka’s political move wrong-footed the war-winning military. UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe ensnared the Sinha Regiment veteran who had no option but to join an unholy alliance that included the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) led Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

The man, who was supposed to lead Sri Lanka’s defence against war crimes accusations, himself contributed to the Geneva plot by alleging Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa ordered the 58 Division to execute those who surrendered on the Vanni east front. Fonseka’s declarations in the run-up to the 2010 presidential election undermined the country in no small measure.

As to why Fonseka got on the same political platform with the TNA that had recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of Tamil speaking people, way back in 2001, is still a mystery. Fonseka’s contentious move divided the war-winning Army and repercussions are still being felt, that being the worst type of treachery. Although retired officer’s right to enter active politics cannot be challenged under any circumstances, Fonseka’s alliance with those who relentlessly pursued hostile campaigns against the military during the conflict, caused immense damage.

The US, the UK and Canada have taken specific punitive measures against selected officers, while the UN held Sri Lanka responsible for over 40,000 civilian deaths out of thin air. But none of them ever sanctioned Fonseka over accusations though the world accepted he spearheaded the successful ground offensive from Colombo as he knew the terrain like the back of his hand.

The ex-top brass must contribute to a collective effort to set the record straight. The country cannot any further delay a cohesive bid to counter the Geneva challenge and action taken by individual countries as part of their overall political strategy to cultivate voters of Sri Lankan origin. There cannot be a better example than Canada that relentlessly pursued Sri Lanka. The appointment of Gary Anandasangaree as their Public Safety Minister recently highlighted the danger the Canadian strategy posed as Sri Lanka still remained ignorant of the developing scenario.

The Tamil Guardian recently declared moves to establish a second Tamil genocide monument, close on the heels of one put up in Brampton, Ontario. Naïve Sri Lankan leadership seems to be struggling to cope up with the Canadian onslaught.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

Fonseka clears Rajapaksas of committing war crimes he himself once accused them of

Published

2 days ago

2026/02/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

With Sri Lanka’s 17th annual war victory over separatist Tamil terrorism just months away, warwinning Army Chief, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka (Dec. 06, 2005, to July 15, 2009) has significantly changed his war narrative pertaining to the final phase of the offensive that was brought to an end on May 18, 2009.

The armed forces declared the conclusion of ground operations on that day after the entire northern region was brought back under their control. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, hiding within the secured area, was killed on the following day. His body was recovered from the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

With the war a foregone conclusion, with nothing to save the increasingly hedged in Tigers taking refuge among hapless Tamil civilians, Fonseka left for Beijing on May 11, and returned to Colombo, around midnight, on May 17, 2009. The LTTE, in its last desperate bid to facilitate Prabhakatan’s escape, breached one flank of the 53 Division, around 2.30 am, on May 18. But they failed to bring the assault to a successful conclusion and by noon the following day those fanatical followers of Tiger Supremo, who had been trapped within the territory, under military control, died in confrontations.

During Fonseka’s absence, the celebrated 58 Division (formerly Task Force 1), commanded by the then Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva, advanced 31/2 to 4 kms and was appropriately positioned with Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne’s 53 Division. The LTTE never had an opportunity to save its leader by breaching several lines held by frontline troops on the Vanni east front. There couldn’t have been any other option than surrendering to the Army.

The Sinha Regiment veteran, who had repeatedly accused the Rajapaksas of war crimes, and betraying the war effort by providing USD 2 mn, ahead of the 2005 presidential election, to the LTTE, in return for ordering the polls boycott that enabled Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory, last week made noteworthy changes to his much disputed narrative.

GR’s call to Shavendra What did the former Army Commander say?

* The Rajapaksas wanted to sabotage the war effort, beginning January 2008.

* In January 2008, Mahinda Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Navy Commander VA Wasantha Karannagoda, proposed to the National Security Council that the Army should advance from Vavuniya to Mullithivu, on a straight line, to rapidly bring the war to a successful conclusion. They asserted that Fonseka’s strategy (fighting the enemy on multiple fronts) caused a lot of casualties.

* They tried to discourage the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka

* Fonseka produced purported video evidence to prove decisive intervention made by Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa on the afternoon of May 17. The ex-Army Chief’s assertion was based on a telephone call received by Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva from Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That conversation had been captured on video by Swarnavahini’s Shanaka de Silva who now resides in the US. He had been one of the few persons, from the media, authorised by the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry to be with the Army leadership on the battlefield. Fonseka claimed that the videographer fled the country to escape death in the hands of the Rajapaksas. It was somewhat reminiscent of Maithripala Sirisena’s claim that if Rajapaksas win the 2015 Presidential election against him he would be killed by them.

* Shanaka captured Shavendra Silva disclosing three conditions laid down by the LTTE to surrender namely (a) Their casualties should be evacuated to Colombo by road (b) They were ready to exchange six captured Army personnel with those in military custody and (c) and the rest were ready to surrender.

* Then Fonseka received a call from Gotabaya Rajapaksa, on a CDMA phone. The Defence Secretary issued specific instructions to the effect that if the LTTE was to surrender that should be to the military and definitely not to the ICRC or any other third party. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, one-time Commanding Officer of the 1st battalion of the Gajaba Regiment, ordered that irrespective of any new developments and talks with the international community, offensive action shouldn’t be halted. That declaration directly contradicted Fonseka’s claim that the Rajapaksas conspired to throw a lifeline to the LTTE.

Fonseka declared that the Rajapaksa brothers, in consultation with the ICRC, and Amnesty International, offered an opportunity for the LTTE leadership to surrender, whereas his order was to annihilate the LTTE. The overall plan was to eliminate all, Fonseka declared, alleging that the Rajapaksa initiated talks with the LTTE and other parties to save those who had been trapped by ground forces in a 400 m x 400 m area by the night of May 16, among a Tamil civilian human shield held by force.

If the LTTE had agreed to surrender to the Army, Mahinda Rajapaksa would have saved their lives. If that happened Velupillai Prabhakaran would have ended up as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, he said. Fonseka shocked everyone when he declared that he never accused the 58 Division of executing prisoners of war (white flag killings) but the issue was created by those media people embedded with the military leadership. Fonseka declared that accusations regarding white flag killings never happened. That story, according to Fonseka, had been developed on the basis of the Rajapaksas’ failed bid to save the lives of the LTTE leaders.

Before we discuss the issues at hand, and various assertions, claims and allegations made by Fonseka, it would be pertinent to remind readers of wartime US Defence Advisor in Colombo Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith’s June 2011 denial of white flag killings. The US State Department promptly declared that the officer hadn’t spoken at the inaugural Colombo seminar on behalf of the US. Smith’s declaration, made two years after the end of the war, and within months after the release of the Darusman report, dealt a massive blow to false war crimes allegations.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in 2010, appointed a three-member Panel of Experts, more like a kangaroo court, consisting of Marzuki Darusman, Yasmin Sooka, and Steven Ratner, to investigate war crimes accusations.

Now Fonseka has confirmed what Smith revealed at the defence seminar in response to a query posed by Maj. General (retd.) Ashok Metha of the IPKF to Shavendra Silva, who had been No 02 in our UN mission, in New York, at that time.

White flag allegations

‘White flag’ allegations cannot be discussed in isolation. Fonseka made that claim as the common presidential candidate backed by the UNP-JVP-TNA combine. The shocking declaration was made in an interview with The Sunday Leader Editor Frederica Jansz published on Dec. 13, 2009 under ‘Gota ordered them to be shot – General Sarath Fonseka.’

The ‘white flag’ story had been sensationally figured in a leaked confidential US Embassy cable, during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here. Butenis had authored that cable at 1.50 pm on Dec. 13, 2009, the day after the now defunct The Sunday Leader exclusive. Butenis had lunch with Fonseka in the company of the then UNP Deputy Leader Karu Jayasuriya, according to the cable. But for the writer the most interesting part had been Butenis declaration that Fonseka’s advisors, namely the late Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (incumbent President) and Vijitha Herath (current Foreign Minister) wanted him to retract part of the story attributed to him.

Frederica Jansz fiercely stood by her explosive story. She reiterated the accuracy of the story, published on Dec. 13, 2009, during the ‘white flag’ hearing when the writer spoke to her. There is absolutely no reason to suspect Frederica Jansz misinterpreted Fonseka’s response to her queries.

Subsequently, Fonseka repeated the ‘white flag’ allegation at a public rally held in support of his candidature. Many an eyebrow was raised at The Sunday Leader’s almost blind support for Fonseka, against the backdrop of persistent allegations directed at the Army over Lasantha Wickrematunga’s killing. Wickrematunga, an Attorney-at-Law by profession and one-time Private Secretary to Opposition Leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was killed on the Attidiya Road, Ratmalana in early January 2009.

The Darusman report, too, dealt withthe ‘white flag’ killings and were central to unsubstantiated Western accusations directed at the Sri Lankan military. Regardless of the political environment in which the ‘white flag’ accusations were made, the issue received global attention for obvious reasons. The accuser had been the war-winning Army Commander who defeated the LTTE at its own game. But, Fonseka insisted, during his meeting with Butenis, as well as the recent public statement that the Rajapaksas had worked behind his back with some members of the international community.

Fresh inquiry needed

Fonseka’s latest declaration that the Rajapaksas wanted to save the LTTE leadership came close on the heels of Deputy British Prime Minister David Lammy’s whistle-stop visit here. The UK, as the leader of the Core Group on Sri Lanka at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council, spearheads the campaign targeting Sri Lanka.

Lammy was on his way to New Delhi for the AI Impact Summit. The Labour campaigner pushed for action against Sri Lanka during the last UK general election. In fact, taking punitive action against the Sri Lankan military had been a key campaign slogan meant to attract Tamil voters of Sri Lankan origin. His campaign contributed to the declaration of sanctions in March 2025 against Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, General (retd) Shavendra Silva, General (retd) Jagath Jayasuriya and ex-LTTE commander Karuna, who rebelled against Prabhakaran. Defending Shavendra Silva, Fonseka, about a week after the imposition of the UK sanctions, declared that the British action was unfair.

But Fonseka’s declaration last week had cleared the Rajapaksas of war crimes. Instead, they had been portrayed as traitors. That declaration may undermine the continuous post-war propaganda campaign meant to demonise the Rajapaksas and top ground commanders.

Canada, then a part of the Western clique that blindly towed the US line, declared Sri Lanka perpetrated genocide and also sanctioned ex-Presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Other countries resorted to action, though such measures weren’t formally announced. General (retd) Jagath Dias and Maj. Gen (retd) Chagie Gallage were two of those targeted.

Against the backdrop of Fonseka’s latest claims, in respect of accountability issues, the urgent need to review action taken against Sri Lanka cannot be delayed. Although the US denied visa when Fonseka was to accompany President Maithripala Sirisena to the UN, in Sept. 2016, he hadn’t been formally accused of war crimes by the western powers, obviously because he served their interests.

On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations that hadn’t been subjected to judicial proceedings, Geneva initiated actions. The US, Canada and UK acted on those accusations. The US sanctioned General Shavendra Silva in Feb. 2020 and Admiral Karannagoda in April 2023.

What compelled Fonseka to change his narrative, 18 years after his Army ended the war? Did Fonseka base his latest version solely on Shanaka de Silva video? Fonseka is on record as claiming that he got that video, via a third party, thereby Shanaka de Silva had nothing to do with his actions.

DNA and formation of DP

Having realised that he couldn’t, under any circumstances, reach a consensus with the UNP to pursue a political career with that party, Fonseka teamed up with the JVP, one of the parties in the coalition that backed his presidential bid in 2010. Fonseka’s current efforts to reach an understanding with the JVP/NPP (President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is the leader of both registered political parties) should be examined against the backdrop of their 2010 alliance.

Under Fonseka’s leadership, the JVP, and a couple of other parties/groups, contested, under the symbol of the Democratic National Alliance (DNA) that had been formed on 22 Nov. 2009. but the grouping pathetically failed to live up to their own expectations. The results of the parliamentary polls, conducted in April 2010, had been devastating and utterly demoralising. Fonseka, who polled about 40% of the national vote at the January 2010 presidential election, ended up with just over 5% of the vote, and the DNA only managed to secure seven seats, including two on the National List. The DNA group consisted of Fonseka, ex-national cricket captain Arjuna Ranatunga, businessman Tiran Alles and four JVPers. Anura Kumara Dissanayake was among the four.

Having been arrested on February 8, 2010, soon after the presidential election, Fonseka was in prison. He was court-martialed for committing “military offences”. He was convicted of corrupt military supply deals and sentenced to three years in prison. Fonseka vacated his seat on 7 Oct .2010. Following a failed legal battle to protect his MP status, Fonseka was replaced by DNA member Jayantha Ketagoda on 8 March 2011. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa released Fonseka in May 2012 following heavy US pressure. The US went to the extent of issuing a warning to the then SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena that unless President Rajapaksa freed Fonseka he would have to face the consequences (The then Health Minister Sirisena disclosed the US intervention when the writer met him at the Jealth Ministry, as advised by President Rajapaksa)

By then, Fonseka and the JVP had drifted apart and both parties were irrelevant. Somawansa Amarasinghe had been the leader at the time the party decided to join the UNP-led alliance that included the TNA, and the SLMC. The controversial 2010 project had the backing of the US as disclosed by leaked secret diplomatic cables during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here.

In spite of arranging the JVP-led coalition to bring an end to the Rajapaksa rule, Butenis, in a cable dated 15 January 2010, explained the crisis situation here. Butenis said: “There are no examples we know of a regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes while that regime or government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka.”

Then Fonseka scored a major victory when Election Commissioner Mahinda Deshapriya on 1 April, 2013, recognised his Democratic Party (DNA was registered as DP) with ‘burning flame’ as its symbol. There hadn’t been a previous instance of any service commander registering a political party. While Fonseka received the leadership, ex-Army officer Senaka de Silva, husband of Diana Gamage ((later SJB MP who lost her National List seat over citizenship issue) functioned as the Deputy Leader.

Having covered Fonseka’s political journey, beginning with the day he handed over command to Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, in July, 2009, at the old Army Headquarters that was later demolished to pave the way for the Shangri-La hotel complex, the writer covered the hastily arranged media briefing at the Solis reception hall, Pitakotte, on 2 April, 2023. Claiming that his DP was the only alternative to what he called corrupt Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government and bankrupt Ranil Wickremesinghe-led Opposition, a jubilant Fonseka declared himself as the only alternative (‘I am the only alternative,’ with strapline ‘SF alleges Opposition is as bad as govt’. The Island, April 3, 2013).

Fonseka had been overconfident to such an extent, he appealed to members of the government parliamentary group, as well as the Opposition (UNP), to switch allegiance to him. As usual Fonseka was cocky and never realised that 40% of the national vote he received, at the presidential election, belonged to the UNP, TNA and the JVP. Fonseka also disregarded the fact that he no longer had the JVP’s support. He was on his own. The DP never bothered to examine the devastating impact his 2010 relationship with the TNA had on the party. The 2015 general election results devastated Fonseka and underscored that there was absolutely no opportunity for a new party. The result also proved that his role in Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE hadn’t been a decisive factor.

RW comes to SF’s rescue

Fonseka’s DP suffered a humiliating defeat at the August 2015 parliamentary polls. The outcome had been so bad that the DP was left without at least a National List slot. Fonseka was back to square one. If not for UNP leader and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Fonseka could have been left in the cold. Wickremesinghe accommodated Fonseka on their National List, in place of SLFPer M.K.D.S. Gunawardene, who played a critical role in an influential section of the party and the electorate shifting support to Maithripala Sirisena. Gunawardena passed away on 19 January, 2016. Wickremesinghe and Fonseka signed an agreement at Temple Trees on 3 February, 2016. Fonseka received appointment as National List MP on 9 February, 2016, and served as Minister of Regional Development and, thereafter, as Minister of Wildlife and Sustainable Development, till Oct. 2018. Fonseka lost his Ministry when President Sirisena treacherously sacked Wickremesinghe’s government to pave the way for a new partnership with the Rajapaksas. The Supreme Court discarded that arrangement and brought back the Yahapalana administration but Sirisena, who appointed Fonseka to the lifetime rank of Field Marshal, in recognition of his contribution to the defeat of terrorism, refused to accommodate him in Wickremesinghe’s Cabinet. The President also left out Wasantha Karannagoda and Roshan Goonetilleke. Sirisena appointed them Admiral of the Fleet and Marshal of Air Force, respectively, on 19, Sept. 2019, in the wake of him failing to secure the required backing to contest the Nov. 2019 presidential election.

Wickremesinghe’s UNP repeatedly appealed on behalf of Fonseka in vain to Sirisena. At the 2020 general election, Fonseka switched his allegiance to Sajith Premadasa and contested under the SJB’s ‘telephone’ symbol and was elected from the Gampaha district. Later, following a damaging row with Sajith Premadasa, he quit the SJB as its Chairman and, at the last presidential election, joined the fray as an independent candidate. Having secured just 22,407 votes, Fonseka was placed in distant 9th position. Obviously, Fonseka never received any benefits from support extended to the 2022 Aragalaya and his defeat at the last presidential election seems to have placed him in an extremely difficult position, politically.

Let’s end this piece by reminding that Fonseka gave up the party leadership in early 2024 ahead of the presidential election. Senaka de Silva succeeded Fonseka as DP leader, whereas Dr. Asosha Fernando received appointment as its Chairman. The DP has aligned itself with the NPP. The rest is history.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

Strengths and weaknesses of BRICS+: Implications for Global South

Published

2 days ago

2026/02/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

The 16th BRICS Summit, from 22 to 24 October 2024 in Kazan, was attended by 24 heads of state, including the five countries that officially became part of the group on 1 January: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia. Argentina finally withdrew from the forum after Javier Milei’s government took office in 2023.

In the end, it changed its strategy and instead of granting full membership made them associated countries adding a large group of 13 countries: two from Latin America (Bolivia and Cuba), three from Africa (Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda) and eight from Asia (Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Vietnam). This confirms the expansionary intent of the BRICS, initiated last year and driven above all by China, which seeks to turn the group into a relevant multilateral forum, with focus on political than economic interaction, designed to serve its interests in the geopolitical dispute with the United States. This dispute however is not the making of China but has arisen mainly due to the callous bungling of Donald Trump in his second term in office.

China has emerged as the power that could influence the membership within the larger group more than its rival in the region, India. Obviously, the latter is concerned about these developments but seems powerless to stop the trend as more countries realize the need for the development of capacity to resist Western dominance. India in this regard seems to be reluctant possibly due to its defence obligations to the US with Trump declaring war against countries that try to forge partnerships aiming to de-dollarize the global economic system.

The real weakness in BRICS therefore, is the seemingly intractable rivalry between China and India and the impact of this relationship on the other members who are keen to see the organisation grow its capacity to meet its stated goals. China is committed to developing an alternative to the Western dominated world order, particularly the weaponization of the dollar by the US. India does not want to be seen as anti-west and as a result India is often viewed as a reluctant or cautious member of BRICS. This problem seems to be perpetuated due to the ongoing border tensions with China. India therefore has a desire to maintain a level playing field within the group, rather than allowing it to be dominated by Beijing.

Though India seems to be committed to a multipolar world, it prefers focusing on economic cooperation over geopolitical alignment. India thinks the expansion of BRICS initiated by China may dilute its influence within the bloc to the advantage of China. India fears the bloc is shifting toward an anti-Western tilt driven by China and Russia, complicating its own strong ties with the West. India is wary of the new members who are also beneficiaries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While China aims to use BRICS for anti-Western geopolitical agendas, India favors focusing on South-South financial cooperation and reforming international institutions. Yet India seems to be not in favour of creating a new currency to replace the dollar which could obviously strengthen the South-South financial transactions bypassing the dollar.

Moreover, India has explicitly opposed the expansion of the bloc to include certain nations, such as Pakistan, indicating a desire to control the group’s agenda, especially during its presidency.

In this equation an important factor is the role that Russia could play. The opinion expressed by the Russian foreign minister in this regard may be significant. Referring to the new admissions the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said: “The weight, prominence and importance of the candidates and their international standing were the primary factors for us [BRICS members]. It is our shared view that we must recruit like-minded countries into our ranks that believe in a multipolar world order and the need for more democracy and justice in international relations. We need those who champion a bigger role for the Global South in global governance. The six countries whose accession was announced today fully meet these criteria.”

The admission of three major oil producing countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran and UAE is bound to have a significant impact on the future global economic system and consequently may have positive implications for the Global South. These countries would have the ability to decisively help in creating a new international trading system to replace the 5 centuries old system that the West created to transfer wealth from the South to the North. This is so because the petro-dollar is the pillar of the western banking system and is at the very core of the de-dollarizing process that the BRICS is aiming at. This cannot be done without taking on board Saudi Arabia, a staunch ally of the west. BRICS’ expansion, therefore, is its transformation into the most representative community in the world, whose members interact with each other bypassing Western pressure. Saudi Arabia and Iran are actively mending fences, driven by a 2023 China-brokered deal to restore diplomatic ties, reopen embassies, and de-escalate regional tensions. While this detente has brought high-level meetings and a decrease in direct hostility rapprochement is not complete yet and there is hope which also has implications, positive for the South and may not be so for the North.

Though the US may not like what is going on, Europe, which may not endorse all that the former does if one is to go by the speech delivered by the Canadian PM in Brazil recently, may not be displeased about the rapid growth of BRICS. The Guardian UK highlighted expert opinion that BRICS expansion is rather “a symbol of broad support from the global South for the recalibration of the world order.” A top official at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Caroline Kanter has told the daily, “It is obvious that we [Western countries] are no longer able to set our own conditions and standards. Proposals will be expected from us so that in the future we will be perceived as an attractive partner.” At the same time, the bottom line is that BRICS expansion is perceived in the West as a political victory for Russia and China which augurs well for the future of BRICS and the Global South.

Poor countries, relentlessly battered by the neo-liberal global economy, will greatly benefit if BRICS succeeds in forging a new world order and usher in an era of self-sufficiency and economic independence. There is no hope for them in the present system designed to exploit their natural resources and keep them in a perpetual state of dependency and increasing poverty. BRICS is bound to be further strengthened if more countries from the South join it. Poor countries must come together and with the help of BRICS work towards this goal.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga