In June 1991, the then Army Chief of Staff, Major General Cecil Waidyaratne, submitted to the government a document outlining an overall strategy to conclusively defeat the LTTE. One of the recommendations in the Major General’s proposal was that the Navy should be expanded more than the Army. His argument was that the terrorists were dependent on arms and supplies by sea and the cutting off of such supplies would enable the Army to successfully combat terrorism on land” (The Island, August 11, 2025).

Published below are “extracts of a presentation titled ‘Three Questions on Conflict Resolution’ by Sir Adam Roberts, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Balliol College, University of Oxford, to commemorate the 20th death anniversary of former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar (Sunday Times, August 10, 2025). The three questions are:

1 ARE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS NECESSARILYTHE RIGHT APPROACH?

Quoting from the extract: “Calls for ceasefire agreements (CFA) have become an almost standard response of the international community to ongoing armed conflicts …. However, there is a question about whether calls for ceasefires are always the right approach. Have they sometimes been adopted more out of habit than from a realistic appraisal of a particular situation? ….. Kadirgamar, who was on the opposition benches in Parliament…. gradually came to see it structurally flawed, as vulnerable to violations by the LTTE, and as failing to lead on to any broader measures of conflict resolution. His critique of the CFA in his speech in Parliament in Colombo on 8 May 2003 presents a uniquely coherent, even forensic criticism of this agreement. He did not spell out exactly what the alternatives to the CFA might be, but that was evident enough: it was a continuation of the war involving the application of relentless military, economic, and political pressure on the LTTE”.

2 ARE EXTERNAL ROLES IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS BOUND TO RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES?

Continuing, the extract states: “In the Sri Lankan conflict, there were broadly speaking three types of external involvement and/or assisting the hard-pressed population of conflict areas. All three ran into difficulties”.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)which was deployed under the terms of the 1987 Indo-Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka, sought to impose disarmament provisions of the agreement on the LTTE, which was not a party to the agreement. The Norwegian –led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)established within weeks of signing of the CFA on 22 February 2002, had a strictly defined monitoring role. After operating for six years, its activities were terminated on 16 January 2008, just two weeks after the Sri Lankan Government’s withdrawal from the CFA. Like the CFA to which it was inextricably linked, it was extensively criticised during its active years and subsequently. As a Norwegian report issued in November 2011 stated, some LTTE sympathisers blamed the Norwegians for being complicit in a process that weakened the rebel movement, while among Muslim and Sinhala constituencies there was perceived Norwegian appeasement of the LTTE. Within Sri Lanka a damning critique of the SLMM was included in the December 2011 report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission”.

3 ARE SAFETY ZONES INHERENTLY PROBLEMATIC?

According to the extract: “What went wrong in the no fire zone in Sri Lanka that had been unilaterally proclaimed by the Sri Lankan Army? They proved in the end to be a death trap for many who had fled there. Far from being safety zones, they turned out to be extraordinarily unsafe. Why was this so? From a variety of sources, we now have a picture of zones where there were repeated shelling including many on or in the area of hospitals. There is pervasive evidence that there was a strong LTTE presence and that the LTTE did not permit the civilians to leave”.

“There are some structural reasons for these failures. A proclaimed safety zone is likely to contain, and even attract, large number of civilians, but also some belligerent forces, who may themselves seek safety there or may plan and conduct military operations from safe area, or may want to control movement of civilians in and out of it. They may even seek to practice ‘lawfare’, where belligerents by inducing or faking attacks on civilians try to present their adversaries as violating the laws of war. Unless there are significant and properly thought-out arrangements for defence management of a safety zone, it can become a magnet for military involvement and activities of all kinds”.

COMMENTS on the THREE QUESTIONS

CFAs and External Roles in conflicts between Sovereign States is vastly different to CFAs and External Roles in Internal Armed Conflicts. The primary reason being that in the case of the former, sovereign States can be held accountable for violations of International Law relating to Armed Conflicts, while in the case of the latter, where non-state actors and sovereign States are involved in internal Armed Conflicts, rules of war are not enforceable to equal degrees between parties to the conflict because non-state actors such as the LTTE, in reality, cannot be held accountable to the same degree as the Sri Lankan State, despite being equal parties to the Armed Conflict as stated in the CFA.

This difference was exploited by the LTTE when they concealed their identities by shedding their distinctive uniforms and took the civilians in the safety zones hostage and used them as a human shield and resorted to ‘lawfare’ as described by Sir Roberts, thus making the safety zones “Inherently Problematic”. In the context of how events unfolded, the fourth question that should be asked is whether the Sri Lankan State is more accountable for violations committed by adopting the strategy of “safety zones” with the intention of ensuring the safety of the civilians or the LTTE who exploited the opportunity presented to their advantage, by merging with the civilians in complete disregard to their plight.

A fifth question is whether the adoption of the strategy of a CFA was entirely an initiative of the Sri Lankan State or did Sri Lanka capitulate under external pressure of the Norwegians considering the fact that it was the Norwegians who brokered the CFA to give legitimacy to the LTTE similar to current relentless pressures by the likes of Volker Turk for investigation and prosecution? Under the circumstances, should not the Norwegians also be a party to the accountability exercise?

In view of these serious questions to which there are no ready answers, the statement that is reported to be in the forthcoming Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk, appears to be nothing but an exercise to look for a ready scape goat – the Sri Lankan State, in the absence of anyone to represent the LTTE when it states: “While the primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes under international law and ensuring accountability lies with the Government of Sri Lanka, this can be complimented and supported by international means”(Daily FT, August 14, 2025) For the UNHRC to continue to recommend External Roles, notwithstanding the difficulties raised by Sir Roberts cited above, is not to have learnt any lessons from the past.

One lesson that should be learnt is to acknowledge the complexity of the issues involved with the Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka because the many players associated with it, make it next to impossible to hold one party or individual accountable. Is it the party that recommends a strategy or the one who implements it, despite its “structural flaws and vulnerabilities”? Investigating and prosecuting as recommended by Volker Turk can only apply to individual penal responsibility. If Command responsibility also applies, it should apply to all who participate in pressuring the Government of Sri Lanka without diligent appraisal and failing to take into account the demonstrated character of the LTTE was “more out of habit than from a realistic appraisal of a particular situation”.as stated by Sir Roberts.

AN ALTERNATIVE

As stated in Sir Robert’s extracts, although Kadirgamar was critical of the CFA, “He did not spell out exactly what the alternative to the CFA might be”. However, there was an alternative. In the course of the review of Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda’s “The Turning Point”, C.A. Chandraprema states: “Throughout the decade of the 1980s, as separatist terrorism developed into a full blown civil war, nobody had given much thought to a comprehensive strategy to defeat the LTTE. However, after the Indian involvement ended in 1990, and Sri Lanka was left to its own devices, the need for such a strategy became evident. In June 1991, the then Army Chief of Staff, Major General Cecil Waidyaratne, submitted to the government a document outlining an overall strategy to conclusively defeat the LTTE. One of the recommendations in the Major General’s proposal was that the Navy should be expanded more than the Army. His argument was that the terrorists were dependent on arms and supplies by sea and the cutting off of such supplies would enable the Army to successfully combat terrorism on land” (The Island, August 11, 2025).

I am personally aware of a similar proposal being sent to former President J.R. Jayewardene, who had it read out to him at his breakfast table. Apparently, it was presented to the Service Chiefs but was dismissed by them on grounds that the conflict in Sri Lanka was a Land war. Whatever the underlying reasons may have been, personal or strategic, the fact that the concept of denying supplies to the enemy is as old as warfare, and therefore cannot and should not have been discounted. The idea of the proposal was to build up the Navy to create a “Cordon Sanitaire”, out at sea and away from civilians, instead of along the coast, to prevent arms and supplies from reaching the LTTE and thus gradually ending the conflict through attrition. Had former Governments considered this option seriously, considering that its merits far outweigh the cost of a Land war, Sri Lanka would not be facing the multiplicity of charges it is now being presented with.

CONCLUSION

Emeritus Professor of Balliol College, University of Oxford, Sir Adam Roberts, in his book “Democracy, Sovereignty and Terror – Lakshman Kadirgamar on the Foundation of International Order”, presents three defining questions as challenges to Conflict Resolution. They are the Cease Fire Agreement, External Role in the Armed Conflict and Safety Zones. By raising these questions, Sir Roberts highlights the “structural flaws and vulnerabilities” of the strategies deployed during Sri Lanka’s Armed Conflict making them a barrier to post-conflict reconciliation.

In such a context for Volker Turk to propose “investigating and prosecuting crimes under international law”, reflects his inability to make a realistic appraisal of the challenges involved due to the fact that after 16 years in which the members of the LTTE who were responsible for individual violations and others for command and control of violations cannot be located and identified. Since they are not likely to volunteer, tracking them in various parts of the world would not only be a daunting undertaking but also time consuming not to mention the prohibitive cost. On the other hand, such challenges would be significantly less in the case of Sri Lankan Security Forces. The net effect is a seriously flawed and skewed outcome where investigations and prosecutions against the Security Forces would far outweigh those against former members of the LTTE. Such disparities would NOT facilitate a reconciled nation but instead, one that would be even more bitter and polarized. As for Volker Turk, should he not be held accountable for a failed outcome, as it was with the External Role of Norway.

The only hope for Sri Lanka is for it to be blessed with a Government that has the Chutzpah to make a realistic appraisal of the ground situation and acknowledge that, instead of adopting the strategy recommended by Volker Turk which is in keeping with external values of Retributive Justice followed by inevitable bitterness associated with it, to adopt a strategy that mirrors Sri Lanka’s heritage of Restorative Justice as being in its long term best interests. Such a strategy would be to grant a general amnesty to all associated with the Armed Conflict and focus on the present by attending to the physical wellbeing of the survivors of all communities in a tangible way. (https://island.lk/a-model-for-reconciliation/).

What Sri Lanka is witnessing today is the cost of choosing wrong strategies in the execution of Sri Lanka’s Armed Conflict. Having missed the opportunity to neutralize the capabilities of the LTTE by means of a Naval “Cordon Sanitaire” out at sea to prevent arms and supplies reaching the LTTE; a strategy that was adopted only during the latter stages of the Armed Conflict. Even at this late stage, the government should, invest in building a strong Navy to defend the interests and security of Sri Lanka if Sri Lanka is to overcome persistent threats from drug smuggling, human trafficking, illegal poaching etc. and the destruction of maritime resources caused by bottom trawling. In addition, Sri Lanka has to acknowledge that there is a compelling need to equip itself with a strong Navy backed by Air surveillance to ensure its security independent of others, for its security and the protection of its resources in its territorial waters and beyond, in the Exclusive Economic Zone.