Features
The Parliament bomb: Former Secretary-General remembers
(Excerpted from Memories of 33 years in Parliament by Nihal Seneviratne)
On July 29, 1987 President J. R. Jayewardene signed the controversial Indo-Lanka Peace Accord with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in Colombo. Most observers take the view that Jayewardene, fighting a JVP insurrection in the South and the LTTE insurgency in the North, had little option but to sign an agreement and he was railroaded into accepting India’s terms. The LTTE was determined to win a separate state of Eelam for the Tamil people even at the expense of a ferocious war they waged. The JVP’s second insurgency had created near anarchy in the South. There was no possibility of fighting on two fronts and JRJ signed the agreement which brought the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Lankan soil.
It was fairly well known that President Jayewardene had not consulted his own Cabinet Ministers except for one. The belief was that the Accord draft had been drawn up in India with almost no consultation with the Sri Lankan side. They were trying times for the country and the Government in power. Days before the signing of the Accord, the Indian Air Force had airdropped food supplies over Jaffna, a move that came in for heavy criticism from Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa.
He was among a powerful group within the Government opposed to the signing of the Accord. But JRJ went ahead and signed the agreement. The signs were apparent that the move had angered many including those within the armed forces. A naval rating who was part of the guard-of-honour for Rajiv Gandhi assembled opposite President’s House in Colombo struck him a heavy blow on the shoulder with the butt of his gun. Fortunately, Gandhi was not seriously hurt, suffering only bad bruises, and was immediately led to safety by his own and Sri Lankan security. This single incident which captured global headlines illustrated the mood in the country which caused much heartburn and even anger among the Sri Lankan people.
On August 18, President Jayewardene was due in Parliament as he wanted to address the Government Parliamentary Group and explain the reasons why he signed this Accord /Pact with India. This fact was not fully known to many members of his own Cabinet, including possibly Prime Minister Premadasa. President Jayewardene had kept the contents and the substance of the Agreement a close secret and possibly the only Minister who had been taken into his confidence was Gamini Dissanayake.
The President needed the support of two-third majority in Parliament to enact the enabling legislation by way of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution which spelt out the devolution of power to the provinces and the introduction of the Provincial Councils and was seeking to shore up support from those in his Party. While the ruling United National Party (UNP) had the required numbers in Parliament, there were worries that some of them would not support the legislation needed to give effect to the terms of the Accord. President Jayewardene was coming face to face with many of his Party’s lawmakers for the first time since the signing of the Accord and hence the Group meeting was scheduled for the morning on 7 August 1987, ahead of the regular sitting of the House later in the day.
The President arrived in Parliament that morning by around 8.20 a.m. to meet his Parliamentary Group. They were meeting in Committee Room 1, which is the largest Committee Room located on the ground floor which had a seating capacity of almost 150. The meeting was to start around 8.45. before which I got a message that the President wanted to see me. I was initially reluctant to go to the Committee Room .is it was a meeting of only Government MPs and I felt it was incorrect and unwise for me in my position to go there.
But since it was the Head of State who summoned me, I went to the Committee Room. He was sitting at the head table with Prime Minister Premadasa on his right and Minister Vincent Perera, Chief Government Whip, on his left. In front of him sat over a 100 MPs with Ministers seated in the front rows. He inquired from me what business was due to be taken up that day. I had remembered to take the day’s Order Paper with me and together we read through the 25 items of Government business fixed for that day. When this was over, I left the Committee Room and went back to my office upstairs on the second floor.
Not even half an hour later, my office assistant came rushing into my room out of breath and saying excitedly,” Sir, the President and Prime Minister are calling for you.” I was totally unaware of the mayhem that was unfolding in Committee Room One located on the ground floor of the Parliament building but rushed down immediately. At the very entrance to the corridor leading up to the Committee Room I met the Prime Minister with his national dress cloth partly raised excitedly exclaiming “Nihal, a bomb has exploded in the Committee Room. Search and surround the place.” As I rushed to the Committee Room, I saw President Jayewardene, being hurriedly escorted out of the building to his vehicle parked outside the Members’ Entrance.
I then rushed into the Committee Room and found it in shambles, full of heavy smoke, splintered glass, and shrapnel all over the place; and a few MPs lying prostate on the floor. Others were trying to rush out in the melee that prevailed. I saw Minister Lalith Athulathmudali being placed on a stretcher, bleeding heavily, and taken by ambulance, parked outside the Members Entrance, to the Sri Jayewardenepura Hospital through the back entrance to Parliament. We had hardly used that entrance and kept it closed for security reasons but kept it open on sitting days as it was just about a mile to the Sri Jayewardenepura Hospital. Deniyaya MP Kirthi Abeywickrema and Norbert Senadeera, an official with the Parliament staff, sadly died as a result of shrapnel wounds.
While the enormity of what had taken place did not sink in immediately, it was unlike any situation I have had to face in my many years as a parliamentary official. Quickly I steadied myself and began the process of rushing the injured to the hospital and securing the House, in what turned out to be the longest and most unforgettable day in my Parliamentary career. I immediately rang my university mate, Frank De Silva, then IGP, and told him to come immediately and asked him to provide adequate security right around the perimeters of Parliament to prevent anyone from leaving.
I then ordered the Superintendent of Police posted to Parliament to ensure that no one be allowed to leave the building. In the Committee Room, I asked an MP from where the bomb was thrown, and he pointed to a door behind the head table. I ordered all the Parliament staff on duty not to leave the building. Even after the police contingent arrived, no one was sure how exactly the bomb exploded, or whether it was a bomb at all or whether anyone had fired a gun or some other firearm.
I for one was beginning to suspect that somebody of even the President’s staff who accompanied him to the room, or one of my own Parliamentary staff in the room, may have been responsible. Thinking it was a gunshot the IGP asked me to get each and every member of my staff to have both their hands checked for tell-tale traces of gunpowder believing it was the firing of a weapon. No one was allowed to leave the building and it was close to 9 p.m. that night when the meticulous checking was over. I then permitted the staff to leave. It was around midnight that I was able to go home. During this time, I inquired from a few Members how the door through which the attacker was believed to have entered and how it opened and all they said was that some of them saw a hand clothed in a white sleeve throwing something at the polished table at which the President and the others were seated. That was all I was able to gather about who threw the bomb.
The next morning, I checked whether all of my staff had come to office all were present except four one in hospital, two on approved leave; but one person was missing and his house near Kadawatha was closed. Police after questioning neighbors, learnt that the occupant had left his home that night taking his family with him. I found this was Ajith Kumara, who I had employed as a housekeeper a few years previously. The police rightly regarded him as the prime suspect for having attempted to assassinate the President and Prime Minister of the country and an island-wide dragnet was set up.
After a few days, with Police help, we were able to fit the pieces of the puzzle together Ajith Kumara had come that morning with a hand grenade hidden in his shoe. The Police at the entrance had missed it. The President’s security had checked all the rooms and doors leading to the Committee Room, locked them, and then left. Ajith Kumara, after the President’s security personnel had completed their checks, had opened a door using a false key he had made and had hidden behind a large painting standing the ground.
He had then opened the door leading into the Committee Room and aiming at the President flung the hand grenade he carried which fortunately ricocheted off the polished table at which the President, PM and Govt. Whip sat and landed under the chair on which Lalith Athulathmudali was sitting in the front row. The grenade then exploded blasting a large hole in the ground and injuring Lalith Atulathmudali’s entire back. When he was recovering in the Sri Jayewardenepura Hospital, I called on him and chatted for a while.
He was full of praise for Dr. K. Yoheswaran, who operated on him and saved his life. He told me that he had particularly wanted Dr. Yoheswaran to do the complicated surgery having complete trust in him. Later on, after Lalith had recovered he walked into my room and discussed the incident with me. He told me that Ajith Kumara had made the fundamental mistake of hurling the grenade at the President as soon as he pulled off the pin. With Lalith’s knowledge of arms and defense matters, he told me that once the pin is pulled, one had to count, “One Thousand, Two Thousand, Three Thousand” and then throw the grenade. By his not doing so, all three VIPs seated at the table were spared.
Six months had passed after the incident and the Police were still on maximum alert for Ajith Kumara. Apprehending the man who had nearly assassinated the President and Prime Minister was then top priority for the Police. After a lapse of a few more months, the Police in the Kegalle area were searching for local illicit alcohol distillers in a village paddy-field. It so happened that Ajith Kumara was then hiding in a small shed nearby; he panicked when he saw the police searching the paddy-field and ran away.
Police saw the fleeing man, chased, and caught him. He was brought to Police Headquarters in Colombo. When they realized they had made a prize catch. They immediately contacted me, and we confirmed that this was indeed Ajith Kumara, the most wanted man in the country. A week later, the police brought him to Parliament after he had confessed to his crime. He had even told the police how he brought in the grenade, the route he had taken through all the corridors to enter the back room and how he had hidden behind the painting. This was after the Presidential security had left after they had completed making their checks. We discovered later that he had surreptitiously made a copy of the key to enter that room.
Two days later, the Speaker and I were summoned before the Cabinet. Speaker E. L. Senanayake diplomatically refused to go saying it was improper for him to present himself before Cabinet. This left me with no option but to face the music. This was the very first time I had to appear before Cabinet, and I nervously walked in feeling like the Christian being thrown to the lions in Roman times. I knew they were going to ask me as to how I had recruited Ajith Kumara to the Parliament staff.
Fortunately, I had asked for a security clearance from Police Headquarters which I had received before he was signed on. In fact, all recruits to our staff required such security clearance. Armed with that clearance file, I sat down before the entire Cabinet. As 1 took my seat, Minister Montague Jayawickrama pounced on me asking me to explain how and why I had recruited Ajith Kumara and why and where I had stationed him that day and many other follow-up questions. I took time and answered all questions from him and many other Cabinet Ministers.
It later transpired that a few weeks after getting clearance from Police screening and having joined the staff of Parliament, the JVP had secretly recruited him. Since the JVP was then very vociferously against the Indo-Sri Lanka Pact signed by the President, they had found in Ajith Kumara working in Parliament the best possible person to assassinate the President, Prime Minister, and other VIPs of Government. I later had a request from Mrs. J. R. Jayewardene to visit the scene and see the room where her husband was nearly killed. She, accompanied by two grandchildren (sons of Ravi whom I knew quite well), inspected the table where the grenade bounced and the Committee Room where it all happened. I was quite moved by her presence and the gracious lady she was, left without making any comments.
The saga of Ajith Kumara had a strange ending. When he was produced in Court and charged with attempted murder, his counsel was able to get him discharged on the grounds of inadmissibility of the confession he had made to Police. Regrettably, the Attorney General’s Department and Police had mishandled the Prosecution and the judge discharged Ajith Kumara who left Court a free man.
Features
Foreign funding and private donations for CIABOC
Reform of the Anti-Corruption Act – Part I
The Director General of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) announced last month that amendments to the Anti-Corruption Act of 2023 were on the cards so as to restrict public access to the assets and liabilities declarations filed with the Commission. The information, released in 2025, caused profound embarrassment to the present government, but was received very well by the public and any attempt to restrict that information flow at this stage, may prove to be very unpopular.
The popular demand now would be that organisational entities, like political parties and trade unions, also be required to file assets and liabilities declarations with the CIABOC, instead of just the individuals holding positions in such bodies.
Be that as it may, there are some serious issues that need to be rectified in the Anti-Corruption Act of 2023. Foremost among them is Section 31(4) (b) which states that the fund of the CIABOC can receive money “by way of donations, gifts, bequests, or grants from any source whatsoever, whether within or outside Sri Lanka, subject to the approval of the Minister assigned the subject of Finance.”
Those who would be motivated to give gifts and donations to a body like the CIABOC would only be those who want to influence it in some manner to achieve a collateral purpose. While the English version of the Anti-Corruption Act states that the CIABOC can receive such funds “from any source whatsoever whether within or outside Sri Lanka”, the Sinhala version of the Act has sought to disguise that intention by using more opaque wording which goes as: “Sri Lankawa thula ho Sri Lankawen pitatha pihiti yam mulashrayakin”.
The English “any source whatsoever” has been diluted in the Sinhala version by the use of the phrase “yam mulashrayakin” which roughly translates as ‘from a certain source’. When the Sinhala word ‘yam’ is used and nothing more is specified, in practice it becomes “any source whatsoever”! The difference in the way Section 31(4) (b) has been worded in the English and the Sinhala versions of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2023 clearly reveals the villainous intention behind this provision.
Giving the Finance Minister a say in approving such donations gives an incumbent Finance Minister undue leverage over the Commission. We must be mindful of the fact that the Finance portfolio has often been held by the President.
The Indian policy
Section 31(6) of the Anti-Corruption Act states that the source and purpose of such foreign and local private donations have to be made public by the Commission, within one month. However, even if funding is received openly, that does not mean that such funding is given without a collateral purpose. Journalists, like Shamindra Ferdinando, and Malinda Seneviratne, have taken up cudgels in the past about foreign interested parties, like USAID openly funding organisations, such as the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, and certain associations of journalists. Does anyone remember what President Donald Trump said about the activities of USAID? A law enforcement agency, like the CIABOC, should never be left open to the contagion of private funding by local and foreign interested parties.
India imposes strict limitations on all Indian citizens with regard to the receipt of foreign funds under the Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Act of 2010. These limitations apply to politicians at all levels of government, judges, public servants and even journalists, cartoonists and political activists. The Indian restrictions apply not only to money or property but even to foreign trips and other forms of foreign-funded hospitality.
India would never allow its premier anti-corruption law enforcement body to directly receive funding from abroad or from private donors within India. The Indian anti-corruption body that corresponds to Sri Lanka’s CIABOC is the Central Vigilance Commission of India. Section 13 of the Indian Central Vigilance Commission Act of 2003 states that all expenses of the Commission will be charged on the Consolidated Fund of India. In Sri Lanka, too, all expenses of the CIABOC should be a charge on the Consolidated fund of Sri Lanka.
Because of the enormous power that it wields over the lives of all politicians, public servants, and judicial officers in Sri Lanka, the receipt of foreign funding or private donations by the CIABOC impacts negatively on the national interest and even the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. The power of the CIABOC is such that it’s like the Police Department, Attorney General’s Department, parts of the judiciary and the executive presidency all rolled into one. Sections 32 to 72 of the Anti-Corruption Act outlines the wide ranging powers wielded by the CIABOC.
The CIABOC has complete and total control over their officers and employees. The appointment, salaries, conditions of service, promotion, disciplinary control and dismissal of their employees is handled entirely by the Commission itself. In contrast to this, such matters with regard to the Police, the Attorney General’s Department and the Judiciary are handled by the National Police Commission, the Public service Commission and the Judicial Services Commission, respectively. The checks and balances that apply to other law enforcement entities do not apply to the CIABOC.
The CIABOC can recruit staff from other parts of the public service (which includes the Police Department). However, the police officers taken into the Commission do not function under the IGP but under the authority of the Commission which effectively gives the CIABoC its own police force. Authorised officers of the CIABOC can manhandle and arrest suspects without an order from a Magistrate, enter and search any premises, or vehicle, seize any article deemed necessary for their investigations and use force if necessary in carrying out these functions. They can carry out undercover operations and use bugging devices.
The Commission can summon any person and examine him on oath or affirmation; obtain details of transactions and accounts from banks, obtain information from the Inland Revenue Department, freeze bank accounts, order the Controller of Immigration and Emigration to impound passports. With the sanction of a Magistrate the CIABOC can direct any person to unlock or unencrypt digital devices and intercept messages. Following such investigations, the CIABOC can institute criminal proceedings against the persons concerned in the Magistrate’s Court or the High Court.
Under Sections 67 and 71, the CIABOC can withdraw or defer the indictment against the accused after taking into account considerations such as the national interest and public interest; the views of the victims of the offence; and representations that may be made by the accused person or his lawyer. In withdrawing such indictments, the CIABOC may impose on the accused conditions such as publicly expressing remorse and apology before the High Court, providing reparations to victims of the offence, publicly pledging to refrain from committing further offences or to permanently refrain from holding elected or appointed public office.
Most powerful law enforcement agency
Thus, we see that the CIABOC controls the entire gamut of law enforcement in relation to offences coming within its purview. From manhandling and arresting suspects, obtaining statements under oath, seizing documents and other goods, searching premises, freezing bank accounts, impounding passports, to conducting criminal prosecutions in Magistrate’s Courts and High Courts, and even granting clemency to accused individuals, the Commission controls the entire process.
No single institution, whether it be the Police Department, the Attorney General’s Department, the Judiciary or the Executive Presidency, wields such extensive power over the lives of key government functionaries, public servants, judges and ordinary citizens. Even the President’s power to pardon offenders is restricted in so many ways. However, the Commission can grant clemency to anyone facing legal proceedings on nothing more than the representations made by the alleged offender’s lawyer and on the condition of not committing such offences again or agreeing never to hold public office again.
Leaving an exit pathway, such as that envisaged in Section 67 and 71, is a good policy in criminal justice administration, especially when it comes to bringing to a conclusion cases with many grey areas. Hence, we do not question the power conferred on the CIABOC to grant clemency under Sections 67 and 71. However this provision, when taken together with the other powers of the Commission, immeasurably increases its power. In the hands of the wrong people, the powers of the CIABOC can be used to pressurize and remove targeted individuals from public life.
Any foreign or local interested party that provides private donations to the CIABOC, under Section 31(4) (b) of the Anti-Corruption Act, will in effect be buying influence over Sri Lanka’s most powerful law enforcement agency.
In 2010, over half a million US Dollars in cash was found in the possession of a close relative of a candidate at the Presidential election. In December 2014, foreign currency totaling well over one million USD was discovered in the possession of a relative of another presidential candidate. In more recent times, many media personalities have commented on the manner in which the 2025 assets and liabilities declarations of certain government figures reveal large inflows of cash in 2022 – the regime change year.
Against such a backdrop, allowing an all-powerful law enforcement agency, like the CIABOC, to accept donations from foreign and local interested parties, can hardly be in the public interest. Hence, Section 31(4) (b) of the Anti-Corruption Act should be repealed.
(To be continued tomorrow)
by A Special Correspondent
Features
Sri Lankan Airlines Airbus Scandal and the Death of Kapila Chandrasena and my Brother Rajeewa
The death of Mr Kapila Chandrasena (KC), the former CEO of SriLankan Airlines, caused quite a stir in the country. A few politicians, particularly from the opposition, tried to take advantage of the confusion surrounding his death, whilst social media went into a frenzy, with everyone having a theory as to the cause of death.
Even Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL), the independent anti-corruption watchdog, issued a public statement urging the Government to ensure a full, transparent, and credible investigation into the circumstances surrounding Kapila Chandrasena’s (KC’s) death. TISL further emphasized that the Government bears a responsibility to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to ensure that individuals connected to high-profile investigations are able to participate in proceedings in a safe and secure environment.
While such concerns are understandable, I strongly believe that it is necessary to await the findings of the magisterial inquiry before reaching conclusions regarding the cause of death. To speculate irresponsibly, particularly to fit pre-existing political beliefs, is unfair not only to the deceased but also to his grieving family and loved ones.
First and foremost, I wish to convey my sincere condolences to the family of KC. I understand personally the trauma and anguish associated with losing a loved one unexpectedly and under tragic circumstances.
My brother’s death
Unfortunately, the death of KC also resulted in renewed interest in the death of my brother, Rajeewa Jayaweera, in June 2020. Some individuals on social media attempted to link his death to the newspaper article he published on the Airbus scandal involving SriLankan Airlines, KC and his wife.
Some people even circulated photographs of my brother’s body at the site of the incident across social media platforms. This was deeply insensitive and extremely distressing to my sisters and me. The loss of a sibling under tragic circumstances is something from which one never fully recovers. It took our family years to come to terms with his passing, and to have those painful images resurfaced in connection with an entirely unrelated event reopened old wounds unnecessarily.
On behalf of my sisters and myself, I wish to state unequivocally that my brother, Rajeewa Jayaweera, took his own life in June 2020 due to personal circumstances. His death had absolutely no connection whatsoever to his writings regarding the Airbus scandal. Neither the Rajapaksas, nor any political actor, nor any state agency was involved in his death. The magisterial inquiry into the matter returned a verdict of suicide.
Those who know me personally are aware of my forthright and combative nature. Had there been even the slightest credible suspicion surrounding my brother’s death, I would never have rested until justice was pursued. Since this was clearly established as a case of suicide, I sincerely hope that those who continue to circulate unfounded theories will finally allow the matter to rest with dignity.
The Sri Lankan Airbus scandal
The alleged payment of a USD 2 million bribe by Airbus SE to a shell company established in Brunei by the wife of a senior SriLankan Airlines official came to light following the approval of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) between the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and Airbus SE.
The DPA was approved on January 31, 2020 by Dame Victoria Sharp, President of the Queen’s Bench Division, sitting at the Crown Court in Southwark. The award represented one of the largest global anti-corruption settlements in modern corporate history.
The Airbus investigation by the SFO extended far beyond Sri Lanka. It involved allegations of bribery and corrupt practices linked to aircraft purchases by AirAsia and AirAsia X in Malaysia, SriLankan Airlines, TransAsia Airways in Taiwan, PT Garuda Indonesia, Citilink Indonesia, and military aircraft transactions involving the Government of Ghana.
The approved judgment contained specific references to the SriLankan Airlines transaction (page 12, points 41 to 44). It alleged that Airbus employees, contrary to Section 7 of the UK Bribery Act 2010, failed to prevent bribery involving individuals connected to the airline’s aircraft procurement process between July 2011 and June 2015.
According to the Statement of Facts, Airbus engaged the wife of an individual connected to the aircraft acquisition process through a shell entity described as “Company Intermediary 1”. Airbus employees allegedly offered up to USD 16.84 million in commissions in relation to SriLankan Airlines’ purchase of ten Airbus aircraft and the lease of four additional aircraft. Ultimately, only USD 2 million was allegedly paid.
The judgment further stated that Airbus employees sought to disguise the identity of the beneficial owner behind the intermediary company and misled the United Kingdom Export Finance Agency (UKEF) regarding the intermediary’s qualifications, aviation experience, and role in the transaction.
The smoking gun from Sri Lanka that commenced the UK SFO investigation
The matter became particularly significant because it was the concerns raised by UKEF regarding the SriLankan Airlines intermediary that ultimately triggered the wider SFO investigation into Airbus. UKEF questioned why an individual with little aviation experience and who was domiciled outside Sri Lanka had been engaged as a business partner in such a major transaction.
Airbus reportedly provided misleading and inaccurate responses to those concerns in February 2015. Unsatisfied with the explanations provided, UKEF escalated the matter, which subsequently contributed to the formal investigation launched by the SFO in July 2016.
Ironically, what appears to have been a poorly concealed and amateurishly structured bribe involving SriLankan Airlines ultimately became one of the catalysts for a global corruption investigation that resulted in Airbus paying penalties approaching EUR 4 billion across the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.
Under the settlement approved in the UK, Airbus agreed to pay approximately EUR 991 million into the UK Consolidated Fund, including disgorgement of profits and financial penalties. Simultaneously, French and American authorities imposed additional penalties amounting to nearly EUR 3 billion.
Aircraft procurement and corruption
The Airbus matter once again highlighted a longstanding global reality: aircraft procurement has historically been highly vulnerable to corruption. The purchase of aircraft involves enormous financial values, complex financing arrangements, confidential negotiations, intermediaries, export credit agencies, and political influence. These factors create conditions for improper payments and abuse of authority.
Globally, there have been numerous allegations over several decades involving commissions, hidden intermediaries, and questionable consultancy agreements linked to aircraft purchases by both commercial airlines and governments. It is generally believed that the average commissions paid are between 3% to 5% of the order value.
The cost to Sri Lankan taxpayers
One of the most undesirable aspects of the Airbus affair is the financial burden ultimately borne by ordinary Sri Lankan taxpayers.
In 2015, the Government of Sri Lanka decided to cancel the order for four Airbus A350 aircraft as they were deemed unsuitable. As a consequence of that cancellation, SriLankan Airlines incurred penalties estimated at approximately USD 140 million, equivalent to roughly Rs. 19.2 billion at the time.
While Sri Lankan taxpayers absorbed these enormous losses, the United Kingdom taxpayers benefited financially from the Airbus settlement. The UK Consolidated Fund received almost EUR 1 billion arising from the penalties imposed on Airbus.
The contrast is stark. Sri Lanka suffered substantial financial losses as a result of a transaction tainted by allegations of corruption, while foreign governments received the benefit of the resulting fines and penalties.
The questions raised by my brother
My late brother, Rajeewa Jayaweera, wrote an article about the Airbus scandal in an article published in the Sunday Island on February 16, 2020, titled “SriLankan Airlines Airbus Deal”. In the article, he referred to a SriLankan Airlines Board meeting held on October 27, 2016.
According to his article, Board Minute 7.3 dealt specifically with reports that Airbus was under investigation in Europe for bribery-related offences. Rajan Brito, who was then a director of the airline, reportedly informed fellow board members about the investigations and tabled draft letters intended for Airbus, Rolls-Royce, and AerCap.
Those draft letters reportedly suggested that the aircraft transactions may not have been based solely on commercial considerations and sought information regarding the role of facilitators and intermediaries.
However, according to my brother’s article, Brito’s proposal to send those letters was reportedly ignored on the basis that the airline was negotiating favourable terms to cancel aircraft purchase commitments and that sending such letters might sour relations and disadvantage the airline.
However, my brother believed that the decision not to proceed with Brito’s letters was controversial and highly questionable, and that the airline could have sought the assistance of the PNF (Parquet National Financier) to investigate the deal and seek financial restitution, given that the order was allegedly tainted by corruption, particularly given the emerging evidence of corruption surrounding the transaction.
Even today, an important question remains unanswered: did the Government of Sri Lanka or any subsequent board of SriLankan Airlines seriously attempt to recover the USD 140 million cancellation penalty, along with any inflated amounts paid after the global corruption findings against Airbus became public?
The slow pace of Sri Lankan justice
Following the public release of the UK judgment on January 31, 2020, Sri Lankan authorities moved relatively quickly to initiate legal proceedings against KC and his wife.
On February 4, 2020, arrest warrants were reportedly sought. On February 6, 2020, KC and his wife surrendered to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and were remanded until March 4, 2020, when they were released on bail.
The allegations reportedly related to accepting a USD 2 million bribe and engaging in money laundering activities. Press reports also indicated that travel restrictions had been imposed.
However, six years later, the matter still appears unresolved. Based on publicly available information, indictments were reportedly filed before the Colombo High Court in 2022. Since then, several hearings dealing with procedural and preliminary issues have reportedly taken place, but the substantive trial itself has yet to properly commence. With KC now deceased and reports suggesting that his wife may have absconded, the prospects of successfully prosecuting the matter appear increasingly uncertain.
Many Sri Lankans understandably feel frustrated by the slow pace at which corruption-related cases proceed through the judicial system. This frustration is particularly acute where allegations involve politically connected individuals or transactions involving massive losses to the public.
The public perception is that investigations move slowly, prosecutions are delayed for years, and accountability is often ultimately avoided through procedural delays, political changes, or the passage of time.
To be fair, corruption cases involving international financial transactions are inherently complex. They require cooperation between multiple jurisdictions, access to banking records, mutual legal assistance processes, forensic accounting, and substantial documentary evidence. Nevertheless, the extraordinary delays contribute to growing public cynicism regarding the administration of justice.
It is also worth noting that the UK proceedings against Airbus did not publicly identify KC by name. Much of the public discussion in Sri Lanka has therefore relied on local investigations and media reporting rather than the UK judgment itself.
According to information available in the public domain, the alleged funds connected to the USD 2 million payment ultimately found their way into an Australian bank account linked to KC. Given the reputation of Australian authorities for cooperating with international law enforcement investigations, many members of the public expected a faster and more decisive legal process in Sri Lanka.
In that context, a detailed public explanation by the Attorney General’s Department regarding the legal and evidentiary challenges affecting the case may help improve public understanding and confidence.
SriLankan Airlines: A continuing national burden
The Airbus controversy cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader failures surrounding SriLankan Airlines over several decades.
The national carrier has accumulated debts estimated at approximately USD 1.2 billion, equivalent to nearly Rs. 350 billion. This translates to a burden of roughly Rs. 16,000 per Sri Lankan citizen, including millions who have never travelled on the airline.
Successive governments have interfered extensively in the airline’s operations. Political appointments, weak governance, lack of commercial discipline, and poor strategic decision-making have contributed significantly to the airline’s decline.
Far too often, individuals lacking meaningful aviation expertise have been appointed to key board and management positions. Political loyalty has frequently taken precedence over competence and experience.
The decision to terminate the management and ownership partnership with Emirates remains one of the most controversial episodes in the airline’s history. Many industry observers believe that decision alone cost Sri Lanka billions of rupees in lost opportunities and operational deterioration.
Despite repeated financial losses and mounting taxpayer burdens, very few individuals have ever been held accountable for the disastrous decisions that contributed to the airline’s decline.
The current Government faces an unavoidable reality. SriLankan Airlines cannot continue indefinitely as a financially unsustainable state enterprise funded by taxpayers already struggling under severe economic hardship. Decisions regarding the future of the airline must be guided by commercial reality rather than political ideology or emotional nationalism.
Ultimately, the Airbus scandal is not merely about one individual or one alleged bribe. It reflects deeper structural weaknesses involving governance, political interference, accountability, and institutional failure within Sri Lanka.
Sadly, a relatively young man has now lost his life amidst these events and controversies. Regardless of the allegations against him, that remains a human tragedy. At the same time, the country must continue to demand transparency, accountability, and institutional reform so that such scandals are never repeated.
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of any organization or institution with which the author is affiliated).
By Sanjeewa Jayaweera
Features
High stakes and hidden hands: Navigating the maze of electronic financial fraud
Electronic or digital financial fraud is the current, extremely distasteful description of a blight that has hit the entire globe; a menace that is perpetrated through an unbelievable labyrinth of interconnected dishonourable and nasty manoeuvres. In an era where our financial lives are increasingly becoming digital, the “perfect financial crime” no longer requires a getaway car. It just needs a high-speed internet connection and stupendously brilliant, depraved and Machiavellian minds.
Modern scams have advanced far beyond the poorly spelt emails of the past. They are now extremely sophisticated operations exploiting psychological manipulation and deep-fake technology. Financial fraud has evolved from simple street-level deception into a complex, multi-billion-dollar industry. It has been manipulated through many different currencies in different parts of the world. In Sri Lanka, the landscape of scams has shifted from traditional “pyramid” schemes to sophisticated digital heists and institutional bond scandals that threaten the very fabric of our national economy. From an international outlook, financial fraud is becoming increasingly transnational. Sri Lanka is currently under intense scrutiny by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force). Sri Lanka falling onto the “Grey List” again would have severe repercussions, potentially causing international banks to suspend payments to the island, severely upsetting our exporters.
The financial fraud profile of Sri Lanka has gone from “Bonds” to “Glitches”. Our country has been rocked by high-profile financial irregularities that serve as a stark warning about institutional integrity. First was the Treasury Bond Scandal. Often cited as the largest financial scam in the nation’s history, the Central Bank bond issuance of 2015 highlighted the risks of Insider Trading and the manipulation of government securities. The fallout cost the public billions of rupees, demonstrating how high-level collusion can bypass traditional safeguards.
The recent problem where the Treasury remitted a very large amount of foreign currency to a different portal to which money should not have been sent is a special type of Financial Fraud problem that seems to have been instigated by a deceptive email. It is under investigation at present, and it appears that it is the money that had been earmarked for foreign debt reconciliation. It is the taxpayers’ money that has been allowed to be swindled by unscrupulous crooks.
Then there is the National Development Bank (NDB) “Glitch” Controversy.
The entire banking sector was shaken to its roots by reports of a massive multi-billion-rupee fraud at the NDB. This incident, often referred to in local circles as “The Glitch,” involved the alleged diversion of funds through a sophisticated manipulation of the bank’s internal accounting systems.
Then there are the perceived Guardians, who often serve as Whistleblowers. The fight against such deep-seated corruption rarely begins with a regulator; it often starts with an individual. It is just someone who smells a rat. Maya Senanayake, a forensic expert at NDB, has emerged as a symbol of integrity in this landscape by identifying anomalies that others chose to ignore. Whistleblowers like Senanayake face immense personal and professional risks. Their role is a “Herculean effort”, very often battling institutional stonewalling to bring the truth to light. Without such individuals, “Suspense Account” spikes and “shell-company diversions” would remain invisible to the public eye.
Having mentioned just two of the buzz phrases in circulation, given in Italics above, it is pertinent to provide definitions for some of these phrases that are being bandied about very frequently in articles on the main subject of this article.
· SCAM – It is a fraudulent scheme or deceptive act performed by an individual or group to trick a victim into giving up something of value, typically money, personal information, or assets. It is a blatant lie or a misrepresentation of the truth. Unlike theft (where something is taken by force), a scam usually involves the victim “willingly” handing over assets because they believe the fraudster’s story. Scams often rely on psychological manipulation, such as creating a sense of urgency, fear, or the promise of a “too good to be true” reward.
· HACKERS –
The term has evolved significantly and carries different meanings depending on the context. In the broadest sense, a hacker is someone who uses technical skills to overcome a problem or bypass a system’s limitations. The cybersecurity industry generally classifies hackers by their intent, often using a “hat” colour system.
The White Hat Hackers are an ethical group that is hired to detect vulnerabilities. They are legal and helpful as they improve security by reporting bugs.
The Black Hat Group are cybercriminals who break into systems illegally. They are malicious, steal data, plant malware, or disrupt services.
The Grey Hats Individuals who may break laws to access a system, but without malicious intent. They are individuals who might find a bug without permission and then offer to fix it for a fee.
· MONEY LAUNDERING – It is the process of “cleaning” illicitly-earned money by passing it through complex bank transfers or commercial transactions.
· TREASURY BOND –
A government debt security that provides a fixed interest rate. Manipulating these affects the nation’s debt and interest rates.
· WHISTLEBLOWER –
It is an “insider” who reports and even makes public, concealment of illegal or unethical activities within an organisation to the public or relevant authorities.
· SUSPENSE ACCOUNT –
A temporary account used to hold funds while their final destination is determined. These are frequently used in fraud to “hide” money during transfers.
· SHELL COMPANY –
No., NO…, it is not the Shell Company that deals with fuel. This terminology refers to a company that exists only on paper and has no active business operations. It is very frequently used to obscure the identity of those moving money. They become “Ghosts”.
· FORENSIC AUDIT –
An examination of financial records to find evidence that can be used in a court of law or for legal proceedings.
When one examines some of these frauds and scams, it becomes clear that at the bottom of the distasteful occurrences lie systemic inadequacies. Scrupulous attention to all details of financial transactions, trustworthy and fool-proof systems dealing with financial transactions, utmost vigilance and a very high degree of suspicion are the incontrovertible needs of the hour. The powers-that-be in all things that deal with financial transactions must consist of people with unblemished honesty, unbridled integrity and honour.
International best practices now emphasise a shift from “rules-based” to “risk-based” oversight, even going to the extent of utilising Artificial Intelligence (AI) to detect suspicious patterns in money laundering and financial fraud that a human eye might miss.
For individuals and the general public, the Three Golden Rules for Protection are as follows”
· Demand Transparency:
Whether you are an investor or a depositor, always ask for the audited financial statements of the institution.
· Verify the Chain:
In government securities, ensure you are dealing through registered primary dealers.
· Support Protections:
Advocate for stronger Whistleblower Protection Acts to ensure that those who speak the truth are not penalised by the system they seek to save.
The trick is to protect ourselves from the Invisible Thief by protecting ourselves from Modern Scams. Here is a breakdown of the most prevalent threats today and how to safeguard your assets.
A. The “Urgent Authority” Tactic
Scammers often impersonate trusted institutions such as banks, financial institutions, tax offices, or law enforcement. They create a sense of artificial urgency, claiming your account has been compromised or you owe an immediate fine.
· The Red Flag: Any request to move money to a “safe account” or pay via untraceable methods like gift cards or cryptocurrency.
· The Defence:
Hang up immediately or delete the message if it is on email. Contact the institution using a verified phone number from their official website or the back of your bank card to check the veracity of the request.
B. Investment and “Get Rich Quick” Schemes
With the rise of digital assets, “pig butchering” scams have become rampant. Fraudsters build a relationship with the victim over weeks (the “fattening”) before suggesting a “guaranteed” investment opportunity in crypto or forex (the “slaughter”).
· The Red Flag: Returns that consistently outperform the market with “zero risk.”
· The Defence:
If an investment opportunity sounds “too good to be true”, it almost always is. Professional financial advisors do not solicit clients via WhatsApp or dating apps.
C. Phishing and Smishing (SMS Phishing)
These are deceptive messages designed to steal login credentials. You might receive a text stating a package delivery failed, or your Netflix subscription has lapsed, followed by a link to a “login” page that looks identical to the real thing.
· The Red Flag: Unusual URLs (e.g., wellsfarg0.net instead of wellsfargo.com) and unexpected attachments.
· The Defence:
Never click links in unsolicited messages. Use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) on all sensitive accounts; even if a thief gets your password, they won’t get the secondary code.
4. The AI Impersonation (The Grandparent Scam)
Advancements in AI voice cloning allow scammers to mimic the voice of a loved one in distress. They may call claiming to be in a car accident or legal trouble, begging for immediate funds.
· The Red Flag: High emotional pressure and a demand for secrecy.
· The Defence:
Establish a “family password” – a unique word or phrase only your inner circle knows. If the caller cannot provide it, they are not who they say they are.
The Three Golden Rules for Financial Safety are
· Slow Down and Do Not Get Frightened:
Scammers rely on panic. Taking five minutes to think or consult a friend usually breaks the spell of the scam. It is also important to realise that some scammers try repeatedly.
· Verify the Source:
Never trust Caller ID, as numbers can be easily “spoofed” to look local or official.
· Protect Your Data:
Be wary of how much personal information you share on social media. Scammers use these details to make their impersonations more convincing.
Your bank will NEVER EVER ask for your Personal Identification Number (PIN), your Account Password, One-Time-Password (OTP) or request you to transfer money to an entirely new, unknown account. If any such request comes, do not fall for it and immediately contact the institution through their standard publicised telephone lines to check on the veracity of the request.
If you suspect you have been targeted, report it to the bank or financial institution, your local authorities and the legal investigative portals…, IMMEDIATELY.
(Some of the material presented
in this article was extracted with the help of AI.)
by Dr B. J. C. Perera
MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paediatrics), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL)
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
An independent free-lance correspondent.
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