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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part IV

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Sri Lankan Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War

By the end of the Cold War, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy priorities were predominantly shaped by its armed conflict with the LTTE, despite pivotal shifts in its regional and global geopolitical spaces. The significance of the country’s foreign relations was largely viewed through the lens of its strategic needs in the ongoing civil war, often overshadowing other broader regional and global developments.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 and the subsequent establishment of the Provincial Council system under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution failed to bring lasting peace and merely perpetuated the vicious cycle of violence. Meanwhile, the uprising (1987-1989) led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and its ruthless suppression deepened the political and social turmoil and tarnished the country’s democratic credentials, further constraining the government’s ability to focus and react to broad external strategic developments. As a result, the critical shifts occurring in South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the global strategic environment after the Cold War were more or less overlooked in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy decisions.

Following the decisive military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, Sri Lanka underwent a significant shift in its politico-strategic needs, marking the beginning of a new phase in the country’s foreign policy. With the conclusion of the protracted civil war, a different set of issues came to the forefront and decided Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and geopolitical priorities. Accordingly, the evolution of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era can be divided in two distinct phases, with the end of the war in 2009 acting as a pivotal turning point.

Enduring Crises and Foreign Policy

under President Premadasa

When Ranasinghe Premadasa assumed the presidency after a violence-ridden election, Sri Lanka was mired in multi-faceted crises. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), initially deployed to supervise the Peace Accord, quickly found it embroiled in violent conflict with the LTTE in the North. Maneuvering the IPKF’s withdrawal without alienating India became a delicate and daunting challenge. Meanwhile, the brutal suppression of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurgency in the South only deepened the country’s instability and culpability, further intensifying international backlash over human rights violations.

Despite facing significant challenges, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy lacked coherence and strategic direction. The government’s foreign policy responses were often reactive, addressing events in isolation rather than within a broader strategic framework. Decision-making appeared to be driven more by immediate political considerations than by long-term objectives. As a result, Sri Lanka became entrapped in a foreign policy dilemma, struggling to manage multiple crises across various fronts simultaneously.

One of President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s key achievements was persuading/pressuring  India to withdraw the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka in 1990. However, it also strained Indo-Sri Lanka relations in the short term. One of the key achievements of President Ranasinghe Premadasa was persuading India to withdraw the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka. However, this success came at the cost-damaging Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

During a public meeting on June 1, 1989, President Premadasa demanded the complete withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka by July 29, 1989, giving India just two months’ notice. India was taken aback by the manner in which this demand was made and made it clear that Sri Lanka could not impose a unilateral deadline. India was only prepared for a phased withdrawal and had limited options. In response, India made a misguided decision to train a Tamil National Army.

In an effort to pressure India into withdrawing the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka, President Premadasa sought to leverage the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In July 1989, Sri Lanka boycotted the SAARC Ministerial-level meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan. Furthermore, Sri Lanka made it clear that it would not host the SAARC Summit scheduled later that year in Colombo. The Sri Lanka informed SAARC countries that the Summit could not precede in Colombo as long as the IPKF remained stationed in the country against its will (RavinathaAryasinha, 1997: 54)

After V.P. Singh of Janata Dal became Prime Minister of India in December 1989, the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka was expedited. In contrast to Rajiv Gandhi’s position, I.K.Gujral, the External Affairs Minister in the Janata Dal government, stated that “Tamil security is an internal matter of Sri Lanka.” He expressed hope that the Sri Lankan government had learned from the lessons of history and would no longer deny the country’s ethnic minorities their due rights (Sunday Times, 29 April 1990).

However, the rescheduled Summit for Colombo in 1990 was ultimately not held there. The Maldives insisted on hosting the summit in Malé, coinciding with the 25th anniversary of it becoming a Republic. The failure of the planned 1990 summit in Colombo also reflects the complex regional dynamics at the time.

After the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) swiftly reemerged as a formidable military and political force in the North and East of Sri Lanka, setting the stage for the onset of Eelam War II in June 1990. In the 1990s, parallel to the expansion of Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, the LTTE’s international influence grew significantly.

Its front organisations in Western countries became increasingly active, openly fundraising, pressuring host governments on behalf of the LTTE, and even facilitating the transportation of arms and supplies to the conflict zones in Sri Lanka. This growing international network of support posed a substantial challenge to the Sri Lankan government. Moreover, the LTTE frequently framed its actions as a response to alleged human rights violations by the Sri Lankan government, using this narrative to justify its activities and gain international sympathy and support. The complexities of this issue—encompassing both military confrontations and political maneuvering—posed a formidable challenge that required a comprehensive strategy and sharp diplomatic acumen.

The Premadasa administration failed to fully recognise the growing significance of the international public sphere and the increasing prominence of international human rights frameworks. These were often dismissed as instruments of the LTTE’s propaganda. The Sri Lankan government held a largely negative view of Western countries that raised human rights concerns, perceiving these countries as supportive of the LTTE. This perception, coupled with a failure to distinguish between the LTTE and the broader ethnic conflict, impeded the government’s ability to formulate an effective strategy in response to international criticism.

Despite his unconventional approach, President Premadasa recognised that the Foreign Ministry was in disarray, lacking direction amidst the decisive challenges facing the country. In response, he established a Foreign Affairs Study Group, chaired by Dr. Gamani Corea, to address the situation (Dayan Jayatilleka, 2017). The group completed its report on restructuring Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and diplomatic missions, but before it could be presented, President Premadasa was tragically assassinated. Following his death, President Wijetunga, the caretaker president, assumed office but hesitated to take any new initiatives on the matter.

Change Vision and Restructuring under President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga

The efforts to instill a new policy vision and reshape the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) began after the People’s Alliance (PA) assumed power in 1995 under the leadership of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. By the time Kumaratunga assumed the presidency, the MFA was in disarray—lacking direction and burdened by excessive politicisation. To address this, President Kumaratunga appointed Lakshman Kadirgamar as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Drawing on his extensive experience as an international civil servant, Kadirgamar implemented reforms to streamline recruitment, promotions, and diplomatic postings, restoring some order to the MFA. At the same time, the government sought to bolster Sri Lanka’s democratic image on the international stage.

Strengthening the country’s credentials as a functional democracy was viewed as essential for garnering global support in addressing the LTTE military challenge. In this context, internal policy reforms were expected to provide strong backing to a foreign policy with a clear vision and direction.

The PA government marked a significant departure from the antagonistic stance of its predecessors towards international human rights bodies. Recognising the growing influence of the global public sphere on national policies, the PA government made a deliberate effort to engage with key international human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations. These engagements included open dialogues aimed at addressing concerns about Sri Lanka’s human rights situation.

The PA government’s commitment to international human rights standards and norms was demonstrated by its ratification of several major international human rights conventions. Additionally, the PA Government worked to strengthen domestic human rights institutions, particularly the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL), further solidifying its dedication to human rights both within Sri Lanka and on the international stage. These efforts were seen as essential for two reasons: promoting domestic reconciliation and enhancing Sri Lanka’s international credibility.

In light of the geopolitical implications of India’s strategic rise and changes in the South Asian geopolitical landscape, developing strong ties with India remained a key achievement of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under the People’s Alliance (PA) government. After decades of mutual suspicion,

accusations, and tensions, both countries recognised the importance of normalising their relations. President Chandrika Bandaranaike’s new vision and foreign policy approach provided a significant opportunity for a fresh start towards rapprochement. The Indian government’s diplomatic shift, marked by the Gujral Doctrine introduced by External Affairs Minister I. K. Gujral in 1996, further paved the way for improved bi-lateral relations. Indo-Sri Lanka relations had not been as cordial for decades as they were under President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. A key testament to the South Asian policy of the Kumaratunga administration was the 10th SAARC Summit held in Sri Lanka in 1998. During this summit, informal discussions between India and Pakistan, initiated through the personal efforts of President Kumaratunga, marked a critical development in the regional strategic context.

Under President Premadasa, Sri Lanka’s relations with Western powers, particularly Britain and the United States, began to deteriorate rapidly. For a small country like Sri Lanka, which was grappling with a significant internal armed conflict with international Diaspora linkages, navigating the post-Cold War global strategic landscape became a critical challenge. Nearly two-thirds of Sri Lanka’s export market was tied to the West—primarily Britain, the United States, and the European Union. At the same time, the LTTE’s international headquarters operated from Western capitals. Given this, Sri Lanka paid a steep price for its adversarial stance toward these Western powers. In contrast, one of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s notable achievements was her efforts to foster better relations with the West. By implementing internal democratic reforms and adopting the PA’s approach to the ethnic crisis, she created a more favourable environment for diplomatic engagement. This foreign policy shift paid off: In 1996, the United States resumed arms sales to Sri Lanka, and the US “Green Beret” corps began offering advanced training to the Sri Lankan security forces. This military support included specialized training missions by the US Navy SEALs, the US Air Force Special Operations Squadron, and the US Army’s Psychological Operations Group. The proscription of LTTE as a terrorist organization by the United States in October 1997, followed by similar designations from the United Kingdom in 2000 and Australia in 2001, dealt a severe blow to the LTTE international operations.

The dynamics of the crisis, however, posed significant obstacles to the continued implementation of this policy. Negotiations with the LTTE, which began in October 1994, collapsed on April 17, 1995, when the LTTE withdrew from both the talks and the ceasefire after four rounds of discussions. The hope of achieving a negotiated settlement with the LTTE was dashed within six months. The conflict with the LTTE once again became the central focus of foreign policy, but this time, the government’s
approach shifted from defensive to more assertive.

With the onset of Eelam War III, the government launched the Reviresa operation in November–December 1995 and regained control of Jaffna from the LTTE. In September 1996, the government conducted the Sath Jaya operation, which led to the recapture of Kilinochchi. However, the situation began to change in 1998. The government’s attempt to establish a land route to Jaffna failed, resulting in heavy human and material losses. By late 1998, military camps in Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Elephant Pass fell to the LTTE. Between 1999 and 2000, the Sri Lankan government forces suffered continuous setbacks on the military front.

Similarly, the proposal for the devolution of power, which had been incorporated into a draft of the new constitution, became entangled in political debates with the United National Party (UNP). The country had shown readiness to accept devolution through widespread public awareness campaigns, such as the Sudu Nelum movement. However, when the proposal was only presented to Parliament in August 2000, it was rejected by the UNP. As a result, the People’s Alliance (PA) government was unable to fulfill one of its key political promises to both the Tamil people and the international
community.

In 1999, another attempt was made to resume talks with the LTTE, this time with the prospect of third-party facilitation. President Kumaratunga explored the possibility of securing international involvement, with potential facilitators including France, a joint Commonwealth team, and the Vatican. By March 2000, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE agreed on Norway as the mediator. With Norwegian facilitation, a Ceasefire Agreement was drafted between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, scheduled to be signed on April 11, 2001. However, two days before the signing, the LTTE
unexpectedly declared that they would not proceed with the agreement, without providing any explanation for their decision.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella



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Opinion

Hidden truth of Sri Lanka’s debt story: The untold narrative behind the report

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This article presents a quantitative and critical analysis of the volume, composition, and utilization of public debt in Sri Lanka during the period 2024–2026. In general discourse, attention is primarily focused on the size of debt alone. However, this article reveals a broader economic reality by examining the interconnections among debt sources, patterns of utilisation, and repayment capacity.

In particular, when factors such as high debt-to-national-income ratios, limited revenue-generating capacity, and a heavy reliance on recurrent expenditure are considered together, Sri Lanka’s debt problem appears not merely as a numerical issue, but as the outcome of a systemic imbalance. Furthermore, the article highlights that external factors—such as geopolitical instability in the Middle East—are likely to further intensify these challenges.

1. Introduction

During the period from September 2024 to March 2026, a multi-layered discourse has emerged regarding the volume of debt obtained by the Government of Sri Lanka and the manner in which it has been utilised. Within these discussions, particular attention has been given to the increase in debt levels. While this is a valid and necessary concern, it is essential not to accept the issue at face value, but rather to analyze it critically within a broader economic context.

The primary focus should not be limited to the narrow question of “how much debt has the government borrowed?” but should instead extend to a broader set of questions: “from where has this debt been obtained, for what purposes has it been used, and what is the country’s capacity to repay it?” In other words, a complete and accurate understanding of the economic picture can only be achieved by analysing the interconnections among debt volume, utilization, and revenue-generating capacity.

Within this context, it is estimated that by the end of 2023, Sri Lanka’s total public debt stood between LKR 27–30 trillion (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2023; IMF, 2024). At the same time, the debt-to-GDP ratio is observed to be in the range of 110%–128%, while the burden of debt servicing relative to government revenue remains at a high level of approximately 60%–70%. In addition, the revenue-to-GDP ratio stands at only around 8%–10%, which is considered a structural fiscal weakness (World Bank, 2023).

Against this backdrop, it becomes evident that during the period 2024–2026, Sri Lanka is not on a path of deleveraging, but rather in a transitional phase centered on debt restructuring and economic stabilisation. Therefore, this article seeks to provide a deeper and more comprehensive understanding by analyzing not only the size of debt, but also its utilisation, structure, and policy implications.

2. Total Public Debt as at End-2023

As at the end of 2023, Sri Lanka’s total public debt is estimated to be between LKR 27–30 trillion. The debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the commonly accepted safe threshold of 70% and remains within the range of 110%–128% (CBSL, 2023; IMF, 2024). In addition, the burden of debt servicing relative to government revenue is at a very high level, in some instances reaching approximately 60%–70% of revenue. At the same time, government revenue as a percentage of GDP stands at only around 8%–10%, which is below the required level for emerging economies.

When these indicators are considered together, a clear imbalance emerges between the rising debt burden and the country’s limited revenue-generating capacity.

Furthermore, the composition of debt and external economic linkages intensify this vulnerability. It is estimated that approximately 40%–45% of total debt is external, making the country highly sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, imports account for around 25%–35% of GDP, while exports remain at only about 20%–22%, resulting in a trade deficit and increasing the demand for foreign exchange (World Bank, 2023).

Consequently, external debt repayments depend heavily on export earnings and foreign employment income. Under these conditions, new borrowing often appears to be used for servicing existing debt, thereby creating a debt cycle that does not contribute to long-term economic growth.

Therefore, Sri Lanka’s debt problem should not be understood merely as a numerical issue, but rather as a manifestation of a deep structural imbalance among revenue capacity, economic structure, and patterns of debt utilisation.

3. Debt Situation During the 2024–2026 Period

An analysis of Sri Lanka’s debt utilisation patterns during the period 2024–2026 clearly indicates that new borrowing has been used primarily not to generate economic growth, but to manage existing debt and support short-term stabilisation.

Under the International Monetary Fund program, a significant portion of the funds obtained has been directed toward debt servicing, interest payments, and requirements related to debt restructuring (IMF, 2024). In addition, based on the composition of government expenditure, a high proportion is allocated to recurrent expenditure, while capital expenditure remains relatively limited. Typically, nearly 70% of total government expenditure is directed toward recurrent expenditure, while capital expenditure accounts for around 20%–30% (CBSL, 2023).

This pattern of utilisation demonstrates that borrowing is being used to sustain existing fiscal pressures rather than to enhance revenue-generating capacity. In particular, the use of new borrowing to repay existing debt (debt rollover) further reinforces a debt cycle, thereby constraining long-term economic growth. Moreover, the import-dependent economic structure and shortages in foreign exchange further reduce the efficiency of debt utilisation.

Accordingly, during the period 2024–2026, Sri Lanka’s borrowing can be characterized not as growth-oriented borrowing, but rather as survival-oriented borrowing. This clearly represents a significant challenge to long-term economic stability.

4. Future Challenges

An analysis of Sri Lanka’s current economic condition clearly indicates that the country has not yet fully emerged from the crisis. It is not in a phase of debt reduction, but rather has entered a stage of debt restructuring and stabilisation. Total public debt remains at a high level, and a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 100% raises serious concerns regarding debt sustainability.

Although debt restructuring has been implemented under the International Monetary Fund program, it primarily serves as a short-term relief measure, and a comprehensive long-term solution has yet to be achieved. Furthermore, the fact that new borrowing is largely used for debt rollovers and short-term economic stabilization indicates that the country remains in a debt stabilisation stage.

Moreover, the current pattern of debt utilization and the overall economic structure further deepen future challenges. A significant portion of borrowed funds is directed toward servicing existing debt, financing recurrent government expenditure, and maintaining short-term stability, thereby limiting productive investment. At the same time, despite efforts to increase government revenue, the high burden of debt servicing and expenditure levels constrain fiscal space.

In terms of foreign exchange, reliance on export earnings and foreign employment income, combined with an import-dependent economic structure, continues to expose the country to external economic risks.

Within this context, ongoing geopolitical instability in the Middle East represents an additional source of pressure for an import-dependent economy such as Sri Lanka. In particular, volatility in fuel prices, security risks along key maritime routes, and potential impacts on foreign employment income could weaken the country’s foreign exchange position and overall economic stabilisation process.

In effect, the interaction between internal economic imbalances and external instability creates a condition of double vulnerability for Sri Lanka.

Despite positive signals such as declining inflation, exchange rate stabilization, and support from the International Monetary Fund, economic growth remains weak, private investment is low, and cost-of-living pressures persist. These conditions confirm that significant and complex policy challenges lie ahead.

The interaction of internal imbalances and external instability creates a condition of double vulnerability for Sri Lanka.

5. Conclusion Remarks

This analysis demonstrates that Sri Lanka’s current debt situation is not merely a numerical issue, but the outcome of a deep systemic imbalance among economic structure, public financial management, and policy decisions. During the period 2024–2026, the country is not on a path of debt reduction, but rather in a stabilisation phase based on debt management and restructuring.

New borrowing is largely used not to generate economic growth, but to manage existing fiscal pressures. This further intensifies the imbalance between the quality of debt utilisation and the country’s revenue-generating capacity.

However, when one reads between the lines of these figures and reports, many unspoken realities become evident. Decisions related to borrowing and its utilisation are closely linked to policy priorities, political objectives, and the quality of governance. Therefore, analysing numbers alone is insufficient; it is essential to critically examine the decisions, priorities, and responsibilities that lie behind them.

Accordingly, moving forward requires not only controlling the volume of debt, but also transforming the manner in which it is utilised and the policy decision-making framework that underpins it. Only through productive investment, revenue growth, and strong public financial management can Sri Lanka transition from a debt-dependent economy to one characterised by stable and sustainable long-term growth.

In conclusion, Sri Lanka’s debt narrative is not merely a story of numbers—it is a comprehensive reflection of the country’s economic decisions, patterns of utilisation, and often unspoken priorities.

References

Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) (2023) Annual Report 2023. Colombo: Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2024) Sri Lanka: Debt Sustainability Analysis and Program Review. Washington, DC: IMF.

Ministry of Finance (2026) Sri Lanka Government Debt Report: September 2024 – March 2026. Colombo: Ministry of Finance, Sri Lanka.

World Bank (2023) Sri Lanka Development Update: Restoring Stability and Growth. Washington, DC: World Bank.

International Energy Agency (IEA) (2023) Sri Lanka Energy Profile. Paris: IEA.

by Professor Ranjith Bandara

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Opinion

Eulogy to a supremely gifted son of Lanka

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Professor Rezvi Sheriff

Vidya Jyothi Professor Rezvi Sheriff

We do mourn the passing away of Vidya Jothi Emeritus Professor Rezvi Sheriff on the 30th of March 2026. He was a man who was one of the finest doctors who served the health service of our beloved country and several other nations as well.

I was most fortunate to be selected to formulate and present the citation for Professor Rezvi Sheriff just last year, for the award of the coveted Fellowship of the Sri Lanka Medical Association during the Inauguration Ceremony of the Annual Congress of the Sri Lanka Medical Association on the 23rd of July 2025.

That narrative is reproduced here as the final tribute to a superlative medical scientist, a humane carer, teacher par excellence, an academic of profound scholastic stature and a very close friend.

Our Chief Guest tonight, Guest of Honour, Special Guests, the President, Council, Fellows, and Members of the Sri Lanka Medical Association, and Distinguished Invitees…….

I am delighted to present to you, Vidyajyothi Professor Rezvi Sheriff, MBBS Ceylon), MD(Ceylon), MRCP(UK), FRCP(London), FRCP(Edinburgh), FRACP, FCCP, Fellow of the National Academy of Sciences of Sri Lanka, and Emeritus Professor of Medicine for the superlative award of the Fellowship of the Sri Lanka Medical Association.

In fact, the man is so very well-known, and formulating a citation for him was a veritable Herculean task, similar only to one trying to sell ice to Eskimos. In such a context, I will attempt only to portray some strategic vantage points of a career that clearly defies an adequate description in the time allotted to me. One could write reams about the man and still leave quite a lot unsaid.

Following a spectacular school career, Rezvi entered the Faculty of Medicine, Colombo, in 1966, just one year after me, and we have been close friends ever since. The man went through his undergraduate career, securing many distinctions and gold medals, and qualified in 1971 as the first in class valedictorian, topmost performer of the batch, and the first in the combined order of merit of the two Medical Schools of Colombo and Peradeniya.

From then onwards, there was no looking back. It was a steady, persistent, and exponential climb in the academic ladder to finally reach the pinnacle of the Chair Professorship of the Department of Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, Colombo. He is a great researcher and has a monumental plethora of scientific papers published in peer-reviewed, indexed, high-impact medical journals. He has delivered several orations, many plenary lectures, guest lectures, and taken part in numerous academic symposia as a resource person. He has been internationally recognised through fellowships and memberships from prestigious colleges and academic institutions. He has lectured in many centres worldwide, inclusive of a considerable number of universities in the United States of America, Great Britain, Australia, Norway, Japan and Pakistan.

As an Educator, he has mentored thousands of undergraduate and postgraduate students and allied health professionals. He is acclaimed for his quality clinical teaching, integrity, kindness and compassion. His medical journey, culminating in the Chair Professorship of Medicine, has inspired many a generation. He retired from the University of Colombo in 2014 and then worked at the Kotelawala Defence University for another 10 years. Altogether, he has had 60 years of university service and been a professor for 41 years. He was awarded Emeritus status by the University of Colombo, following his retirement.

He is known as the Pioneer Godfather of Nephrology and Transplant Medicine in Sri Lanka. He initiated the country’s first Dialysis Unit and Kidney Transplant Programme, a vision that forever transformed renal care and paved the way for other organ transplantations in Sri Lanka as well.

He has served for six years as the only Sri Lankan Council Member in the International Society of Nephrology. Incidentally, he and I were in the UK around the same time during our postgraduate training. He was in nephrology in the South of England, and I was doing nephrology in Nottingham in the Midlands. He continued in nephrology while I changed track and went in a different direction.

Professor Sheriff’s influence extended beyond the lecture rooms, wards and clinics. He was a member of the First National Health Policy Formulation Team, the University Reforms Committee, the National Education Commission and the Sri Lanka Medical Council. He was the Director of the Postgraduate Institute of Medicine from 2006 to 2011. All these assignments were conferred directly by the Executive President of Sri Lanka.

Professor Sheriff founded major nationally important bodies such as the Sri Lanka Society of Nephrology, the Health Informatics Society of Sri Lanka and the Hypertension Society of Sri Lanka. He was also instrumental in building critical medical infrastructure, such as the CLINMARC building at NHSL, the National Institute of Nephrology Dialysis and Transplantation Centre in Maligawatta, the Ceylon College of Physicians Building in Rajagiriya, and the first Kidney Transplant Unit at NHSL. He also set up the most advanced Dialysis Unit in Sri Lanka at the General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University Hospital.

In a kind of nostalgic rumination, Rezvi and I used to be on the opposing teams in the Annual Physicians Versus the Paediatricians Cricket Match. If I remember right, and in a lighter vein, that is perhaps the only time anyone has been able to beat this great man.

Ladies and Gentlemen, legends are found not only in the movies. They are there in real life, too. Role models are remembered, not just for what they achieve, but for the lives they inspire, the opportunities they create, and the kindness they perpetually exhibit. Despite his vast achievements, Professor Rezvi Sheriff remains an extremely humble, deeply religious, superlatively kind, service-oriented person. Today, as we honour him, we celebrate not just a brilliant academic and a superb clinician, but a man who has lived a life of purpose and integrity: a life devoted to service to the community. Some years ago, in recognition of his services to our Motherland, the Government of Sri Lanka conferred on him the National Titular Award Vidya Jyothi, the highest national honour that can be bestowed on a scientist.

Mr President, I am ever so pleased to present Professor Rezvi Sheriff, a superlative clinician and a healer, a fine researcher, a brilliant teacher, a visionary, and a true servant of humanity, for the award of the legendary Fellowship of the Sri Lanka Medical Association.

Ladies and Gentlemen, please be kind enough to rise and applaud this great son of Mother Lanka.

***

With the demise of Professor Rezvi Sheriff, we have lost a superlative son of our hallowed Motherland, and I have lost a very dear friend.

Goodbye, our friend…, May the turf of our Motherland rest ever so gently on you.

May he rest in eternal bliss as we acknowledge the words in the Holy Qaran 𝗜 i𝗜𝗹𝗮i𝗵 𝗻!

(Verily to Allāh we belong, and verily to Him, we shall return)

By Dr B. J. C. Perera
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician

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Opinion

Is there hope for Palestine?

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Map courtesy BBC

Since the creation of Israel, in 1948, Palestine has lost so much that it is a wonder that it is still a part of the world map. Since 1948, Palestinians have lost approximately 85% of the land that made up historic British Mandate Palestine. This loss occurred in several major stages, beginning with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and continuing through the 1967 Six-Day War and ongoing settlement expansion.

It is necessary to outline the relevant historical facts about the state of Palestine. Palestine was among former Ottoman territories, placed under UK administration, by the League of Nations, in 1922. All of these territories eventually became fully independent States, except Palestine, where, in addition to “the rendering of administrative assistance and advice,” the British Mandate incorporated the “Balfour Declaration” of 1917, expressing support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. During the Mandate, from 1922 to 1947, large-scale Jewish immigration, mainly from Eastern Europe, took place, with the numbers swelling in the 1930s with the Nazi persecution. Arab demands for independence and resistance to immigration led to a rebellion in 1937, followed by continuing terrorism and violence from both sides. The UK considered various formulas to bring independence to a land ravaged by violence. In 1947, the UK turned the Palestine problem over to the UN.

After looking at alternatives, the UN proposed terminating the Mandate and partitioning Palestine into two independent States, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish, with Jerusalem internationalised (Resolution 181 (II) of 1947). Records indicate that Jewish individuals, or organisations, only owned between 5.8% and 7% of the land in Palestine, prior to the 1947 Partition Plan. The remainder was either privately owned by Palestinians (94.2% according to some fiscal records) or classified as state/public land by the British authorities. The vast majority (90%) of the population was Palestinians. The Partition Plan did not take these demographic facts into consideration and this led to the war in 1948 with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia joining forces against Israel. The war was a major loss for the Arab countries  as Israel was backed by the west and, following the war, Israel established control over 77% to 78% of the land. The remaining 22%—consisting of the West Bank and Gaza Strip—came under Jordanian and Egyptian administration, respectively.

The Arab countries were very much concerned about this situation and were very sympathetic towards the Palestinians. In a desperate attempt, in 1967, Egypt, Jordan and Syria attacked Israel, which by now, with huge western support, was militarily far superior to the collective strength of these countries and could capture Sinai Peninsula, Gaza strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem and Golan Heights. Again, in 1973, Egypt attacked Israel in a surprise move and inflicted much damage, though finally losing the war. This led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and the return of Sinai. The outcome of all these wars was that today the Palestinians have lost administrative and sovereign control over approximately 85% of historic Palestine, since 1948, with current autonomous Palestinian areas (Gaza and parts of the West Bank) making up less than 15% of the total original territory.

Palestine gradually lost its major military allies; Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Libya, due mainly to the machinations and direct invasions by western forces and Israel. There were internal disputes and betrayals, as well, with Hamas falling out with Fatah and Palestinian Authority colluding with Israel to undermine Palestinians. All this shows the pathetic tragedy that has befallen the historical inheritors of the land of Palestine. Today, they are subjected to the most inhuman harassment and genocide, with daily killings, and their land is being grabbed by Israel. And there is, apparently, no one to help them; the UN can only pay lip service and if this continues Palestine will soon be obliterated from the world map.

However, there may be a glimmer of hope for this beleaguered country if the war between Iran and Israel ends in the way people like Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, Prof. John Mearsheimer, Col. Douglas Macgregor, Prof. Richard Wolf, Miko Peled, etc., predict. These people have made comments like “Iran has the upper hand”, “The US has already lost the war”, “Iran will be the graveyard of American hegemony”, “This will be the end of Israel”.

It was Miko Peled, a Jew by birth, and a Palestinian activist by conviction, who said “This will be the end of Israel” in a recent podcast interview, and he was hoping that it would eventually solve the Palestine problem. Peled’s grandfather, Avraham Katznelson, was one of the founders of Israel who signed Israel’s Declaration of Independence.  Peled’s father, Mattityahu Peled, had fought in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and served as a general in the Six-Day War of 1967.

In 1997, Peled’s 13-year-old niece Smadar, daughter of his sister Nurit Peled-Elhanan, was murdered in a Palestinian suicide terror attack in Jerusalem. After her funeral Peled had said, “Why not tell the truth… That this, and similar tragedies, are taking place because we are occupying another nation and that, in order to save lives, the right thing to do is to end the occupation and negotiate a just peace with our Palestinian partners?” Today Miko Peled is fighting for the liberation of Palestine. He asserted that the raid by Hamas into Israel, in October, 2023,  was not terrorism but a heroic act.

Col. Douglas Macgregor, a retired US Army officer, who had faught in the Iraq war, and who was nominated by President Trump as the Ambassador to Germany, and also appointed to the board of the US Military Academy, has said “Iran holds the upper hand”. He has several reasons to support his claim; Iranian missiles outnumber the interceptors of Israel and Gulf states, and already Israel is running out of weapons, the economic fallout in the US, Gulf countries and Europe would be catastrophic if the war drags on, ground forces option would be disastrous as landing them would be a suicidal process given the advance surveillance methods that Iran possess, courtesy China and Russia. Further, he says, several such US campaigns in the past have failed, pointing out that Iraq, which was ‘conqured,’ is now asking the US to leave. The Syrian leader – another country ‘conqured’ – is visiting Russia. A Minister, in Qatar, has told the US to leave her country alone.

Prof John Mearsheimer  is  Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. In his 2007 book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, Mearsheimer argues that the Israel lobby wields disproportionate influence over US foreign policy in the Middle East. Mearsheimer asserts that Benjamin Netanyahu is driving the push for conflict, rather than US interests. He describes Israel as an “albatross around our neck” regarding this war. He claims the U.S. and Israel initiated this war against Iran, which he does not believe the US can win.

Mearsheimer has argued that “Iran holds all the cards” in the war of attrition, suggesting that Iran is not losing and that the US is facing a strategic defeat. He argues that Iran does not represent a threat massive enough to justify American involvement in the conflict and that the US is fighting ‘somebody else’s war’.

Prof. Jeffrey Sachs  is a professor at Columbia University, where he was formerly Director of The Earth Institute, and is Director of the Centre for Sustainable Development at the University. He had been a tenured professor of Economics at Harvard. From 2002 to 2018, Sachs was special adviser to the UN Secretary-General. Regarding the war, he has said that the US and Israel had underestimated Iran and that Iran would be the Graveyard of American hegemony. Further Sachs has called Israel ” a reckless country” and a joint military campaign with it is not in the US interests. He has made a special appeal to the leaders of China, Russia and India to pressure Donald Trump to stop the war, which he says would be very effective.

Prof Richard Wolf, leading economist, says the US is at present  heavily in debt and the defence budget for 2026/27 has been increased from 900 bn to 1.5 tr which could affect health, education and welfare programmes. People in the US are on the streets protesting against the war.

What could be gleaned from all these opinions and views of people, who know what they speak of, is that, whatever the outcome of the war, the world will not be the same for all of us. Beginning from Trump and the people of the US, European leaders, China, Russia and India, Iran and the Middle East, particularly the Gulf States, the Global South and finally Israel, would learn that war cannot solve problems, that hegemony is hated, imperialism has to end and, last but not least, if the world wants peace the Palestine problem must be solved.

(Some of the information in this article was derived from Wikipedia)

By N. A. de S. Amaratunga

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