by Rajan Philips

It is no exaggeration to say that no previous Sri Lankan political leader has achieved what Anura Kumara Dissanayake accomplished this week. His leap from 418,553 (3.16%) in 2019 to 5,634,915 (42.31%) and victory in 2024 – a 14-fold jump in five years – is in itself unprecedented, not only in Sri Lanka but likely also elsewhere. More importantly AKD did what he did without the proverbial political spoon in his mouth. Up till now everyone who achieved high political office in this country had a feudal head start and/or got an early seat on the political party train that was always on a track to the station of power. Those tracks are still there, but the old trains have been cannibalized through the corruption and nepotism of their operators.

The long and short view

In my view, there are two sequential aspects to AKD’s historic win – one immediate and the other long term. In the more immediate sense, it certainly helped AKD that the last person to win a presidential election before him arrived with a political foot in his mouth. The voting story of this election is that with the implosion of the Rajapaksas following the disaster of the Gotabaya Rajapaksa presidency, the contest became a race between three candidates – AKD, SP and RW – for the 6.9 million votes that Gotabaya Rajapaksa polled in 2019. AKD beat the other two hands down.

The overnight conventional wisdom is that AKD benefited from the vote split between SP and RW, and that if one of them had given way to other AKD would not have won the election. The vote tallies and distributions between 2019 and 2024 do not quite support this assessment. On the contrary, the distribution of votes seem to show that in a two person race against either SP or RW, AKD would have polled over six million votes and still won the election.

In the longer historical view, as opposed to the immediate post-Gota context, I would argue that AKD’s historic success is a testament to the resilient possibilities of Sri Lanka’s political system and culture, and it gives the lie to the hyped up narrative that the country has been an unmitigated basket of failures for all the 76 years after becoming independent in 1948. That nothing good ever happened in 76 years. This is an obvious exaggeration, if not a patent falsehood.

While this narrative was a part of the NPP’s campaign and could at least partly be justified as normal election rhetoric, some of the commentating fellow travellers of the NPP took the narrative to absurd limits and flew in the face of the same history that some of them learnt and even taught in our schools and universities.

Put another way, AKD’s victory is proof that things can work in Sri Lanka, and that nearly a century of state welfarism and the progressive political ethos that sustains it have enabled vast cross-sections of the Sri Lankan society to improve their living conditions and life prospects, and to inspire committed individuals like Anura Kumara Dissanayake to emerge as leaders and succeed in democratic politics at the highest level.

Nor should there be any denying that all of Sri Lanka’s progressive ethos is the main achievement of the country’s left movement from the 1930s, the same movement that schismatically gave birth to the now victorious NPP’s own progenitor, the JVP, among so many others along the way. All of this is not to diminish AKD’s impressive achievement, but to applaud it.

No one on the left has come anywhere near to achieving political power that Anura Kumara Dissanayake has now achieved. On the one hand, those who took the parliamentary path to achieving socialism did so in spite of their sharing the same social advantages with many on the political right. On the other hand, those who spurned the parliamentary path as a bourgeois dead end, made no headway in spite of pursuing a violent route that only brought more grief and not much good.

To the credit of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, he has demonstrated that the left can contest and win an election without the old vehicle of the united front or the new bandwagon of a multi-party alliance. And more remarkably, he has demonstrated that it is possible to succeed within the democratic electoral process, and that turning to violence is not necessary for achieving political ends.

Promising First Steps

All the same, achieving electoral victory is only the start of the political journey and not the end of it. Especially when political goals are inspired by the common good and not driven by private or familial gain. Making private gains and promoting family interests through political means is easily achieved and in short order. Pursuing the common good, both substantive (as in resurrecting the economy) and procedural (as in reforming the constitution), on the other hand, involves a long and grinding journey that requires a team of equals and friendly rivals, but all having the discipline, dedication, and the necessary skills.

In electoral politics, the first steps after victory go a long way in showing the sincerity, the commitment, and the ability of the winner and the winning party to follow the people’s mandate, honour their trust, and deliver on the electoral promises. So far, as the newly minted President, Anura Kumara Dissanayaka has been making all the right moves and avoiding obvious mis-steps. His decisions are good outcomes forced by the virtue of necessity, on the one hand, and constrained by his own commitments, on the other. His first steps are both laudable and promising.

With himself as President and only two MPs in parliament, the only way President Dissanayake could have convened the now dissolved parliament would have been through deals with one or two parties and their MPs in parliament. Such deals would invariably have involved cabinet positions, governor positions, diplomatic postings and keeping the current parliament on extended life support. The same old quagmire that Sri Lankan politics has been wallowing in for the last 30 years. The quagmire that Ranil Wickremesinghe would not free himself from, in any of his three incarnations this century – as peace prime minister, yahapalanaya prime minister, and economic rescue president.

President Dissanayake has made it look so easy. He dissolved parliament immediately, as he had promised to do before the election; and has scheduled parliamentary elections for November 14, and the convening of the new parliament for November 21. After two years of delays and dilly dallying by Ranil Wickremesinghe, and all the planetary explorations for years before that by the Rajapaksas, President Dissanayake has ensured that Sri Lanka will be having both a new president and a new parliament in a span of two months.

For the intervening caretaker period, he has struck a cabinet of three and neatly divided the portfolios between himself as President, Harini Amarasuriya as Prime Minister, and veteran parliamentarian Vijitha Herath. All born in and after 1968, they are a breath of fresh air for a polity that has been overburdened by old men for an overly long time. Sri Lanka not only has the smallest cabinet ever, but also for the first time a cabinet without family or extended and extensible family members – with the possible exception, perhaps, of the cabinet of SWRD Bandaranaike.

The President’s focus rightly seems to be on the economic front, as it should be, and he is showing a steady hand and readiness for consultations as he takes initiatives to navigate the country through its continuing economic crisis. Minister Vijitha Herath, whose list of portfolios includes Public Security, appears to be finally bringing some reprieve to the vexed Visa question, which Tiran Alles turned had into a global skullduggery and which Ranil Wickremesinghe handsomely ignored while lecturing everyone on how to run a country.

For her part, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya has reportedly issued a directive advising schools not to invite politicians to school functions. A charming piece of educational initiative that would have served the country very well had it been in place from the time CWW Kannangara introduced the free education system.

Most of all, for the first time in 47 years, Sri Lankan voters have the opportunity to have a clean slate of new parliamentarians in the November parliamentary election. The NPP will assuredly field a slate of new candidates who have never been in parliament. Hopefully, their list will include candidates with a range of educational qualifications and life experiences, and will scrupulously exclude family members and individuals with a criminal record. At the minimum, the NPP’s list should put the onus on the other parties to prune their own lists and get rid of all the deadwood and rotten mangoes that have been in out of parliament from as far back as 1970.

Based on the presidential election results, the NPP has more than a fair chance of forming a majority government. Of the 160 polling divisions in 22 districts, the NPP (AKD) won 106 and SJB (SP) 48, with six in the Jaffna District won by the Common Tamil Candidate. The NPP vote is likely to stay steady and grow, while the SJB votes will revert back to their respective political parties for the parliamentary election. This would be more so in the seven districts where Sajith Premadasa came first, five of which are in the north and east and the other two are Badulla and Nuwara Eliya. Also 28 of the 48 polling districts where Sajith Premadasa came first are in these seven districts.

The dynamic of the elections and the top of mind issues for the voters will likely be different in the parliamentary election from the presidential election. The voter turnout in the presidential election dropped by 5% nationally from 84% in 2019 to 79% in 2024, and the turnout was lower in each district as well. Whether the campaign for the parliamentary election will energize more voters to turn out in November remains to be seen. What seems to be clear is that energy and enthusiasm are now mostly with the NPP.

by Mohan Mendis

The 2019 and 2024 Sri Lankan presidential elections saw significant shifts in political leadership and voter preferences.

In 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, representing the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), won with 52.25% of the vote, defeating Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), who garnered 41.99%. Rajapaksa’s victory was driven by promises of strong governance, national security, and economic stability, but his administration faced severe challenges due to the economic crisis that led to his resignation in 2022.

In 2024, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, leader of the Marxist National People’s Power (NPP), emerged as the victor with 42.31% of the vote, surpassing Premadasa, who secured 32.76%. Dissanayake’s victory reflected widespread public dissatisfaction with the traditional political elite, as he campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption and working-class representation. His win signaled a major political shift, particularly in light of the country’s ongoing economic recovery following the 2022 crisis. While Dissanayake did not secure an outright majority, he won after a second round of vote redistribution, marking a historic moment in Sri Lanka’s politics, as he represented a break from the dominance of traditional political families like the Rajapaksas and Premadasa.

Here’s a statistical comparison between the 2019 and 2024 Sri Lankan

presidential election results:

2019 Presidential Election Results:

Winner: Gotabaya Rajapaksa (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna – SLPP)

Votes: 6,924,255

Percentage: 52.25%

Runner-up: Sajith Premadasa (Samagi Jana Balawegaya – SJB)

Votes: 5,564,239

Percentage: 41.99%

Voter Turnout: 83.72%

2024 Presidential Election Results:

Winner: Anura Kumara Dissanayake (National People’s Power – NPP)

Votes: 5,740,179

Percentage: 42.31%

• Runner-up: Sajith Premadasa (SJB)

Votes: 4,530,902

Percentage: 32.76%

Voter Turnout: 76%

Key Differences:

1. Winning Margin:

= 2019: Rajapaksa won by a margin of 10.26%.

= 2024: Dissanayake won with 9.55% fewer votes than Rajapaksa did in 2019, and his margin over Premadasa was 9.55%.

2. Performance of Sajith Premadasa:

= 2019: Premadasa received 41.99% of the vote.

= 2024: Premadasa’s vote share dropped to 32.76%, a decrease of

9.23%.

3. Turnout:

2019: Turnout was higher at 83.72%.

2024: Turnout fell to 76%, indicating slightly lower voter participation This comparison reflects a shift from the dominance of traditional political figures to a more left-wing, anti-establishment candidate in 2024.

If Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe had contested together in the 2024

Sri Lankan presidential election, their combined vote total could have significantly altered the outcome.

Premadasa’s 2024 vote share: 4,530,902 votes (32.76%)

Wickremesinghe’s 2024 estimated vote share: Although Wickremesinghe ran as an independent in 2024, his support base would primarily come from his long-time affiliation with the United National Party (UNP). Given his recent governance, we can estimate his vote base to be around 8-10%, based on the fragmented political landscape after the 2022 economic crisis

Combined Vote Estimate:

If we add an estimated 8-10% support for Wickremesinghe to Premadasa’s 32.76%, their combined vote share could have reached:

Around 40-43% of the total vote, with around 6-6.5 million votes.

This combination would likely have outperformed Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s 42.31% (5,740,179 votes), potentially leading to a victory for the combined opposition. However, this scenario depends on various factors:

Voter behavior: Not all of Wickremesinghe’s supporters might have automatically backed a Premadasa-Wickremesinghe alliance.

Strategic alignment: Wickremesinghe’s pro-market policies and Premadasa’s more populist stances may not fully align, possibly affecting voter turnout and support.

In conclusion, a joint candidacy could have statistically won the election, but the actual dynamics would depend on the coherence of their combined platform and voter perception.

The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election saw a drop in voter turnout, an increase in the number of rejected votes, and a larger voter base due to demographic changes compared to 2019. Let’s break down these elements:

1. Voter Turnout:

2019: Voter turnout was 83.72%, reflecting high engagement during a time when national security and economic concerns were dominant.

2024: Turnout dropped to 76%, which is a significant decline

Factors Contributing to the Drop in Turnout:

Disillusionment with traditional political parties: Voters became frustrated with the old political guard due to their perceived role in Sri Lanka’s economic collapse. This disenchantment likely discouraged voter participation, especially for Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa, whose parties were part of the “establishment.”

Economic instability and voter fatigue: After a severe economic crisis in 2022, many citizens felt the political process did not adequately address their concerns, further lowering voter enthusiasm.

Frustration with political elites: The dissatisfaction with traditional political families (such as the Rajapaksas and the Wickremesinghe-led UNP) led many voters to feel their votes wouldn’t significantly change the status quo

Reduced enthusiasm: After the crisis in 2022, many voters were struggling with day-to-day survival, leading to a decreased interest in political participation.

Large-Scale Emigration Since 2022: Following the 2022 economic collapse, an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 Sri Lankans left the country. Many were professionals, skilled workers, and members of the middle class, who were seeking better economic opportunities abroad due to the high inflation, shortages of basic goods, and the general economic instability in Sri Lanka

Loss of eligible voters: A significant portion of those who left were eligible voters. Since Sri Lanka does not have an established mechanism for absentee voting for citizens living abroad, these individuals were effectively excluded from the 2024 election process.

2. Impact of Economic Migration on Voter Motivation:

Frustration and disengagement: Many who remained in Sri Lanka may have felt disillusioned by the lack of effective governance, leading to voter apathy.

The exodus likely signaled a deep disconnection between citizens and the political system, as those who left may have represented a politically active demographic.

• Diaspora influence: While Sri Lankans living abroad typically maintain strong ties with their homeland, their inability to vote could have dampened political enthusiasm among their families and networks at home. This may have further contributed to the sense of futility in voting, reducing turnout.

3. Economic Hardships and Focus on Survival:

= Those remaining in the country continued to struggle with the aftermath of the economic collapse, including high taxes, inflation, and daily hardships. For many, political engagement took a backseat to focusing on economic survival. When citizens are burdened with meeting basic needs, voter participation can decline as political engagement becomes less of a priority

4. Lower Middle-Class and Professional Exodus:

The people who left were often from urban, educated, and professional backgrounds, a group that traditionally had higher political engagement.

Their absence directly impacted turnout, as many who typically participate in elections had left the country. This reduction was compounded by the youth and first-time voters who supported Anura Kumara Dissanayake, balancing the overall turnout to an extent, but not fully compensating for the exodus.

5. Lack of Trust in the Political System:

With Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over after the 2022 crisis and enacting austerity measures, many citizens felt betrayed by both the government and the opposition. The traditional political parties failed to regain trust, and this disillusionment likely led to a sense of hopelessness among voters, reducing their participation further. The combination of large-scale migration, disenchantment with the political system, and economic hardships all contributed to the reduced voter turnout in 2024. The lack of absentee voting rights for Sri Lankans abroad compounded the issue, as many potential voters were unable to participate in the electoral process, contributing to the overall decline in turnout

LESSONS LEARNT TO BE LEARNT BY ALL THREE MAJOR CANDIDATES BASED ON THE ELECTION VOTES

Based on the 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election results, each of the three major candidates — Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sajith Premadasa, and Ranil Wickremesinghe — can draw important lessons to improve their future political strategies:

1. Anura Kumara Dissanayake (NPP):

= Key Lesson: Sustain Popular Momentum with Broader Appeal

Victory and Support from Youth and Left-Wing Voters: Dissanayake’s victory in 2024 reflected his success in capturing the youth vote, as well as those frustrated with traditional political elites. His anti-corruption and antiestablishment stance appealed to many who wanted change after the economic crisis

Challenge

: He must now expand his appeal beyond his core base. Though his 42.31% vote share brought him victory, it wasn’t an outright majority. His Marxist platform and revolutionary background make financial and business circles wary, which could hamper economic reforms and stability Lesson: To secure broader support, Dissanayake will need to moderate his economic policies to reassure businesses while staying true to his progressive base. He must also deliver on promises of systemic change, which was key to his support among younger voters.

2. Sajith Premadasa (SJB):

= Key Lesson: Reinvent Campaign Strategy and Unite the Opposition Failure to Build Momentum: Despite his 32.76% vote share, Premadasa failed to capitalize on the public’s discontent with traditional politics. His drop in support from the 41.99% in 2019 reveals that he could not gain the trust of those seeking change Challenge: Premadasa’s policies may not have stood out enough to differentiate him from the very system voters were rejecting. His inability to consolidate the opposition vote, especially in the face of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s split candidacy, further diminished his chances of winning. Lesson: Premadasa needs to reform his image and policy platform to offer a clear alternative to the status quo. Additionally, building alliances and uniting fragmented opposition forces, including Wickremesinghe’s supporters, would increase his chances in future elections.

3. Ranil Wickremesinghe (UNP):

Key Lesson: Address Public Discontent and Reform Political Strategy Economic Stabilization but Political Defeat: Wickremesinghe’s focus on economic recovery, including debt restructuring with the IMF, may have stabilized inflation and foreign reserves, but his low voter support (estimated 8-10%) showed a significant disconnect with the electorate).

His austerity measures were unpopular, as they were perceived as benefiting the elite while burdening ordinary citizens with higher taxes and costs. Challenge: Wickremesinghe’s political brand has become synonymous with the establishment, which is seen as partly responsible for the country’s crises. This made it difficult for him to attract a broad voter base despite his economic reforms.

Lesson

: He needs to rebuild public trust, particularly by demonstrating empathy for ordinary citizens affected by austerity measures. Engaging in more transparent governance and incorporating social welfare policies into economic recovery plans could help him regain public favor.

Additional Lessons for All Candidates:

Address Voter Disenchantment: The 7.72% drop in voter turnout and rise in rejected votes signal widespread disillusionment. All candidates must focus on rebuilding trust in democratic institutions by addressing the public’s core concerns, especially economic hardships and corruption

Incorporate the Diaspora: Given the significant exodus of Sri Lankans overseas, candidates should advocate for mechanisms such as absentee voting to engage the diaspora, many of whom still hold strong ties to the country and could be influential voters.

Offer Clear Policy Alternatives: The growing complexity of voter issues, particularly in the post-crisis landscape, requires candidates to offer clear, actionable policy proposals that address both short-term survival (inflation, employment) and long-term reforms (corruption, education, economic diversification).

These lessons highlight the importance of trust, clarity of message, and broad-based coalitions in an evolving political environment marked by economic uncertainty and widespread public dissatisfaction.

If Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe had contested together in the 2024

Sri Lankan presidential election, their combined vote total could have significantly altered the outcome.

Potential Combined Vote Share (Premadasa + Wickremesinghe):

Premadasa’s 2024 vote share: 4,530,902 votes (32.76%)

Wickremesinghe’s 2024 estimated vote share: Although Wickremesinghe ran as an independent in 2024, his support base would primarily come from his long-time affiliation with the United National Party (UNP). Given his recent governance, we can estimate his vote base to be around 8-10%, based on the fragmented political landscape after the 2022 economic crisis

Combined Vote Estimate:

If we add an estimated 8-10% support for Wickremesinghe to Premadasa’s 32.76%, their combined vote share could have reached:

Around 40-43% of the total vote, with around 6-6.5 million votes. This combination would likely have outperformed Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s 42.31% (5,740,179 votes), potentially leading to a victory for the combined opposition. However, this scenario depends on various factors:

Voter behavior: Not all of Wickremesinghe’s supporters might have automatically backed a Premadasa-Wickremesinghe alliance.

Strategic alignment: Wickremesinghe’s pro-market policies and Premadasa’s more populist stances may not fully align, possibly affecting voter turnout and support. In conclusion, a joint candidacy could have statistically won the election, but the actual dynamics would depend on the coherence of their combined platform and voter perception.

The United National Party (UNP) and the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), despite their shared origins, remain divided as a united political force for several key reasons:

1. Leadership Rift between Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa:

The primary reason for the division is the personal and leadership rivalry between Ranil Wickremesinghe, the long-time leader of the UNP, and Sajith Premadasa, who broke away to form the SJB in 2020.

Premadasa’s frustration: Premadasa had long sought a leadership role within the UNP, but Wickremesinghe’s reluctance to step down or share power with younger leaders created tension within the party. This frustration culminated in Premadasa forming the SJB ahead of the 2020 parliamentary elections .

Wickremesinghe’s dominance: Wickremesinghe’s control over the UNP and his reluctance to pass the torch exacerbated internal tensions. Many UNP members felt that under Wickremesinghe, the party was becoming disconnected from voters, but they couldn’t reform leadership, leading to the SJB split

2. Ideological and Policy Differences:

While both parties have roots in the UNP’s center-right liberalism, the SJB has taken a more populist and centrist approach under Premadasa. The SJB focuses on social welfare programs and expanding public services, making it more appealing to working-class voters.

UNP’s pro-market policies: Under Wickremesinghe, the UNP continued to champion pro-market, neoliberal economic policies, favoring privatization, foreign investments, and austerity measures. These policies became particularly unpopular after the 2022 economic crisis, further alienating a segment of voters who felt left behind

The SJB’s attempt to distance itself from these neoliberal policies was a critical reason for Premadasa’s breakaway and remains a central division between the two parties.

3. Public Perception of the Parties:

 The UNP’s popularity sharply declined after the 2019 presidential election, where Wickremesinghe’s leadership was seen as ineffective in addressing key national issues, including the Easter Sunday attacks and the economic downturn. The party’s inability to stop the rise of the Rajapaksas was also a sore point for many supporters.

SJB’s formation was seen as a fresh start and an opportunity for renewal. Premadasa’s SJB quickly gained traction as a stronger opposition force against the Rajapaksas, winning more seats than the UNP in the 2020 parliamentary elections .

Public distrust of the UNP after the 2022 crisis, where Wickremesinghe was appointed president following Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation, has reinforced the perception of the UNP as part of the old political guard that failed to protect the country from economic collapse.

4. Strategic Differences:

Premadasa’s SJB has focused on grassroots mobilization and appealing to the general public’s frustration with the status quo. His campaign style is more people-centric, offering populist measures that address immediate economic concerns.

Wickremesinghe’s UNP, in contrast, relies on institutional experience and positioning itself as the party with the capability to manage macroeconomic issues, especially in navigating complex financial negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, these strategies have not resonated with the broader electorate, which is looking for immediate relief.

5. Electoral Competition and Political Ambitions:

 Both Premadasa and Wickremesinghe harbor strong political ambitions. Premadasa, as the leader of the SJB, sees himself as the face of Sri Lanka’s opposition, while Wickremesinghe continues to hold the presidency and remains determined to maintain his political relevance.

Competition for leadership: A merger between the two parties would likely force a power-sharing agreement, something neither leader seems willing to compromise on. This leadership struggle and competition for dominance in the opposition landscape make a merger highly unlikely without significant concessions

6. Party Structures and Grassroots Support:

The SJB’s infrastructure and voter base have been growing rapidly since its formation, attracting disillusioned former UNP members and voters, particularly from rural areas. On the other hand, the UNP’s support base has dwindled, particularly after its near-total defeat in the 2020 parliamentary elections, where it won just one seat.

This asymmetry in organizational strength and grassroots support makes it difficult for both parties to merge, as the SJB now commands the larger voter base and structure, while the UNP relies on its institutional history and Wickremesinghe’s position as president.

Conclusion:

The rivalry between Premadasa and Wickremesinghe, combined with policy differences, strategic ambitions, and diverging party infrastructures, makes it difficult for the UNP and SJB to unite as a political force. While they share a common origin, their leadership conflicts and differing visions for the country’s future have created significant barriers to reconciliation and unity in Sri Lankan politics. For the people of Sri Lanka striving for a new beginning—focused on prosperity, corruption-free governance, the rule of law, and unity among diverse communities—the following guiding lessons are crucial:

1. Strong Rule of Law and Accountability:

To ensure a corruption-free society, it is vital that Sri Lanka strengthens its legal and institutional frameworks:

• Transparent governance: Implement transparency in government contracts, spending, and policies. This includes creating robust mechanisms to audit public officials, ensuring that corruption and mismanagement are detected and addressed.

• Independent judiciary: Strengthening the judiciary so that it is free from political influence will restore faith in legal systems. Citizens must trust that laws will be applied equally, regardless of political or social status.

• Anti-corruption institutions: Fully empower institutions such as the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), giving them the resources and independence to investigate and prosecute corruption effectively

2. Inclusive Economic Development:

For Sri Lanka to achieve sustainable prosperity, it is crucial that economic growth is inclusive and benefits all regions, ethnicities, and social classes:

• Equitable growth: Economic policies must focus on bridging the urban-rural divide and ensure equitable access to opportunities. Special emphasis should be placed on regions affected by the civil war, such as the North and East, where communities continue to struggle with poverty and infrastructure deficits.

• Investment in education and skills: The country’s future prosperity depends on education reform and equipping youth with modern skills for global markets. Investments in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education can boost innovation and create more job opportunities.

• Support for small businesses and entrepreneurs: Encourage local entrepreneurship through microfinance programs, innovation hubs, and support for agriculture and tourism industries, which have the potential to uplift rural economies

3. Strengthening Democracy and Civic Engagement:

The 2022 mass protests, where people demanded government accountability, show a shift towards active civic engagement. To maintain momentum:

• Participatory governance: Citizens should be encouraged to engage in local decision-making processes. Decentralization of government functions can bring decision-making closer to the people, ensuring their voices are heard.

• Civic education: Programs that educate citizens, particularly the youth, on democratic values and their role in governance can foster a politically conscious population that holds leaders accountable.

• Reform political institutions: There must be significant reforms in electoral laws to reduce the influence of money and political dynasties. Ensuring that elections are free, fair, and competitive is critical for democracy to flourish

4. Promoting National Unity Across Ethnic and Religious Lines:

Sri Lanka’s diverse ethnic and religious fabric has historically been both its strength and a source of conflict. Building a unified nation requires a genuine commitment to:

• Reconciliation and healing: Post-civil war reconciliation must move beyond superficial initiatives. Policies that address the grievances of Tamil, Muslim, and other minority communities should focus on restoring cultural autonomy and rebuilding trust through transitional justice processes that include reparations, truth-telling, and recognition of past wrongs.

• Inclusive leadership: Leaders must work to break down ethnic and religious divides. National discourse should celebrate diversity and encourage interfaith dialogue to foster mutual understanding.

• Balanced development: Ensure that all regions and communities, regardless of ethnic makeup, receive equal access to resources, infrastructure, and education. This creates a shared sense of belonging and reduces regional disparities

5. Building Trust through Transparent Economic Recovery:

Given the economic crisis of 2022, public trust in governance has eroded:

• Debt transparency: Sri Lanka must adopt clear and transparent debt management policies, allowing citizens to understand how foreign loans and aid are utilized. Public access to information about IMF and other foreign assistance programs will help reduce skepticism.

• Fair tax policies: Implement tax reforms that do not overly burden the working class but ensure the wealthy contribute fairly to economic recovery. Equitable tax policies can foster trust that recovery efforts are being handled responsibly

6. Sustainable and Environmentally-Conscious Policies:

• Environmental stewardship: Protecting Sri Lanka’s natural resources is crucial for long-term prosperity. Policies should promote sustainable development that balances economic growth with environmental preservation, particularly in industries like tourism and agriculture.

• Disaster preparedness: As a nation vulnerable to climate change, Sri Lanka must prioritize disaster resilience through investments in infrastructure, water management, and sustainable agriculture practices

7. Ending Political Dynasties and Cronyism:

One of the most pressing issues in Sri Lanka’s politics has been the dominance of political families (e.g., Rajapaksas), which has led to allegations of corruption and cronyism:

by Dr. Kadira Pethiyagoda
former visiting scholar Oxford University

Sri Lanka’s Presidential election saw a genuine left-winger, from a Marxist party, record a victory that upended the country’s political establishment. But the NPP’s win was more than just historic for this country. A man whose ideology with regard to the fundamental questions of policy differs from all predecessors was elected. This is something presently unimaginable in the West. While it may have been different 100 years ago, today in most major Western countries, there is increasingly no way for the public to vote away the two sacred cows of the establishment: neoliberal capitalism and neo-con foreign policy. Here, Sri Lanka can provide hope.

Economy

In Sri Lanka the debate centred on who could best ease the economic hardship of ordinary people, in the short and long-term. Sri Lankans voted for their core economic interests, even when this meant a break from the status quo. In the West, not only is the question of capitalism versus socialism off the table, but so too the possibility of a politician winning who may have even mild views questioning neoliberalism.

This is accomplished partly by the Western political debate being curated for preoccupation with identity politics (immigration, abortion, gender) or inane platitudes, both unthreatening to the establishment. At most, there may be clashes over micro-differences in niche economic policies (health insurance in the US, child benefits cap in the UK).

The contrast is not simply due to Sri Lanka’s economic situation being more dire. In the US, economic stress for ordinary people has increased with precedents being set in terms of the first generation emerging to be poorer than their parents and declining life expectancy. In the UK, a decade of austerity saw the state criticized by the UN Special Rapporteur in 2019 for maintaining policies that increasingly deny enjoyment of basic economic rights to the vulnerable.

The lack of debate over economic fundamentals today is historically rooted, in large part, in the anti-communist repression and propaganda in the US, in the early 20^th century and 1950s, and the anti-Soviet propaganda across the West throughout the 20^th century. This left an indelible mark on the psyche of the Western public. Leftist or social democratic political parties had to constantly equivocate and apologize to avoid being smeared as ‘traitors’. By the 1970s, the erstwhile ‘Left’, Democrat Party had surrendered the economic argument, retreating to identity issues.

The policy outcomes of this lack of choice speak for themselves. In the early 1960s, the richest 10% of Americans enjoyed around . By 2012, it was over 50%. During the pandemic years 63% of new wealth created was bagged by the richest 1%. assessing public opinion and government policy over 20 years, found that the opinions of “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts” while “the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact”. Even at the technical level, the US could no longer be accurately described as a democracy, but as an oligarchy.

Foreign Policy

The same is seen in the other paramount area of government action, foreign policy.

Since Vietnam, the US and those countries whose foreign policies unfailingly mirror the US’s, have entered war after war, almost always without full public support or full public knowledge. From backing the Contras against Nicaragua to the Iraq War and beyond.Today we have a situation where a majority of Americans believe that the US should not do any more to ‘help Ukraine’, yet Congress keeps voting, including by a 3/4 majority, to keep spending billions. Regarding the reheated Israel-Palestine conflict believe Israel should call a ceasefire and try to negotiate. Only of Israel’s military actions in Gaza. The US Congress meanwhile, pledging whatever support Israel needs to continue the war in a vote of 412-10, a 98% majority. Biden’s approval rating is at an all-time low, with all voters disapproving of his foreign policy amidst the conflict. Among those aged 18-34, of his handling of the war. In Britain, 76% of the public support a ceasefire. When Parliament voted, however, only 125 MPs out of 650, just 19%, backed a ceasefire.

This has led to a situation where governments of states like Sri Lanka, often lectured to about democracy, hold stances on the two major international issues that are more aligned with their public’s views than Western governments are with their public. In relation to Israel-Palestine, Global South states are actually more aligned with the views of Western public, than Western governments themselves are.

Sri Lanka’s election campaign did not focus as much as Western states on Gaza or Ukraine, due to Colombo having few direct interests at stake. However, even in relation to the small degree of involvement Sri Lanka did have – previous President Wickremesinghe’s commitment to the US Red Sea force – there was a range of views across candidates, with such decisions unlikely under the new NPP government. On the most important foreign policy/national security matter for Sri Lanka, the questions of separatism and devolution – voters had diversity of choice across candidates, reflected in their geographic spread of votes.

No Choice

In the US and most other Western states, there have long been minor parties which have at various times reflected the will of the majority on these important policy areas. The US Greens provide a useful example. They have consistently aligned with the public on unpopular wars and supported economic policies that benefit the majority. Nevertheless, they are never serious contenders for power. Neither are independent candidates, despite more voters identifying as ‘independents’ than as Democrats or Republicans. This is due to several undemocratic structures such as the legal exclusion of minor candidates from ballots and debates. In the UK, the ‘first past the post’ system has meant that a party that receives only 34% of the vote can win 64% of the parliamentary seats, while millions who voted for minor parties see their will unrepresented.

In contrast, Sri Lanka’s election saw around 38 candidates listed on the ballot for President. Even candidates who ended up winning less than 2,000 votes (in a country of 22 million) were represented on the national ballot paper, giving the public genuine choice. In the end, despite NPP having won just four percent in the 2020 parliamentary elections and AKD having garnered three percent in the 2019 presidential election, Sri Lankans were able to vote him to victory in 2024.

The inability to be represented has led to terminal apathy among Western voters.

The turnout for the last US presidential election was 66% of the voting eligible population. In the UK election it was 60% of those registered to vote, only eligible to register to vote, the lowest since universal suffrage. In Sri Lanka the turnout was 75%.

Media

Democracy requires informed consent. Perhaps the most pivotal actor in the suffocation of democratic choice within the West is the mainstream media. This is due to the unprecedented uniformity of permitted views, due to the unprecedented levels of concentration of media ownership. In the UK around 90% of the newspaper market, 80% when online is included, is . In the US, just six mega-corporations own almost everything people watch, read, and hear. This means those who do not deliberately search for alternative media (because they have to focus their time on economic survival, i.e. the majority) have no freedom of choice, and are not informed. The same conglomerates that profit from war maintain near-exclusive power to tell people the pros and cons of war.

Politicians who dare speak against the prevailing orthodoxy are ignored, dismissed, ridiculed or demonized at industrial scale. Even in Western reporting of AKD’s win – from the paper of record, The New York Times, to The Economist – headlines included the descriptor “Marxist” to draw the attention of a Western public conditioned to be alarmed by it. Media bias is so extreme that the Western public seem to have realized it. Mainstream media corporations are the institutions in the US. In the UK, only of the public trust the media.

This is what Democracy Looks Like

In an era where global war stands wait at the precipice of experience, Western masses have been plunged into a democratic malaise; a deep loss of faith in the electoral system. In America this November, the public’s choice is between two, both of which are the same in the ways that really matter. Voting for a long-shot, for someone who asks questions on the two most important areas of government policy, is deemed a wasted vote.

But now there is hope that it does not have to be this way. While the Western establishment media cluck their tongues at the fact that some country, somewhere, dared to elect a Marxist-leaning President, Sri Lanka has demonstrated what true democracy looks like.

It looks like an open field of dozens of contenders, the popular and the unknown, on the same ballot paper. It looks like a candidate who has never before had a shot at power, actually winning. It looks like a government that will likely prioritize the economic benefits of the country over wars thousands of miles away. It looks like an NPP administration that will likely make foreign policy decisions weighing the national interest, the public will and the Party’s values, rather than the interests, will and values of lobby groups representing foreign countries and corporations. It looks like real change. Today, democracy looks like Sri Lanka.

Dr Kadira Pethiyagoda is the first Sri Lankan born candidate for Oxford University Chancellor. He is a foreign policy expert who was a visiting scholar at Oxford, diplomat and ministerial advisor. He is author of “Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values” (Palgrave). @KPethiyagoda