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Understanding social upheavals: Beyond Conspiracy Theories

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Argalaya (File photo)

By Kalinga Tudor Silva

Sociological explanations frequently serve as a counter point to popular conspiracy theories. Historically, sociology evolved as a subject that tried to prove that social reality cannot be reduced to the separate actions of the individuals who make up that society, such individual motivations or what was understood as the standard way persons think and behave in given situations being the dominant analytical frameworks in other social sciences, like economics, psychology, and political science. A key founder of sociology, Frenchman Emile Durkheim, tried to identify the social as external to and in some ways imposed from outside upon the individuals who are included in the social reality. In his unique way, he demonstrated the validity of the social by explaining how even a deeply personal and emotional matter, such as suicide, must be seen as a socially determined phenomenon. Of course, these views have been interrogated by many critics over the years for his single-minded preoccupation with the social by deemphasizing its natural linkages with the psychological and for his denial of the agency of human beings.

Sri Lanka has always been a hotbed of conspiracy theories. Matters of national importance whether we are talking about collective uprisings against the state such as the JVP uprisings in 1971 and 1987-1989 and the LTTE uprising from 1980s until 2009, and public decisions such as signing of a peace accord between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, in 2002, were explained by certain observers in terms of conspiracy theories of one kind or another. A secretive nature and lack of transparency often added to public confusion about these events. More recently, the Aragalaya uprising has also triggered a variety of conspiracy theories, despite its openness to the public and explicit accommodation of diverse viewpoints. Nearly always conspiracy theories are ways of explaining away the compounded social and political reality using flimsy evidence by parties with vested interests in keeping with their own political and ideological moorings without making a genuine effort at reaching an objective explanation of the complex reality we are dealing with. As professional social scientists, we have a duty to explain that conspiracy theories in circulation are seriously flawed when it comes to explaining the complex realities fraught with multiple challenges we are dealing with in contemporary Sri Lanka. Conspiracy theories come forward to oversimplify matters, interpret a complex phenomenon in ways that conform with preconceptions and suspicions and deny an evidence-based analysis that is likely to challenge popular assumptions and preconceived ideas and the popular need to find a scapegoat who can be readily blamed for a public disaster that has unfolded. While key decision makers responsible for poor public decisions must be certainly identified and appropriate action taken against them, it should not end up with untenable conspiracy theories as valid explanations for macro social processes with a complex etiology.

Fredric Jameson (1999) considered conspiracy theories as ‘the poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern age’ characterized by insecurities and related paranoia. In other words, conspiracy theories are a questionable way of speculatively making sense of many seemingly unexplainable issues in the postmodern world. However, conspiracy theories often involve blaming a publicly tainted person without investigating his or her specific liability within a larger macro environment characterized by resource constraints and unsurmountable challenges. What is equally problematic is the complete ignorance or blatant neglect of relevant social science perspectives in trying to explain complex social realities attributing them to assumed conspiracy plans of one or more actors to account for events that engage the agency of a multitude of related or unrelated actors as well as the unintended consequences of their action that is social or group generated rather than an aggregated outcome of individual decision making. This is why conspiracy theories are always suspect in social sciences and seen as an epistemological frontier responding to emergencies in a populist manner without going through the rigors of systematic social analysis.

Several social upheavals that happened in Sri Lanka during the recent past can be used to illustrate how conspiracy theories divert attention away from the larger social context relating to these mobilizations requiring systematic investigation. We select the Easter attacks by a cluster of Islamic terrorists on April 21, 2019, to illustrate the specific role of conspiracy theories. In this violent outbreak the country was shocked and taken by surprise with different conspiracy theories looming large in the minds of the affected people and their intellectual leaders. This event involved a serious breakdown of the law-and-order situation in the country. The conspiracy theories tried to understand the attack as the work of some hidden hands that mobilized and instrumentalized the persons involved for achieving their ulterior motives, left unelaborated in these populist explanations.

From what is reported in the media, the Easter attacks were conducted by an apparently religiously motivated secret group of armed actors who were part of a closely knit network. Several official investigations have already been carried out including an enquiry by a parliamentary select committee, two presidential commissions and a judicial investigation. These investigations tried to understand why the police and the security forces failed to prevent the attack while prior information had been received from intelligence sources outside Sri Lanka, who is accountable for the observed security lapses and how the attackers escaped the attention of the intelligence network in Sri Lanka. These are important and valid questions particularly from the law enforcement and national security angles. What is missing, however, is an investigation into the social background of the attackers, how and under what circumstances they became radicalized to the point of having a tunnel vision to end their lives and lives of others and what can be done to prevent a recurrence of such violent outbreaks in future.

Apart from a seemingly pro-government cluster of anti-Islamic conspiracy theories reporting Islamic fundamentalist mobilizations in Sri Lanka for some time, many independent observers were puzzled by an Islamic terror cell targeting their attacks on Christians involved in an important religious congregation on Easter Sunday in April 2019 and some key tourist hotels in Colombo.

The deliberate targeting of Christian places of worship was particularly problematic in the light of the absence of any prior history of tension between Islam and Christianity in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, tensions between Buddhists and Muslims had been escalating with effect from 2012 due to the propaganda work of some anti-Islamic Sinhala nationalist outfits that provoked mob violence against Muslim communities and Muslim-owned businesses in Aluthgama, Ampare, Digana and elsewhere (Haniffa, Amarasuriya, Wijenayake, and Gunatilleke 2014). A potential clue to solve the puzzle about the chosen targets of the Easter violence was provided by an ISIS official declaration through its Amaq news agency on April 23, two days after the Easter attack. It stated that the attackers involved were Islamic state fighters who targeted citizens of coalition states (meaning western tourists staying in the hotels attacked) and the Christians (Amarsingham 2019: 2). This suggested that the Easter attack was connected with an ISIS global campaign targeting suspected agents of westernization in the non-western world rather than any local triggers of conflict in Sri Lanka. As far as we know, the authenticity of this declaration, however, has not been verified or confirmed by any subsequent investigations. So far investigations have not revealed any direct connection between ISIS and the attackers in Sri Lanka even though remote connections and the influence of ISIS online propaganda cannot be ruled out as drivers of a jihadist one track mind.

It raised important questions as to how an Islamist nucleus prepared to die and kill on behalf of an external agency, namely ISIS, was formed in Sri Lanka with an overall history of Islamic tolerance and support for peaceful coexistence though increasingly challenged by infiltrations of Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, the Catholic establishment in the country predictably disturbed over many church goers who were killed, mimed and who lost their dear family members during the attack wanted to identify the mastermind (mahamolakaru) behind the attack presumably considering him to be someone other than those who sacrificed their lives during the attack and probe him about why the attack was made and why innocent civilians were targeted.

While this is certainly a legitimate concern, the conspiracy theories that go with it do not help understand the larger social context that produced the network of attackers and why they turned their violence towards a completely innocent party unconnected with them. The view that the attack was strategically designed by yet another party for its own political advantage has been in circulation since the national political crisis unfolded in 2019. While this cannot be ruled out completely, how far such a master plan can instrumentalize deep religious sentiments connected with an established religion to carry out deadly suicide attacks remains a major challenge for such a claim. These contradictory conspiracy theories leave many questions unanswered not only about the Easter attack itself, but also about the larger social context connected with the disaster, including the global scenario where ISIS had been cornered by pro-American alignments and the local scenario of one political crisis followed by another.

There are some unresolved social issues related to the formation of an Islamist extremist group bent on violence in Sri Lanka. Why and how a nucleus of Muslims including some members of a very affluent business family in Colombo became so radicalized during a short period of time to be prepared to kill and die in a jihadist mission for an externally determined cause apparently unconnected with their day-to-day existence in Sri Lanka. Why they targeted innocent civilians who are by no means accountable for the atrocities caused to ISIS is part of a larger puzzle connected with what one analyst referred to as “the ambivalence of the sacred”, particularly after 9/11 (Appleby 2020). While religion continues to remain a key driver of global peace, the tendency on the part of certain religious actors to carry out violent attacks on identified targets is something that requires a systematic social science enquiry outside the purview of individual religious perspectives.

It is also important to note that some of the attackers were well-educated people with established professional careers. For instance, according to media reports there was an aerospace engineer, a lawyer and two leading businesspeople in Colombo among the inner core of attackers who carried out the attack on April 21, 2019 (Srinivasan 2019). Not only do these facts go against the secularization thesis expecting people to become less religious as they gain education and more engaged in technical and business enterprises. It also problematizes any simplistic assumptions about possible connections between economic disadvantage and radicalism. These concerns highlight the need to go beyond simplistic assumptions and popular analytical framings including conspiracy theories in understanding what caused Easter mayhem.

How this small group of faith actors became radicalized possibly through their exposure to ISIS online propaganda, powerful command Sahran was supposed to have on colloquial Tamil and Islamic religious symbols coupled with periodic physical and virtual congregations of the group need to be examined using available empirical evidence also considering potential importance of the wave of anti-Muslim violence escalated since 2012 as a trigger for this mobilization and the progressive radicalization of the nucleus of the attackers (Keethaponcalan 2019).

Finally, in addition to pinpointing security failures contributing to the Easter attack, understanding the underlying social factors and group dynamics is necessary for preventing a possible future recurrence of Islamic radicalization leading to violence. These are some issues calling for thorough social science research in and outside Sri Lanka. Conspiracy theories of various kinds merely serve to accuse an identified public enemy without providing any reliable evidence. Social sciences must bring out the social and ideological factors that account for upheavals like the Easter attack using empirical evidence and sound analytical frameworks to support their explanations. Instead of providing valid explanations of the subject under consideration, the conspiracy theories merely serve to reinforce prejudices of one kind or another at a time of uncertainty and anxiety. Often such theories add to the existing aura of anxieties and conflict dynamics. Conspiracy theories are something to be explained in social analysis rather than a satisfactory framework for explaining an organized violent attack that shocked the whole world, not just Sri Lanka. In some ways conspiracy theories are an inherent aspect of the crisis environment where affected people as well as the key stakeholders in society are constantly looking for answers that suit their interests and deep seated prejudices. Just like gossip and rumour, conspiracy theories serve to spread fake news and false alarms during civil disturbances in ways that divert public anger towards identified targets and contribute towards reinforcing conflict dynamics. This is why debunking conspiracy theories becomes an important challenge for social sciences at times of social upheavals and mass panic. In the official investigations carried out so far, this is a dimension relatively unexplored, and much work needs to be done regarding filling in the gaps.

References

Amarasingam, Amarnath (2019) “Terrorism on the Teardrop Island: Understanding the Easter 2019 Attacks in Sri Lanka,” CTC Sentinel 12, no. 5: 1-6

Haniffa, F. Amarasuriya, H., Wijenayake, V. and Gunatilleke, G. (2014). Where have all the Neighbours Gone? Aluthgama Riots and its Aftermath. Colombo: Law and Society Trust.

Keethaponcalan, Soosaipillai (2019) “Understanding Zahran: Sri Lanka’s Ultra Terrorist.” Colombo Telegraph, 3 May 2019.

Jameson, Fredric (1990) “Cognitive Mapping”. In: Nelson, C./Grossberg, L. [ed]. Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, pp. 347-60.

Srinivasan, Meera (2019) “Inside Story of 9 Suicide Bombers behind Sri Lanka’s Savage Easter Sunday Attacks.” Hindu, May 25, 2019.

An earlier version of this essay was published as an editorial of the Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences Vol 45 (2) on April 27, 2023.



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A plural society requires plural governance

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The local government elections that took place last week saw a consolidation of the democratic system in the country.  The government followed the rules of elections to a greater extent than its recent predecessors some of whom continue to be active on the political stage.  Particularly noteworthy was the absence of the large-scale abuse of state resources, both media and financial, which had become normalised under successive governments in the past four decades.  Reports by independent election monitoring organisations made mention of this improvement in the country’s democratic culture.

In a world where democracy is under siege even in long-established democracies, Sri Lanka’s improvement in electoral integrity is cause for optimism. It also offers a reminder that democracy is always a work in progress, ever vulnerable to erosion and needs to be constantly fought for. The strengthening of faith in democracy as a result of these elections is encouraging.  The satisfaction expressed by the political parties that contested the elections is a sign that democracy in Sri Lanka is strong.  Most of them saw some improvement in their positions from which they took reassurance about their respective futures.

The local government elections also confirmed that the NPP and its core comprising the JVP are no longer at the fringes of the polity.  The NPP has established itself as a mainstream party with an all-island presence, and remarkably so to a greater extent than any other political party.  This was seen at the general elections, where the NPP won a majority of seats in 21 of the country’s 22 electoral districts. This was a feat no other political party has ever done. This is also a success that is challenging to replicate. At the present local government elections, the NPP was successful in retaining its all-island presence although not to the same degree.

Consolidating Support

Much attention has been given to the relative decline in the ruling party’s vote share from the 61 percent it secured in December’s general election to 43 percent in the local elections. This slippage has been interpreted by some as a sign of waning popularity. However, such a reading overlooks the broader trajectory of political change. Just three years ago, the NPP and its allied parties polled less than five percent nationally. That they now command over 40 percent of the vote represents a profound transformation in voter preferences and political culture. What is even more significant is the stability of this support base, which now surpasses that of any rival. The votes obtained by the NPP at these elections were double those of its nearest rival.

The electoral outcomes in the north and east, which were largely won by parties representing the Tamil and Muslim communities, is a warning signal that ethnic conflict lurks beneath the surface. The success of the minority parties signals the different needs and aspirations of the ethnic and religious minority electorates, and the need for the government to engage more fully with them.  Apart from the problems of poverty, lack of development, inadequate access to economic resources and antipathy to excessive corruption that people of the north and east share in common with those in other parts of the country, they also have special problems that other sections of the population do not have. These would include problems of military takeover of their lands, missing persons and persons incarcerated for long periods either without trial or convictions under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (which permits confessions made to security forces to be made admissible for purposes of conviction) and the long time quest for self-rule in the areas of their predominance

The government’s failure to address these longstanding issues with urgency appears to have caused disaffection in electorate in the north and east. While structural change is necessarily complex and slow, delays can be misinterpreted as disinterest or disregard, especially by minorities already accustomed to marginalisation. The lack of visible progress on issues central to minority communities fosters a sense of exclusion and deepens political divides. Even so, it is worth noting that the NPP’s vote in the north and east was not insignificant. It came despite the NPP not tailoring its message to ethnic grievances. The NPP has presented a vision of national reform grounded in shared values of justice, accountability, development, and equality.

Translating electoral gains into meaningful governance will require more than slogans. The failure to swiftly address matters deemed to be important by the people of those areas appears to have cost the NPP votes amongst the ethnic and religious minorities, but even here it is necessary to keep matters in perspective.  The NPP came first in terms of seats won in two of the seven electoral districts of the north and east.  They came second in five others. The fact that the NPP continued to win significant support indicates that its approach of equity in development and equal rights for all has resonance. This was despite the Tamil and Muslim parties making appeals to the electorate on nationalist or ethnic grounds.

Slow Change

Whether in the north and east or outside it, the government is perceived to be slow in delivering on its promises.  In the context of the promise of system change, it can be appreciated that such a change will be resisted tooth and nail by those with vested interests in the continuation of the old system.  System change will invariably be resisted at multiple levels.  The problem is that the slow pace of change may be seen by ethnic and religious minorities as being due to the disregard of their interests.  However, the system change is coming slow not only in the north and east, but also in the entire country.

At the general election in December last year, the NPP won an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats in both the country as well as in the north and east.  But it has still to make use of its 2/3 majority to make the changes that its super majority permits it to do.  With control of 267 out of 339 local councils, but without outright majorities in most, it must now engage in coalition-building and consensus-seeking if it wishes to govern at the local level. This will be a challenge for a party whose identity has long been built on principled opposition to elite patronage, corruption and abuse of power rather than to governance. General Secretary of the JVP, Tilvin Silva, has signaled a reluctance to form alliances with discredited parties but has expressed openness to working with independent candidates who share the party’s values. This position can and should be extended, especially in the north and east, to include political formations that represent minority communities and have remained outside the tainted mainstream.

In a plural and multi-ethnic society like Sri Lanka, democratic legitimacy and effective governance requires coalition-building. By engaging with locally legitimate minority parties, especially in the north and east, the NPP can engage in principled governance without compromising its core values. This needs to be extended to the local government authorities in the rest of the country as well. As the 19th century English political philosopher John Stuart Mill observed, “The worth of a state in the long run is the worth of the individuals composing it,” and in plural societies, that worth can only be realised through inclusive decision-making.

by Jehan Perera

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Commercialising research in Sri Lanka – not really the healthiest thing for research

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Image credit University of Sydney

In the early 2000s, a colleague, returning to Sri Lanka after a decade in a research-heavy first world university, complained to me that ‘there is no research culture in Sri Lanka’. But what exactly does having a ‘research culture’ mean? Is a lot of funding enough? What else has stopped us from working towards a productive and meaningful research culture? A concerted effort has been made to improve the research culture of state universities, though there are debates about how healthy such practices are (there is not much consideration of the same in private ‘universities’ in Sri Lanka but that is a discussion for another time). So, in the 25 years since my colleague bemoaned our situation, what has been happening?

What is a ‘research culture’?

A good research culture would be one where we – academics and students – have the resources to engage productively in research. This would mean infrastructure, training, wholesome mentoring, and that abstract thing called headspace. In a previous Kuppi column, I explained at length some of the issues we face as researchers in Sri Lankan universities, including outdated administrative regulations, poor financial resources, and such aspects. My perspective is from the social sciences, and might be different to other disciplines. Still, I feel that there are at least a few major problems that we all face.

Number one: Money is important.

Take the example American universities. Harvard University, according to Harvard Magazine, “received $686.5 million in federally sponsored research grants” for the fiscal year of 2024 but suddenly find themselves in a bind because of such funds being held back. Research funds in these universities typically goes towards building and maintenance of research labs and institutions, costs of equipment, material and other resources and stipends for graduate and other research assistants, conferences, etc. Without such an infusion of money towards research, the USA would not have been able to attracts (and keeps) the talent and brains of other countries. Without a large amount of money dedicated for research, Sri Lankan state universities, too, will not have the research culture it yearns for. Given the country’s austere economic situation, in the last several years, research funds have come mainly from self-generated funds and treasury funds. Yet, even when research funds are available (they are usually inadequate), we still have some additional problems.

Number two: Unending spools of red tape

In Sri Lankan universities red tape is endless. An MoU with a foreign research institution takes at least a year. Financial regulations surrounding the award and spending of research grants is frustrating.

Here’s a personal anecdote. In 2018, I applied for a small research grant from my university. Several months later, I was told I had been awarded it. It comes to me in installments of not more than Rs 100,000. To receive this installment, I must submit a voucher and wait a few weeks until it passes through various offices and gains various approvals. For mysterious financial reasons, asking for reimbursements is discouraged. Obviously then, if I were working on a time-sensitive study or if I needed a larger amount of money for equipment or research material, I would not be able to use this grant. MY research assistants, transcribers, etc., must be willing to wait for their payments until I receive this advance. In 2022, when I received a second advance, the red tape was even tighter. I was asked to spend the funds and settle accounts – within three weeks. ‘Should I ask my research assistants to do the work and wait a few weeks or months for payment? Or should I ask them not to do work until I get the advance and then finish it within three weeks so I can settle this advance?’ I asked in frustration.

Colleagues, who regularly use university grants, frustratedly go along with it; others may opt to work with organisations outside the university. At a university meeting, a few years ago, set up specifically to discuss how young researchers could be encouraged to do research, a group of senior researchers ended the meeting with a list of administrative and financial problems that need to be resolved if we want to foster ‘a research culture’. These are still unresolved. Here is where academic unions can intervene, though they seem to be more focused on salaries, permits and school quotas. If research is part of an academic’s role and responsibility, a research-friendly academic environment is not a privilege, but a labour issue and also impinges on academic freedom to generate new knowledge.

Number three: Instrumentalist research – a global epidemic

The quality of research is a growing concern, in Sri Lanka and globally. The competitiveness of the global research environment has produced seriously problematic phenomena, such as siphoning funding to ‘trendy’ topics, the predatory publications, predatory conferences, journal paper mills, publications with fake data, etc. Plagiarism, ghost writing and the unethical use of AI products are additional contemporary problems. In Sri Lanka, too, we can observe researchers publishing very fast – doing short studies, trying to publish quickly by sending articles to predatory journals, sending the same article to multiple journals at the same time, etc. Universities want more conferences rather than better conferences. Many universities in Sri Lanka have mandated that their doctoral candidates must publish journal articles before their thesis submission. As a consequence, novice researchers frequently fall prey to predatory journals. Universities have also encouraged faculties or departments to establish journals, which frequently have sub-par peer review.

Alongside this are short-sighted institutional changes. University Business Liankage cells, for instance, were established as part of the last World Bank loan cycle to universities. They are expected to help ‘commercialise’ research and focuses on research that can produce patents, and things that can be sold. Such narrow vision means that the broad swathe of research that is undertaken in universities are unseen and ignored, especially in the humanities and social sciences. A much larger vision could have undertaken the promotion of research rather than commercialisation of it, which can then extend to other types of research.

This brings us to the issue of what types of research is seen as ‘relevant’ or ‘useful’. This is a question that has significant repercussions. In one sense, research is an elitist endeavour. We assume that the public should trust us that public funds assigned for research will be spent on worth-while projects. Yet, not all research has an outcome that shows its worth or timeliness in the short term. Some research may not be understood other than by specialists. Therefore, funds, or time spent on some research projects, are not valued, and might seem a waste, or a privilege, until and unless a need for that knowledge suddenly arises.

A short example suffices. Since the 1970s, research on the structures of Sinhala and Sri Lankan Tamil languages (sound patterns, sentence structures of the spoken versions, etc.) have been nearly at a standstill. The interest in these topics are less, and expertise in these areas were not prioritised in the last 30 years. After all, it is not an area that can produce lucrative patents or obvious contributions to the nation’s development. But with digital technology and AI upon us, the need for systematic knowledge of these languages is sorely evident – digital technologies must be able to work in local languages to become useful to whole populations. Without a knowledge of the structures and sounds of local languages – especially the spoken varieties – people who cannot use English cannot use those devices and platforms. While providing impetus to research such structures, this need also validates utilitarian research.

This then is the problem with espousing instrumental ideologies of research. World Bank policies encourage a tying up between research and the country’s development goals. However, in a country like ours, where state policies are tied to election manifestos, the result is a set of research outputs that are tied to election cycles. If in 2019, the priority was national security, in 2025, it can be ‘Clean Sri Lanka’. Prioritising research linked to short-sighted visions of national development gains us little in the longer-term. At the same time, applying for competitive research grants internationally, which may have research agendas that are not nationally relevant, is problematic. These are issues of research ethics as well.

Concluding thoughts

In moving towards a ‘good research culture’, Sri Lankan state universities have fallen into the trap of adopting some of the problematic trends that have swept through the first world. Yet, since we are behind the times anyway, it is possible for us to see the damaging consequences of those issues, and to adopt the more fruitful processes. A slower, considerate approach to research priorities would be useful for Sri Lanka at this point. It is also a time for collective action to build a better research environment, looking at new relationships and collaborations, and mentoring in caring ways.

(Dr. Kaushalya Perera teaches at the Department of English, University of Colombo)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

By Kaushalya Perera

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Melantha …in the spotlight

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Fun mode for Melantha Perera and Allwyn H. Stephen

Melantha Perera, who has been associated with many top bands in the past, due to his versatility as a musician, is now enjoying his solo career, as well … as a singer.

He was invited to perform at the first ever ‘Noon2Moon’ event, held in Dubai, at The Huddle, CityMax Hotel, on Saturday, 3rd May.

It was 15 hours of non-stop music, featuring several artistes, with Melantha (the only Sri Lankan on the show), doing two sets.

According to reports coming my way, ‘Noon2Moon’ turned out to be the party of the year, with guests staying back till well past 3.00 am, although it was a 12.00 noon to 3.00 am event.

Having Arabic food

Melantha says he enjoyed every minute he spent on stage as the crowd, made up mostly of Indians, loved the setup.

“I included a few Sinhala songs as there were some Sri Lankans, as well, in the scene.”

Allwyn H. Stephen, who is based in the UAE, was overjoyed with the success of ‘Noon2Moon’.

Says Allwyn: “The 1st ever Noon2Moon event in Dubai … yes, we delivered as promised. Thank you to the artistes for the fab entertainment, the staff of The Huddle UAE , the sound engineers, our sponsors, my supporters for sharing and supporting and, most importantly, all those who attended and stayed back till way past 3.00 am.”

Melantha:
Dubai and
then Oman

Allwyn, by the way, came into the showbiz scene, in a big way, when he featured artistes, live on social media, in a programme called TNGlive, during the Covid-19 pandemic.

After his performance in Dubai, Melantha went over to Oman and was involved in a workshop – ‘Workshop with Melantha Perera’, organised by Clifford De Silva, CEO of Music Connection.

The Workshop included guitar, keyboard and singing/vocal training, with hands-on guidance from the legendary Melantha Perera, as stated by the sponsors, Music Connection.

Back in Colombo, Melantha will team up with his band Black Jackets for their regular dates at the Hilton, on Fridays and Sundays, and on Tuesdays and Thursdays at Warehouse, Vauxhall Street.

Melantha also mentioned that Bright Light, Sri Lanka’s first musical band formed entirely by visually impaired youngsters, will give their maiden public performance on 7th June at the MJF Centre Auditorium in Katubadda, Moratuwa.

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