Connect with us

Features

Standoff between Church and State

Published

on

The 1962 coup – Part II

A group of senior Police and Military officers attempted to overthrow the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Government. They were driven by three critical events in the years leading up to January 1962. The coup participants belonged to the Westernised urban middle class who were alarmed at the undermining of the secular plural state and government.

By Jayantha Somasundaram

(Part I of this article appeared yesterday)

The first trigger was the anti-Tamil violence of 1958. The second trigger was the growing confrontation between the regime and the Christian community, particularly the Roman Catholic Church.

As soon as he took office S. W. R. D Bandaranaike had 21 CID and Special Branch gazetted officers resign or retire. Half of them were non-Sinhalese and the majority were reported to be Christian. Despite that, in 1957, 29 percent of the gazetted police officers were Burghers and about 65 percent were Christian. The situation in the military was no different during British times while the officers in the Army were mainly British, Burghers accounted for half the troops.

This anomaly goes back to 1902, when a Cadet Battalion was set up as part of the Ceylon Light Infantry Volunteers with companies initially in Royal College and then in the Christian public schools S. Thomas’ and Wesley in Colombo, Trinity and Kingswood in Kandy and Richmond in Galle. Buddhist and Hindu schools were late in introducing cadetting because of their adherence to ahimsa. When the Ceylon Army was established in 1949 the initial Officer Cadets sent to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for training were also largely from the ethnic and religious minorities. “Buddhist parents did not like their sons in the army … Perhaps there is something of the Buddhist aversion to killing in this prejudice …. There is an ancient tradition among the Sinhalese of employing mercenaries: Malays, Moors, Malabars, Tamils,” speculates Horowitz.

Despite their huge influence, the Protestant Christians in Sri Lanka were numerically small, a metropolitan minority making up one percent of the national population. By contrast, the Portuguese religious impact had resulted in a Roman Catholic community in the country that comprised seven percent. And unlike the Protestants who were split among numerous denominations, the Roman Catholics were united in a single church and fiercely loyal to their faith.

Neil Quintus Dias

The majority community as well as the regime feared what was termed ‘Catholic Action’, the attempt by lay Catholics to spread Catholic influence in a host society. “‘Bauddha Balavegaya (Buddhist Force) formed by L. H. Mettananda former principal of Ananda College, Neil Quintus (NQ) Dias, PM Sirimavo’s Defence Secretary and several other prominent Sinhala Buddhist nationalist leaders’ stand against ‘Catholic Action’ was well known. However, the existence of such a secretive campaign remained a mystery,” writes K. K. S. Perera (The Nation 4/11/12)

“N.Q. Dias was well known for his strong stand against ‘Catholic Action’ as it was then called,” wrote Bradman Weerakoon in Rendering Unto Caesar. “His actions in regard to the defence establishment and police were also being watched by the upper echelons of the three forces which were then largely manned by non-Buddhist officers.”

First the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Regime removed both local and foreign Catholic nursing nuns from state hospitals. This was followed by a decision to nationalise the assisted schools.

The school system was three-tiered. First, a small number of fee-levying public schools run mainly by the Anglican Church; they received no state financial support. Second, fee-levying denominational schools, mainly Roman Catholic, called assisted schools; they received government funding. Third, state owned schools which levied no fees.

The Catholic population is concentrated along the coastal belt stretching from Chilaw to Kalutara. In November 1960, the Army was brought in for internal security duties relating to the schools takeover; the 1st Battalion the Ceylon Light Infantry (1 CLI) covered Aluthgama, Ja-ela, Katunayake, Panadura and Kalutara. “There were demands in the Cabinet to … move forcefully against Christians protesting the takeover of the denominational schools,” explains Horowitz.

On the motive for the Coup, Sidney de Zoysa former Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) said, “The great issue then was the schools take-over. N. Q. Dias was a Buddhist chauvinist, and determined to take everything over into a Buddhist state. And Felix Dias was talking about a dictatorship and arguing that it would be a good thing,” wrote K. M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins in J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka Vol II.

A Christian education for their children is vital and critical to Roman Catholics and the takeover of denominational schools was bitterly opposed by the Church. Parents occupied the schools and a siege mentality developed. Finally, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had to request Cardinal Garcia of Bombay to go to Sri Lanka and mediate between the Church and the government to defuse the standoff. The final outcome however was that many denominational schools were taken into the state system with a minority in the cities being allowed to remain the property of the churches, but the latter could neither levy fees nor receive government assistance.

Tamil Satyagraha

When she became Prime Minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike proceeded to implement the Official Language Act. And in January 1961 Sinhala became the country’s operative official language. “Army officers who were Sinhala Christians retired under the language Act because they thought their careers had no future,” writes Patrick Peebles in The History of Sri Lanka. “The police had been about three-fourths Christian. In 1962 police and military officers staged a coup attempt led not by Tamils but by Sinhala Christians.”

K. M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins in J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka Vol II conclude, “N. Q. Dias was suspect to them as the leader of a powerful religio-political force in the government – the Bauddha Jatika Balavegaya – intent on establishing control over the machinery of government for themselves by championing the cause of the Sinhala Buddhist majority. He was seen as the evil genius behind the government’s policies since Mrs. Bandaranaike came to power, directed against the minorities – Christians and Tamils.

“A former Cabinet Minister in Mrs. Bandaranaike’s Government reported tremendous pressure from Sinhalese Civil Servants to enforce strict language requirements on their Tamil colleagues in the hope of forcing them out,” says Horowitz, “N.Q. Dias is said to have made life difficult for Tamil Civil Servants, helping to push some out because of disqualification in Sinhalese.”

These events led to the Federal Party launching a Satyagraha, a civil disobedience campaign across the northern and eastern provinces, bringing government administration to a standstill. The third trigger for the coup participants was the use of the Army against the Tamil Satyagraha.

One of the coup participants who had been assigned to Jaffna found the
Satyagraha peaceful and advised against the use of force. But when he sat in on a Cabinet discussion he found that the Government wanted to use the Army in the North to “teach the Tamils a lesson.”

The government therefore ordered the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment to Jaffna.
But when it was time to entrain, the commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Willie Abrahams MBE, and his second in command Major Ignatius Loyola, who were Tamil Catholics, were barred from accompanying the regiment. Instead, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Udugama MBE, an infantry officer who was a kinsman of Mrs. Bandaranaike was placed in command. The troops protested at the station, refusing to entrain without their commanders until Colonel Abrahams prevailed upon them to proceed without him.

Army occupation of

North and East

Leaders of the Federal Party were arrested and detained at the Army Cantonment, Panagoda. Lt Col Richard Udugama was appointed Coordinating Officer Jaffna District, with Lt Col Lyn Wickremasuriya (Trincomalee), Lt Col P. D. Ramanayake (Batticaloa), Major S.T.B. Sally (Mannar) and Major C.F. Fernando (Vavuniya). And a state of emergency was declared.

“The Army brutalized the peaceful protesters … (and) began a two year long occupation of the Northern and Eastern Provinces,” writes Brian Blodgett in Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission 1949-2004. The government also began to establish “several permanent camps in the northern and eastern sectors of the country.” N. Q. Dias wanted to increase the armed forces deployed to the north and east and the creation of new military bases in Arippu, Maricchikatti, Pallai, Thalvapadu, Pooneryn, Karainagar, Palaly, Point Pedro, Elephant Pass, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee.

The deployment of the Army to deal with what was essentially a civil political issue was viewed by many Ceylonese with a liberal secular outlook, as deliberately provocative. And this sentiment, though more latent, was also shared by both the cosmopolitan Tamils living in Colombo who considered themselves essentially Ceylonese as well as the more conservative Tamil-speaking people of the North and East. In Sri Lanka: Political-Military Relations Prof K. M de Silva wrote, “The attitude of the Tamils to the police and the security forces stationed there began to change in the 1960s and with it their view of the role the forces played. In the Jaffna peninsula, the principal centre of Tamil residence in the island, the police began to be seen as part of the state security network devised to keep the Tamils down.”

These developments were compounded by what Blodgett believed was Mrs. Bandaranaike’s desire for more Sinhalese Buddhist officers in order to “give them greater influence in running of the armed services”, when Mrs. Bandaranaike took over as Prime Minister in July 1960. He quotes K.M. de Silva who says that with the new government there was a major shift in “the ethnic and religious composition of the officer corp.

“Interpreters frequently note that ‘all but a few of the accused were Christians, mostly Roman Catholics.’ And they generally view the coup as a Christian reaction to the Buddhist resurgence and ascendency of the several years preceding 1962,” writes Donald Horowitz. “The heavily Westernised English-speaking, urban elite felt itself under stress. So did the ethnic and religious minorities: Tamils, Burghers, and Sinhalese Christians. The urban elite and the minorities were well represented in the officer corps of all the armed services and among the conspirators as well.”

Horowitz goes on: “‘The politicians were treating the country as if it belonged only to the Sinhalese who were Buddhists and no one else,’ argued a Sinhalese Christian Police Officer. Other Sinhalese officers, Christian and Buddhist, agreed.”

Felix Dias

“Although dispirited, those adversely affected by the post-1956 changes had not given up. Among Tamils there was some tendency to espouse the federalist solution…excluded from all the opportunities Colombo afforded at least they could return to administer their own areas in Jaffna … For non-Tamils, this course was not open. They dreamed not of an Asian Switzerland, where ethnic groups might coexist in an amicable territorial separatism; their model was rather of a tolerant, cheek-by-jowl cosmopolitanism in which a person’s origins might affect what he ate or where he worshipped but would have no public importance. The potency of these ideals … were held … because it was known that they were the ideals of the wider world beyond Sri Lanka’s shores,” concludes Donald Horowitz.

The Coup participants realised that Udugama was being groomed to take over command of the Army by promoting him over his seniors. He had organised a Buddhist Association within the Army, and officers including Buddhists who refused to be drawn into his Association regarded him with disdain.

For those who launched the coup the personification of the growing authoritarian-theocratic trend was Felix Dias, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and nephew of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. At their trial they asserted that the coup was a pre-emptive move to thwart a dictatorship by Felix Dias. According to one of the Coup participants “If Felix Dias had established himself in power … his regime would have rested on Sinhala Buddhist sentiment.”

By now military commanders were convinced that their authority was eroding and being replaced by an insidious dictatorship. “Felix Dias had at a meeting … in reference to conditions in Russia, stated that a little bit of totalitarianism might be of benefit to Ceylon.” (Trial-at-Bar)

“Felix Dias had antagonised many of the senior police and military officers by his interference in details of administration and by a hauteur which they found insufferable in one so young and inexperienced.” (K. M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka Vol II)

“The majority of the conspirators reserved their most extreme animosity for Felix Dias … Because of his political position and personal style, the conspirators distrusted and disliked him …” explains Donald Horowitz. “Their characterisations of him were unflattering in the extreme: ‘the most arrogant bastard you ever met … pompous … revengeful … untruthful … a bit mad.”

To be continued



Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

Coping with Batalanda’s emergence to centre stage

Published

on

Bimal Ratnayake tabling the Batalanda report in Parliament recently.

by Jehan Perera

The Batalanda Commission report which goes into details of what happened during the JVP insurrection of 1987-89 has become the centre of public attention. The controversy has long been a point of contention and a reminder of the country’s troubled past and entrenched divisions that still exist. The events that occurred at Batalanda during the violent suppression of the JVP-led insurgency, remain a raw wound, as seen in the sudden resurfacing of the issue. The scars of violence and war still run deep. At a time when the country is grappling with pressing challenges ranging from economic recovery to social stability, there is a need to keep in focus the broader goal of unity for long-term peace and prosperity. But the ghosts of the past need also to be put to rest without continuing to haunt the present and future.

Grisly accounts of what transpired at Batalanda now fill the social media even in the Tamil media, though Tamils were not specifically targeted at that time. There was then a ceasefire between the government and LTTE. The Indo-Lanka Accord had just been signed and the LTTE were fighting the Indian peacekeeping army. The videos that are now circulating on social media would show the Tamil people that they were not the only ones at the receiving end of counter-terrorist measures. The Sinhalese were in danger then, as it was a rebellion of Sinhalese against the state. Sinhalese youth had to be especially careful.

It appears that former president Ranil Wickremesinghe was caught unprepared by the questions from a team from Al Jazeera television. The answers he gave, in which he downplayed the significance of the Batalanda Commission report have been viewed differently, depending on the perspective of the observer. He has also made a statement in which he has rejected the report. The report, which demands introspection, referred to events that had taken place 37 years earlier. But the ghosts of the past have returned. After the issue has come to the fore, there are many relatives and acquaintances of the victims from different backgrounds who are demanding justice and offering to come forward to give evidence of what they had witnessed. They need closure after so many years.

MORE POLARISATION

The public reaction to the airing of the Al Jazeera television programme is a reminder that atrocities that have taken place cannot be easily buried. The government has tabled the Batalanda Commission report in parliament and hold a two-day debate on it. The two days were to be consecutive but now the government has decided to space them out over two months. There is reason to be concerned about what transpires in the debate. The atrocities that took place during the JVP insurrection involved multiple parties. Batalanda was not the only interrogation site or the only torture chamber. There were many others. Former president Ranil Wickremesinghe was not the only prominent protagonist in the events that transpired at that time.

The atrocities of the late 1980s were not confined to one location, nor were they the responsibility of a single individual or group. The JVP engaged in many atrocities and human rights violations. In addition to members of the former government and military who engaged in counter-terrorism operations there were also other groups that engaged both in self-defence and mayhem. These included members of left political parties who were targeted by the JVP and who formed their own para-military groups. Some of the leaders went on to become ministers in succeeding governments and even represented Sri Lanka at international human rights forums. Even members of the present government will not be able to escape the fallout of the debate over the Batalanda Commission report.

If the debate becomes a battleground for assigning blame rather than seeking solutions, it could have far-reaching consequences for Sri Lanka’s social and political stability. Economic recovery, governance reform, and development require stability and cooperation. The present storm caused by the Batalanda Commission report, and the prospects for increased polarisation and hatred do not bode well for the country. Rather than engaging in potentially divisive debates that could lead to further entrenchment of opposing narratives, Sri Lanka would be better served by a structured and impartial approach to truth-seeking and reconciliation.

NATIONAL HEALING

Earlier this month at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, the government rejected the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights assertion that the external evidence gathering unit would continue to collect evidence on human rights violations in Sri Lanka. This evidence gathering unit has a mandate to collect information on a wide range of human rights violations including intimidation and killings of journalists but with a focus on the human rights violations and war crimes during the course of the LTTE war and especially at its end. The government’s position has been that it is determined to deal with human rights challenges including reconciliation through domestic processes.

Addressing the High-Level Segment of the 58th Regular Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva in February this year, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath said: “The contours of a truth and reconciliation framework, will be further discussed with the broadest possible cross section of stakeholders, before operationalisation to ensure a process that has the trust of all Sri Lankans. Our aim is to make the domestic mechanisms credible and sound within the constitutional framework. This will include strengthening the work towards a truth and reconciliation commission empowered to investigate acts of violence caused by racism and religious extremism that give rise to tensions within Sri Lankan society.”

The concept of a truth and reconciliation commission was first broached in 2015 by then prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government. In 2019 after winning the presidential elections, former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa too saw merit in the idea, but neither of these two leaders had the commitment to ensure that the process was completed. Promoting reconciliation in Sri Lanka among divergent political actors with violent political pasts requires a multi-faceted approach that blends political, social, and psychological strategies.

Given the country’s complex history of armed conflict, ethnic tensions, and political polarisation, the process must be carefully designed to build trust, address grievances, and create a shared vision for the future. A truth and reconciliation process as outlined in Geneva by the government, which has teeth in it for both punishment and amnesty, can give the country the time and space in which to uncover the painful truths and the path to national healing.

Continue Reading

Features

Challenging hierarchy? Student grievance mechanisms at state universities

Published

on

Our universities are characterized by hierarchies. They manifest in formal and informal ways, reinforcing power asymmetries based on class, ethnicity and gender, and placing inordinate authority in those with higher status. In medicine, a ‘hidden curriculum’ orients undergraduates to hierarchies from their early days in training, placing professors over lecturers, ‘clinical’ over ‘non-clinical’ teachers, consultants over medical officers, and so on. While hierarchies are needed at universities (and hospitals) to streamline decision-making, dysfunctional hierarchies create unhealthy learning environments and a culture of fear that discourages students from asking questions and voicing concerns. They also legitimize mistreatment, humiliation, bullying, and other abuses of power. A few months ago, when I invited a medical student to participate in a session on ragging and harassment for incoming students, she asked me (quoted with permission), “What’s the point of doing a programme like that if ragging happens in official level by teachers with everyone knowing, Madam?” Her question led me to explore the avenues available at state universities for undergraduates to counter abuses of power by teachers and university administrations.

What can undergrads do?

The University Grants Commission (UGC) and all state universities have established mechanisms for reporting complaints of ragging and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The UGC’s online portal entertains complaints on “all forms of ragging; sexual harassment; sexual or gender based violence; threats and intimidation; bullying; and harassment.” Complaint procedures for ragging and SGBV are described in detail on the websites of each university, as well as the websites of some faculties. Students may also take any complaints directly to the Dean, student counsellors, academic advisors/mentors, and teachers. In addition, many faculties have portals to submit online complaints on ragging and harassment, while others rely on informal mechanisms, like complaint boxes, to protect anonymity. While these systems are used by students to some extent, rarely do they function as checks and balances against abuses of power by teachers and others at the pinnacle of the university hierarchy.

Anyone who works at a state university would know that students (and the university community more broadly) have very little confidence in existing complaint and grievance procedures. While the minority of incidents that get reported may make it to the inquiry stage, the complaints are often withdrawn under threat and intimidation from the authorities or simply brushed under the carpet. More recently, certain universities and faculties have worked towards establishing formal student grievance procedures outside the SGBV/ragging reporting systems.

Newer grievance mechanisms

Sabaragamuwa University appears to be the only university with a university-wide policy for grievance redressal. The protocol described in the standard operating procedure (SOP) requires that students submit their complaint in writing to the Dean or Deputy Senior Student Counsellor of the relevant faculty. On receiving a complaint, a Committee will be set up by the Dean/Deputy Senior Student Counsellor to conduct an inquiry. The Committee will comprise five senior staff members, including “two independent members (one representing another department, and one may represent the Gender Equity and Equality Cell of the Faculty where relevant)…” The SOP further states that “any student can oppose to have his/her mentor and/or any faculty member to be in the five-person team handling his/her issue.” However, this information is available only to the discerning student who is able to navigate the university’s complex website, hit the Centre for Quality Assurance tab, view the list of documents and click ‘best practices’.

Several faculties of medicine appear to have introduced grievance mechanisms. The Grievance Committee of the Faculty of Medicine, Colombo, considers complaints regarding “a decision or action that is perceived to adversely affect the grievant in her or his professional academic capacity.” The procedure requires that students submit the grievance in writing to the Dean. The Committee comprises “persons who are not current employees of the Faculty of Medicine” and the complainant may request the presence of a member of the Medical Students’ Welfare Society. The Faculty of Medicine, Ruhuna, implements a grievance policy that is more expansive in scope, covering concerns related to “organizational changes in the teaching and learning environment, decisions by academic staff members affecting individuals or groups of students, changes in the content or structure of academic programmes, changes in the nature and quality of teaching and assessment, supervision of students undertaking research projects, authorship and intellectual property, [and the] quality of student services and access to university facilities and resources.” While the policy notes that incidents related to harassment, discrimination and bullying, come under the jurisdiction of the university’s SGBV policy, it does not entertain complaints about examinations. The medical faculty of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura (SJP), has an online grievance system that investigates complaints related to “any physical, psychological, academic or any other problem related to the University life”. The system commits to maintaining confidentiality, pledging that “information will not be divulged to members outside the Student Grievances Committee without the student’s permission.”

Gaps in existing systems

The university-wide SGBV/ragging reporting system could be used to address harassment and intimidation of all kinds. Sadly, however, undergraduates appear to be unaware of these possibilities or reluctant to use them. It is unclear as to whether the newer grievance mechanisms at universities and faculties have managed to achieve the desired outcome. Are they used by students and do they lead to constructive changes in the learning environment or do they simply exist to tick the check box of quality assurance? None of the websites report on the number of cases investigated or the kinds of redressal measures taken. If these mechanisms are to be used by students, they must fulfill certain basic requirements.

First and foremost, all students and staff must be made aware of existing grievance mechanisms. Policies and procedures cannot simply be included under a tab buried in the faculty/university website, but need to be placed front and centre. Students should know what steps the institution will take to ensure confidentiality and how those who come forward, including witnesses, will be protected. They should be confident that swift action will be taken when any breaches of confidentiality occur. Inquiries need to be conducted without delay and complainants kept informed of the actions taken. All in all, universities and/or faculties must commit to ensuring integrity and fairness in the grievance process.

Second, the independence of inquiries must be guaranteed. Some universities/faculties have SOPs that require the inclusion of ‘independent’ members in grievance committees—members who are currently non-faculty, academics from other faculties and/or student representatives. Whether the inclusion of non-faculty members would be sufficient to safeguard independence is questionable in fields like medicine where there is a tendency to cover up professional misconduct at all levels. Permitting complainants to have a say in the makeup of the inquiry committee may help to increase confidence in the system. It may be advisable for inquiries to be handled by ombudspersons or others who do not have a stake in the outcome, rather than by academic staff who are part of the university hierarchy.

Third, grievance mechanisms must address the very real possibility of retaliation from university administrations and teachers. The TOR of the Faculty of Medicine, University of Ruhuna, states that the Committee must ensure “students do not suffer any victimization or discrimination as a result of raising complaints or grievances,” but provides no guidance on how this might be accomplished. Any grievance mechanism must address what recourse to action complainants (and witnesses) have in the event of retaliation. At present, there are no regulations in place to ensure that persons alleged of misconduct are not involved in examination procedures. Neither do universities provide any guarantee that complainants’ academic/employment prospects will not be compromised by coming forward. This is especially concerning in medicine where practical assessments of clinical skills and interview-based examinations (viva) are common, and those at higher rank are usually trainers at the postgraduate level.

Going forward

Student grievance mechanisms provide a structured process for students to voice concerns and seek redress when they feel they have been treated unfairly or unjustly by university staff or policies. The mechanisms currently in place at state universities appear to be weak and insufficient. The UGC could call for universities to participate in a consultative process aimed at developing a policy on handling student grievances in ways that promote fairness in academic matters, faculty conduct, and administration at state universities. While such a policy could foster supportive learning environments, build trust between university administrations and students, and protect students from bullying, intimidation and harassment, it must be accompanied by efforts to address and undo dysfunctional hierarchies within our universities.

(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna.)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

By Ramya Kumar

Continue Reading

Features

Big scene for Suzi… at oktoberfest

Published

on

Colombo…Suzi with a fan, from Australia (L) / With bassist Benjy who checked out Suzi’s performance at a five-star venue in Colombo (R)

The months literally keep flying and, before long, we will be celebrating Oktoberfest.

In our scene, Oktoberfest is looked forward to by many and the five-star venues, especially, create the ideal kind of atmosphere for the celebration of this event, held in late September and early October.

Suzi Croner, who was in town last month (February), is already contracted to do the Oktoberfest scene at a popular five-star venue, in the city.

She says she will be performing six consecutive nights, from 23rd to 28th September, along with a band from Germany.

Suzi’s scene in Switzerland

According to Suzi, the organisers have indicated that they are looking forward to welcoming around 1,500 Oktoberfest enthusiasts on all six days the festivities are held.

“I’m really looking forward to doing the needful, especially with a German band, and I know, for sure, it’s going to be awesome.”

In fact, Suzi, of the band Friends’ fame, and now based in Switzerland, indicated that she never expected to come to her land of birth for the second time, this year.

“After my trip to Sri Lanka, in February, I thought I would check things out again next year, but I’m so happy that I don’t have to wait that long to see my fans, music lovers and friends for the second time, in 2025.”

Suzi spent 11 amazing days in Sri Lanka, in February, performing six nights at a five-star venue in Colombo, in addition to doing the ‘Country & Western Nite’ scene, at the Ramada, and an unscheduled performance, as well.

Suzi Croner: Colombo here I come…in September

Her next much-looked-forward to event is ‘Country Night,’ Down Under.

It will be her second appearance at this ‘Country Night’ dance and music lovers, in Melbourne, in particular, are waiting eagerly to give Suzi a rousing welcome.

Suzi’s bubbly personality has made her a hit wherever she performs.

In her hometown of Spreitenbach, in Switzerland, she is a big draw-card at many local events.

Suzi was the frontline vocalist for the group Friends, decades ago, and this outfit, too, had a huge following in the local scene, with a fan club that had over 1,500 members.

The band was based abroad and travelled to Sri Lanka, during the festive season, to keep their fans entertained, and it was, invariably, a full house for all their performances in the scene here.

Continue Reading

Trending