Features
The cost of wrong strategies in internal conflicts
In June 1991, the then Army Chief of Staff, Major General Cecil Waidyaratne, submitted to the government a document outlining an overall strategy to conclusively defeat the LTTE. One of the recommendations in the Major General’s proposal was that the Navy should be expanded more than the Army. His argument was that the terrorists were dependent on arms and supplies by sea and the cutting off of such supplies would enable the Army to successfully combat terrorism on land” (The Island, August 11, 2025).
Published below are “extracts of a presentation titled ‘Three Questions on Conflict Resolution’ by Sir Adam Roberts, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Balliol College, University of Oxford, to commemorate the 20th death anniversary of former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar (Sunday Times, August 10, 2025). The three questions are:
1 ARE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS NECESSARILYTHE RIGHT APPROACH?
Quoting from the extract: “Calls for ceasefire agreements (CFA) have become an almost standard response of the international community to ongoing armed conflicts …. However, there is a question about whether calls for ceasefires are always the right approach. Have they sometimes been adopted more out of habit than from a realistic appraisal of a particular situation? ….. Kadirgamar, who was on the opposition benches in Parliament…. gradually came to see it structurally flawed, as vulnerable to violations by the LTTE, and as failing to lead on to any broader measures of conflict resolution. His critique of the CFA in his speech in Parliament in Colombo on 8 May 2003 presents a uniquely coherent, even forensic criticism of this agreement. He did not spell out exactly what the alternatives to the CFA might be, but that was evident enough: it was a continuation of the war involving the application of relentless military, economic, and political pressure on the LTTE”.
2 ARE EXTERNAL ROLES IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS BOUND TO RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES?
Continuing, the extract states: “In the Sri Lankan conflict, there were broadly speaking three types of external involvement and/or assisting the hard-pressed population of conflict areas. All three ran into difficulties”.
The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)which was deployed under the terms of the 1987 Indo-Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka, sought to impose disarmament provisions of the agreement on the LTTE, which was not a party to the agreement. The Norwegian –led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)established within weeks of signing of the CFA on 22 February 2002, had a strictly defined monitoring role. After operating for six years, its activities were terminated on 16 January 2008, just two weeks after the Sri Lankan Government’s withdrawal from the CFA. Like the CFA to which it was inextricably linked, it was extensively criticised during its active years and subsequently. As a Norwegian report issued in November 2011 stated, some LTTE sympathisers blamed the Norwegians for being complicit in a process that weakened the rebel movement, while among Muslim and Sinhala constituencies there was perceived Norwegian appeasement of the LTTE. Within Sri Lanka a damning critique of the SLMM was included in the December 2011 report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission”.
3 ARE SAFETY ZONES INHERENTLY PROBLEMATIC?
According to the extract: “What went wrong in the no fire zone in Sri Lanka that had been unilaterally proclaimed by the Sri Lankan Army? They proved in the end to be a death trap for many who had fled there. Far from being safety zones, they turned out to be extraordinarily unsafe. Why was this so? From a variety of sources, we now have a picture of zones where there were repeated shelling including many on or in the area of hospitals. There is pervasive evidence that there was a strong LTTE presence and that the LTTE did not permit the civilians to leave”.
“There are some structural reasons for these failures. A proclaimed safety zone is likely to contain, and even attract, large number of civilians, but also some belligerent forces, who may themselves seek safety there or may plan and conduct military operations from safe area, or may want to control movement of civilians in and out of it. They may even seek to practice ‘lawfare’, where belligerents by inducing or faking attacks on civilians try to present their adversaries as violating the laws of war. Unless there are significant and properly thought-out arrangements for defence management of a safety zone, it can become a magnet for military involvement and activities of all kinds”.
COMMENTS on the THREE QUESTIONS
CFAs and External Roles in conflicts between Sovereign States is vastly different to CFAs and External Roles in Internal Armed Conflicts. The primary reason being that in the case of the former, sovereign States can be held accountable for violations of International Law relating to Armed Conflicts, while in the case of the latter, where non-state actors and sovereign States are involved in internal Armed Conflicts, rules of war are not enforceable to equal degrees between parties to the conflict because non-state actors such as the LTTE, in reality, cannot be held accountable to the same degree as the Sri Lankan State, despite being equal parties to the Armed Conflict as stated in the CFA.
This difference was exploited by the LTTE when they concealed their identities by shedding their distinctive uniforms and took the civilians in the safety zones hostage and used them as a human shield and resorted to ‘lawfare’ as described by Sir Roberts, thus making the safety zones “Inherently Problematic”. In the context of how events unfolded, the fourth question that should be asked is whether the Sri Lankan State is more accountable for violations committed by adopting the strategy of “safety zones” with the intention of ensuring the safety of the civilians or the LTTE who exploited the opportunity presented to their advantage, by merging with the civilians in complete disregard to their plight.
A fifth question is whether the adoption of the strategy of a CFA was entirely an initiative of the Sri Lankan State or did Sri Lanka capitulate under external pressure of the Norwegians considering the fact that it was the Norwegians who brokered the CFA to give legitimacy to the LTTE similar to current relentless pressures by the likes of Volker Turk for investigation and prosecution? Under the circumstances, should not the Norwegians also be a party to the accountability exercise?
In view of these serious questions to which there are no ready answers, the statement that is reported to be in the forthcoming Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk, appears to be nothing but an exercise to look for a ready scape goat – the Sri Lankan State, in the absence of anyone to represent the LTTE when it states: “While the primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes under international law and ensuring accountability lies with the Government of Sri Lanka, this can be complimented and supported by international means”(Daily FT, August 14, 2025) For the UNHRC to continue to recommend External Roles, notwithstanding the difficulties raised by Sir Roberts cited above, is not to have learnt any lessons from the past.
One lesson that should be learnt is to acknowledge the complexity of the issues involved with the Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka because the many players associated with it, make it next to impossible to hold one party or individual accountable. Is it the party that recommends a strategy or the one who implements it, despite its “structural flaws and vulnerabilities”? Investigating and prosecuting as recommended by Volker Turk can only apply to individual penal responsibility. If Command responsibility also applies, it should apply to all who participate in pressuring the Government of Sri Lanka without diligent appraisal and failing to take into account the demonstrated character of the LTTE was “more out of habit than from a realistic appraisal of a particular situation”.as stated by Sir Roberts.
AN ALTERNATIVE
As stated in Sir Robert’s extracts, although Kadirgamar was critical of the CFA, “He did not spell out exactly what the alternative to the CFA might be”. However, there was an alternative. In the course of the review of Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda’s “The Turning Point”, C.A. Chandraprema states: “Throughout the decade of the 1980s, as separatist terrorism developed into a full blown civil war, nobody had given much thought to a comprehensive strategy to defeat the LTTE. However, after the Indian involvement ended in 1990, and Sri Lanka was left to its own devices, the need for such a strategy became evident. In June 1991, the then Army Chief of Staff, Major General Cecil Waidyaratne, submitted to the government a document outlining an overall strategy to conclusively defeat the LTTE. One of the recommendations in the Major General’s proposal was that the Navy should be expanded more than the Army. His argument was that the terrorists were dependent on arms and supplies by sea and the cutting off of such supplies would enable the Army to successfully combat terrorism on land” (The Island, August 11, 2025).
I am personally aware of a similar proposal being sent to former President J.R. Jayewardene, who had it read out to him at his breakfast table. Apparently, it was presented to the Service Chiefs but was dismissed by them on grounds that the conflict in Sri Lanka was a Land war. Whatever the underlying reasons may have been, personal or strategic, the fact that the concept of denying supplies to the enemy is as old as warfare, and therefore cannot and should not have been discounted. The idea of the proposal was to build up the Navy to create a “Cordon Sanitaire”, out at sea and away from civilians, instead of along the coast, to prevent arms and supplies from reaching the LTTE and thus gradually ending the conflict through attrition. Had former Governments considered this option seriously, considering that its merits far outweigh the cost of a Land war, Sri Lanka would not be facing the multiplicity of charges it is now being presented with.
CONCLUSION
Emeritus Professor of Balliol College, University of Oxford, Sir Adam Roberts, in his book “Democracy, Sovereignty and Terror – Lakshman Kadirgamar on the Foundation of International Order”, presents three defining questions as challenges to Conflict Resolution. They are the Cease Fire Agreement, External Role in the Armed Conflict and Safety Zones. By raising these questions, Sir Roberts highlights the “structural flaws and vulnerabilities” of the strategies deployed during Sri Lanka’s Armed Conflict making them a barrier to post-conflict reconciliation.
In such a context for Volker Turk to propose “investigating and prosecuting crimes under international law”, reflects his inability to make a realistic appraisal of the challenges involved due to the fact that after 16 years in which the members of the LTTE who were responsible for individual violations and others for command and control of violations cannot be located and identified. Since they are not likely to volunteer, tracking them in various parts of the world would not only be a daunting undertaking but also time consuming not to mention the prohibitive cost. On the other hand, such challenges would be significantly less in the case of Sri Lankan Security Forces. The net effect is a seriously flawed and skewed outcome where investigations and prosecutions against the Security Forces would far outweigh those against former members of the LTTE. Such disparities would NOT facilitate a reconciled nation but instead, one that would be even more bitter and polarized. As for Volker Turk, should he not be held accountable for a failed outcome, as it was with the External Role of Norway.
The only hope for Sri Lanka is for it to be blessed with a Government that has the Chutzpah to make a realistic appraisal of the ground situation and acknowledge that, instead of adopting the strategy recommended by Volker Turk which is in keeping with external values of Retributive Justice followed by inevitable bitterness associated with it, to adopt a strategy that mirrors Sri Lanka’s heritage of Restorative Justice as being in its long term best interests. Such a strategy would be to grant a general amnesty to all associated with the Armed Conflict and focus on the present by attending to the physical wellbeing of the survivors of all communities in a tangible way. (https://island.lk/a-model-for-reconciliation/).
What Sri Lanka is witnessing today is the cost of choosing wrong strategies in the execution of Sri Lanka’s Armed Conflict. Having missed the opportunity to neutralize the capabilities of the LTTE by means of a Naval “Cordon Sanitaire” out at sea to prevent arms and supplies reaching the LTTE; a strategy that was adopted only during the latter stages of the Armed Conflict. Even at this late stage, the government should, invest in building a strong Navy to defend the interests and security of Sri Lanka if Sri Lanka is to overcome persistent threats from drug smuggling, human trafficking, illegal poaching etc. and the destruction of maritime resources caused by bottom trawling. In addition, Sri Lanka has to acknowledge that there is a compelling need to equip itself with a strong Navy backed by Air surveillance to ensure its security independent of others, for its security and the protection of its resources in its territorial waters and beyond, in the Exclusive Economic Zone.
Features
Relief without recovery
The escalating conflict in the Middle East is of such magnitude, with loss of life, destruction of cities, and global energy shortages, that it is diverting attention worldwide and in Sri Lanka, from other serious problems. Barely four months ago Sri Lanka experienced a cyclone of epic proportions that caused torrential rains, accompanied by floods and landslides. The immediate displacement exceeded one million people, though the number of deaths was about 640, with around 200 others reported missing. The visual images of entire towns and villages being inundated, with some swept away by floodwaters, evoked an overwhelming humanitarian response from the general population.
When the crisis of displacement was at its height there was a concerted public response. People set up emergency kitchens and volunteer clean up teams fanned out to make flooded homes inhabitable again. Religious institutions, civil society organisations and local communities worked together to assist the displaced. For a brief period the country witnessed a powerful demonstration of social solidarity. The scale of the devastation prompted the government to offer generous aid packages. These included assistance for the rebuilding of damaged houses, support for building new houses, grants for clean up operations and rent payments to displaced families. Welfare centres were also set up for those unable to find temporary housing.
The government also appointed a Presidential Task Force to lead post-cyclone rebuilding efforts. The mandate of the Task Force is to coordinate post-disaster response mechanisms, streamline institutional efforts and ensure the effective implementation of rebuilding programmes in the aftermath of the cyclone. The body comprises a high-level team, led by the Prime Minister, and including cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, provincial-level officials, senior public servants, representing key state institutions, and civil society representatives. It was envisaged that the Task Force would function as the central coordinating authority, working with government agencies and other stakeholders to accelerate recovery initiatives and restore essential services in affected regions.
Demotivated Service
However, four months later a visit to one of the worst of the cyclone affected areas to meet with affected families from five villages revealed that they remained stranded and in a state of limbo. Most of these people had suffered terribly from the cyclone. Some had lost their homes. A few had lost family members. Many had been informed that the land on which they lived had become unsafe and that they would need to relocate. Most of them had received the promised money for clean up and some had received rent payments for two months. However, little had happened beyond this. The longer term process of rebuilding houses, securing land and restoring livelihoods has barely begun. As a result, families who had already endured the trauma of disaster, now face prolonged uncertainty about their future. It seems that once again the promises made by the political leadership has not reached the ground.
A government officer explained that the public service was highly demotivated. According to him, many officials felt that they had too much work piled upon them with too little resources to do much about it. They also believed that they were underpaid for the work they were expected to carry out. In fact, there had even been a call by public officials specially assigned to cyclone relief work to go on strike due to complaints about their conditions of work. This government official appreciated the government leadership’s commitment to non corruption. But he noted the irony that this had also contributed to a demotivation of the public service. This was on the unjustifiable basis that approving and implementing projects more quickly requires an incentive system.
Whether or not this explanation fully captures the situation, it points to an issue that the government needs to address. Disaster recovery requires a proactive public administration. Officials need to reach out to affected communities, provide clear information and help them navigate the complex procedures required to access assistance. At the consultation with cyclone victims this was precisely the concern that people raised. They said that government officers were not proactive in reaching out to them. Many felt they had little engagement with the state and that the government officers did not come to them. This suggests that the government system at the community level could be supported by non-governmental organisations that have the capacity and experience of working with communities at the grassroots.
In situations such as this the government needs to think about ways of motivating public officials to do more rather than less. It needs to identify legitimate incentives that reward initiative and performance. These could include special allowances for those working in disaster affected areas, recognition and promotion for officers who successfully complete relief and reconstruction work, and the provision of additional staff and logistical support so that the workload is manageable. Clear targets and deadlines, with support from the non-governmental sector, can also encourage officials to act more proactively. When government officers feel supported and recognised for the extra effort required, they are more likely to engage actively with affected communities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most.
Political Solutions
Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the cyclone victims do not know what to do. The government needs to act on this without further delay. Government policy states that families can receive financial assistance of up to Rs 5 million to build new houses if they have identified the land on which they wish to build. But there is little freehold land available in many of the affected areas. As a result, people cannot show government officials the land they plan to buy and, therefore, cannot access the government’s promised funds. The government needs to address this issue by providing a list of available places for resettlement, both within and outside the area they live in. However, another finding at the meeting was that many cyclone victims whose lands have been declared unsafe do not wish to leave them. Even those who have been told that their land is unstable feel more comfortable remaining where they have lived for many years. Relocating to an unfamiliar area is not an easy decision.
Another problem the victims face is the difficulty of obtaining the documents necessary to receive compensation. Families with missing members cannot prove that their loved ones are no longer alive. Without official confirmation they cannot access property rights or benefits that would normally pass to surviving family members. These are problems that Sri Lanka has faced before in the context of the three decade long internal war. It has set up new legal mechanisms such as the provision of certificates of absence validated by the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in place of death certificates when individuals remain missing for long periods. The government also needs to be sensitive to the fact that people who are farmers cannot be settled anywhere. Farming is not possible in every location. Access to suitable land and water is essential if farmers are to rebuild their livelihoods. Relocation programmes that fail to take these realities into account risk creating new psychological and economic hardships.
The message from the consultation with cyclone victims is that the government needs to talk more and engage more directly with affected communities. At the same time the political leadership at the highest levels need to resolve the problems that government officers on the ground cannot solve. Issues relating to land availability, legal documentation and livelihood restoration require policy decisions at higher levels. The challenge to the government to address these issues in the context of the Iran war and possible global catastrophe will require a special commitment. Demonstrating that Sri Lanka is a society that considers the wellbeing of all its citizens to be a priority will require not only financial assistance but also a motivated public service and proactive political leadership that reaches out to those still waiting to rebuild their lives.
by Jehan Perera
Features
Supporting Victims: The missing link in combating ragging
A recent panel discussion at the University of Peradeniya examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s judgement on ragging, in which the Court recognised that preventing ragging requires not only criminal penalties imposed after an incident occurs but also systems and processes within universities that enable victims to speak up and receive support. Bringing together perspectives from law, university administration, psychology and students, the discussion sought to understand why ragging continues to persist in Sri Lankan universities despite the existence of legal prohibitions. While the discussion covered legal and institutional dimensions, one theme emerged clearly: addressing ragging requires more than laws and disciplinary rules. It requires institutions that are capable of supporting victims.
Sri Lanka enacted the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Educational Institutions Act No. 20 of 1998 following several tragic incidents in universities, during the 1990s. Among the most widely remembered is the death of engineering student S. Varapragash at the University of Peradeniya in 1997. Incidents such as this shocked the country and revealed the consequences of allowing violent forms of student hierarchy to persist. The 1998 Act marked an important legal intervention by recognising ragging as a criminal offence. The law introduced severe penalties for individuals found guilty of engaging in ragging or other forms of violence in educational institutions, including fines and imprisonment.
Despite the existence of this law for nearly three decades, prosecutions under the Act have been extremely rare. Incidents continue to surface across universities although most are not reported. The incidents that do reach university administrations are dealt with internally through disciplinary procedures rather than through the criminal justice system. This suggests that the problem does not lie solely in the absence of legal provisions but also in the ability of victims to come forward and pursue complaints.
The tragic reminders; the cases of Varapragash and Pasindu Hirushan
Varapragash, a first-year engineering student at the University of Peradeniya, was forced by senior students to perform extreme physical exercises as part of ragging, resulting in severe internal injuries and acute renal failure that ultimately led to his death. In 2022, the courts upheld the conviction of one of the perpetrators for abduction and murder. The case illustrates not only the brutality of ragging but also how long and difficult the path to justice can be for victims and their families. Even when victims speak about their experiences, they may not always disclose the full extent of what they have endured. In the case of Varapragash, the judgement records that the victim told his father that he was asked to do dips and sit-ups. Varapragash’s father had testified that it appeared his son was not revealing the exact details of what he had to endure due to shame.
More than two decades after the death of Varapragash, the tragedy of ragging continues. The 2025 Supreme Court judgement arose from the case of Pasindu Hirushan, a 21-year-old student of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, who sustained devastating head injuries at a fresher’s party, in March 2020, after a tyre sent down the stairs by senior students struck him. He became immobile, was placed on life support, and returned home only months later. If the Varapragash case exposed the deadly consequences of ragging in the 1990s, the Pasindu Hirushan case demonstrates that universities are still failing to prevent serious violence, decades after the enactment of the 1998 Act. It was against this background of continuing institutional failure that the Supreme Court issued its Orders of Court in 2025. Among the key mechanisms emphasised by the judgement is the establishment of Victim Support Committees within universities.
Why do victims need support?
Ragging in universities can take many forms, including verbal humiliation, physical abuse, emotional intimidation and, in some instances, sexual harassment. While all forms of ragging can have serious consequences, incidents involving sexual harassment often present additional barriers for victims who wish to come forward. Victims may hesitate to complain due to weak institutional mechanisms, fear of retaliation, or uncertainty about whether their experiences will be taken seriously. In many cases, those who speak out are confronted with questions that shift attention away from the alleged misconduct and onto their own behaviour: why did s/he continue the conversation?; why did s/he not simply disengage, if the harassment occurred as claimed?; why did s/he remain in the environment?; or did his/her actions somehow encourage the accused’s behaviour? Such responses illustrate how easily victims can be subjected to a second layer of scrutiny when they attempt to report incidents. When individuals anticipate disbelief, minimisation or blame, silence may appear safer than disclosure. In such circumstances, the presence of a trusted institutional body, capable of providing guidance, protection and support, become critically important, highlighting the need for effective Victim Support Committees within universities.
What Victim Support Committees must do
As expected by the Supreme Court, an effective Victim Support Committee should function as a trusted institutional mechanism that places the safety and dignity of victims at the centre of its work. The committee must provide a safe and confidential point of contact through which victims can report incidents of ragging without fear of intimidation or retaliation. It should assist victims in understanding and pursuing available complaint procedures, while also ensuring their immediate protection where there is a risk of continued harassment. Recognising the psychological harm ragging may cause, the committee should facilitate access to counselling and emotional support services. At a practical level, it should also help victims document incidents, record statements, and preserve evidence that may be necessary for disciplinary or legal proceedings. The committee must coordinate with university authorities to ensure that complaints are addressed promptly and responsibly, while maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the identity and well-being of those who come forward. Beyond responding to individual cases, Victim Support Committees should also contribute to broader awareness and prevention efforts, within universities, helping to create an environment where ragging is actively discouraged and students feel safe to report incidents. Without such support, the process of pursuing justice can become overwhelming for individuals who are already dealing with the emotional impact of abuse.
Making Victim Support Committees work
According to the Orders of Court, these committees should include representatives from the academic and non-academic staff, a qualified counsellor and/or clinical psychologist, an independent person, from outside the institution, with experience in law enforcement, health, or social services, and not more than three final-year students, with unblemished academic and disciplinary records, appointed for fixed terms. Further, universities must ensure that committees consist of individuals who possess both expertise and genuine commitment in areas such as student welfare, psychology, gender studies, human rights and law enforcement, in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s directions, rather than consisting largely of ex officio positions. If treated as routine administrative positions, rather than responsibilities requiring specialised knowledge, sensitivity and empathy, these committees risk becoming symbolic rather than functional.
Greater transparency in the appointment process could strengthen the credibility of these committees. Universities could invite expressions of interest from individuals with relevant expertise and demonstrated commitment to supporting victims. Such an approach would help ensure that the committees benefit from the knowledge and dedication of those best equipped to fulfil this role.
The Supreme Court judgement also introduces an important safeguard by giving the University Grants Commission (UGC) the authority to appoint members to university-level Victim Support Committees. If exercised with integrity, this provision could help ensure that these committees operate with greater independence. It may also help address a challenge that sometimes arises within institutions, where individuals, with relevant expertise, or strong commitment to addressing issues, such as violence, harassment or student welfare, may not always be included in institutional mechanisms due to internal administrative preferences. External oversight by the UGC could, therefore, create opportunities for such individuals to contribute meaningfully to Victim Support Committees and strengthen their effectiveness.
Ultimately, the success of the recent judgement will depend not only on the directives it issued, the number of committees universities establish, or the number of meetings they convene, or other box-checking exercises, but on how sincerely those directives are implemented and the trust these committees inspire among students and staff. Laws can prohibit ragging, but they cannot by themselves create environments in which victims feel safe to speak. That responsibility lies with institutions. When universities create systems that listen to victims, support them and treat their experiences with seriousness, universities will become places where dignity and learning can coexist.
(Udari Abeyasinghe is attached to the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
by Udari Abeyasinghe
Features
Big scene … in the Seychelles
Several of our artistes do venture out on foreign assignments but, I’m told, most of their performances are mainly for the Sri Lankans based abroad.
However, the group Mirage is doing it differently and they are now in great demand in the Seychelles.
Guests patronising the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, in the Seychelles, is made up of a wide variety of nationalities, including Russians, Chinese, French and Germans, and they all enjoy the music dished out by Mirage, and that is precisely why they are off to the Seychelles … for the fifth time!
The band is scheduled to leave this month and will be back after three weeks, but their journey to the Seychelles will continue, with two more assignments lined up for 2026.
In August it’s a four-week contract, and in December another four-week contract that will take in the festive celebrations … Christmas and the New Year.

Donald’s birthday
celebrations
According to reports coming my way, it is a happening scene at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, whenever Mirage is featured, and the band has even adjusted its repertoire to include local and African songs.
They work three hours per day and six days per week at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant.

Donald Pieries:
Leader, vocalist,
drummer
Led by vocalist and drummer Donald Pieries, many say it is his
musical talents and leadership that have contributed to the band’s success.
Donald, who celebrated his birthday on 07 March, at the Irish Pub, has been with the group through various lineup changes and is known for his strong vocals.
He leads a very talented and versatile line up, with Sudham (bass/vocals), Gayan (lead guitar/vocals), Danu (female vocalist) and Toosha (keyboards/vocals).
Mirage performs regularly at venues like the Irish Pub in Colombo and also at Food Harbour, Port City.
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