Features
Trump tariffs and their effect on world trade and economy with particular
reference to Sri Lanka – Part III
(Continued from yesterday)
Textile Industry Significance
The textile and apparel sector holds outsised importance in Sri Lanka’s economy. It accounts for approximately 40% of the country’s total exports and directly employs around 350,000 workers, predominantly women from rural areas, for whom these jobs represent a crucial pathway out of poverty. When indirect employment in supporting industries is included, the sector supports the livelihoods of over one million Sri Lankans.
The industry’s development was initially facilitated through quotas assigned by the Multi-Fiber Agreement (1974-1994), which allocated specific export volumes to developing countries. When this agreement expired, Sri Lanka managed to maintain its position in global apparel supply chains by focusing on higher-value products, ethical manufacturing practices, and reliability. The country has positioned itself as a producer of quality garments, particularly lingerie, activewear, and swimwear for major global brands.
However, this success has created a structural dependency on continued access to markets in wealthy countries, particularly the United States. As the Secretary General of the Joint Apparel Association Forum, the main representative body for Sri Lanka’s
apparel and textile exporters, bluntly stated following the tariff announcement, “We have no alternate market that we can possibly target instead of the US.”
This dependency is reinforced by the industry’s integration into global supply chains dominated by U.S. brands and retailers. Many Sri Lankan factories operate on thin margins as contract manufacturers for these international companies, with limited ability to quickly pivot to new markets or product categories. The industry has also made significant investments in compliance with U.S. buyer requirements and sustainability certifications, creating path dependencies that make rapid adaptation to new market conditions extremely challenging.
The textile and apparel sector’s significance extends beyond its direct economic contributions. It has been a crucial source of foreign exchange earnings for a country that has consistently run trade deficits and struggled with external debt sustainability. In the ten years leading up to Sri Lanka’s default on external debt (2012-2021), debt repayments amounted to an average of 41% of export earnings, highlighting how vital steady export revenues are to the country’s ability to service its international obligations.
The sector has also played an important role in Sri Lanka’s social development, providing formal employment opportunities for women and contributing to poverty reduction in rural areas. Many of the industry’s workers are the primary breadwinners for their families, and their wages support extended family networks in economically disadvantaged regions of the country.
Given this context, the imposition of a 44% tariff on Sri Lankan goods, with the textile and apparel sector likely to bear the brunt of the impact, represents not merely an economic challenge but a potential social crisis for hundreds of thousands of vulnerable workers and their dependents.
SPECIFIC IMPACT OF TRUMP TARIFFS ON SRI LANKA
The imposition of a 44% tariff on Sri Lankan exports to the United States represents a seismic shock to an economy still recovering from its worst crisis in decades. This section examines the immediate economic consequences, the implications for Sri Lanka’s debt sustainability, and the broader social and political ramifications of this dramatic policy shift.
Immediate Economic Consequences
The most immediate impact of President Trump’s tariffs will be a severe erosion of Sri Lankan goods’ competitiveness in the U.S. market. A 44% price increase effectively prices many Sri Lankan products out of reach for American consumers and businesses, particularly in price-sensitive categories like apparel, where margins are already thin and competition from other producing countries is intense.
Economic analysts project significant declines in export volumes as a result. The PublicFinance.lk think tank estimates that the new tariff rates will lead to a 20% fall in exports to America and an annual loss of approximately $300 million in foreign exchange earnings. Given that Sri Lanka’s total merchandise exports in 2024 were around $13 billion, this represents a substantial blow to the country’s trade balance and economic growth prospects.
The textile and apparel sector will bear the brunt of this impact. Industry representatives have warned that numerous factories may be forced to reduce production or close entirely if they cannot quickly find alternative markets for their products. The Joint Apparel Association Forum has indicated that smaller manufacturers with less diversified customer bases and limited financial reserves will be particularly vulnerable to closure.
These production cutbacks and potential closures would translate directly into job losses. Conservative estimates suggest that tens of thousands of workers in the textile sector could lose their livelihoods if the tariffs remain in place for an extended period. Given that many of these workers are women from rural areas with limited alternative employment opportunities, the social impact of these job losses would be particularly severe.
Beyond the direct effects on textile exports, the tariffs will have ripple effects throughout Sri Lanka’s economy. Supporting industries such as packaging, logistics, and input suppliers will face reduced demand. The loss of foreign exchange earnings will put pressure on the Sri Lankan rupee, potentially leading to currency depreciation that would increase the cost of essential imports including fuel, food, and medicine.
The timing of these tariffs is especially problematic given Sri Lanka’s fragile economic recovery. After experiencing a GDP contraction of 7.8% in 2022 during the height of the economic crisis, the country had only recently returned to modest growth. The IMF had projected GDP growth of 3.1% for 2025, but this forecast now appears overly optimistic in light of the tariff shock. Some economists are already revising their growth projections downward, with some suggesting growth could fall below 2% if the full impact of the tariffs materializes. We must hope they will be proven wrong.
Impact on Sri Lanka’s Debt Sustainability
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of Trump’s tariffs is their potential to undermine Sri Lanka’s hard-won progress on debt sustainability. After defaulting on its external debt in April 2022, the country has undergone a painful restructuring process that concluded only in December 2024. This restructuring was predicated on assumptions about Sri Lanka’s future ability to generate foreign exchange to service its remaining debt obligations.
The IMF’s debt sustainability analysis, which formed the basis for the restructuring agreement, focused almost exclusively on debt as a share of GDP while making insufficient distinction between domestic and foreign debt. This approach has been criticized for ignoring the structural trade deficit and the critical importance of foreign currency earnings to Sri Lanka’s ability to meet its external obligations.
The $300 million annual reduction in export earnings projected as a result of the tariffs directly threatens these calculations. Sri Lanka’s external debt stood at approximately $55 billion in 2023 (about 65% of its GDP), and even after restructuring, debt service payments will consume a significant portion of the country’s foreign exchange earnings in coming years.
In the decade preceding Sri Lanka’s default (2012-2021), debt repayments consumed an average of 41% of export earnings, an unsustainably high ratio that contributed directly to the eventual crisis. The loss of export revenues due to President Trump’s tariffs risks pushing this ratio back toward dangerous levels, potentially setting the stage for renewed debt distress despite the recent restructuring.
This situation highlights a fundamental flaw in the approach taken by international financial institutions to debt sustainability in developing countries. Unlike the treatment afforded to West Germany through the London Debt Agreement of 1953, where future debt repayments were explicitly linked to the country’s trade surplus and capped at 3% of export earnings—Sri Lanka and similar countries are expected to meet rigid repayment schedules regardless of their trade performance or external shocks beyond their control.
The tariffs thus expose the precariousness of Sri Lanka’s economic recovery and the fragility of the international debt architecture that underpins it. Without significant adjustments to account for this external shock, the country could find itself sliding back toward debt distress despite all the sacrifices made by its people during the recent adjustment period.
Social and Political Implications
The economic consequences of Trump’s tariffs will inevitably translate into social and political challenges for Sri Lanka. The country has already experienced significant social strain due to the austerity measures implemented under the IMF program, including tax increases, subsidy reductions, and public sector wage restraint. The additional economic pain caused by export losses and job cuts risks exacerbating social tensions and potentially triggering renewed protests.
The textile industry’s workforce is predominantly female, with many workers supporting extended family networks. Job losses in this sector would therefore have disproportionate impacts on women’s economic empowerment and household welfare, potentially reversing progress on gender equality and poverty reduction. Many of these workers come from rural areas where alternative formal employment opportunities are scarce, raising the spectre of increased rural poverty and potential migration pressures.
Politically, the tariff shock presents a significant challenge for President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government, which came to power promising economic revival and relief from the hardships of the crisis period. The administration has appointed an advisory committee consisting of government officials and private sector representatives to study the impact of the tariffs and develop response strategies, but its options are constrained by limited fiscal space and the conditions of the IMF programme.
The situation also raises questions about Sri Lanka’s foreign policy orientation. The country has traditionally maintained balanced relationships with major powers, including the United States, China, and India. However, the unilateral imposition of punitive tariffs by the United States may prompt some policymakers to reconsider this balance and potentially look more favourably on economic engagement with China, which has been a major infrastructure investor in Sri Lanka through its Belt and Road Initiative.
Such a reorientation would have significant geopolitical implications in the Indian Ocean region, where great power competition has intensified in recent years. It could potentially accelerate the fragmentation of the global economy into competing blocs, a trend that President Trump’s broader tariff policy seems designed to encourage despite its economic costs.
The social and political fallout from the tariffs thus extends far beyond immediate economic indicators, potentially reshaping Sri Lanka’s development trajectory and its place in the regional and global order. For a country still recovering from political instability triggered by economic crisis, these additional pressures come at a particularly vulnerable moment.
BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Sri Lanka’s experience with Trump’s tariffs is not unique. The sweeping nature of these trade measures has created similar challenges for developing economies across the Global South, revealing structural vulnerabilities in the international economic system and raising fundamental questions about the sustainability of export-led development models in an era of rising protectionism.
Comparative Analysis with Other Affected Developing Countries
While Sri Lanka faces a punishing 44% tariff rate, it is not alone in confronting severe trade barriers. Bangladesh, another South Asian country heavily dependent on textile exports, has been hit with a 37% tariff. Like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh has built its development strategy around its garment industry, which accounts for more than 80% of its export earnings and employs approximately 4 million workers, mostly women.
Other significantly affected developing economies include Vietnam (46% tariff), Cambodia (49%), Pakistan (29%), and several African nations that had previously benefited from preferential access to the U.S. market through programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Many of these countries share common characteristics, relatively low per capita incomes, heavy reliance on a narrow range of export products, and limited domestic markets that make export-oriented growth their primary development pathway.
The pattern of tariff rates reveals a troubling dynamic, some of the highest tariffs have been imposed on countries that can least afford the economic shock. While wealthy nations like Japan or Germany certainly face challenges from these trade
barriers, they possess diversified economies, substantial domestic markets, and financial resources to cushion the impact. By contrast, countries like Sri Lanka or Bangladesh have far fewer economic buffers and face potentially devastating consequences from similar or higher tariff rates.
This disparity highlights how President Trump’s “reciprocal tariff” formula, ostensibly designed to create a level playing field, actually reinforces existing power imbalances in the global economy. By treating trade deficits as the primary metric for determining tariff rates, the policy ignores the vast differences in economic development, productive capacity, and financial resilience between countries at different stages of development.
Structural Vulnerabilities of Export-Dependent Economies
The tariff shock has exposed fundamental vulnerabilities in the export-led development model that has dominated economic thinking about the Global South for decades. Since the 1980s, international financial institutions have consistently advised developing countries to orient their economies toward export markets, specialize according to comparative advantage, and integrate into global value chains as a path to economic growth and poverty reduction.
This model has delivered significant benefits in many cases. Countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and, to some extent, Sri Lanka have achieved impressive poverty reduction and economic growth by expanding their manufacturing exports. However, President Trump’s tariffs reveal the precariousness of development strategies built on continued access to wealthy consumer markets, particularly the United States.
Several structural vulnerabilities have become apparent,
1. First, export concentration creates acute dependency on a small number of markets and products. When Sri Lanka sends 23% of its exports to the United States and concentrates 40% of its total exports in textiles and apparel, it becomes extraordinarily vulnerable to policy changes affecting that specific market-product combination.
Diversification, both of export markets and products, has often been acknowledged as desirable in theory but has proven difficult to implement in practice due to established trade patterns, buyer relationships, and specialized production capabilities.
2. Second, participation in global value chains often traps developing countries in lower-value segments of production with limited opportunities for upgrading. Sri Lanka’s textile industry, while more advanced than some of its regional competitors, still primarily engages in contract manufacturing rather than controlling higher-value activities like design, branding, or retail. This position in the value chain yields lower returns and creates dependency on decisions made by lead firms in wealthy countries.
3. Third, the mobility of capital relative to labour creates a fundamental power imbalance. If tariffs make production in Sri Lanka uneconomical, global brands can relatively quickly shift their sourcing to other countries with lower tariffs or costs. However, Sri Lankan workers cannot similarly relocate, leaving them bearing the brunt of adjustment costs through unemployment and wage depression.
4. Fourth, developing countries typically lack the fiscal space to provide adequate social protection during economic shocks. Unlike wealthy nations that can deploy extensive safety nets during trade disruptions, countries like Sri Lanka, already implementing austerity measures under IMF programmes, have limited capacity to support displaced workers or affected industries. This exacerbates the social costs of trade shocks and can trigger political instability. (To be continued)
(The writer served as the Minister of Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka)
Disclaimer:
This article contains projections and scenario-based analysis based on current economic trends, policy statements, and historical behaviour patterns. While every effort has been made to ensure factual accuracy, using publicly available data and established economic models, certain details, particularly regarding future policy decisions and their impacts, remain hypothetical. These projections are intended to inform discussion and analysis, not to predict outcomes with certainty.
Features
Trump’s Interregnum
Trump is full of surprises; he is both leader and entertainer. Nearly nine hours into a long flight, a journey that had to U-turn over technical issues and embark on a new flight, Trump came straight to the Davos stage and spoke for nearly two hours without a sip of water. What he spoke about in Davos is another issue, but the way he stands and talks is unique in this 79-year-old man who is defining the world for the worse. Now Trump comes up with the Board of Peace, a ticket to membership that demands a one-billion-dollar entrance fee for permanent participation. It works, for how long nobody knows, but as long as Trump is there it might. Look at how many Muslim-majority and wealthy countries accepted: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates are ready to be on board. Around 25–30 countries reportedly have already expressed the willingness to join.
The most interesting question, and one rarely asked by those who speak about Donald J. Trump, is how much he has earned during the first year of his second term. Liberal Democrats, authoritarian socialists, non-aligned misled-path walkers hail and hate him, but few look at the financial outcome of his politics. His wealth has increased by about three billion dollars, largely due to the crypto economy, which is why he pardoned the founder of Binance, the China-born Changpeng Zhao. “To be rich like hell,” is what Trump wanted. To fault line liberal democracy, Trump is the perfect example. What Trump is doing — dismantling the old façade of liberal democracy at the very moment it can no longer survive — is, in a way, a greater contribution to the West. But I still respect the West, because the West still has a handful of genuine scholars who do not dare to look in the mirror and accept the havoc their leaders created in the name of humanity.
Democracy in the Arab world was dismantled by the West. You may be surprised, but that is the fact. Elizabeth Thompson of American University, in her book How the West Stole Democracy from the Arabs, meticulously details how democracy was stolen from the Arabs. “No ruler, no matter how exalted, stood above the will of the nation,” she quotes Arab constitutional writing, adding that “the people are the source of all authority.” These are not the words of European revolutionaries, nor of post-war liberal philosophers; they were spoken, written and enacted in Syria in 1919–1920 by Arab parliamentarians, Islamic reformers and constitutionalists who believed democracy to be a universal right, not a Western possession. Members of the Syrian Arab Congress in Damascus, the elected assembly that drafted a democratic constitution declaring popular sovereignty — were dissolved by French colonial forces. That was the past; now, with the Board of Peace, the old remnants return in a new form.
Trump got one thing very clear among many others: Western liberal ideology is nothing but sophisticated doublespeak dressed in various forms. They go to West Asia, which they named the Middle East, and bomb Arabs; then they go to Myanmar and other places to protect Muslims from Buddhists. They go to Africa to “contribute” to livelihoods, while generations of people were ripped from their homeland, taken as slaves and sold.
How can Gramsci, whose 135th birth anniversary fell this week on 22 January, help us escape the present social-political quagmire? Gramsci was writing in prison under Mussolini’s fascist regime. He produced a body of work that is neither a manifesto nor a programme, but a theory of power that understands domination not only as coercion but as culture, civil society and the way people perceive their world. In the Prison Notebooks he wrote, “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old world is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid phenomena appear.” This is not a metaphor. Gramsci was identifying the structural limbo that occurs when foundational certainties collapse but no viable alternative has yet emerged.
The relevance of this insight today cannot be overstated. We are living through overlapping crises: environmental collapse, fragmentation of political consensus, erosion of trust in institutions, the acceleration of automation and algorithmic governance that replaces judgment with calculation, and the rise of leaders who treat geopolitics as purely transactional. Slavoj Žižek, in his column last year, reminded us that the crisis is not temporary. The assumption that history’s forward momentum will automatically yield a better future is a dangerous delusion. Instead, the present is a battlefield where what we thought would be the new may itself contain the seeds of degeneration. Trump’s Board of Peace, with its one-billion-dollar gatekeeping model, embodies this condition: it claims to address global violence yet operates on transactional logic, prioritizing wealth over justice and promising reconstruction without clear mechanisms of accountability or inclusion beyond those with money.
Gramsci’s critique helps us see this for what it is: not a corrective to global disorder, but a reenactment of elite domination under a new mechanism. Gramsci did not believe domination could be maintained by force alone; he argued that in advanced societies power rests on gaining “the consent and the active participation of the great masses,” and that domination is sustained by “the intellectual and moral leadership” that turns the ruling class’s values into common sense. It is not coercion alone that sustains capitalism, but ideological consensus embedded in everyday institutions — family, education, media — that make the existing order appear normal and inevitable. Trump’s Board of Peace plays directly into this mode: styled as a peace-building institution, it gains legitimacy through performance and symbolic endorsement by diverse member states, while the deeper structures of inequality and global power imbalance remain untouched.
Worse, the Board’s structure, with contributions determining permanence, mimics the logic of a marketplace for geopolitical influence. It turns peace into a commodity, something to be purchased rather than fought for through sustained collective action addressing the root causes of conflict. But this is exactly what today’s democracies are doing behind the scenes while preaching rules-based order on the stage. In Gramsci’s terms, this is transformismo — the absorption of dissent into frameworks that neutralize radical content and preserve the status quo under new branding.
If we are to extract a path out of this impasse, we must recognize that the current quagmire is more than political theatre or the result of a flawed leader. It arises from a deeper collapse of hegemonic frameworks that once allowed societies to function with coherence. The old liberal order, with its faith in institutions and incremental reform, has lost its capacity to command loyalty. The new order struggling to be born has not yet articulated a compelling vision that unifies disparate struggles — ecological, economic, racial, cultural — into a coherent project of emancipation rather than fragmentation.
To confront Trump’s phenomenon as a portal — as Žižek suggests, a threshold through which history may either proceed to annihilation or re-emerge in a radically different form — is to grasp Gramsci’s insistence that politics is a struggle for meaning and direction, not merely for offices or policies. A Gramscian approach would not waste energy on denunciation alone; it would engage in building counter-hegemony — alternative institutions, discourses, and practices that lay the groundwork for new popular consent. It would link ecological justice to economic democracy, it would affirm the agency of ordinary people rather than treating them as passive subjects, and it would reject the commodification of peace.
Gramsci’s maxim “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will” captures this attitude precisely: clear-eyed recognition of how deep and persistent the crisis is, coupled with an unflinching commitment to action. In an age where AI and algorithmic governance threaten to redefine humanity’s relation to decision-making, where legitimacy is increasingly measured by currency flows rather than human welfare, Gramsci offers not a simple answer but a framework to understand why the old certainties have crumbled and how the new might still be forged through collective effort. The problem is not the lack of theory or insight; it is the absence of a political subject capable of turning analysis into a sustained force for transformation. Without a new form of organized will, the interregnum will continue, and the world will remain trapped between the decay of the old and the absence of the new.
by Nilantha Ilangamuwa ✍️
Features
India, middle powers and the emerging global order
Designed by the victors and led by the US, its institutions — from the United Nations system to Bretton Woods — were shaped to preserve western strategic and economic primacy. Yet despite their self-serving elements, these arrangements helped maintain a degree of global stability, predictability and prosperity for nearly eight decades. That order is now under strain.
This was evident even at Davos, where US President Donald Trump — despite deep differences with most western allies — framed western power and prosperity as the product of a shared and “very special” culture, which he argued must be defended and strengthened. The emphasis on cultural inheritance, rather than shared rules or institutions, underscored how far the language of the old order has shifted.
As China’s rise accelerates and Russia grows more assertive, the US appears increasingly sceptical of the very system it once championed. Convinced that multilateral institutions constrain American freedom of action, and that allies have grown complacent under the security umbrella, Washington has begun to prioritise disruption over adaptation — seeking to reassert supremacy before its relative advantage diminishes further.
What remains unclear is what vision, if any, the US has for a successor order. Beyond a narrowly transactional pursuit of advantage, there is little articulation of a coherent alternative framework capable of delivering stability in a multipolar world.
The emerging great powers have not yet filled this void. India and China, despite their growing global weight and civilisational depth, have largely responded tactically to the erosion of the old order rather than advancing a compelling new one. Much of their diplomacy has focused on navigating uncertainty, rather than shaping the terms of a future settlement. Traditional middle powers — Japan, Germany, Australia, Canada and others — have also tended to react rather than lead. Even legacy great powers such as the United Kingdom and France, though still relevant, appear constrained by alliance dependencies and domestic pressures.
st Asia, countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have begun to pursue more autonomous foreign policies, redefining their regional and global roles. The broader pattern is unmistakable. The international system is drifting toward fragmentation and narrow transactionalism, with diminishing regard for shared norms or institutional restraint.
Recent precedents in global diplomacy suggest a future in which arrangements are episodic and power-driven. Long before Thucydides articulated this logic in western political thought, the Mahabharata warned that in an era of rupture, “the strong devour the weak like fish in water” unless a higher order is maintained. Absent such an order, the result is a world closer to Mad Max than to any sustainable model of global governance.
It is precisely this danger that Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney alluded to in his speech at Davos on Wednesday. Warning that “if great powers abandon even the pretense of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from transactionalism will become harder to replicate,” Carney articulated a concern shared by many middle powers. His remarks underscored a simple truth: Unrestrained power politics ultimately undermine even those who believe they benefit from them.
Carney’s intervention also highlights a larger opportunity. The next phase of the global order is unlikely to be shaped by a single hegemon. Instead, it will require a coalition — particularly of middle powers — that have a shared interest in stability, openness and predictability, and the credibility to engage across ideological and geopolitical divides. For many middle powers, the question now is not whether the old order is fraying, but who has the credibility and reach to help shape what comes next.
This is where India’s role becomes pivotal. India today is no longer merely a balancing power. It is increasingly recognised as a great power in its own right, with strong relations across Europe, the Indo-Pacific, West Asia, Africa and Latin America, and a demonstrated ability to mobilise the Global South. While India’s relationship with Canada has experienced periodic strains, there is now space for recalibration within a broader convergence among middle powers concerned about the direction of the international system.
One available platform is India’s current chairmanship of BRICS — if approached with care. While often viewed through the prism of great-power rivalry, BRICS also brings together diverse emerging and middle powers with a shared interest in reforming, rather than dismantling, global governance. Used judiciously, it could complement existing institutions by helping articulate principles for a more inclusive and functional order.
More broadly, India is uniquely placed to convene an initial core group of like-minded States — middle powers, and possibly some open-minded great powers — to begin a serious conversation about what a new global order should look like. This would not be an exercise in bloc-building or institutional replacement, but an effort to restore legitimacy, balance and purpose to international cooperation. Such an endeavour will require political confidence and the willingness to step into uncharted territory. History suggests that moments of transition reward those prepared to invest early in ideas and institutions, rather than merely adapt to outcomes shaped by others.
The challenge today is not to replicate Bretton Woods or San Francisco, but to reimagine their spirit for a multipolar age — one in which power is diffused, interdependence unavoidable, and legitimacy indispensable. In a world drifting toward fragmentation, India has the credibility, relationships and confidence to help anchor that effort — if it chooses to lead.
(The Hindustan Times)
(Milinda Moragoda is a former Cabinet Minister and diplomat from Sri Lanka and founder of the Pathfinder Foundation, a strategic affairs think tank. this article can read on
https://shorturl.at/HV2Kr and please contact via email@milinda.org)
by Milinda Moragoda ✍️
For many middle powers, the question now is not whether the old order is fraying,
but who has the credibility and reach to help shape what comes next
Features
The Wilwatte (Mirigama) train crash of 1964 as I recall
Back in 1964, I was working as DMO at Mirigama Government Hospital when a major derailment of the Talaimannar/Colombo train occurred at the railway crossing in Wilwatte, near the DMO’s quarters. The first major derailment, according to records, took place in Katukurunda on March 12, 1928, when there was a head-on collision between two fast-moving trains near Katukurunda, resulting in the deaths of 28 people.
Please permit me to provide details concerning the regrettable single train derailment involving the Talaimannar Colombo train, which occurred in October 1964 at the Wilwatte railway crossing in Mirigama.
This is the first time I’m openly sharing what happened on that heartbreaking morning, as I share the story of the doctor who cared for all the victims. The Health Minister, the Health Department, and our community truly valued my efforts.
By that time, I had qualified with the Primary FRCS and gained valuable surgical experience as a registrar at the General Hospital in Colombo. I was hopeful to move to the UK to pursue the final FRCS degree and further training. Sadly, all scholarships were halted by Hon. Felix Dias Bandaranaike, the finance minister in the Bandaranaike government in 1961.
Consequently, I was transferred to Mirigama as the District Medical Officer in 1964. While training as an emerging surgeon without completing the final fellowship in the United Kingdom, I established an operating theatre in one of the hospital’s large rooms. A colleague at the Central Medical Stores in Maradana assisted me in acquiring all necessary equipment for the operating theatre, unofficially. Subsequently, I commenced performing minor surgeries under spinal anaesthesia and local anaesthesia. Fortunately, I was privileged to have a theatre-trained nursing sister and an attendant trainee at the General Hospital in Colombo.
Therefore, I was prepared to respond to any accidental injuries. I possessed a substantial stock of plaster of Paris rolls for treating fractures, and all suture material for cuts.
I was thoroughly prepared for any surgical mishaps, enabling me to manage even the most significant accidental incidents.
On Saturday, October 17, 1964, the day of the train derailment at the railway crossing at Wilwatte, Mirigama, along the Main railway line near Mirigama, my house officer, Janzse, called me at my quarters and said, “Sir, please come promptly; numerous casualties have been admitted to the hospital following the derailment.”
I asked him whether it was an April Fool’s stunt. He said, ” No, Sir, quite seriously.
I promptly proceeded to the hospital and directly accessed the operating theatre, preparing to attend to the casualties.
Meanwhile, I received a call from the site informing me that a girl was trapped on a railway wagon wheel and may require amputation of her limb to mobilise her at the location along the railway line where she was entrapped.
My theatre staff transported the surgical equipment to the site. The girl was still breathing and was in shock. A saline infusion was administered, and under local anaesthesia, I successfully performed the limb amputation and transported her to the hospital with my staff.
On inquiring, she was an apothecary student going to Colombo for the final examination to qualify as an apothecary.
Although records indicate that over forty passengers perished immediately, I recollect that the number was 26.
Over a hundred casualties, and potentially a greater number, necessitate suturing of deep lacerations, stabilisation of fractures, application of plaster, and other associated medical interventions.
No patient was transferred to Colombo for treatment. All casualties received care at this base hospital.
All the daily newspapers and other mass media commended the staff team for their commendable work and the attentive care provided to all casualties, satisfying their needs.
The following morning, the Honourable Minister of Health, Mr M. D. H. Jayawardena, and the Director of Health Services, accompanied by his staff, arrived at the hospital.
I did the rounds with the official team, bed by bed, explaining their injuries to the minister and director.
Casualties expressed their commendation to the hospital staff for the care they received.
The Honourable Minister engaged me privately at the conclusion of the rounds. He stated, “Doctor, you have been instrumental in our success, and the public is exceedingly appreciative, with no criticism. As a token of gratitude, may I inquire how I may assist you in return?”
I got the chance to tell him that I am waiting for a scholarship to proceed to the UK for my Fellowship and further training.
Within one month, the government granted me a scholarship to undertake my fellowship in the United Kingdom, and I subsequently travelled to the UK in 1965.
On the third day following the incident, Mr Don Rampala, the General Manager of Railways, accompanied by his deputy, Mr Raja Gopal, visited the hospital. A conference was held at which Mr Gopal explained and demonstrated the circumstances of the derailment using empty matchboxes.
He explained that an empty wagon was situated amid the passenger compartments. At the curve along the railway line at Wilwatte, the engine driver applied the brakes to decelerate, as Mirigama Railway Station was only a quarter of a mile distant.
The vacant wagon was lifted and transported through the air. All passenger compartments behind the wagon derailed, whereas the engine and the frontcompartments proceeded towards the station without the engine driver noticing the mishap.
After this major accident, I was privileged to be invited by the General Manager of the railways for official functions until I left Mirigama.
The press revealed my identity as the “Wilwatte Hero”.
This document presents my account of the Wilwatte historic train derailment, as I distinctly recall it.
Recalled by Dr Harold Gunatillake to serve the global Sri Lankan community with dedication. ✍️
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