Midweek Review

UNHRC in Mullivaikkal dirty politics

Published

1 year ago

2025/06/18

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk is scheduled to visit Colombo later this month. The House on June 5 announced the visit, two days after the UN Resident Coordinator in Sri Lanka, Marc-André Franche, informed Speaker, Dr. Jagath Wickramaratne, of the impending visit.

A press release issued by the Parliament, dated June 5, 2025, mistakenly identified Volker Türk as the High Commissioner of the International Commission on Human Rights. Parliament never bothered to correct the statement posted on its website. Franche was accompanied by UN Peace and Development Resident Advisor Patrick McCarthy.

BTF (British Tamil Forum) General Secretary V. Ravi Kumar, in a letter dated May 27, 2025, urged the UN rights chief to visit Mullivaikkal where he alleged a genocide was committed in 2009. Kumar also requested the Austrian lawyer to visit Chemmani, where mass graves have been unearthed recently, as alleged by the BTF. Kumar, a former member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), received British citizenship many years ago. The Tamil Diaspora, spread over Europe, Canada and various other parts of the world, includes a significant number of former members of Tamil terrorist organisations.

The National People’s Power (NPP) government, without hesitation, should allow the UN official to visit Mullivaikkal, Chemmani or any other place desired by the Tamil Diaspora. The government shouldn’t allow the BTF and other interested parties to make wild allegations on the basis of not including Mullivaikkal and Chemmani in the UN official’s itinerary. The government should also invite Volker Türk to visit Nanthikadal lagoon where the Army eliminated the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and his remaining diehard members in a last encounter on May 19, 2009, the day after Sri Lanka brought the war to a successful conclusion.

Senior military commanders, who spearheaded the successful war against the LTTE, should declare their support for the UN Human Rights chief’s visit to Sri Lanka. Whatever the differences they may have had among themselves during the war, retired Army, Navy and Air Force officers must sink their differences to set the record straight.

The BTF shouldn’t be allowed to manipulate the forthcoming UN human rights chief’s visit here. Perhaps, they should consider seeking a meeting with the UN official to explain their position. There is absolutely no harm in making representations on behalf of Sri Lanka as all stakeholders want to ascertain the truth.

As for the impartiality of previous High Commissioners, like South African of Indian Tamil origin Navaneethan ‘Navi’ Pillai, the less said is better.

The last UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit Colombo was Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein. The Jordanian was here in 2016, the year after Yahapalana leaders Maithripala Sirisena and Ranil Wickremesinghe betrayed the war-winning military by co-sponsoring a US-led resolution against Sri Lanka at the Geneva-based UNHRC. A treacherous act, indeed. There had never been a previous instance of a government betraying its own war-winning military. The UN official must be reminded that a terrorist organisation had never been defeated before the way the Sri Lankan military crushed the LTTE in a relentless combined security forces campaign (August 2006 to May 2009) that brought the LTTE to its knees by January 2009.

Those who cannot stomach Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE conveniently forget that Prabhakaran launched Eelam War IV on August 11, 2006, with the intention of capturing the Jaffna peninsula. They tend to forget how the Nordic truce monitoring mission found fault with the LTTE for launching the war. Declaring that the LTTE advanced over the forward defence lines near Muhamalai entry/exit point and cadres landed on several beaches on Kayts and Mandaithivu islands, the Norwegian-led five-nation truce monitoring mission said: “…. considering the preparation level of the operations it seems to have been a well prepared LTTE initiative.” (SLMM blames LTTE for Jaffna battle, The Island, Sept. 08, 2006).

Human shields

The majority of those who had been demanding accountability on the part of the Sri Lankan military and war-winning political leadership never asked Prabhakaran not to compel the civilians to accompany the retreating LTTE units. After having fiercely resisted the fighting formations on the Vanni front for several months, the LTTE began gradually withdrawing and, by January 2009, Prabhakaran was in a desperate situation. The man who ordered former Indian Prime Minister and Congress leader Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination was taking cover among hapless Tamil civilians.

The then National List member and presidential advisor Basil Rajapaksa received a one-page missive on Feb. 16, 2009, from the then Norwegian Ambassador, Tore Hattrem. The following is the text of Ambassador Hattrem’s letter, addressed to Basil Rajapaksa: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.” (Secret missive to Basil Rajapaksa revealed: Norwegians believed LTTE won’t release hostages, The Island, April 01, 2015).

Unfortunately, the war-winning government and post-war governments never made an honest attempt to use all available information to prove that the LTTE used civilian shields to hinder the advancing Army. Perhaps, the retired military commanders should bring Hattrem’s letter to UN Human Rights official’s attention.

Having succeeded Michelle Bachelet (2018 to 2022) Volker Türk may not be aware of some of the developments and some interested parties in Geneva are widely believed to have suppressed vital information contrary to their narrative.

The BTF never asked Prabhakaran not to hold civilians hostage. Tamil Diaspora never appealed on behalf of the civilians forcibly held by the LTTE. Regardless of anti-government/military propaganda, civilians sought refuge in the government-held areas at an early stage of the Vanni offensive that was launched in March 2007.

In February, 2007 the LTTE detained two UN workers for helping civilians to reach government lines (LTTE detains UN workers, The Island, April 20, 2007). The NGO community and the truce monitoring mission remained silent to protect Tiger interests. What really baffled the government was the UN Office in Colombo having secret negotiations with the LTTE for the release of its workers (UN workers in LTTE custody: “UN had talks with Tigers on the sly,” The Island, April 23, 2007).

The so called human rights defenders turned a blind eye to the developing situation. Western powers, Tamil Diaspora and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) that infamously declared the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil-speaking people in the run-up to the Eelam War IV, remained silent. Had they taken a stand against holding civilians against their will, the armed forces could have eradicated the LTTE’s conventional fighting power much quicker and spared many a life on both sides.

In the wake of The Island revelation, then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa urged the UN not to mollycoddle terrorists. Rajapaksa questioned the rationale in the UN trying to secure the lease of its abducted workers through secret negotiations (UN workers in LTTE custody: Lanka urges UN not to shield Tigers, The Island, April 25, 2007).

The UN mission in Colombo not only kept the government in the dark, it refrained from informing the UN Secretary General’s Office of the abduction of UN workers. When the media raised the abduction of UN workers at their daily press briefing in New York, the Secretary General’s spokesman Michele Montas disclosed they weren’t alerted (The Island expose of UN employees abducted by LTTE: UN HQ admits Colombo Office kept it in the dark, The Island April 28, 2007).

In other words, the UN mission in Colombo in a way facilitated the LTTE’s sordid operations. Had the UN resorted to tough action, the LTTE wouldn’t have held Tamil civilians as human shields for their protection.

No basis for comparison with Israeli actions

UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher made reference to Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE when he addressed the United Nations Security Council in May this year on the massive death and destruction inflicted by Israel on Gaza.

It would be pertinent to remind all concerned that the Israeli military action directed at Gaza and other countries, with the backing of the US-UK combine, cannot be compared in any way to Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE simply because of the terrible monstrosity of Israeli actions. Top British diplomat Fletcher cannot be unaware how successive UK governments encouraged the LTTE to wage war here with covert support, especially by the partial British media that white-washed LTTE atrocities, while magnifying even the slightest transgression by the Sri Lankan security forces, with the help of NGOs funded by them.

However, the British provided critical support during JRJ’s time by allowing ex-British personnel to train Sri Lankans.

The UK allowed the LTTE to establish its International Secretariat in London at a time India sponsored several terrorist groups fighting to divide Sri Lanka on ethnic lines.

It would be pertinent to ask whether the UK at least secretly urged Prabhakaran to give up human shields as the Army pressed its dwindling fighting cadre on the Vanni east front. Instead, the UK, with the French backing, sought to pressure President Mahinda Rajapaksa to halt the offensive. The President and his brother, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, steadfastly refused to bow down to combined British-French pressure. They sustained the offensive until the eradication of the terrorist organisation. The war could never have been won without their resolute leadership.

Geneva must recognise that until the eradication of the LTTE, conscription of Tamil children continued. The LTTE sacrificed thousands of children in high intensity battles with the military after a steep decline in adults joining the fighting cadre. The UN had been so concerned about deaths of children it sought to reach a consensus with the LTTE to halt deployment of child combatants.

The NGO community, or Tamil Diaspora, never asked the LTTE to stop throwing children into battle. In spite of agreeing to halt child recruitment, following talks with Olara Otunnu, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Prabhakaran never stopped the despicable practice (Pledge to stop using children in combat: UN, LTTE to discuss modalities, The Island, May 11, 1998). UNICEF, too, appealed to the LTTE not to forcibly conscript children. The LTTE simply ignored such requests. Otunnu travelled to the North, in May 1998, to meet Prabhakaran’s representatives, British passport holder Anton Balasingham (died and buried in the UK in December 2006) and S.P. Thamilselvam (killed in SLAF strike in November 2007). They agreed on halting children, below 18, in combat operations and stopping recruitment of those under 17 (Tigers agree to end use of children below 18 in combat, The Island, May 9, 1998).

The Tamil Diaspora never ever demanded an end to child conscription. They felt comfortable as their children were not living in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Child recruitment had never been an issue for the Tamil Diaspora or the TNA. The child recruitment was finally brought to an end after the combined security forces eradicated the LTTE.

How many children escaped with their lives thanks to the annihilation of the LTTE militarily? The LTTE had to be destroyed at any cost. Sri Lanka paid a very heavy price to restore peace. The Gaza conflict with Sri Lanka’s war against the separatist Tamil terrorism cannot be equated as the modern massive firepower of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) by land, air and sea is simply overwhelming in comparison to the combined Sri Lanka security forces, under any circumstances.

Sri Lanka actually fought a lone battle against the most ruthless terrorist outfit with immense conventional capability. Western covert support and availability of ship loads of arms, ammunition and equipment and a steady sea supply allowed the LTTE to wage war until Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda’s Navy sunk their floating warehouses on the high seas. Intelligence provided by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), and the US, led to the total destruction of the LTTE. Therefore, the US, too, helped Sri Lanka to save children by hastening the LTTE’s destruction, albeit only to speed up its fall when it became clear that the Tigers were not invincible as they earlier tried to make them out to be.

The Air Force carried out operations in support of the Army while carrying out a strategic campaign that relentlessly targeted the enemy. That was meant to break the backbone of the LTTE.

Dhanapala’s advice disregarded

One of Sri Lanka’s famed career diplomats, the late Jayantha Dhanapala, discussed the issue of accountability when he addressed the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), headed by one-time Attorney General, the late C. R. de Silva, on August 25, 2010. Dhanapala, in his submissions, said: “Now I think it is important for us to expand that concept to bring in the culpability of those members of the international community who have subscribed to the situation that has caused injury to the civilians of a nation. I talk about the way in which terrorist groups are given sanctuary; harboured; and supplied with arms and training by some countries with regard to their neighbours or with regard to other countries. We know that in our case this has happened, and I don’t want to name countries, but even countries which have allowed their financial procedures and systems to be abused in such a way that money can flow from their countries in order to buy arms and ammunition that cause deaths, maiming and destruction of property in Sri Lanka are to blame and there is therefore a responsibility to protect our civilians and the civilians of other nations from that kind of behaviour on the part of members of the international community. And I think this is something that will echo within many countries in the Non-Aligned Movement, where Sri Lanka has a much respected position and where I hope we will be able to raise this issue.”

Dhanapala also stressed on the accountability on the part of Western governments, which conveniently turned a blind eye to massive fundraising operations in their countries, in support of the LTTE operations. It is no secret that the LTTE would never have been able to emerge as a conventional fighting force without having the wherewithal abroad, mainly in the Western countries, to procure arms, ammunition and equipment.

Sri Lanka could have built its defence on Dhanapala’s statement to the LLRC. Even more importantly Sri Lanka ignored wartime US military advisor Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith’s defence of the Army that it didn’t execute surrendering LTTE cadres. In other words, the US official contradicted the then retired General Sarath Fonseka, who, with no shame whatsoever, accused the Army (that he earlier led to victory against all odds), of war crimes, to curry favour with the LTTE lackey TNA ahead of the 2010 presidential election.

Similarly Lord Naseby provided a golden opportunity to counter lies when he obtained confidential British diplomatic cables that were sent to the Foreign Office in London from Colombo during January-May 2009. In spite of them being heavily censored, the cables that had been sent by Smith’s British counterpart in Colombo, Lt. Col. Anthony Gash, effectively countered the wild UN allegation pertaining to the deaths of over 40,000 civilians on the Vanni east front.

The British estimated the number of deaths around 7,000. The British figure tallied with a survey carried out by the UN in Colombo during August 2008 to May 13, 2009, in the Vanni region. The UN recorded over 7,000 deaths but Sri Lanka never had a cohesive strategy to utilise all available information in a manner to counter lies.

****

How Geneva erred on Mannar mass graves

Michelle Bachelet

The Tamil Diaspora wants United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk to visit what they call Chemmani mass graves. There must be mass graves all over the northern and eastern provinces. Have they forgotten the large number of Tamils executed by the LTTE? Where did the LTTE bury the body of Velupillai Prabhakaran’s deputy Gopalswamy Mahendraraja alias Mahattaya? Mahattaya was executed on the mere suspicion of serving India’s interests. There can be skeletons of Indian officers and men killed in the northern and eastern regions during 1987-1990 deployment here. India altogether lost well over 1,300 personnel here.

Let me remind you of the Mannar mass grave farce. Radiocarbon dating analysis by the Beta Analytic Testing Laboratory in Florida, US, in respect of six skeletal samples sent there in January 2019 with the intervention of the Office of Missing Persons (OMP) established in accordance with October 2015 Geneva Resolution, proved that the skeletons belonged to a period that covered the Portuguese and the Dutch rule.

This was after Volker Türk’s predecessor Michelle Bachelet, typical of UN hacks negatively dealt with Mannar mass grave site in a report titled ‘Promoting Reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’ submitted to the ongoing 40th session of the HRC.

The following is the relevant section bearing No 23: “On May 29, 2018, human skeletal remains were discovered at a construction site in Mannar (Northern Province), Excavations conducted in support of the Office on Missing Persons, revealed a mass grave from which more than 300 skeletons were discovered. It was the second mass grave found in Mannar following the discovery of a site in 2014. Given that other mass graves might be expected to be found in the future, systematic access to grave sites by the Office as an observer is crucial for it to fully discharge its mandate, particularly with regard to the investigation and identification of remains, it is imperative that the proposed reforms on the law relating to inquests, and relevant protocols to operationalise the law be adopted. The capacity of the forensic sector must also be strengthened, including in areas of forensic anthropology, forensic archeology and genetics, and its coordination with the Office of Missing Persons must be ensured.”

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

Published

5 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

Midweek Review

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

Published

5 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Listening to the Winds, Reading the Waves:

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s latest publication, Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945 will be launched on 5 August at the Auditorium of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS). The keynote address will be delivered by Prof. T. V. Paul, James, McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Canada and the former President of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Prof. Keerawella, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Peradeniya, has dedicated hisbook to the memory of Dr. Newton Gunasinghe, the eminent sociologist and Marxist theoretician who encouraged him to venture beyond disciplinary frontiers. In many respects, this work represents a successful realization of that intellectual endeavour. In her testimonial to back cover of the book, Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy observes that “Gamini Keerawella offers a nuanced and layered account of the Indian Ocean region’s strategic evolution from the era of decolonization to the contemporary phase of intensifying great-power rivalry. Its distinctive analytical perspective makes it an important contribution to the study of international relations, maritime geopolitics, and regional strategic dynamics.” This assessment accurately captures the significance of the work, and I fully endorse her judgement.

This volume constitutes the final publication of a trilogy that explores the evolving dynamics of international relations from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective. The first study examined the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s defence and foreign policy, while the second revisited the origins, evolution, and principal constituent elements of international relations as an academic discipline from a Global South perspective. The present work broadens the analytical canvas by tracing the shifting geopolitical contours of the Indian Ocean since 1945 and examining the evolving interplay between great-power competition and regional agency.

Indian Ocean not merely maritime transit space

At the heart of Prof. Keerawella’s analysis is the argument that the Indian Ocean is not merely a maritime space of transit but a living archive whose language is inscribed in tides, trade, and collective memory. To uncover the deeper structures that have shaped the region, he draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of the archaeology of knowledge, probing beneath the visible layers of historical experience to reveal successive strata of thought, exchange, and power. This approach enables him to trace the multiple origins of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical significance through the sedimented traces of how the ocean has been known, governed, and imagined across time. Complementing this perspective is Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée, which provides the framework for understanding the long-term evolution of Indian Ocean geopolitics. As Keerawella notes, for Braudel, history unfolds not as a single linear sequence but as a layered field of continuity and change, revealing the deeper architecture of the past—the slow yet powerful currents that shape political and economic developments beneath the surface of events (Keerawella 2026: xxiii).Prof. Keerawella further notes that later historians such as K. N. Chaudhuri and M. N. Pearson drew on Braudel’s insights and adapted them to understand the Indian Ocean as a polycentric world.

Prof. Keerawella argues that the terms employed in the title of this work—Winds, Waves, and Currents—evoke the ocean’s dual language of surface movement and underlying structure. In his reading, winds and waves signify motion: the visible and often turbulent forces that carry ships, peoples, commodities, and ideas across shifting maritime frontiers. Currents, by contrast, refer to the deeper and less visible forces that shape historical trajectories and connect coasts and continents through enduring patterns of interaction. As he observes, while winds and waves represent the restless dynamics of the ocean’s surface, currents embody the slower yet more consequential energies that operate beneath it, binding disparate regions into a larger maritime system (2026: xx).

Metaphors and Conceptual Foundation

Building on this conceptual foundation, the author employs winds, waves, and currents not merely as metaphors but also as analytical categories. Winds represent changing strategic directions and geopolitical realignments; waves denote recurring cycles of commerce, conflict, and interaction; and currents symbolize the deep structural forces that connect societies across space and time. Viewed from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective, the volume demonstrates how a strategically located small state at the centre of the Indian Ocean perceives and navigates this maritime space through its own strategic lens. The book opens by situating Sri Lanka within the intersecting forces of history, geography, and power that have shaped the Indian Ocean world. It advances the notion of a dual strategic consciousness that has informed Sri Lanka’s external engagements: a persistent sense of vulnerability, rooted in colonial experience and geographical exposure, coexisting with a cosmopolitan outlook forged through centuries of maritime exchange. Prof. Keerawella contends that this dual consciousness constitutes the underlying framework through which Sri Lanka has historically interpreted and responded to developments in its external environment.

Winds and Waves is a comprehensive study comprising eleven chapters and an extensive introduction that establishes the analytical foundations of the work by treating the ocean simultaneously as text and method. The opening chapter situates Sri Lanka within the wider Indian Ocean system, tracing the island’s navigation through shifting configurations of power while emphasising the agency of small states. The Indian Ocean is presented not merely as a strategic arena but also as a moral and political space, linking Sri Lanka’s historical experience to the broader aspirations and consciousness of the Global South.

Revisiting British withdrawal

The book revisits Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, arguing that it was not simply a consequence of post-war decline but the culmination of deeper structural transformations in the international system. Decolonisation, Afro-Asian nationalism, and the emergence of bipolarity fundamentally altered the regional order and created the conditions for Britain’s retreat. In turn, this withdrawal opened the way for superpower competition, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, transforming the Indian Ocean into major theatre of Cold War geopolitics.

A substantial portion of the volume is devoted to examining the policies and strategic trajectories of the major powers. The author traces American engagement from Cold War containment through post-Cold War maritime predominance to contemporary Indo-Pacific formulations, demonstrating that U.S. strategy has evolved through the interaction of structural imperatives and changing strategic discourses. Particular attention is paid to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War, which is interpreted as a transformative event that exposed the limits of military hegemony and accelerated patterns of strategic hedging and multi-alignment among regional actors. The book also explores the Soviet Union’s entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin through selective naval deployments, arms transfers, and strategic partnerships, illustrating what the author characterises as the recurrent rhythms of great-power engagement in the region.

The rise of China receives extensive treatment as one of the most significant structural developments of the twenty-first century. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, port development projects, and naval modernisation, China has translated growing economic power into expanding strategic influence. The author contrasts Beijing’s assertive posture in the South China Sea with its relatively restrained approach in the Indian Ocean, where economic diplomacy and cooperative security initiatives have assumed greater prominence. Equally significant is the discussion of India’s transformation from a regional power into an emerging global strategic actor. The evolution of Indian maritime strategy—from Nehruvian custodianship to contemporary blue-water ambitions—demonstrates how a rising power navigates structural constraints while expanding its strategic reach. Initiatives such as SAGAR, naval modernization, and deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia have positioned India as a central actor in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

Roles of Japan and EU examined

The volume also examines the roles of Japan and the European Union in shaping the contemporary maritime order. Japan’s transition from post-war restraint to proactive strategic engagement, embodied in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, illustrates how middle powers adapt to changing geopolitical realities through coalition-building and maritime capacity enhancement. The European Union’s engagement is portrayed through less visible but nevertheless significant mechanisms, including trade, development cooperation, maritime governance, and norm diffusion, contributing to what the author terms a form of “quiet-making multipolarity” that encourages restraint, stability, and pragmatic cooperation.

Moving beyond conventional geopolitics, the book broadens the analytical framework to address a range of non-traditional security challenges confronting South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular. Climate change, piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, public health vulnerabilities, and digital insecurity are examined as transnational challenges that transcend the capabilities of individual states. The author argues that these issues reveal the limits of unilateral action and underscore the growing importance of cooperation, collective action, institutional innovation, and middle-power leadership in maritime governance.

Prof. Keerawella further situates the Indian Ocean within the wider context of the emerging Asian Century. Asia’s resurgence—driven principally by China and India and reinforced by the dynamism of Southeast Asia—is presented as a major reconfiguration of global power. In this transformation, the Indian Ocean functions as a vital maritime artery connecting energy resources, manufacturing centres, and consumer markets. At the same time, the author cautions against deterministic interpretations, emphasising that the realisation of the Asian Century remains contingent upon how the region responds to persistent inequalities, environmental challenges, governance deficits, and intensifying strategic competition.

Assessing how SL has navigated shifts

The book concludes by returning to Sri Lanka and assessing how the country has navigated contemporary shifts in the regional and global balance of power under the National People’s Power (NPP) government that emerged in the aftermath of the Aragalaya of 2022. The author demonstrates how economic crisis, demands for accountability, and aspirations for a new political culture have reshaped the domestic context within which foreign policy is conducted. Under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka is portrayed as pursuing a carefully calibrated strategy that combines engagement with international financial institutions, enhanced cooperation with India in defence and energy sectors, continued economic engagement with China, and functional security relations with the United States. The government’s response to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War—rejecting military access requests from all parties while extending humanitarian assistance—serves as an illustration of the author’s broader argument that strategic flexibility, principled neutrality, and diplomatic agility remain essential for small states navigating an increasingly complex Indian Ocean order.

Taken together, the book advances several interconnected propositions. First, the Indian Ocean is entering an increasingly multipolar era in which power is exercised through complex networks of cooperation, competition, and interdependence rather than rigid alliance structures. Second, small states are neither passive spectators nor mere proxies of great powers; they possess strategic agency and navigate competing pressures through hedging, diversification, and calibrated diplomacy. Third, Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour—characterised by navigating asymmetry through flexibility and ambiguity—reflects a historically rooted dual consciousness that combines vulnerability with cosmopolitan engagement. Fourth, non-traditional security challenges and environmental governance are no longer peripheral concerns but central components of the evolving regional order.

Need for adaptive navigation

Prof. Keerawella argues that contemporary statecraft in the Indian Ocean requires adaptive navigation rather than rigid alignment. In a fluid and contested maritime environment, survival and influence depend less on resisting structural change than on understanding and responding to it with prudence, flexibility, and strategic clarity. The book therefore offers important insights into how small states can transform structural vulnerability into strategic agency and convert exposure into opportunities for engagement within a changing regional order.

Combining historical depth with contemporary analysis, it provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between great-power competition, regional transformation, and the strategic choices of smaller states. The book will be of considerable value to students and scholars of international relations, political science, strategic studies, and maritime affairs, while also offering useful perspectives to policymakers, diplomats, and practitioners. Equally important, it opens several promising avenues for future research on the Indian Ocean and the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Hermeneutic approachs

Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutic approaches to examine the geopolitical and maritime environments that shape relationships among states, societies, and historical processes. The result is a work that is both analytically rigorous and intellectually engaging. This review has sought less to evaluate the book in a conventional sense than to introduce its central themes and encourage a wider readership to engage with its arguments. Having highlighted the many merits of the volume, it is worth noting one technical shortcoming: the absence of an index. Given the book’s wide thematic scope and rich empirical content, the inclusion of an index would have significantly enhanced its value as a reference tool for researchers and students alike.

In sum, Prof. Keerawella listens attentively to the winds, reads the waves with analytical precision, and traces the deeper currents that shape the Indian Ocean world. The outcome is Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945, a timely and thought-provoking contribution published by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Reviewed by
Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy
Department of Political Science, University
of Peradeniya