Features
Understanding social upheavals: Beyond Conspiracy Theories
By Kalinga Tudor Silva
Sociological explanations frequently serve as a counter point to popular conspiracy theories. Historically, sociology evolved as a subject that tried to prove that social reality cannot be reduced to the separate actions of the individuals who make up that society, such individual motivations or what was understood as the standard way persons think and behave in given situations being the dominant analytical frameworks in other social sciences, like economics, psychology, and political science. A key founder of sociology, Frenchman Emile Durkheim, tried to identify the social as external to and in some ways imposed from outside upon the individuals who are included in the social reality. In his unique way, he demonstrated the validity of the social by explaining how even a deeply personal and emotional matter, such as suicide, must be seen as a socially determined phenomenon. Of course, these views have been interrogated by many critics over the years for his single-minded preoccupation with the social by deemphasizing its natural linkages with the psychological and for his denial of the agency of human beings.
Sri Lanka has always been a hotbed of conspiracy theories. Matters of national importance whether we are talking about collective uprisings against the state such as the JVP uprisings in 1971 and 1987-1989 and the LTTE uprising from 1980s until 2009, and public decisions such as signing of a peace accord between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, in 2002, were explained by certain observers in terms of conspiracy theories of one kind or another. A secretive nature and lack of transparency often added to public confusion about these events. More recently, the Aragalaya uprising has also triggered a variety of conspiracy theories, despite its openness to the public and explicit accommodation of diverse viewpoints. Nearly always conspiracy theories are ways of explaining away the compounded social and political reality using flimsy evidence by parties with vested interests in keeping with their own political and ideological moorings without making a genuine effort at reaching an objective explanation of the complex reality we are dealing with. As professional social scientists, we have a duty to explain that conspiracy theories in circulation are seriously flawed when it comes to explaining the complex realities fraught with multiple challenges we are dealing with in contemporary Sri Lanka. Conspiracy theories come forward to oversimplify matters, interpret a complex phenomenon in ways that conform with preconceptions and suspicions and deny an evidence-based analysis that is likely to challenge popular assumptions and preconceived ideas and the popular need to find a scapegoat who can be readily blamed for a public disaster that has unfolded. While key decision makers responsible for poor public decisions must be certainly identified and appropriate action taken against them, it should not end up with untenable conspiracy theories as valid explanations for macro social processes with a complex etiology.
Fredric Jameson (1999) considered conspiracy theories as ‘the poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern age’ characterized by insecurities and related paranoia. In other words, conspiracy theories are a questionable way of speculatively making sense of many seemingly unexplainable issues in the postmodern world. However, conspiracy theories often involve blaming a publicly tainted person without investigating his or her specific liability within a larger macro environment characterized by resource constraints and unsurmountable challenges. What is equally problematic is the complete ignorance or blatant neglect of relevant social science perspectives in trying to explain complex social realities attributing them to assumed conspiracy plans of one or more actors to account for events that engage the agency of a multitude of related or unrelated actors as well as the unintended consequences of their action that is social or group generated rather than an aggregated outcome of individual decision making. This is why conspiracy theories are always suspect in social sciences and seen as an epistemological frontier responding to emergencies in a populist manner without going through the rigors of systematic social analysis.
Several social upheavals that happened in Sri Lanka during the recent past can be used to illustrate how conspiracy theories divert attention away from the larger social context relating to these mobilizations requiring systematic investigation. We select the Easter attacks by a cluster of Islamic terrorists on April 21, 2019, to illustrate the specific role of conspiracy theories. In this violent outbreak the country was shocked and taken by surprise with different conspiracy theories looming large in the minds of the affected people and their intellectual leaders. This event involved a serious breakdown of the law-and-order situation in the country. The conspiracy theories tried to understand the attack as the work of some hidden hands that mobilized and instrumentalized the persons involved for achieving their ulterior motives, left unelaborated in these populist explanations.
From what is reported in the media, the Easter attacks were conducted by an apparently religiously motivated secret group of armed actors who were part of a closely knit network. Several official investigations have already been carried out including an enquiry by a parliamentary select committee, two presidential commissions and a judicial investigation. These investigations tried to understand why the police and the security forces failed to prevent the attack while prior information had been received from intelligence sources outside Sri Lanka, who is accountable for the observed security lapses and how the attackers escaped the attention of the intelligence network in Sri Lanka. These are important and valid questions particularly from the law enforcement and national security angles. What is missing, however, is an investigation into the social background of the attackers, how and under what circumstances they became radicalized to the point of having a tunnel vision to end their lives and lives of others and what can be done to prevent a recurrence of such violent outbreaks in future.
Apart from a seemingly pro-government cluster of anti-Islamic conspiracy theories reporting Islamic fundamentalist mobilizations in Sri Lanka for some time, many independent observers were puzzled by an Islamic terror cell targeting their attacks on Christians involved in an important religious congregation on Easter Sunday in April 2019 and some key tourist hotels in Colombo.
The deliberate targeting of Christian places of worship was particularly problematic in the light of the absence of any prior history of tension between Islam and Christianity in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, tensions between Buddhists and Muslims had been escalating with effect from 2012 due to the propaganda work of some anti-Islamic Sinhala nationalist outfits that provoked mob violence against Muslim communities and Muslim-owned businesses in Aluthgama, Ampare, Digana and elsewhere (Haniffa, Amarasuriya, Wijenayake, and Gunatilleke 2014). A potential clue to solve the puzzle about the chosen targets of the Easter violence was provided by an ISIS official declaration through its Amaq news agency on April 23, two days after the Easter attack. It stated that the attackers involved were Islamic state fighters who targeted citizens of coalition states (meaning western tourists staying in the hotels attacked) and the Christians (Amarsingham 2019: 2). This suggested that the Easter attack was connected with an ISIS global campaign targeting suspected agents of westernization in the non-western world rather than any local triggers of conflict in Sri Lanka. As far as we know, the authenticity of this declaration, however, has not been verified or confirmed by any subsequent investigations. So far investigations have not revealed any direct connection between ISIS and the attackers in Sri Lanka even though remote connections and the influence of ISIS online propaganda cannot be ruled out as drivers of a jihadist one track mind.
It raised important questions as to how an Islamist nucleus prepared to die and kill on behalf of an external agency, namely ISIS, was formed in Sri Lanka with an overall history of Islamic tolerance and support for peaceful coexistence though increasingly challenged by infiltrations of Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, the Catholic establishment in the country predictably disturbed over many church goers who were killed, mimed and who lost their dear family members during the attack wanted to identify the mastermind (mahamolakaru) behind the attack presumably considering him to be someone other than those who sacrificed their lives during the attack and probe him about why the attack was made and why innocent civilians were targeted.
While this is certainly a legitimate concern, the conspiracy theories that go with it do not help understand the larger social context that produced the network of attackers and why they turned their violence towards a completely innocent party unconnected with them. The view that the attack was strategically designed by yet another party for its own political advantage has been in circulation since the national political crisis unfolded in 2019. While this cannot be ruled out completely, how far such a master plan can instrumentalize deep religious sentiments connected with an established religion to carry out deadly suicide attacks remains a major challenge for such a claim. These contradictory conspiracy theories leave many questions unanswered not only about the Easter attack itself, but also about the larger social context connected with the disaster, including the global scenario where ISIS had been cornered by pro-American alignments and the local scenario of one political crisis followed by another.
There are some unresolved social issues related to the formation of an Islamist extremist group bent on violence in Sri Lanka. Why and how a nucleus of Muslims including some members of a very affluent business family in Colombo became so radicalized during a short period of time to be prepared to kill and die in a jihadist mission for an externally determined cause apparently unconnected with their day-to-day existence in Sri Lanka. Why they targeted innocent civilians who are by no means accountable for the atrocities caused to ISIS is part of a larger puzzle connected with what one analyst referred to as “the ambivalence of the sacred”, particularly after 9/11 (Appleby 2020). While religion continues to remain a key driver of global peace, the tendency on the part of certain religious actors to carry out violent attacks on identified targets is something that requires a systematic social science enquiry outside the purview of individual religious perspectives.
It is also important to note that some of the attackers were well-educated people with established professional careers. For instance, according to media reports there was an aerospace engineer, a lawyer and two leading businesspeople in Colombo among the inner core of attackers who carried out the attack on April 21, 2019 (Srinivasan 2019). Not only do these facts go against the secularization thesis expecting people to become less religious as they gain education and more engaged in technical and business enterprises. It also problematizes any simplistic assumptions about possible connections between economic disadvantage and radicalism. These concerns highlight the need to go beyond simplistic assumptions and popular analytical framings including conspiracy theories in understanding what caused Easter mayhem.
How this small group of faith actors became radicalized possibly through their exposure to ISIS online propaganda, powerful command Sahran was supposed to have on colloquial Tamil and Islamic religious symbols coupled with periodic physical and virtual congregations of the group need to be examined using available empirical evidence also considering potential importance of the wave of anti-Muslim violence escalated since 2012 as a trigger for this mobilization and the progressive radicalization of the nucleus of the attackers (Keethaponcalan 2019).
Finally, in addition to pinpointing security failures contributing to the Easter attack, understanding the underlying social factors and group dynamics is necessary for preventing a possible future recurrence of Islamic radicalization leading to violence. These are some issues calling for thorough social science research in and outside Sri Lanka. Conspiracy theories of various kinds merely serve to accuse an identified public enemy without providing any reliable evidence. Social sciences must bring out the social and ideological factors that account for upheavals like the Easter attack using empirical evidence and sound analytical frameworks to support their explanations. Instead of providing valid explanations of the subject under consideration, the conspiracy theories merely serve to reinforce prejudices of one kind or another at a time of uncertainty and anxiety. Often such theories add to the existing aura of anxieties and conflict dynamics. Conspiracy theories are something to be explained in social analysis rather than a satisfactory framework for explaining an organized violent attack that shocked the whole world, not just Sri Lanka. In some ways conspiracy theories are an inherent aspect of the crisis environment where affected people as well as the key stakeholders in society are constantly looking for answers that suit their interests and deep seated prejudices. Just like gossip and rumour, conspiracy theories serve to spread fake news and false alarms during civil disturbances in ways that divert public anger towards identified targets and contribute towards reinforcing conflict dynamics. This is why debunking conspiracy theories becomes an important challenge for social sciences at times of social upheavals and mass panic. In the official investigations carried out so far, this is a dimension relatively unexplored, and much work needs to be done regarding filling in the gaps.
References
Amarasingam, Amarnath (2019) “Terrorism on the Teardrop Island: Understanding the Easter 2019 Attacks in Sri Lanka,” CTC Sentinel 12, no. 5: 1-6
Haniffa, F. Amarasuriya, H., Wijenayake, V. and Gunatilleke, G. (2014). Where have all the Neighbours Gone? Aluthgama Riots and its Aftermath. Colombo: Law and Society Trust.
Keethaponcalan, Soosaipillai (2019) “Understanding Zahran: Sri Lanka’s Ultra Terrorist.” Colombo Telegraph, 3 May 2019.
Jameson, Fredric (1990) “Cognitive Mapping”. In: Nelson, C./Grossberg, L. [ed]. Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, pp. 347-60.
Srinivasan, Meera (2019) “Inside Story of 9 Suicide Bombers behind Sri Lanka’s Savage Easter Sunday Attacks.” Hindu, May 25, 2019.
An earlier version of this essay was published as an editorial of the Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences Vol 45 (2) on April 27, 2023.
Features
Own the car or let the App drive?
The real cost of daily travel in urban Sri Lanka
For many middle-class Sri Lankans, the private car still carries connotations of stability, dignity, and upward mobility. Yet in today’s Sri Lanka, with petrol at Rs. 434 per litre, following the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation’s revision, effective 30 May, 2026, loan-to-value ratios tightened to 40% requiring a 60% down payment, and ride-hailing apps now joined by app-based three-wheelers, the question of whether to own a car has become sharper than ever. The answer is not emotional but economic: for ordinary day-to-day travel, is it actually cheaper and wiser to own a car, or to let the app do the work?
Take a generic urban Sri Lankan commuter making a 40 km daily round trip to office and back, with routine errands built in. That is about 880 km a month across 22 working days. At that level of usage, the arithmetic becomes surprisingly clear: for a large group of moderate urban users, app-based mobility, whether a car or a three-wheeler, is financially smarter than owning a car, unless the non-financial benefits of ownership matter deeply enough to justify the premium.
The Sri Lankan distortion:
cars cost too much
In most developed economies, cars are consumer durables. In Sri Lanka, they behave more like luxury financial assets. A moderate vehicle, such as a Toyota Raize or Honda Civic, often costs several times what a comparable car would in a developed market, once taxes, import restrictions, and scarcity are priced in.
Assume a moderate privately used car priced at 10 million. Under the Central Bank’s current 40% LTV directive, the buyer may borrow only 40% against the vehicle’s value, requiring a 60% down payment of 6 million and a five-year lease on the remaining 4 million. At a typical Sri Lankan leasing rate of 14% per annum, the monthly lease instalment comes to approximately 93,000. A moderate petrol vehicle averages around 12 km per litre in urban traffic. At Rs. 434 per litre, fuel cost alone is 36 per km, or 31,800 per month for 880 km. Add insurance of 12,000 and a conservative 4,000 for routine running costs, and total cash outgoings reach approximately 140,800 per month.
But cash outgoings alone understate the true cost. The 6 million down payment, if invested elsewhere at 9% per annum, would generate approximately 45,000 per month in foregone return. Adding this opportunity cost, the full economic cost of the moderate car rises to 185,900 per month, or 211 per km.
The app alternatives: car or three-wheeler
Urban Sri Lankan commuters today have many distinct app-based mobility options, each serving different journey types and comfort preferences.
Uber and PickMe (car hire): A premium car hire through Uber or PickMe costs approximately 150 per km. For 880 km of monthly travel, that comes to 132,000 per month. Compared with the moderate owned car at 185,900, the app saves 53,900 per month, or 61 per km. On purely financial terms, the app wins decisively.
App-based three-wheelers: App-based three-wheelers currently charge approximately 110 per km. For 880 km, that is 96,800 per month, saving 89,100 per month and 101 per km compared with the moderate owned car. The tuk-tuk app is the most economical of the three mobility options for short urban trips, though clearly unsuitable for highway travel, poor weather, carrying passengers in formal settings, however, it represents a compelling financial case.
Non-financial advantages of ownership
Transport decisions are never purely accounting exercises. A private car offers privacy, immediate availability, flexibility, and family utility in ways that no app can fully replicate. With your own car, you can leave when you want, stop when you want, change route mid-journey, carry files or groceries without thought, respond to emergencies, and avoid the uncertainty of waiting for a driver to accept your ride. It also becomes a family coordination tool: school drop-offs, medical visits, elderly passengers, unplanned errands, and weekend travel all become easier. In psychological terms, ownership buys autonomy. No app-based alternative, whether car or three-wheeler, provides that.
The hidden burden of car ownership and app limitations
Yet the same car creates stress. Urban Sri Lankan driving is rarely relaxing. Congestion is exhausting, lane discipline is weak, and parking is a recurring headache. Every daily driver absorbs cognitive fatigue that accumulates invisibly over months.
Uber and PickMe remove the burden of driving, fuelling, and servicing. But they introduce their own friction: waiting times, driver cancellations, surge pricing during peak hours or rain, and inconsistent vehicle quality. App three-wheelers add further constraints, limited luggage capacity, exposure to weather, and social context limitations. The app does not eliminate inconvenience; it transforms driving stress into coordination stress.
There is also the administrative burden of ownership that many buyers underestimate. A car is not just a vehicle; it is an asset management project. Lease payments must be tracked, insurance renewed, service appointments remembered, tyres monitored, and documents maintained. Even a low-maintenance new car carries the persistent fear that one breakdown or accident can create a large unexpected outflow. The app user, by contrast, simply pays for completed trips, no garage anxiety, no debt-linked asset stress, no renewal calendar.
Sensitivity analysis: what if the car is a lower-grade Wagon R?
The picture changes if the household opts for a lower-grade entry-level vehicle. Assume a Suzuki Wagon R or equivalent at 6 million, again with a 60% down payment of 3.6 million and a five-year lease on 2.4 million. At 14% per annum, the monthly lease instalment is approximately 55,800.
The smaller car delivers better fuel economy, around 15 km per litre. At 434 per litre, fuel cost becomes 29 per km, or 25,500 per month for 880 km. Add insurance of 7,000 and running costs of 3,000. Including opportunity cost at 9% on the 3.6 million down payment (27,000 per month), the total economic cost is 118,300 per month, 134 per km.
Now the comparison becomes more nuanced. A lower-grade Uber or PickMe alternative costs around 125 per km, or 110,000 per month for 880 km. The gap narrows dramatically: owning the Wagon R costs only 8,300 more per month, just 9 per km, compared with the app car option. The app three-wheeler at 110 per km (96,800 per month) is still materially cheaper, saving 21,500 per month against the lower-grade owned car. (See Table 1)

So, what should an urban Sri Lankan do?
If you travel alone on routine urban routes, the app three-wheeler at 110/km is the most economical option by a wide margin, saving up to 89,100 per month against a moderate owned car. Its limitation is not financial but practical: unsuitable for families, formal occasions, highway travel, and bad weather, but convenient-no stress.
For families, formal occasions, highway travel, and bad weather and convenient-no stress, Uber or PickMe Moderate car at 150/km delivers private-car comfort without the asset burden, saving 53,900 per month against the moderate owned car. The saving is if you get an economy APP car.
If you need family flexibility, late-night mobility, or privacy, ownership remains rational, but preferably through a lower-grade car around 6 million. At 134/km, the Wagon R-type car is only 9/km more than the app car alternative and 24/km more than a tuk-tuk, a gap that autonomy, family convenience, and immediate availability can legitimately justify.
Therefore, in Sri Lanka’s distorted vehicle market, with fuel at LKR434/lt, a 60% mandatory down payment, the Wagon R-type leased car remains relatively a better choice for a family with moderate earnings.
The private car still offers freedom. But in 2026 Sri Lanka, that freedom comes at very different prices. The real question is how much each household can afford to pay for autonomy, prestige, and convenience, and whether the extra 61/km for a moderate leased car, against a perfectly capable app car, or 101/km against a tuk-tuk app, represents a rational expenditure of household income. For most salaried urban commuters, the honest answer is: probably not.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe.
Views expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Justice and democracy in Sri Lanka’s new political era
The legal processes are steadily closing in on some of the most controversial cases that have remained as open questions without closure for many years. These include the Easter Sunday bombings of 2019, the Treasury bond scam that erupted in 2015, and a range of corruption allegations that became synonymous with successive governments over the past two or more decades. What once appeared to be stalled investigations are now showing signs of movement through the courts and investigative agencies. Recent developments suggest that these long running cases are entering a decisive phase. In the Easter Sunday attacks investigation, new arrests and investigations have brought renewed attention to allegations that extend beyond the immediate perpetrators and into questions of intelligence failures and possible political complicity. The arrest and detention of former intelligence chief Suresh Sallay under the Prevention of Terrorism Act has intensified public interest in uncovering the full truth behind the attacks.
The Treasury bond scam has also re-entered the spotlight. The Supreme Court has recently overturned legal obstacles that had prevented prosecutions from proceeding and directed that the case moves forward expeditiously. This has reopened one of the most sophisticated financial scandals in the country’s recent history and brought several prominent political and financial figures back under legal scrutiny. As those implicated in these unresolved cases are leading figures from previous governments, which have spanned both sides of the political divide since Independence, it can well be imagined that there is tremendous opposition to the gradually enveloping legal processes that is both seen and unseen.
These cases that are now being investigated cut across political camps and involve individuals who occupied some of the highest offices in the country. The result is that resistance to accountability is likely to emerge from many quarters. Still to be opened are the thousands of cases of persons gone missing during the war. Presidential Commissions have been appointed with regard to them, but there has been no serious investigations of the type now taking place.
In these circumstances, it can be surmised that the government led by those who are new to power would wish to retain a maximum of power to face the pushback that is bound to emerge from those in the opposition who have wielded power for generations. The government may calculate that this is not the time to disperse authority or reduce the instruments of state power available to it. Instead, it may believe that a period of centralised control is necessary if investigations, prosecutions and reforms are to proceed without interference.
Provincial Elections
It appears that the opposition’s efforts to mobilise the people and public opinion against the government have not been successful so far. One such instance was the attempt to generate opposition to price increases. Although people have undoubtedly been affected by rising prices and economic difficulties, these efforts failed to gather significant momentum. Another attempt came when President Dissanayake predicted that opposition politicians would face imprisonment in the month of May as legal cases progressed, though this has not happened. Critics claimed that such remarks suggested an intention to influence judicial outcomes. Yet this criticism also failed to gain traction among the public. The likely reason is that public memory remains fresh. Many people continue to associate previous governments with economic mismanagement, corruption scandals, abuse of power and the eventual economic collapse. In comparison, the present government continues to enjoy a reservoir of public goodwill and credibility. As long as legal action appears to be based on evidence and proper process, the public seems prepared to give the government the benefit of the doubt.
The government’s deliberate and cautious approach to political reform that would reduce its centralised power needs to be seen in this context. The monthly approval by Parliament of the emergency regulations is justified by the government as due to the continuing need to respond to the devastation caused by Cyclone Ditwah. However, when viewed together with the reluctance to hold provincial council elections on the grounds of electoral reform, the failure to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the postponement of constitutional reform, they all appear to reflect a preference for retaining maximum control at a politically sensitive moment. There is a logic to this approach. Governments facing major legal and political confrontations often seek stability and control. So does every despot. However, there is also a downside.
When political competition is denied to legitimate outlets, it often finds expression in confrontation, obstruction and polarisation. The advantage of prioritising the conduct of provincial council elections at this time is that it could reduce the political pressures that are building up. The main opposition parties are united in calling for these elections to be held. Conducting them would provide an opportunity for opposition political parties to obtain a measure of democratic representation and political authority at the provincial level. This would be especially true in the northern and eastern provinces, in which the ethnic and religious minorities predominate. It cannot be forgotten that the provincial council system was developed as a constructive response to the ethnic conflict. Elections at the provincial level would create opportunities for a new generation of political leaders to emerge through democratic competition rather than patronage. Many of those now facing legal scrutiny belong to an older generation to whose needs the younger may be less deferential.
Two Pillars
Another reform that could command bipartisan support is the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The PTA has once again become controversial because it is being used in situations that extend beyond its original purpose. The detention of former intelligence chief Suresh Sallay under the Act, the continued incarceration of some Tamil detainees from the war period, and the arrest of individuals accused of speech related offences have all revived concerns regarding prolonged detention without trial and excessive executive power. The reason the PTA has been difficult to repeal is that it is closely associated with concerns regarding national security and territorial integrity. Introduced in 1979 as a temporary measure to confront the emerging separatist conflict, it survived through decades of war and has remained on the statute books long after the conflict ended.
At the same time, history shows that extraordinary powers are likely to be misused. Laws that permit detention without trial or broad executive discretion are rarely confined to their original purpose. Governments of different political parties have used such powers against opponents and critics. The temptation to do so is inherent in the possession of unchecked authority. The way forward could therefore be a combination of accountability and reform. The government should continue to support independent investigations and prosecutions in major corruption and security related cases. Demonstrating political will in this regard would strengthen public confidence in the rule of law and reinforce the principle that no individual is above the law. The PTA could be replaced with legislation that amends the Criminal Procedure Code and Penal Code in a manner that addresses legitimate security concerns while complying with democratic norms and human rights standards.
There are also international dimensions to consider. The European Union has repeatedly linked governance and human rights reforms, including reform of the PTA, to Sri Lanka’s continuing access to the GSP Plus trade concession. Progress on these issues would strengthen Sri Lanka’s international standing at a time when economic recovery remains a national priority. The government has a rare opportunity. It possesses a strong electoral mandate, public goodwill and a reputation for integrity that previous governments lacked. It can combine the pursuit of justice in long delayed cases with meaningful democratic reforms that reduce political resistance and broaden public support. At this time, accountability and power sharing are the two pillars which Sri Lankans need to be committed to build a just and democratic society for a better future without delay. Failure now would make for a long period of waiting for the next time.
by Jehan Perera
Features
Pitfalls and exclusions in academic recruitment
A public university relies on its teachers in fulfilling its responsibilities to the wider community. While teaching remains the chief responsibility of the academic staff, they also conduct research and play a central role in keeping the university a vibrant space where they and students can freely participate in conversations that concern not just routine classroom education but also society at large. The broader intellectual culture and intellectual integrity of a university thus depend on how its academics perform their functions. Therefore, universities should take the task of recruiting their academics seriously. It is important to ensure that this task is done responsibly, transparently and credibly through a fair, thorough and multi-phased evaluation process.
As both an applicant and a member of selection panels for recruitment, I hold that the recruitment procedures, currently in place in our university system, require radical reforms. Echoing some of the concerns raised by Kaushalya Perera in her Kuppi article on recruitment in March 2026, I focus on the limitations I have observed and experienced, specifically in the recruitment of Lecturer (Probationary) and Senior Lecturer positions. The article also aims to explore how these shortcomings could be addressed.
The Advertisement
Recruitment for Lecturer (Probationary) and Senior Lecturer positions is done through an open-advertisement which also involves an interview with shortlisted candidates. Advertisements are finalised in line with a template issued by the Registrar’s Office. Generally, an initial draft, prepared by the Registrar’s Office, is sent to the relevant academic departments for revisions. The revisions have to be made within the template provided, which allows space for the mention of only specialisation requirements.
It should be noted that not all revisions to the advertisement, suggested by the Department Head, are accepted in the next round. Deans, Vice Chancellors and Registrars, who have very little understanding of the disciplines associated with the position, sometimes reject the changes proposed by the Department. Technocratic in their thinking, they don’t recognise that an academic programme can be taught by persons with specialisation in another overlapping discipline. For instance, a position in English, at a university in Sri Lanka, is very well suited to not just those who have postgraduate qualifications in literary studies but also those who are from the disciplines of Applied Linguistics, Cultural Studies or Translation Studies, as these areas are taught as sub-fields of English studies at most universities in the country. These disciplinary overlaps, even when pointed out by Heads, are often overlooked by our administrators.
In place of this process, dominated by academic administrators and registrars, the advertisement should ideally emerge, from the relevant department, in the form of a comprehensive job description. It should mention the nature of the position advertised, the kind of teaching (and research) expected, how the position relates to other positions in the department, in terms of specialisation and workload, and the ways in which the recruited candidate would contribute to overall institutional development.
There can be no one-size-fits-all model when it comes to recruitment. Individual departments vary in size, strength and specialisation requirements. Departments with sizable academic staff may want to emphasise specialisation during recruitment, whereas smaller departments may prefer generalists who can handle a wide-array of courses. Specifying the rationale for the requirements included in the job description may help potential applicants get an understanding of the position advertised and the selection panel to conduct the evaluation process in a fair manner.
Review of Applications
Once applications are received, we sometimes find promising candidates but with qualifications that don’t carry in their title the name of the discipline or the department in which the position is advertised. Sometimes the disciplines or fields of specialisation that appear in the advertisement and the ones that appear in the qualifications are not identical in nomenclature, even though the research undertaken by the applicant during their graduate studies is strongly relevant to the position advertised. Even when such applications are accompanied by strong and relevant publications, our system does not view them positively. Instead, nomenclatural differences are used to reject promising candidates. Such differences are also used as a pretext when universities want to exclude a candidate for their cultural background, political beliefs or other reasons. Even if academic departments recognise such applications, at the next stage, the administrators of the university try to veto them. We lose inter-disciplinary scholars of high academic standing because of the high-handedness of university administrators.
Selection Panels
Selection panels for academic positions typically comprise the Vice Chancellor, the Dean of the Faculty, the Head of the Department, two academics nominated by the Senate and two members of the University Council. In the case of programmes/disciplines jointly housed under a single department, if the Head comes from a discipline other than the one in which the position is advertised, they may not be able to contribute in an informed manner to the recruitment process. However, some Heads refuse to appoint nominees from the relevant discipline in their place as they view sitting on selection panels as their exclusive privilege.
Sometimes university Senates do not take the appointment of Senate nominees seriously. These appointments are decided in a hurry without serious deliberations at senate meetings packed with numerous agenda items. Sometimes even if the relevant department has suitable academics to serve as Senate nominees, the Senate chooses academics from other departments or disciplines who do not have a nuanced understanding of the requirements of the position advertised and its disciplinary parameters. Sometimes specialists in the relevant discipline may not be available at a university. On such occasions, Senates tend to fill up the positions with academics from other disciplines, instead of inviting external nominees from other universities. At a state university in Sri Lanka, I was interviewed thrice for academic positions by selection panels that comprised not even one specialist from the relevant discipline.
The Marking Scheme
The marking schemes used in recruitment have their own drawbacks. Publications are sometimes evaluated for their quantity rather than quality. The opinion of the subject specialist is not sought or taken seriously when a candidate’s research is evaluated. This is why our universities are saddled with academics who engage in plagiarism or predatory publishing. The evaluation process should be tightened in such a way to bar the entry of those who lack academic integrity.
It is worrying to see that marking schemes and schemes of recruitment penalise applicants who have excelled in their graduate studies and are well-reputed for their recent research and publications just because they did not earn a first-class or second-class upper-division pass at the undergraduate level. Our narrow focus on a candidate’s first degree prevents us from giving due recognition to how that person has gained intellectual depth over the years. Some marking rubrics, which allocate points for eye-contact and posture during the interview, dilute the seriousness associated with the academic position, de-prioritise scholarship and turn the interview process into a stage performance.
Cultural Credibility
In recruitment, many universities look for cultural credibility (a term that I borrow from the work of Sulaxana Hippisley) as an unwritten requirement. Some departments are reluctant to hire applicants who are not their alumni. Some selection panels discriminate against candidates from certain ethnic or religious backgrounds. In some departments, women are rejected because they are likely to go on maternity leave or have more domestic responsibilities than men. Gender and sexual minorities have to mute and censor their identities at interviews because they are likely to face rejection if they openly declare their orientation. We have no policies and procedures in place to ensure recruitment is conducted in an inclusive way that sees diversity as a strength.
The Way-forward
When recruitment fails, the entire intellectual culture of that university takes a hit, and several generations of students are affected. Some of the current problems, related to quality in our higher education system, stem from bad recruitment policies and practices. Instead of trying to address these issues through rigorous and inclusive recruitment practices, we try to seek solutions via band-aids like quality assurance and workshops on curriculum writing and pedagogy for university academics.
In developing alternative recruitment policies and practices, we have to demand that the needs and expectations of individual departments are heard. Our selection panels should include more subject specialists than administrators and council nominees. Most of the evaluation should be completed before the interviews, and interviews should be treated as opportunities to get to know candidates in person and pose clarifying questions rather than as occasions for full-scale evaluation. We have to be open and receptive to new, inter-disciplinary scholarship and cultural, ethnic and gender diversity. If we are unwilling to introspect and bring about these reforms and revise our marking schemes, we will continue to recruit the wrong candidates and thereby fail our students and the wider community.
Mahendran Thiruvarangan is a Senior Lecturer attached to the Department of Linguistics & English at the University of Jaffna.
(Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.)
by Mahendran Thiruvarangan
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