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Sri Lanka’s economy in the first 10 years



By Uditha Devapriya

Assessments of Sri Lanka’s history often depict the period from 1947 to 1956 as an Eden before the Fall. Partly, this was owing to how independence had been secured. Freedom was seen as being granted, not won; unlike the multiclass bloc that had prevailed against British dominion in India, in Ceylon independence had amounted to a transition from the colonial bureaucracy to a comprador elite. Independence became a top-down affair, led by those who emphasised cooperation with rather than resistance to Britain.

Moreover, unlike in India, where ethnic tensions led to the partition of the country into Hindu and Muslim sections, in Sri Lanka similar tensions between the Sinhala and Tamil communities did not erupt until a decade later. Until they did, a belief sprang up that the country had secured independence without “dropping a shed of blood.”

Though these sentiments bolstered optimism over the direction the colonial bourgeoisie intended to take Ceylon, they also symbolised the bourgeoisie’s failure to consolidate a multi-class identity. Multiethnic though the composition of the leadership may have been, this was not reflected in the country’s population, which bifurcated between an English speaking elite and a Sinhala and Tamil speaking majority. The elite’s failure to address these concerns eventually led to previous calls for the replacement of English by two languages being replaced by calls to enthrone one, Sinhala.

Yet writers, politicians, even historians depict the first 10 years of Sri Lanka’s independent statehood as one of high prosperity. Two reasons are cited: the elite’s consolidation of a multiethnic identity, and favourable economic conditions which, had the UNP-allied elite continued in power, would have taken Sri Lanka ahead. I have addressed the first of these assumptions above. The second requires more scrutiny and examination.

Commentators who note that we could have done better contend that the colonial office handed over a highly developing country to local elites, and that the latter, particularly those elected after 1956, squandered the opportunity. Implicit in this assumption is the belief that the Ceylonese economy had fared well under British rule.

It goes without saying that this was far from the case. The claims of these commentators, that the country possessed the best road network, railway service, and harbour in Asia, in addition to being “second only to Japan in terms of per capita income”, under British rule, are hence suspect: “The fact of the matter,” Avocado Collective notes, “is that nobody has calculated with any degree of accuracy Sri Lanka’s per capita income in 1948.”

The UN’s, World Bank’s, and IMF’s estimates for Ceylon’s per capita figures in 1950 stood respectively at 311, 326, and 331. As the Avocado Collective writers correctly observe, these numbers could not have been different a mere two years earlier.

The situation was thus more complex, and less rosy, than what these commentators would have one believe. Sri Lanka’s first five years of independent statehood were dominated by problems of rampant poverty, widespread landlessness, inflationary pressures, trade and budget deficits, and declining terms of trade. These reflected the limits of an economy that had been catered to commodity extraction to the exclusion of industrial and productive activity. They eventually came to constrain the country’s potential.

Contrary to those who think otherwise, the country’s plantation sector did not do much to improve the situation. In 1950 the Indian economist B. Das Gupta pointed out that with a per capita monthly aggregate national income of Rs. 30, the development of tea and rubber sectors had “not necessarily meant general economic development of the country.” Simply put, the country remained “extremely underdeveloped.” To top these problems, “only some 10 percent of the population” earned monthly incomes in excess of Rs. 50, no better than the situation in the 1920s. That in turn had opened up a huge savings deficit.

Trade prospects were even worse. The balance of payments fell from a surplus of Rs. 314 million in 1945 to a deficit of Rs. 196 million two years later. The recession in the US had been partly to blame – US imports made up around 45 percent of the total in the country – but so too had Ceylon’s forever precarious terms of trade situation.

Sri Lanka’s terms of trade had risen from 103 to 138 between 1938 and 1947. By 1949 they had come down to 131. Fluctuations in commodity prices contributed to these declines: a decrease in rubber prices from 60 cents a pound in 1948 to 54 cents a pound a year later, for instance, contributed to decreases in the terms of trade of around five percent and in the balance of payments of more than Rs. 52 million.

Making matters worse, by independence the population had been locked into consumption patterns which favoured imports. One economist estimated the country’s propensity to consume in 1956 to have been 0.8493, with a constant of Rs. 20.03. Marginal propensity to import, on the other hand, stood at 0.2516, with a constant of 11.74.

Six years earlier, H. A. de S. Gunasekara had pointed out that three-fourths of total national expenditure was being spent on imports. Very little was diverted to gross capital formation: while the figure stood at seven percent in most developing countries, in Sri Lanka it stood at a paltry four percent, even in 1948. This meant that the country lacked investment capacity, without which growth could simply not be sustained.

Industrialisation was the only feasible and viable answer, and that obviously required heavy State intervention, as was happening in South-East Asia. But all three UNP regimes from 1947 to 1956 dismissed such an idea. The first Finance Minister, J. R. Jayewardene, had been entranced by Keynesian prescriptions, but his high regard for Keynes blinded him to the fact that aggregate demand policies were, as H. A. de S. Gunasekara noted in a critique of the government’s policies, relevant to industrialised countries suffering from excess capacity. In Sri Lanka, by contrast, the problem wasn’t an excess of capacity, but a lack of it.

To give the first two UNP regimes credit, though, they differed from the laissez-faire, non-interventionist position that Jayewardene’s successor, Oliver Goonetilleke, would adopt. Moreover, right until the withdrawal of food subsidies in 1953, which sparked the Hartal, the government continued the social welfare policies it had inherited at independence. The latter, in particular, became a sine qua non of democratic governance in Sri Lanka, a legacy of the Donoughmore reforms: thus, while expenditure on welfare had absorbed 16 percent in the 1920s, by 1947 it was absorbing a more impressive 56 percent.

Generous as these schemes would have been, however, the government’s economic plans were seen as less than stellar, in need of much improvement.

In a critique of the 1950 Budget, G. V. S. de Silva accused the UNP of transferring wealth to the rich even while expanding welfare measures. The government’s attitude to the question of local industry, which had by then become a priority across South-East Asia, also came for criticism: according to one observer, the tariff structure privileged the filling up of coffers “at the cost of irrational treatment for home industries.” The situation was such that while tariffs on areca nuts stood at 100 percent, those on brushes and rat traps did not exceed 50 percent, though the latter items could be manufactured locally.

Historians like K. M. de Silva dismiss the Opposition’s regard for industrialisation as a much-exaggerated panacea for all ills. Yet, it was industrialisation, led by the State in conjunction with private players, which had spurred growth in South-East Asia. Regrettably enough, Sri Lanka’s elites did not pursue such a strategy, even in the long term.

Instead the first three UNP governments prioritised full employment, which meant focusing on aggregate demand. On the one hand, they oversaw huge land resettlement schemes, which Tamil politicians alleged were a cover for mass Sinhalese colonisation. On the other hand, they embarked on large-scale projects like the Gal Oya scheme, which the Left lucidly critiqued: S. A. Wickramasinghe, for instance, described Gal Oya as a white elephant that benefitted American experts and local elites rather than the people.

The government’s focus on demand policies distracted it from other considerations. It also compelled it to promote if not entrench unproductive sectors, rather than urging reforms on them by way of taxation or nationalisation. Indeed, as H. A. de S. Gunasekara correctly observed, demand policies could not work in a context where land and labour were being channelled for such sectors, prime among them the estates. As S. B. D. de Silva noted in The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, for over a century these sectors had been driven by neither science nor technology, but rather by labour exploitation, profit repatriation, and absentee landlordism. This was hardly a productive combination.

Not surprisingly, the UNP endeavoured to appease these interests. Disregarding Marxist demands to nationalise estates, the government went about imposing higher taxes on them. Yet this hardly endeared the UNP to estate owners: Das Gupta noted that the latter began repatriating their assets soon after independence, fearful of the State “lessening their prospect of profit.” Later, Finance Minister J. R. Jayewardene realised, rather dismally, that planters did not necessarily prefer his solution of taxation to the Marxist alternative of outright nationalisation. They dreaded both options, and wanted out. In its own way, that was as much a tribute to the regime’s failures as to its economic ideology, which reflected the elite’s preference to cooperate with, rather than antagonise, British interests.

The writer can be reached at

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Solidarity and Aragalaya: A few thoughts from an educationist’s perspective



by Harshana Rambukwella

Very little in Sri Lanka at the moment inspires hope. We are facing an existential crisis that was inconceivable just six months ago. Sri Lanka is also, ironically, just a year away from marking the 75th year of its independence. As we reflect on these seven decades of postcolonial nation building, and as we confront a future of extreme precarity, our scorecard as a country is not a proud one. Much blood has been spilt in the name of postcolonial nation building and the ethno-nationalist conflict that shaped almost three decades of that history and two youth rebellions against the state speak to a history of division and enmity. While our current predicament cannot be entirely attributed to this conflictual history alone, it surely played more than a small role in shaping our present misery. It is within this context that I want to offer this brief set of reflections on what I feel is an unprecedented form of solidarity that has emerged in Sri Lanka as the aragalaya took shape. While I do not want to romanticize this solidarity because it is a highly contingent phenomenon and is shaped by the extreme nature of the current political and economic conditions, it offers us as a society, but more specifically as educators, something to reflect on as we try to imagine our role in a society that faces a painful process of rebuilding and recovery (though my hope is that such rebuilding and recovery does not mean the repetition of the tired old neo-liberal script we have followed for decades).

Before I explore what I mean by solidarity within the aragalaya, let me briefly reflect on solidarity as a concept. Solidarity is a term sometimes deployed in geopolitics. Particularly in this time of global turmoil where not just Sri Lanka, but many other countries are experiencing serious economic challenges, we see nations expressing solidarity with or towards other nations. However, such solidarity is almost always shaped by instrumental motives. This is what we might call a form of ‘vertical’ solidarity where more powerful and wealthy nations extend a ‘helping hand’ to their more unfortunate counterparts. Therefore, when India says ‘neighbourhood first’ and expresses solidarity with Sri Lanka in this time of trouble one can easily discern this as a hierarchical gesture shaped by instrumental motives. It is in reality, India’s strategic geopolitical interests that largely dominate this narrative of solidarity though one cannot disregard the critical importance of the assistance extended by India and other such ‘powerful’ nations in this time of national distress.

Another form in which solidarity manifests is through what some scholars have termed ‘enchanted’ solidarities. This is literally and metaphorically a distant form of solidarity where intellectuals, activists and others extend solidarity towards a struggle they perceive as deserving their support but without truly understanding the context in which they are intervening. This has often happened with ‘first world’ academics and intellectuals expressing solidarity towards ‘third world’ struggles which they felt were ideologically aligned with their beliefs. One example is how many liberal and leftist intellectuals supported the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, believing it to be an anti-imperial liberation movement, only to become disillusioned with the movement as they began to see the full horror of the repression and violence unleashed by the Khmer regime. I think if we reflect on Sri Lanka’s postcolonial history, we can also find many such moments where enchanted solidarities were expressed towards various movements from people in the ‘metropolitan’ center with little understanding of the nuances of the politics on the ground.

Premised against both vertical and enchanted solidarities, scholars have also proposed what is called ‘disenchanted solidarity’. By this they mean a situation where diverse groups, sometimes with very different political and ideological agendas, come together to fight for a common cause. They are often critically conscious of their differences but face a common precarity that pushes them together to struggle and align in ways that were not possible before. Often such moments are also underwritten by anger, though the sources of anger or the objects towards which the anger is directed could be different. I would like to read the aragalaya through this lens of disenchanted solidarity. Particularly at the height of the Galle Face ‘Gota go gama’ protests – before the brutish May 9th attack symbolically ‘killed’ something of the ‘innocence’ of the struggle – there was a sense in which the different groups represented in that space were expressing solidarity towards a singular goal – getting rid of the Rajapakasas and a political system they saw as deeply corrupt – there was anger and a gathering of disenchanted solidarities. For many middle-class people, the aragalaya was a way in which to express their frustration at the lack of the basic necessities of life – be it gas, electricity and fuel – and how a corrupt political class had robbed them of their future. For those with longer histories of political activism such as the IUSF (the Inter University Students Federation) or youth activists from the Frontline Socialist Party or the JVPs youth wing or the many trade unions that supported the aragalaya, this moment in some ways represented the culmination, and perhaps even a vindication, of their longstanding struggles against a political, social and economic order that they consider fundamentally unfair and exploitative. Of course, within this larger narrative, there were and continue to be pragmatic political calculations, particularly from groups affiliated with political parties. At the same time, we also witnessed ethnic and religious minorities, often historically marginalized in Sri Lanka’s social and political mainstream finding a rare space to express their anger at the ways in which they have been discriminated against. However, the argalaya gave them a rare space to do so by channeling their anger as a form of solidarity towards the common goal of getting rid of the Rajapaksa dynasty and the corrupt political system as a whole.

But at the same time, we also saw the tenuous nature of these disenchanted solidarities in the aftermath of the 9th May attack on ‘Gota go gama’. Initially we saw another spectacular display of organic and spontaneous solidarity when health workers and office workers abandoned their workstations and rushed to ‘Gota go gama’ when news of the attack broke. But by the evening of that day the story had turned more insidious with a wave of attacks against the properties of politicians and others thought to have been involved in the attack against the peaceful aragayala participants. While we may understand and even empathize with this backlash, its violent nature and what appeared to be other instrumental motives driving it, such as the looting and revenge attacks, made it difficult to associate it with the moral principles that had animated the aragalaya thus far.

Thereafter, at the current moment I am writing, the aragalaya also appears to have lost some of its vital energy as the political configuration has shifted and the tragi-comedy of Sri Lanka’s realpolitik with its underhand deals and political mechanizations seems to have regained the upper hand.

However, what does this mean? Does it mean post May 9th the aragalaya has lost its meaning and purpose or can we push our analysis a little deeper. At this point I would like to introduce one final way in which scholars have discussed solidarity which I feel is appropriate to understand the aragalaya and the spirit that underwrote it and continues to underwrite it. This is what some scholars have called ‘deep solidarity’ – a situation where in today’s neo-liberal context where the vast majority of the population come to a realization of their common social and economic predicament and realize their common enemy is the symbolic ‘one percent’ or an insidious nexus between crony capital and political power that disempowers them. This is of course an idealistic conception but one which I feel holds true at least partially to this moment in Sri Lanka. People from widely varying social and economic strata, from different religious persuasions and people with wildly different ideological and political beliefs have been suddenly pushed together. They are all standing in the never-ending petrol and diesel queues, they are desperately hunting for the next cylinder of gas and increasingly many of them are going hungry. The privileges and the divisions that once defined them, no longer seem to be so ‘real’ and the one stark reality confronting them is a form of existential annihilation. I believe within the aragalaya we can glimpse traces of this deep solidarity and as an educationist I think it is our vital task to think of creative ways in which we might sustain this solidarity, grow it and nurture it, so that we can at least ‘imagine’ a better future. These are idealistic sentiments, but at least for me, such hope, is a political and pedagogical necessity of the current moment.

Harshana Rambukwella is attached to the Postgraduate Institute of English at the Open University of Sri Lanka

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies

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No solutions to nation’s problems from draft constitutional amendment



by jehan perera

The three-wheel taxi driver did not need much encouragement to talk about the hardships in his life, starting with spending two days in the petrol queue to get his quota. He said that he had a practice of giving his three children a small packet of biscuits and a small carton of milk every morning. But now with the cost tripling, he could only buy one packet of biscuits and his three children had to share it. This is because their beloved country is facing one debacle after another for no fault of those kids or the larger nation. The latest is the failure of the government to make headway in accessing either IMF funding or other funding on any significant scale. Several countries have made donations, but these are in the millions whereas Sri Lanka requires billions if it is to come out of its vicious cycle of a dollar shortage.

There was much anticipation that the appointment of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe would bring in the billions that are desperately needed by the country if it is to obtain the fuel, food and medicines to keep the people healthy and the economy moving. But things have not worked out in this manner. The pickings have been slim and sparse. The IMF has given the reasons after the ten day visit by its staff to Sri Lanka. They have specifically referred to “reducing corruption vulnerabilities” in their concluding statement at the end of their visit. The international community in the form of multilateral donors and Western governments have prioritized political stability and a corruption-free administration prior to providing Sri Lanka with the financial assistance it requires.

The pressing need in the country is for the government to show there is political stability and zero tolerance for corruption in dealing with the prevailing crisis. It is not enough for government leaders to give verbal assurances on these matters. There needs to be political arrangements that convince the international community, and the people of Sri Lanka, that the government is committed to this cause. Several foreign governments have said that they will consider larger scale assistance to Sri Lanka, once the IMF agreement is operational. So far the government has not been successful in convincing the international community that its own accountability systems are reliable. This is the main reason why the country is only obtaining millions in aid and not billions.


The draft 22nd Amendment that is now before the parliament (which will become the 21st Amendment should it be passed) would be a good place for the government to show its commitment. The cabinet has approved the draft which has three main sections, impacting upon the establishment of the constitutional council, the powers of the president and dual citizenship. However, the cabinet-approved draft is a far cry from what is proposed by the opposition political parties and civil society groups. It is watered down to the point of being ineffective. Indeed, it appears to be designed to fail as it is unlikely to gain the support of different political parties and factions within those parties whose support is necessary if the 2/3 majority is to be obtained.

In the first place, the draft constitutional amendment does not reduce the president’s power in any significant manner. The amendment is drafted in a way that the reduction of presidential powers will only occur with the next president. The president now in office, who has publicly admitted failure on his part, continues to be empowered to appoint and sack the prime minister and cabinet ministers at his arbitrary discretion. He is also empowered to appoint and dismiss the secretaries to ministries, who are the highest-ranking public service officials. In short, the executive arms of the government are obliged to do the president’s bidding or risk their jobs. This indicates the Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, whose party has only a single seat in parliament, has no independent strength, but is there at the will and pleasure of the president.

In the second instance, the draft amendment was expected to set up a system of checks and balances for accountability and anti-corruption purposes. The pioneering effort in this regard was the 17th Amendment of 2001 that made provisions for a constitutional council and independent commissions. According to it, the members of all state bodies tasked with accountability and anti-corruption functions, such as the Bribery and Corruption Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Police Commission, the Public Service Commission and the appointees to the higher judiciary were to be appointed through the constitutional council. The 17th Amendment made provision for seven of the ten members of the constitutional council to be from civil society.


Unfortunately, in a manner designed to deal a death blow to the concept of checks and balances, the draft amendment sets up a constitutional council with the proportions in reverse to that of the 17th Amendment. It reveals a mindset in the political leadership that fears de-politicisation of decision making. Seven of the ten members will be appointed by the political parties and the president in a way in which the majority of members will be government appointees. Only three will be from civil society. This ensures a majority representation in the Council for government politicians, and the ensures government dominance over the political members. The composition of the constitutional council proposed in the Bill undermines the independence of the institutions to which appointments are made through the Council who will be unable to stem the wildly growing tide of corruption in the country.

It is no wonder that the furious people in the endless queues for petrol and diesel should believe that there is corruption at play in the continuing shortage of basic commodities. The government promised that ships would come in laden with fuel a week ago. Then, inexplicably, the information was disseminated that no ships were on the horizon. In any other country, except in a country like no other, the concerned leaders would have resigned. Due to the lack of fuel, perishable farm produce rots in rural farmhouses and markets in urban centres are empty and prices are rocketing up. In the meantime, the media has exposed rackets where the privileged, politically powerful and super rich, are given special access to fuel. It is patently clear that the government has failed to deliver on the results that were expected. The situation is getting worse in terms of corrupt practices.

To the credit of the Sri Lankan people, they are being patient. The bonds of social solidarity still prevail. But the anger at the self-seeking and incompetent political leaders is reaching the boiling point, as it did on 09 May. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa pledged to set up an interim government in consultation with party leaders in parliament. However, he did not do so but appointed UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister and thereby ended efforts of other parliamentarians to form a national unity government. The president’s pledge, made in the aftermath of the cataclysmic and unexpected violence that took place that day, was to reduce his presidential powers, transfer those powers to parliament and to appoint an all-party and interim government of no more than 15 ministers. These pledges remain unfulfilled and need to be implemented to be followed by elections as soon as the situation stabilises.

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Kehelgamuwa’s football skills and President Premadasa’s political sagacity



By Hema Arachi

T.B. Kehelgamuwa, the cricketer who needs no plaudits from anyone, is well known. He represented then Ceylon and, later, Sri Lanka as a fearsome fast bowler during the pre-Test era. His contemporaries still talk about Kehel with great respect. Once S Skanda Kumar, the well-known cricketer, cricket commentator and former High Commissioner for Sri Lanka to Australia, proudly told me about his playing cricket with Kehelgamuwa. Bandu Samarasinghe, a Sri Lanka film star, on a TV programme vividly demonstrated how he faced Kehelgamuwa in a Sara Trophy game. That was the top-level tournament in the country.

This note is to share my watching Kehelgamuwa playing soccer when he was not so young. Then, though his grey hair was visible, he ran fast and played hard like a teenager. This was during President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s tenure. Returning from The Netherlands, after my postgraduate studies, I lived in Pelawatta, near the Sri Lanka Parliament and my workplace – International Irrigation Management Institute headquarters. I used to enjoy walking on Parliament grounds. That day was unique because the game between the President’s soccer team, comprising parliamentarians, and the Sri Lanka Police team, was played there.

President Premadasa was well known for his political sagacity, especially in manipulating any situation in his favour. For instance, the day Anura Bandaranayake became the Opposition Leader, Premadasa, praised Anura stating, “Anura is the best Opposition Leader we have.” He further requested that Anura join the ruling party and become a minister and also marry a girl from a prominent ruling party family. But within weeks, he was critical of Anura. One day an Opposition member asked him, “You said Anura was our best Opposition leader a few weeks ago but now criticise.” His reply was this: “Yes, I said so because Anura is the best Opposition leader for us, the ruling party, not for the Opposition. For the Opposition, the best leader is Sarath Muththetuwegama!”

A few weeks before the scheduled encounter between the Parliamentarians and the Police football team, there was a game between the Parliamentarians and the Colombo Municipality team. Premadasa captained the Parliamentarians and kicked the winning goal. I remember a cartoon in a newspaper where the Municipality team goalkeeper withdrew so that Premadasa could score the goal at his will.

During the game against the Police, Premadasa did not play but visibly played the role of the coach of the Parliamentarian team. Unlike the Municipality players, the Police played the game seriously. Kehelgamuwa represented the Police team that scored five goals by halftime, and the Parliamentarian team was nil. At halftime, Premadasa replaced the Parliamentarian goalkeeper with Jayawickerama Perera. Yet, the Police team recorded a sound victory.

I thought Premadasa was upset due to this defeat for his team. But no. Premadasa claimed victory: “I am happy that my team won the game by beating the Parliamentarians today! Being the Executive President, I do not belong to the Parliament. However, as the Commander-in-Chief, the Police come under my purview, so my team won today!”

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