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Sri Lanka’s economy in the first 10 years

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By Uditha Devapriya

Assessments of Sri Lanka’s history often depict the period from 1947 to 1956 as an Eden before the Fall. Partly, this was owing to how independence had been secured. Freedom was seen as being granted, not won; unlike the multiclass bloc that had prevailed against British dominion in India, in Ceylon independence had amounted to a transition from the colonial bureaucracy to a comprador elite. Independence became a top-down affair, led by those who emphasised cooperation with rather than resistance to Britain.

Moreover, unlike in India, where ethnic tensions led to the partition of the country into Hindu and Muslim sections, in Sri Lanka similar tensions between the Sinhala and Tamil communities did not erupt until a decade later. Until they did, a belief sprang up that the country had secured independence without “dropping a shed of blood.”

Though these sentiments bolstered optimism over the direction the colonial bourgeoisie intended to take Ceylon, they also symbolised the bourgeoisie’s failure to consolidate a multi-class identity. Multiethnic though the composition of the leadership may have been, this was not reflected in the country’s population, which bifurcated between an English speaking elite and a Sinhala and Tamil speaking majority. The elite’s failure to address these concerns eventually led to previous calls for the replacement of English by two languages being replaced by calls to enthrone one, Sinhala.

Yet writers, politicians, even historians depict the first 10 years of Sri Lanka’s independent statehood as one of high prosperity. Two reasons are cited: the elite’s consolidation of a multiethnic identity, and favourable economic conditions which, had the UNP-allied elite continued in power, would have taken Sri Lanka ahead. I have addressed the first of these assumptions above. The second requires more scrutiny and examination.

Commentators who note that we could have done better contend that the colonial office handed over a highly developing country to local elites, and that the latter, particularly those elected after 1956, squandered the opportunity. Implicit in this assumption is the belief that the Ceylonese economy had fared well under British rule.

It goes without saying that this was far from the case. The claims of these commentators, that the country possessed the best road network, railway service, and harbour in Asia, in addition to being “second only to Japan in terms of per capita income”, under British rule, are hence suspect: “The fact of the matter,” Avocado Collective notes, “is that nobody has calculated with any degree of accuracy Sri Lanka’s per capita income in 1948.”

The UN’s, World Bank’s, and IMF’s estimates for Ceylon’s per capita figures in 1950 stood respectively at 311, 326, and 331. As the Avocado Collective writers correctly observe, these numbers could not have been different a mere two years earlier.

The situation was thus more complex, and less rosy, than what these commentators would have one believe. Sri Lanka’s first five years of independent statehood were dominated by problems of rampant poverty, widespread landlessness, inflationary pressures, trade and budget deficits, and declining terms of trade. These reflected the limits of an economy that had been catered to commodity extraction to the exclusion of industrial and productive activity. They eventually came to constrain the country’s potential.

Contrary to those who think otherwise, the country’s plantation sector did not do much to improve the situation. In 1950 the Indian economist B. Das Gupta pointed out that with a per capita monthly aggregate national income of Rs. 30, the development of tea and rubber sectors had “not necessarily meant general economic development of the country.” Simply put, the country remained “extremely underdeveloped.” To top these problems, “only some 10 percent of the population” earned monthly incomes in excess of Rs. 50, no better than the situation in the 1920s. That in turn had opened up a huge savings deficit.

Trade prospects were even worse. The balance of payments fell from a surplus of Rs. 314 million in 1945 to a deficit of Rs. 196 million two years later. The recession in the US had been partly to blame – US imports made up around 45 percent of the total in the country – but so too had Ceylon’s forever precarious terms of trade situation.

Sri Lanka’s terms of trade had risen from 103 to 138 between 1938 and 1947. By 1949 they had come down to 131. Fluctuations in commodity prices contributed to these declines: a decrease in rubber prices from 60 cents a pound in 1948 to 54 cents a pound a year later, for instance, contributed to decreases in the terms of trade of around five percent and in the balance of payments of more than Rs. 52 million.

Making matters worse, by independence the population had been locked into consumption patterns which favoured imports. One economist estimated the country’s propensity to consume in 1956 to have been 0.8493, with a constant of Rs. 20.03. Marginal propensity to import, on the other hand, stood at 0.2516, with a constant of 11.74.

Six years earlier, H. A. de S. Gunasekara had pointed out that three-fourths of total national expenditure was being spent on imports. Very little was diverted to gross capital formation: while the figure stood at seven percent in most developing countries, in Sri Lanka it stood at a paltry four percent, even in 1948. This meant that the country lacked investment capacity, without which growth could simply not be sustained.

Industrialisation was the only feasible and viable answer, and that obviously required heavy State intervention, as was happening in South-East Asia. But all three UNP regimes from 1947 to 1956 dismissed such an idea. The first Finance Minister, J. R. Jayewardene, had been entranced by Keynesian prescriptions, but his high regard for Keynes blinded him to the fact that aggregate demand policies were, as H. A. de S. Gunasekara noted in a critique of the government’s policies, relevant to industrialised countries suffering from excess capacity. In Sri Lanka, by contrast, the problem wasn’t an excess of capacity, but a lack of it.

To give the first two UNP regimes credit, though, they differed from the laissez-faire, non-interventionist position that Jayewardene’s successor, Oliver Goonetilleke, would adopt. Moreover, right until the withdrawal of food subsidies in 1953, which sparked the Hartal, the government continued the social welfare policies it had inherited at independence. The latter, in particular, became a sine qua non of democratic governance in Sri Lanka, a legacy of the Donoughmore reforms: thus, while expenditure on welfare had absorbed 16 percent in the 1920s, by 1947 it was absorbing a more impressive 56 percent.

Generous as these schemes would have been, however, the government’s economic plans were seen as less than stellar, in need of much improvement.

In a critique of the 1950 Budget, G. V. S. de Silva accused the UNP of transferring wealth to the rich even while expanding welfare measures. The government’s attitude to the question of local industry, which had by then become a priority across South-East Asia, also came for criticism: according to one observer, the tariff structure privileged the filling up of coffers “at the cost of irrational treatment for home industries.” The situation was such that while tariffs on areca nuts stood at 100 percent, those on brushes and rat traps did not exceed 50 percent, though the latter items could be manufactured locally.

Historians like K. M. de Silva dismiss the Opposition’s regard for industrialisation as a much-exaggerated panacea for all ills. Yet, it was industrialisation, led by the State in conjunction with private players, which had spurred growth in South-East Asia. Regrettably enough, Sri Lanka’s elites did not pursue such a strategy, even in the long term.

Instead the first three UNP governments prioritised full employment, which meant focusing on aggregate demand. On the one hand, they oversaw huge land resettlement schemes, which Tamil politicians alleged were a cover for mass Sinhalese colonisation. On the other hand, they embarked on large-scale projects like the Gal Oya scheme, which the Left lucidly critiqued: S. A. Wickramasinghe, for instance, described Gal Oya as a white elephant that benefitted American experts and local elites rather than the people.

The government’s focus on demand policies distracted it from other considerations. It also compelled it to promote if not entrench unproductive sectors, rather than urging reforms on them by way of taxation or nationalisation. Indeed, as H. A. de S. Gunasekara correctly observed, demand policies could not work in a context where land and labour were being channelled for such sectors, prime among them the estates. As S. B. D. de Silva noted in The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, for over a century these sectors had been driven by neither science nor technology, but rather by labour exploitation, profit repatriation, and absentee landlordism. This was hardly a productive combination.

Not surprisingly, the UNP endeavoured to appease these interests. Disregarding Marxist demands to nationalise estates, the government went about imposing higher taxes on them. Yet this hardly endeared the UNP to estate owners: Das Gupta noted that the latter began repatriating their assets soon after independence, fearful of the State “lessening their prospect of profit.” Later, Finance Minister J. R. Jayewardene realised, rather dismally, that planters did not necessarily prefer his solution of taxation to the Marxist alternative of outright nationalisation. They dreaded both options, and wanted out. In its own way, that was as much a tribute to the regime’s failures as to its economic ideology, which reflected the elite’s preference to cooperate with, rather than antagonise, British interests.

The writer can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com



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Ongoing ‘International Disorder’ and the role of religions

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Pope Leo the 14th

It was left to that great English poet of the late eighteenth century, William Blake, to pinpoint how formal or organized religion promotes social ills by turning a blind eye on them. Blake’s disturbingly revealing poem titled ‘London’ does not flinch from exposing the horrors of the industrial age in Britain and to this day remains profoundly relevant for humankind.

From the viewpoint of Blake’s expose of the ills of his age stanza three of ‘London’ is particularly important. Focusing on the Church’s hypocrisy and inactivity on the question of helping to redeem the sad lot of persons such as chimney sweepers and soldiers, who were way down the social ladder, Blake writes:

‘How the Chimney-sweeper’s cry,
Every blackning Church appalls,
And the hapless Soldier’s sigh,
Runs in blood down Palace walls.’

Expressed summarily, the essential meaning of this stanza is as follows: the deplorable socio-economic condition of the chimney sweeper shames or ‘appalls’ the Church, on account of the latter’s complacency and lack of social commitment to relieve the burdens of the poor. The same applies to the ruling class or ‘Palace’ that could not care less about the soldier who is compelled to sell his services to the state and to die for it. The poem on the whole is an indictment of the powerful in society.

However, by extension it could be said that the ‘Church’ referred to stands for all formal religions everywhere and in all times that do nothing to alleviate the lot of the powerless in their midst. For example, are the foremost religions of the world doing anything positive and substantive to mitigate the lot of civilians suffering inexorably in the war and conflict zones of today’s world? This question cannot be answered in the affirmative unfortunately.

But the present Head of the Catholic Church Pope Leo the 14th is proving an exception to the rule. For example, he has offered to host any peace negotiations between the warring sides in the Ukraine conflict at the Vatican. Thus is the Pontiff going some distance in sensitizing the Church to the need to be a peace facilitator and a positive influence in the world. The message sent out is that religions could not any longer confine themselves to playing a mere formal or ceremonial role in the affairs of the world.

Children of the Gaza looking for food. Photo Credit: Anas Mohammed/Shutterstock.com

Unfortunately, many of the world’s religions have not decried nor done anything concrete to contain the blood-letting in the Middle Eastern and Ukrainian theatres, to take just two examples. On the other hand, they have virtually winked at the continuing bloodshed; they have stood idly by as the conflicts rage on. Often one sees in the international media, VVIP politicians of Russia, for instance, making what seems to be ‘the sign of the Cross’ in tandem with religious dignitaries.

In fact many religions have proved to be hand-in-glove with the principal perpetrators of the violence. Their clergy have stood staunchly by their lay leaders. Indeed, the blood of the soldiers and the relevant civilian publics is ‘running down Palace walls.’

With regard to the promotive role religions could play in the proliferation of conflict and war, the US continues to figure prominently. It is no secret that the Christian Right in the US is a formidable backer of the Trump administration. The latter has considerably sullied the US’ reputation as the ‘world’s mightiest democracy’ but the Christian Right is committed tooth-and-nail to the defence of the Republican Right, which Trump represents. Thus is religion collaborating with repressive Rightist rule with hardly any scruples.

In the process the political and religious Right in the US has severely compromised a central tenet of Christianity that the Church anywhere ought to be with the powerless and downtrodden of society. The Church/ religion has to be an epitome of humanity but in the US and other countries where the political Right dominates this principle is being abandoned.

However, the worst has come to pass in zones of bloodshed, such as the Middle East and the Ukraine. According to UN sources, some 14,000 babies are expected to die over the next 48 hours in the Gaza. Besides, two million people are believed to be starving in the same region. The observer cannot be blamed for saying that the Gaza could very well be on the threshold of barbarism unless the Israeli offensive is brought to an end and the US holds the key to this outcome.

However, the US is apparently getting nowhere with its supposed peace overtures. Instead it is reportedly collaborating with Israel in regulating the supply of essential necessities to the Gaza. This amounts to arrogating unto itself the role of the UN. Critics are right when they charge that such regulation could lead to a ‘weaponization’ of food and other material needs.

But what is needed of the US is a firm proactive role to end the bloodshed by pressuring Israel to expore the path of a negotiated end to the war. Power aggrandizement, among other factors, is preventing the US from doing this.

The world is getting nowhere to a peaceful settlement in the Ukraine as well. President Trump is on record that progress is being made towards a casefire following some recent conversations that he had with President Putin, but the Kremlin, we are told, is not committing itself firmly to such an undertaking. With regard to timeframes, for instance, a Kremlin spokesman was quoted saying: ‘There are no deadlines and there cannot be any.’

Accordingly, a closure to the current ‘International Disorder’ is nowhere in sight. The UN system for all intents and purposes is paralysed and helpless. As long as the UN Security Council remains divided within itself it would wield no decisive influence over present international develpments. ‘Things have fallen apart’ as never before.

However, the world’s major religions are yet to do their best for world peace and for civilzed co-existence among countries. In fact they are yet to be fully tested. They would need to come together grandly to call for world peace and go more than the extra mile to realize it. The success of such an enterprise depends on the ability of religions to go beyond the formal observance of religion and inculculcate in hearts and minds everywhere a ‘Reverence for Life’.

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UK-India Free Trade Agreement and Sri Lanka

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Diligent observer or clueless bystander

* What will be the implications on Sri Lanka, of this FTA between the UK, our second-largest export market and India, our third-largest export market?

* The UK’s imports from Sri Lanka have declined significantly during the last ten years (from US$1,108 million in 2013 to US$800 million by 2024), mainly due to the drop in apparel exports.

* The FTA will be a game-changer for the Indian apparel exporters as it would provide a nearly ten percent tariff advantage to them. As a result, apparel exports from India to the UK are projected to double by 2030. As the size of the UK’s apparel market is not going to expand proportionately, this growth need to come from the market shares of other main exporters like Sri Lanka.

* Will this, along with new additional Ad Valorem duty in the United States, sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports?

Biggest and most economically significant FTA

On 6th May 2025, India and the United Kingdom agreed on a Free Trade Agreement (the FTA) after nearly three years of negotiations. The FTA is expected to take effect in January 2026. Announcing the agreement, the British government labelled it as the “biggest and most economically significant” trade agreement the UK has signed since leaving the European Union in 2020. If so, this is an extremely important development because the UK has already signed 39 trade agreements with about 73 countries, including very significant trade deals with Australia and Japan and one with the EU. The UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer hailed this agreement as a major achievement and a “landmark deal with far-reaching economic implications.”

Unfortunately, the “far-reaching economic implications” from a landmark deal like this would not be limited to the parties to the agreement. It would certainly result in equally far-reaching implications for their trading partners. The United Kingdom and India are Sri Lanka’s second and third-largest trading partners for exports. So, what would be the implications of this FTA for Sri Lanka?

Implications on “Bystanders”

Regrettably, so far, I have not seen any public discussion on this agreement within the country. Normally, such a discussion should have been initiated by the relevant government agencies and our High Commissions in New Delhi and London, because they have access to more information on this subject, including access to the negotiators. These government agencies should have prompted a public discussion on the FTA with trade chambers, think tanks, exporters and the media, long before the agreement was concluded. Now, as the agreement is finalised, the options available to Sri Lanka to counter the possible adverse implications are more limited. However, even at this late stage, it is necessary to begin a public discussion on the issue, particularly because, a cursory look at the available data shows that the FTA would have a serious adverse impact on Sri Lanka’s exports of goods and services to the UK in general and on apparel exports in particular.

Sri Lanka’s Declining Competitiveness in the UK

To begin with, it is necessary to point out, the UK’s total imports from Sri Lanka had declined substantially during the last ten years; from US$ 1,108 million in 2013 to US$800 million in 2024. Yet, as illustrated in the table below, UK’s imports from India, Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh had improved significantly during the same period. (See Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3)

The drop in imports from Sri Lanka, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, has mainly resulted from the decline of apparel imports from US$ 916 million in 2013 to US$ 510 million by 2024. Unfortunately, our apparel exports are continuing to be stagnant or decline and the market share is getting eroded fast due to strong competition from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, Pakistan and Viet Nam. The export performance of China and India has also been somewhat lacklustre.

Some analysts may try to argue that the decline of Sri Lanka’s exports to UK has resulted from the reduction of UK’s overall imports of apparel products after Brexit (2020). It is true that the UK’s overall imports of apparel have also declined significantly since Brexit. But Sri Lanka’s apparel exports to UK had already reached a very low mark even by 2020 and have failed to recover since.

Impact of Tariff

Currently, all these countries, other than India and China, have duty-free market access to UK market. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan enjoy zero-duty access to the UK under its Developing Countries Trading Scheme (DCTS). Vietnam has an FTA (the UK-Vietnam FTA) under which tariffs will be phased out, but for many Vietnamese apparel exports already enjoy reduced or zero tariffs to the UK. India is currently subjected to a DCTS tariff which is at 9.5 percent. China faces higher MFN tariff of 12 percent.

Though Sri Lanka has duty-free entry under DCTS, Sri Lanka’s preference utilisation has remained significantly low for apparel. I don’t have an official number, but I believe this is less than 50 percent. Most probably, more than half of our exports are charged a 12 percent MFN tariff.

UK India FTA – A Game-Changer for Indian Apparel Industry

Due to the competitive disadvantageous position in this important market, India has very cleverly negotiated this FTA, focussing on the elimination of tariffs on approximately 99 percent of Indian exports to the UK. More importantly, these tariff concessions cover key labour-intensive sectors like apparel, which had struggled under high tariffs. The FTA will eliminate this duty disadvantage instantly and level the playing field for India against her competitors who already have duty-free access to the UK. In the highly price-sensitive apparel market, many companies often operate on very thin margins. For them, this 9.5 percent tariff advantage will be a great advantage to consolidate and expand the market share in the UK.

It is also noteworthy that Indian apparel exporters, even with a major tariff disadvantage, have managed to perform reasonably well in the UK market. Now with the FTA, they can build on this momentum, significantly improve their cost competitiveness and expand its UK market share. An Indian investment information and credit rating agency, ICRA, has predicted that due to the tariff concessions under the FTA, India’s apparel and home textiles exports to the United Kingdom would double by 2030. A reputed apparel industry trade journal has predicted that Indian apparel exports may achieve this landmark by 2027.

Impact on Other Exporters

As the size of the UK’s apparel market is not going to expand proportionately to accommodate this growth, it needs to come from the market shares of other main exporters. According to available information, for a long period, India has focused on relatively higher-priced garments in the UK apparel market, while Bangladesh and Cambodia have operated in the low and ultra-low-cost segments of the market. China and Vietnam, on the other hand, have focused on the middle and premium market segments and have priced their products closer to Indian prices. Sri Lanka, due to the higher cost of production and the focus on ethical and sustainable manufacturing, has always operated around the higher end of the market. So, the enhanced competition from India will have a more immediate impact on Chinese, Vietnamese and Sri Lankan exports than on Bangladeshi or Cambodian exports. And the impact on Sri Lanka may be harsher because we have lost our competitive advantage in the market due low utilization of preferential access.

Will this sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports?

I don’t want to sound pessimistic, but in these uncertain times it is necessary to “prepare for the worst and hope for the best.”

The prevailing conditions in the UK market, 12% duty as against 0% duty for Viet Nam, Bangladesh and Cambodia, don’t bode well for the bulk of our apparel exports. Duty-free access to India would further aggravate the situation. This will reduce our apparel exports significantly, very significantly, unless action is taken early, to improve the conditions on market access through DCTS or other arrangements. This requires early proactive intervention by the government with the UK authorities. If not, this, along with new additional Ad Valorem duty in the United States, may sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports.

(The writer, a former public servant, can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

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English the official language:What India and Sri Lanka can teach US

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President Trump

The United States isn’t the first country to wrestle with the idea of enforcing a single national language. In fact, two Asian democracies—India and Sri Lanka—offer cautionary tales about how language policies, when driven by nationalist ideals, can deepen social divides instead of healing them.

In a sweeping move that has sparked fierce debate across the country, President Donald Trump signed an executive order officially declaring English as the national language of the United States. The announcement came on March 1, 2025, along with the removal of the Spanish-language version of the White House website, signaling a renewed push toward what many are calling “linguistic nationalism.”

While supporters hail the decision as a unifying force, critics warn it could divide the nation further by alienating millions of Americans who speak languages other than English.

Why This Order Matters

The new executive order marks a sharp departure from previous language-access policies, notably reversing a Clinton-era rule that required federally funded programmes to offer assistance in multiple languages. Now, while government agencies are allowed to continue offering services in other languages, there’s no longer a mandate to do so. Instead, they’re “encouraged” to promote English proficiency as a gateway to opportunity.

According to the White House, the change is about “strengthening national unity,” claiming that a common language empowers Americans—new and old—to engage more fully in society.

“English is the language of our founding documents, of our shared culture, and of our national success,” President Trump stated in a press release.

The Reality on the Ground

However, the U.S. isn’t exactly a monolingual country. Far from it. According to the latest Census data, over 350 languages are spoken in American homes. Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Arabic are just a few of the most common.

For many immigrants and ethnic communities, language is more than a tool for communication—it’s a part of their identity. Critics argue that making English the sole official language could marginalise these groups, reduce access to public services like healthcare and education, and ultimately create a more divided society.

“This policy sends a message that some Americans are more ‘American’ than others,” says Dr. Elena Cárdenas, a linguistics and civil rights researcher. “It doesn’t promote unity—it punishes diversity.”

What Other Countries Have Done

The U.S. is one of the few developed nations that has never had an official language—until now. Countries like France and China have long enforced language laws to preserve a national identity. But those policies have come with their own challenges, including the suppression of regional dialects and minority languages.

Meanwhile, nations like Canada and Switzerland have embraced multilingualism. Canada’s bilingual system (English and French) is often credited with strengthening its global trade relationships and social inclusiveness. Switzerland, with four national languages, shows that diversity in language doesn’t have to be a weakness—it can be a strength.

What’s at Stake: Brain functions and human rights

Supporters of the executive order argue that using a single language will make government operations more efficient and encourage immigrants to assimilate. They also point to the fact that more than 30 U.S. states already recognise English as their official language.

But many economists and education experts see it differently. Studies show that being multilingual boosts brain function, increases job opportunities, and improves a country’s ability to compete in global markets. In fact, the European Union operates with 24 official languages and considers linguistic diversity a key part of its economic and diplomatic strategy.

There’s also the legal angle. Critics say removing language-access requirements could violate international human rights agreements, including United Nations guidelines that promote linguistic and cultural inclusion.

A Political Flashpoint

This isn’t the first time language has become a political hot-button. Similar debates have played out in places like Sri Lanka and India, where promoting one language over others led to long-standing social unrest and even violence.

While the U.S. situation is different, the tension is real. Civil rights groups are already exploring legal challenges. Many Spanish-speaking Americans and other minority communities fear losing access to vital information—from disaster alerts to voting instructions—if those services are no longer offered in their native languages.

“This policy doesn’t build bridges—it builds walls,” said Congressman Luis Gutierrez. “It’s less about language and more about whose voices get heard.”

Sri Lanka: A Language That Sparked a Civil War

In 1956, Sri Lanka passed the Sinhala Only Act, which made Sinhala the sole official language of the country. This law was pushed by nationalist Sinhalese politicians to assert cultural dominance in a newly independent nation. But in doing so, it marginalised Tamil-speaking minorities—many of whom had lived in the country for generations.

The consequences were far-reaching and tragic. Tamil communities were excluded from government jobs, education, and public services. Over time, this linguistic injustice fueled ethnic tensions that escalated into a brutal civil war lasting nearly 30 years. Many experts and historians point to the Sinhala Only Act as a key trigger for the conflict. In short, language policy turned into a weapon of division rather than a tool of unity.

India: A Nation United in Diversity—But Not Without Tensions

India, too, has had its struggles with language politics. After independence in 1947, leaders attempted to make Hindi the sole official language. But this move met strong resistance, especially from southern states where people speak Dravidian languages like Tamil, Telugu, and Kannada.

To prevent further unrest, the Indian government compromised by keeping English as an additional associate official language, alongside Hindi. Today, India recognises 22 official languages and supports many regional tongues. While tensions over language still flare up occasionally, the country has largely managed to celebrate its linguistic diversity rather than suppress it.

These international examples show us what can happen when language policies ignore the lived realities of multilingual societies. Instead of creating a shared sense of belonging, such policies can end up deepening divides—whether ethnic, regional, or cultural.

To understand the risks, look no further than Sri Lanka—a country whose well-intentioned language policy in 1956 led not to unity, but to decades of violence.

Sri Lanka: When Language Laws Divide Instead of Unite

In the aftermath of independence, Sri Lanka’s government passed the Sinhala Only Act, making Sinhala the exclusive official language of administration, law, and education. While meant to assert sovereignty and majority identity, it alienated Tamil-speaking minorities who had been integral to the nation’s social fabric.

The Tamil population faced systemic exclusion: they lost access to public sector jobs, university admissions, and government services. Peaceful protests were met with repression, and what began as a linguistic grievance eventually transformed into an armed ethnic conflict. By the early 1980s, Sri Lanka was in the grip of a full-blown civil war, one of the longest and bloodiest in Asia. Historians widely agree: the Sinhala Only policy didn’t just fail to unite Sri Lanka—it fractured it. The country is still healing from the scars today.

India: Diversity Managed Through Inclusion, Not Imposition

In contrast, neighbouring India avoided such a fate by adopting a more pluralistic approach. Though Hindi was promoted as a national language, protests—particularly from Tamil Nadu—led the central government to compromise. Today, India recognizes 22 official languages, with both Hindi and English used at the national level, and regional languages thriving within states.

While not without tensions, India’s inclusive linguistic framework has helped preserve national unity in a country of over 1.4 billion people and extraordinary linguistic diversity.

Conclusion

The ongoing debate in the United States over making English the sole official language may appear as a patriotic initiative aimed at fostering unity. However, history offers a cautionary tale. In 1956, Sri Lanka introduced the “Sinhala Only Act,” effectively excluding the Tamil-speaking minority from state affairs, education, and employment. Rather than uniting the nation, this policy sowed deep resentment, ultimately contributing to a devastating civil war that lasted nearly three decades and claimed over 100,000 lives. The lesson is clear: language is not merely a means of communication—it is a symbol of identity, dignity, and inclusion.

Today, India recognises 22 official languages and uses English as a neutral bridge, managing to maintain unity within diversity despite significant challenges. The Indian experience demonstrates that pluralism, though messy, can be a powerful safeguard against social fragmentation.

As the U.S. contemplates linguistic policy, it must recognise the complex emotional and political weight language carries. In a nation where communities speak hundreds of languages and dialects, enforcing a single linguistic identity risk marginalising entire populations and undermining social cohesion. Rather than repeating historical mistakes, the U.S. has the opportunity to lead by example—building unity not through exclusion, but through recognition and respect for its linguistic and cultural mosaic.

The lesson for the U.S.? Imposing a one-language-fits-all policy may seem like a path to national unity, but it risks alienating communities and undermining the very cohesion it aims to promote. As history shows, true unity often lies in embracing diversity—not erasing it.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT , Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution he works for. He can be contacted at saliya.a@slit.lk and www.researcher.com)

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